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This dissertation explores cultural narratives about technology in the Weimar Republic 
with a particular focus on tropes of the body-as-tool and the organic machine. At once the 
organic seat of the self and merely one instrument among others in the shaping of the natural 
world, the ambiguous figure of the instrumental body straddles the border between nature and 
technology while undermining any strong distinction between the two spheres. The technological
anthropologies of Karl Marx, Ernst Kapp, and Helmut Plessner invoke radically divergent 
political visions from the relationship between technology, the human body, and its environment. 
The conflicted implications of this relationship are literalized in Alfred Döblin’s emblematic 
novel Berge Meere und Giganten (1924), which pushes the trope of the body-as-tool to a 
breaking point by repeatedly and spectacularly rupturing the bounds of the body itself; this 
topological assault on the autonomous individual reflects the confluence of Döblin’s monist 
philosophy of nature and his avant-garde critique of the novel form. I then analyze key 
contributions to Weimar-era photographic discourse by Döblin, Brecht, Benjamin, Kracauer, and 
Albert Renger-Patzsch to unfold the uneasy relationship between physiognomy – the belief in the
body’s inherent legibility – and the way photography as technology compels the visible body to 
speak. And for Ernst Jünger, future technology itself becomes a human organ, thereby closing the
progression of human history in a static, elemental temporality. In contrast to accounts of 
modernity that see an encroachment of a mechanical register on the organicist discourse of the 
body, my dissertation shows how the tropes of the body-as-tool and the organic machine 
destabilize any unidirectional relationship between nature and technology. By recovering the 
centrality of the organic body within contemporary technological imaginaries, my project 
intervenes in scholarship on the culture of the Weimar Republic by contributing a more complex 
– and non-teleological – picture of the aesthetic, philosophical, and political stakes of the 
discursive entwinements of nature and technology.
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INTRODUCTION
The instrumental body and the organic machine: technology as nature in Weimar Germany
This dissertation explores cultural narratives about technology in the Weimar Republic. 
The period between the wars served as a crucible for self-aware and interdisciplinary 
articulations, theorizations, and representations of contemporaneity, modernity, and social and 
technological change. Within this context, the present study focuses on texts and discourses that 
scrutinize the relationship between nature and technology in order to show how this engagement 
with a contemporary moment often took the form of shared tropes, images, and figures drawn 
from registers of biology, the natural sciences, and the organic world. Technology itself was 
depicted or theorized as originating in the natural world, and this reconfiguration of terms, which
was both conceptual and metaphorical, occurred through the nexus of the instrumental human 
body, which had entered the twentieth century awkwardly straddling several dualisms – 
mind/body, Leib/Körper, organic/artificial, Geist/Leben. The corporeal shocks of rapid 
modernization and the First World War, as well as discipline-specific developments in fields from
theoretical biology to the theory of the novel, meant that key texts of Weimar culture were able to
rework, subvert, and recombine these dualisms in ways that continue to resonate. What this 
project therefore tries to recover is the way that an engagement with the contemporary moment 
played out as a self-aware dialogue about the human body. These texts present us with a kind of 
modernism, but it is best described as an organic modernism, a biological modernism, a bodily 
modernism.
Helmut Lethen’s 1994 study Verhaltenslehren der Kälte: Lebensversuche zwischen den 
Kriegen serves as the major theoretical foil for my readings of the period. Lethen’s book 
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interrogates a pervasive attitude of “Sachlichkeit” by recovering the contemporary importance of 
anthropology for Weimar. In dialogue with concepts such as the human being’s “natural 
artificiality” (Plessner), Lethen portrays strategies of polarization, differentiation, distance, and 
technologically-mediated perception that allowed contemporaries to navigate an uncertain 
present destabilized by the sudden absence of the hitherto reliable cultural codes of the 
Wilheminian era. Because of the way that Lethen’s work offers a kind of character sketch of 
Weimar through a capacious interdisciplinarity and a novel recuperation of philosophical 
anthropology, it continues to influence and inform critical access to Weimar culture. It therefore 
serves as a theoretical interlocutor for this study for two main reasons. 
Firstly, by grouping the culture of the period under the organizing figure of the cold 
persona – an armored, technologically enhanced body that draws on distance, speed, coolness, 
and an outward orientation to repress and protect its vulnerable, creaturely side from the risks of 
immediacy, contact, and risibility – Lethen provides a strong point of contrast for readings of key
figures, especially Helmuth Plessner and Ernst Jünger. By attending to the way that 
Verhaltenslehren der Kälte methodologically overemphasizes a strong nature/technology 
dichotomy, it becomes possible to recover how intently thinkers of the period were in fact 
engaged in challenging such a dichotomy and integrating nature and technology, organic and 
mechanical aspects more thoroughly than had been the case in previous periods. Secondly and on
a more general level, Lethen’s work was one of the last scholarly projects to attempt something 
like a grand unified theory of Weimar culture. The present study, which seeks both to offer a 
counternarrative to the cold persona and armored body as the guiding figures of Weimar culture 
and to open up the confining periodization by recovering the role of disparate discourses in 
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Weimar’s “laboratory for modernity”1 that exceed the confines of the interwar period, is both 
indebted to Lethen’s work and critical of it; indebted because Lethen showed that the 
heterogeneous cultural production of the 1920s was predicated on a shared dialogue about the 
relationship between the human and modernity with roots in a contemporary return to 
anthropology, and critical because of the ways in which his guiding conceptual cluster – 
technology/artificiality/coldness – tends to straightjacket his readings and eclipse the significance
of the period’s interdisciplinarity, which it was his work’s contribution to have indicated. The 
cold persona as a foil thus informs the background of this work and recurs throughout the 
chapters’ more specific readings.
To take a step back, a brief genealogy will help situate the figures and concerns of this 
dissertation. This project began as a somewhat naïve misconception. Thinking of the robot Maria 
from Fritz Lang’s Metropolis, of Lethen’s armored cold persona, of Anson Rabinbach’s human 
motor, I set out looking for robots, cyborgs, and Maschinenmenschen in the literature and culture 
of the Weimar Republic. I didn’t find them. More precisely, the more I looked for robots, the 
more I found biology; the more I looked for machines, the more I found organs and organisms; in
short, the harder I looked for technology, the more I found nature. The human didn’t seem to be a
motor so much as motors and machines appeared as organic bodies; corporeal contours seemed 
less like armor and more like membranes; and even the stereotypically iconic status of 
Metropolis grew shaky when I read Thea von Harbou’s novel: the robot is there, to be sure, but is
dwarfed by the text’s dripping insistence on metaphors and patterns of liquidity, flooding, 
surging, and other vitalist flows that are favored over the strictly technological to depict and 
connote modernity, futurity, and masses of bodies in motion. Depictions and portrayals of 
1 Kaes, Jay, and Dimendberg (xvii).
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technology between the wars – what I had hoped to approach as the “technological imaginary” of
the period – seemed less “technological” the closer I looked.
What I found instead were instrumental bodies and organic machines, a pair of terms 
variously complementary and appositional. This is the body that is a tool, and the tool that is 
thoroughly organic, a recurring use of the human body as critique and (re)imaginative space, a 
body that is the site of a convergence of various discourses from social, cultural, scientific, 
political, philosophical domains. This instrumental body is a way of staging a dialogue about 
contemporaneity, the human, and technology, but the way it does so suggests that technology was
seen during the period in various ways as the outgrowth of a force of nature. What this means, 
for one, is that dichotomies that map a division of technology and nature or organic and 
mechanical logics onto a chronology, value distinction, or historical teleology may miss crucial 
features of the period’s culture. This is because of the way that technology and modernity were 
theorized largely in biological and organicist terms.
In this context, then, my dissertation offers an interdisciplinary investigation of the 
instrumental body in German literary, philosophical, and media-theoretical texts from the mid-
nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries. My particular focus is on the Weimar-era tropes of the 
body-as-tool and the organic machine. I identify the figure of the body that is both technological 
and organic as a shared discursive tool, tasked with probing and advancing avant-garde aesthetic 
strategies as well as anti-bourgeois political agendas on both the left and the right.
The first chapter analyzes how the relationship between the human body and technology 
serves as the origin for an anthropology in the work of Karl Marx, Ernst Kapp, and Helmut 
Plessner; the way they arrive at their various pictures of the technological human being in turn 
has political, social, and methodological consequences for their theories of technology. I begin by
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retracing the dialectical conception of the relationship between body and environment Marx 
developed in texts from the Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte (1844) to Volume I of Das 
Kapital (1867). If technology is originally a set of organs appropriated from nature, under 
capitalism the worker’s own body becomes merely a conscious organ in the factory system’s 
monstrous body. Ernst Kapp’s Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik (1877), by contrast, 
lays out a theory of technological innovation as the unconscious projection of human organs. The
body in Kapp’s work thus becomes the instrument of an epistemological dynamic seated in a 
liberal narrative of historical progress. Finally, I turn to Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical 
anthropology of the 1920s and his definition of the human based on a complexly positional 
relationship to embodiment in Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch (1928). Within the 
broader context of technological anthropologies, I argue that Plessner’s bifurcation of the human 
body into mechanical Körper and living Leib and the particular development of his concept of 
the human’s “natural artificiality” prompt reconsideration of the relationship between body and 
technology in Weimar culture, especially with reference to Helmut Lethen’s reception of 
Plessner.
In chapter two, I turn to Alfred Döblin’s novel Berge Meere und Giganten (1924), a 
Zukunftsroman that spectacularly and repeatedly ruptures the boundaries of the individual body 
in scenes of both violence and reconciliation. I read this topological interrogation of the 
instrumental body in Berge Meere und Giganten as the intersection of an avant-garde aesthetic 
discourse with a philosophical monism, which allows Döblin to reimagine the implications of the
avant-garde trope of the technological body in a more radical way than his contemporaries. The 
organic and technological body becomes the site of the novel’s attack on the autonomous, 
contained, homogeneous subject of bourgeois humanism. The anti-bourgeois stance is neither 
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novel nor surprising in the context of the period, yet what Döblin’s unwieldy novel shows is that 
this attack took the form not of an embrace of the technological, cold, distanced sides of modern 
life against the organic, creaturely body of a bygone era, but rather drew its force precisely from 
a total integration of mechanical and organic dimensions. What we find in Berge Meere und 
Giganten is not so much the armored body predicated on a polar logic of separation or 
Entmischung (Lethen) as the ecologically integrated body, home to a dispersed, distributed 
subjectivity. 
Chapter three considers the photographic theory of the Weimar Republic in order to 
evaluate the relationship between the camera’s purported status as a prosthesis of enhanced 
perception on the one hand, and the way that a discourse of physiognomy compels the visible 
body to speak, on the other. Figures such as Alfred Döblin, Bertolt Brecht, Walter Benjamin, 
Albert Renger-Patzsch, Siegfried Kracauer, and Ernst Jünger weigh the representative potential 
of the camera in the broader aesthetic context of a renewed and altered realism that privileges the
type over the individual. My reading of Renger-Patzsch’s photographic theory and practice in the
context of Benjamin’s and Brecht’s dismissals of his work attempts to recover the dense and 
paradoxical interplay between notions of documentation and emphases on perceptual training 
that was central to debates about photography as a specifically modern medium during the 1920s.
The final chapter unfolds the way that Ernst Jünger’s extended essay Der Arbeiter (1932) 
privileges a unified, totalizing form (Gestalt) precisely in the dynamic interplay of working 
bodies that are themselves instrumental components of a collective body. Neither individual nor 
part of a mass, Jünger’s worker constitutes a Typus that is depsychologized not by repressing its 
organic, creaturely nature but rather by foregrounding it. Like Döblin, Jünger presents the reader 
with an organicist critique that privileges the type over the autonomous bourgeois individual, yet 
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in contrast to the egalitarian collectivities at the end of Berge Meere und Giganten, the 
teleological elemental forces in Der Arbeiter – themselves due in part to a borrowing from 
biology – result in a crystalline hierarchical stasis beyond history or politics.
The figures of the instrumental body and organic machine thus prove to be not just a 
useful way to rethink our picture of Weimar culture and thought, but also suggest unexpected 
connections and perhaps new kinds of periodization in the subject matter of the individual 
chapters. The analysis of Berge Meere und Giganten, for example, contributes to a broader 
understanding of the status of the armored body for the German avant-garde by showing how 
Döblin subverts and explodes that trope by recourse to a philosophical monism in the wake of 
Lebensphilosophie2. In contrast to a prevailing reception of Döblin that downplays his 
contributions to modernism in light of his later mysticism or limits his aesthetic contribution to 
Berlin Alexanderplatz, my reading shows how Döblin’s novel in fact reworks the avant-garde 
figure of the technological body in a way that links his programmatic avant-garde critique of the 
bourgeois individual and the 19th century novel, on the one hand, to his monist philosophy of 
nature and his eventual mysticism, on the other. In other words, once we read his novel without 
the anachronistic lens of a strong nature-technology dichotomy (and, as I hope to show, nothing 
in the novel supports use of such an optic), it becomes clear that its critique of the autonomous 
bourgeois individual, an individual strongly rooted in a notion of psychological interiority, uses 
registers both of technology (such as the futuristic technologies of food production, weapons, and
geoengineering) and of nature (rampant forces of organic growth, the return of prehistoric 
2 Lebensphilosophie is not a topic that was within this dissertation’s scope to address directly. Its emphasis on the 
primacy of vitalistic flow of Leben over and against the rationality of Geist, as well as its radical revision of an 
inherited enlightenment tradition that opposes nature to culture, is present indirectly in this project, as this and 
other aspects of the Gedankengut of Dilthey, Simmel, and Klages formed a major part of the cultural and 
intellectual background for the figures who make up this study, particularly Plessner, Döblin, and Jünger. For an 
innovative treatment of the afterlife of Lebensphilosophie’s structures of thought (“Lebensideologie”) during the
Weimar period, see Martin Lindner’s Leben in der Krise (1994).
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monsters in the “Greenland” chapter) to explode the bodily bounds of the sovereign individual. 
More precisely, the novel shows the extent to which these two registers are in fact one and the 
same. 
I read this as part of a longer story, still largely to be written, about a trajectory of the 
avant-garde that explores how biology and industry, machines and organs provided the concepts, 
logics, metaphors, and semantic fields to challenge the centrality of psychological interiority and 
the integral individual body. The body – in Berge Meere und Giganten, in Döblin’s programmatic
essays of the 1920s on art and modernity, in his philosophy of nature articulated most fully in 
Das Ich über der Natur (1927) – stages a dialogue about incorporation, subjectivity, technology, 
and perception. It is both the mass body of modern urbanity and the dispersed, ecologically 
integrated body of philosophical monism; more precisely, it is both of these in and through each 
other. This multilayered body suggests ways to rethink the discursive field in which the historical
avant-garde moved; it also reopens the question of an appraisal of Döblin’s work. Preliminary 
research on Schicksalsreise (1948) and on the manuscript of Berge Meere und Giganten held in 
the Deutsches Literaturarchiv in Marbach suggest that the picture of a conservative turn to 
mysticism and Catholicism in his later years – a turn contrasted starkly in the scholarship with 
his avant-garde engagement of the teens and twenties – is seriously deficient. His reflection on 
his conversion to Catholicism in Angelano exile partakes, in fact, of many of the same questions, 
tropes, and impulses of his earlier works. This in turn may present an intriguingly representative 
trajectory of German modernism from the teens to the postwar period, but much work still 
remains to be done in this area.
In chapter three, recovering the linkage between perceptual training and documentation in
Renger-Patzsch’s photographic work and theory reveals deep ambivalences in the aesthetic 
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theory of Weimar culture. These can also be seen in Benjamin’s and Brecht’s own work as a 
tension between the necessary polyvalence of the photographic image and its possibilities for 
discursive critique, between its capacity to disrupt and reveal patterns of signification and its 
purported ideological self-evidence, between a visual logic (of showing, unmasking, and making 
visible) in their concepts of critique and their criticisms of the photograph’s ambiguous muteness.
Readings of essays by Döblin, Kracauer, and Jünger on photography seek to reconstruct a 
broader dialogue about aesthetics and politics that pivoted on questions of representation, the 
social contexts of perception, and typicality. Thus the photographic theory of the Weimar 
Republic invariably leads beyond the frame of the image, and touches on questions of 
typification, realism, documentary and epic forms central to the literary theory of the period; 
issues of visual representation from the natural sciences; discussions about reproducibility and 
the broader context of the mass media; ideas of embodiment, disruption, and physiognomy 
central to contemporary film theory; and more nebulous questions about modernity as such. 
And my interpretation of Ernst Jünger’s Der Arbeiter shows that the bodies in that text 
are not armored to protect a fragile, vulnerable male psyche, but depend on a logic of corporeal 
integration into a rigid totality that nevertheless depends upon both an organicist register of 
growth and absorption and an elemental logic of electric current. Drawing on research into 
Jünger’s adoption of the concept of entelechy from the theoretical biology of Hans Driesch,3 I 
show how Jünger, like Döblin, stages his attack on the sovereign bourgeois individual through 
twinned registers of technology, speed, and danger, on the one hand, and elemental, biological 
logics connoting integration, growth, development, and teleology, on the other. I thus locate the 
conservative thrust of Jünger’s choreography of typified bodies not in the presence of armoring 
3 See Thomas Löffler and Thomas Pekar (both 2000).
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(as do Helmut Lethen (1994) and Andreas Huyssen (1993)) but rather in the hierarchical stasis 
that results as the end of his account, a turbulent modernity that has grown into an eerily 
harmonious whole. His picture of modernity, in other words, draws on biology to configure 
typified, technological bodies into an elemental stasis that also results in a fantasy of perfect 
narrative closure.
These counternarratives, in turn, resonate well with the broader story this dissertation 
seeks to tell about ways of periodizing Weimar culture, the avant-garde, and German modernism 
more generally. Prominent accounts of the period have tended to read its culture as symptomatic 
– either in an etiological way, as expressing the trauma of the first World War in particular and 
processes of modernization in general, or in a teleological vein, with 1933, the Nazi 
Machtergreifung, the demise of the republic, and the Nazi genocide as the ultimate horizon for 
Weimar cultures. Either way, the emphasis on the precarity of the cultural moment often 
obstructs attention to the nuances and complexities in Weimar culture’s self-understanding and 
cultural and intellectual debts. Read with the benefit of hindsight, “Weimar” becomes the name 
of a unified cultural and historical narrative, an ephemeral moment of dancing on the abyss,4 
rather than a complex of discourses from all social arenas about the meaning and experience of 
modernity, a complex that suggests multiply overlapping logics of period that don’t fit neatly 
within the bookends of 1914, 1918, 1919, and 1933 but rather reach selectively to preceding 
4 In two back-to-back articles published in Merkur 16 (1962), Theodor Adorno and Helmuth Plessner take on the 
legends of the twenties in order to complicate a postwar nostalgia for this period of cultural ferment. Adorno 
reads Weimar as a moment of lateness, following on the energies and impulses of a prewar modernism in order 
to reperiodize the twenties. Plessner in turn situates Weimar culture within his broader idea of Germany as the 
belated nation. In challenging a nostalgic approach to the period and thus the firm confines of a logic of 
periodization, however, both Adorno (in the way he depicts the twenties as a moment of cultural 
stereotypification marked by “Phänomene der Rückbildung, der Neutralisierung, des Kirchhoffriedens” (46)) 
and Plessner (in his narrative of the ascendancy of “die scharfe, schnoddrige, kesse Geste Berlins, Deutschlands 
einziger Zitadelle der Aufklärung” (41-42) at the expense of other cities) may inadvertently reinstate a 
pessimistic form of periodization in place of a simplistic nostalgia. This pessimistic periodization would seem to
fit quite well with the accounts of Lethen and Sloterdijk.
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decades, centuries, epochs, disciplines, and forms of thought for terms, imagery, and 
interlocutors.
Significantly, symptomatic readings of Weimar often mobilize the human body in the 
service of a teleological narrative, relying in particular on sets of nesting dichotomies and 
polarities between technology and nature, mechanical and organic logics, modernity and 
organicism, progress and regression. The implicit or explicit value distinctions that are imported 
with these dichotomies not only obscure the way that various discourses of nature and 
technology were actively co-constituting each other in the Weimar Republic, but also prove 
politically problematic: since authors on the left and right were mobilizing instrumental bodies 
and organic machines against inherited notions of bourgeois subjectivity, political assessments 
that rely overly on an intellectual’s stance vis-a-vis organicism or technological modernity may 
result in an overly simplistic picture of modernity, and also blur political distinctions where they 
are to be found. Put plainly, it is inadequate to assign organicism to the past, to fascism, or to a 
regressive rejection of “modernity.” This is not only because contemporary thought, for example,
drew on the advances of theoretical and empirical biology to construct ideas of modernity and 
the human, but also because the organic body was used as a form of critique that could be found 
in authors with widely divergent political commitments.
Thus when Jeffrey Herf identifies a paradox in “reactionary modernism” “an important 
current within conservative and subsequently Nazi ideology was a reconciliation between the 
antimodernist, romantic, and irrationalist ideas present in German nationalism and the most 
obvious manifestation of means-ends rationality, that is, modern technology” (1), it must be 
remarked that this is only a paradox if one presupposes a dichotomy between organic and 
technological logics or an anachronistic assignment of modern technology to means-ends 
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rationality that is not quite borne out in the culture and thought of the period.5 When Dagmar 
Barnouw assesses the intellectuals of Weimar based on their responses to “the threat of 
modernity” (understood in terms of a pluralistic public sphere in the context of liberal 
parliamentary democracy, ideological relativism, modern mass society, and conceptual 
complexity), we must ask not only what political assumptions are at play in seeing parliamentary 
democracy as the end of politics, so that figures on the radical left and far right are lumped 
together as “extremists” who have no thinkable agency except to refuse the complexities of 
modernity in a delusional desire for redemption and community.6 Beyond this, what deeper 
unexamined assumptions about the nature of “modernity” might be found if modernity, along 
with technology, is conceived in absolute terms?7 What problems are built into such an account 
5 It is also instructive to note that novelist Thomas Pynchon had masterfully explored this juxtaposition in the 
thought of National Socialism a decade earlier. Pynchon, Thomas. Gravity’s Rainbow. New York: Viking, 1973. 
While this juxtaposition can be found throughout the novel, I am thinking in particular of the incorporation of 
the boy Gottfried into the “00000” V-2 rocket.
The point to be made, however, is that while Herf does show a historical change that took place in the 
ideologies of German conservatism, the way he assumes a conceptual opposition between organicism and 
irrationalism on the one hand and rationalism and technophilia on the other obscures the way contemporary 
intellectuals, especially a figure like Ernst Jünger, were actually thinking about technology at the time. The more
facile dimensions of Herf’s framework are evinced in dichotomies and the resulting view of technological 
opportunism, here: “It is not paradoxical to reject technology as well as Enlightenment reason or to embrace 
technology while celebrating reason. These pairings are the customary outcomes of choosing between scientism 
and pastoralism. But it is paradoxical to reject the Enlightenment and embrace technology at the same time, as 
did the reactionary modernists in Germany. Their claim was that Germany could be both technologically 
advanced and true to its soul. The whole anti-Western legacy of German nationalism suggested that such a 
reconciliation between soul and technology was out of the question, for nothing could be more at odds with 
German culture. But the reactionary modernists recognized that antitechnological views were formulas for 
national impotence. The state could not be simultaneously strong and technologically backward. The reactionary
modernists insisted that the Kulturnation could be both powerful and true to its soul.” (3)
6 “To work, as an intellectual, for the KPD or the NSDAP meant the surrender of all critical distance.” (33)
7 The present study shares with Barnouw’s book an interest in reading literary and cultural texts carefully as 
documents of intellectual history. Yet where I find her approach wanting is in the way that there seems to be 
little room for conceptual and figural renegotiation of the terms of “modernity.” An at-times sophisticated 
account of pluralism and relativism coexists in Weimar Intellectuals with a fairly course account of social 
change, technology, and media. Thus the conditions to which Weimar intellectuals insufficiently responded, in 
her view, choosing the distance of “self-protective fictions” (6) over the necessary ambivalence of engagement, 
are often reduced to the uncertain pair of fragmentation and mechanization (13, 38). What is lost is not merely a 
closer account of what these two terms mean, where they are to be located, and how they relate, but any 
possibility of accounting for the ways in which reworked metaphors of mechanicity and organicism could have 
constituted both engagement and distance, reaction to modernity and construction of modernity. In the 
methodological terms of this dissertation, we must ask then how much of the polarity Barnouw identifies in the 
political thought of Weimar intellectuals actually piggy-backs on the polarities she assumes and imports into her 
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from the beginning, where modernity and technology are totally detached from the subjects 
involved not just in living through these processes of change, but who must also necessarily co-
construct them as categories and concepts in constant flux, and what kind of methodology would 
enable us to give a more dialectical and nuanced account of the way that modernity and 
technology were being constructed, imagined, reworked, deployed, and challenged? When 
Helmut Lethen identifies a polar logic of Entmischung in the period and the figure of the cold 
persona that armors itself both against its own creaturely nature and the external threats of 
risibility and exposure, we must seek to uncover the extent to which his guiding trope also 
guided his readings of the figures he explores, often at the cost of their specificity and 
complexity. The armored body is the perfect figure for a moment defined by crisis, but what kind
of body do we find if we heuristically deemphasize the sustained note of crisis in order to attend 
to the borrowings, dialogues, and projects of the 1920s that transcend the markers of 1914, 1918, 
and 1919? Conversely, if we acknowledge the fundamental organic qualities of the period’s 
technological bodies, how might this reorient our sense of crisis, and the period’s horizons, 
interlocutors, and intellectual debts in general? For Peter Sloterdijk, Weimar is the historical case 
study for the cynic (Zyniker); drawing on the prevalence of maimed and prosthetic bodies, 
Sloterdijk evinces a commitment to the organic, integral body by aligning the mechanical, 
prosthetic body to cynical logics of control without remainder.8 The commitment to the 
analysis, between organic and mechanical, modern and reactionary, process and revolution. This has some 
seriously unfortunate consequences for her reading; the category of ‘failure’ becomes particularly important, for 
example, as a way of describing the relationship of intellectuals, desiring harmony and redemption, to their 
turbulent moment. In a particularly disturbing implication of this moralistic framework, Barnouw in effect 
castigates Walter Benjamin for his suicide: “he could not muster the energy necessary for survival” (152).
8 “Die medizinischen Prosthesen und die mit ihnen angebotene Mentalität des rüstigen Roboters bringen nur ein 
allgemein verbreitetes Denkmuster an den Tag. Der Krieg löste dem latenten Herrschafts-, Medizin- und 
Militärzynismus die Zunge. Unter seinem Einfluß gestehen die Miltär und Produktionsapparate ihren Anspruch, 
das Leben der Individuen in ihrem Dienst aufzubrauchen. Der menschliche Körper in der Arbeits- und 
Kampfgesellschaft war schon längst Prothese, ehe man ausgefallene Teile durch technischer Funktionsteile 
ersetzen mußte.” (797)
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unmaimed body is admirable and necessary, I would agree, when talking about real bodies, but 
what does his pessimism vis-a-vis a cultural or metaphoric use of prostheses necessarily elide in 
its analysis of the period?9 
My dissertation thus both draws upon and moves beyond existing readings of the 
discourses of the mechanical, prosthetic, or armored body. Compared to accounts of modernity 
that see an encroachment of a mechanical register on the discourse of the body, the tropes of the 
body-as-tool and the organic machine destabilize any unidirectional relationship; in authors 
across the political spectrum, the organic only becomes mechanical to the extent that the 
mechanical also becomes organic. By recovering the centrality of the organic body within 
contemporary technological imaginaries, my project intervenes in scholarship on the culture of 
the Weimar Republic by contributing a more complex – and non-teleological – picture of the 
aesthetic, philosophical, and political stakes of the discursive entwinements of nature and 
technology. 
The commonalities among the various figures in this study suggest the contours of a 
shared discursive arena within which a self-consciously modern German culture probed, 
reworked, and reconfigured in tandem its ideas about the human, nature, technology, society, 
politics, and art. An emphatic interdisciplinarity marks the period: philosophical questions such 
as the relationship between subject and object, self and world, in the aftermath of German 
9 Sloterdijk begins his chapter on prosthetics, in fact, by contrasting the cultural use of mechanized bodies with 
the graver case of actual bodily existence (“[Kynische Vitalisten] übten die Anklage oder die Bejahung des 
mechanisierten Daseins als Denkfigur. Den leibhaftig Entfremdeten, Verstümmelten und Ummontierten blieben 
solche Ausdrucksformen in beiden Richtungen eher fremd. Es macht einen Unterschied, ob man den Verlust der 
Individualität kulturkkritisch überdenkt oder erlebt, wie einem der Krieg (oder die Arbeit) Stücke vom eigenen 
(‘unteilbaren’) Leib wegreißt.” (791) Yet the movement of the chapter is ultimately towards the cultural function
of prosthetic bodies, which were cynically mobilized in and by fascist ideology; this depiction of Nazi cynicism 
seems to draw force from its selective contrast between a “merely” metaphorical, cultural use of mechanical 
bodies and the real, corporal suffering of these bodies. Matthew Biro (2009) and Mia Fineman (2001) have 
recovered some of the more positive, dynamic roles played by prostheses in the art and cultural imagination of 
the period.
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idealism and Lebensphilosophie, inflected and were inflected by challenges to the autonomy of 
the bourgeois novel; documentary and epic strategies for modifying the form of the novel 
themselves drew on disciplines such as medicine, the natural sciences, and anthropology; the 
camera and photographic image came to serve as the site of interaction for ideas about 
representation, typology, modern industrial production, and ways of seeing that drew on practices
of scientific illustration, to name a few examples.
For reasons I spell out in the individual chapters, the bodies found in the texts I examine 
are not armored bodies. They do not have the clear contours of the cold persona or the protective 
shell of the fascist warrior, which in Klaus Theweleit’s Männerphantasien (1977) defends against
the diffuse liquid threat of femininity, the proletarian masses, and a general oceanic dissolution. 
They are not the cynically-assembled prosthetic bodies identified by Sloterdijk, nor, in response 
to these, the autonomous, gestural monad of the kynik.10 Nor are they human motors. While 
Anson Rabinbach’s 1990 study of the same name is a valuable exploration of a deep-seated 
diachronic trope that linked the way modern European and American cultures thought about 
bodies to the ways they thought about machines, the unidirectional nature of the discursive 
transfer he identifies does not really square well with the texts that make up this study. In 
foregrounding the trope of the human motor, his emphasis is on the way the human is a motor, 
and not on the way the motor is also a human. Scientific advances and tropes take precedence, 
such that the cultural imagination of technology and bodies is reduced to the status of a reflection
of primary scientific discourses. In the case of Marx, as I will discuss in more detail in the first 
chapter, this leads Rabinbach to miss the political-economic specificity of Marx’s critique of 
10 For a discussion of how Sloterdijk’s kynik depends on a problematic extraction of subjectivity from context (and
thus on the supposition of an unproblematically congruous relationship between subject and body), see Adelson 
(1993), 4-5.
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value. Where Marx was identifying the way that historic conditions of capitalism alter the nature 
of labor, Rabinbach sees a shift in Marx’s thought about labor as such, from a theory that 
privileges the organic metaphor of a qualitative Stoffwechsel to one that sees labor as the 
quantitative expenditure of energy per se, modeled after the figures of the steam engine, 
thermodynamics, and energy transfer in general. In other words, Rabinbach ascribes to Marx as a
belief a shift that Marx had ascribed to the historical development of capitalism. What is needed 
(and what I think Marx suggests) is an account that also moves in the other direction: how might 
figures of thought that arise in historical, cultural constellations (such as the necessary 
abstraction of wage labor, e.g.), provide the conceptual and metaphorical ground for 
reformulations in the natural sciences?11 This is not a question that can be answered in the present
context; but it suggests a valuable methodological and historical insight – that discourses of 
technology and nature, science and culture, the organic and the machine must be seen as in a 
necessarily co-constitutive relationship rather than partaking of a unidirectional influence.
The bodies I found, in the work of Döblin, Jünger, Plessner, and (in a more mediated 
way) in the photographic theory of the 1920s, are not really cyborgs either, although the organic 
integrations of this figure come much closer. Though Matthew Biro’s 2009 study, The Dada 
Cyborg: Visions of the New Human in Weimar Berlin, has been very helpful in understanding 
how technology in general and prosthetics in particular were mobilized in creative, active ways 
to rethink the human as such, the bodies found in Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch, 
11 Moishe Postone has already suggested as much in Time, Labor, and Social Domination (1993): “There are many 
similarities between the characteristics of these social forms, as analyzed thus far, and those of nature as 
conceptualized by seventeenth-century natural science, for example. They suggest that when the commodity, as 
a structured form of social practice, becomes widespread, it conditions the way in which the world – natural as 
well as social – is conceived. […] One could describe and analyze further the points of similarity between the 
commodity as a form of social relations and modern European conceptions of nature (such as its impersonal, 
lawlike mode of functioning). On this basis, one could then hypothesize that not only the paradigms of classical 
physics but also the emergence of a specific form and concept of Reason in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries are related to the alienated structures of the commodity form. One could even try to relate changes in 
forms of thought in the nineteenth century to the dynamic character of the fully developed capital form” (175-6).
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Berge Meere und Giganten, and Der Arbeiter tend to undermine the very distinction between 
technology and nature, organs and machines on which the cyborg is necessarily based. Where is 
the cyborg left if the very prostheses, assemblages, and machines that constitute it are themselves
already seen as biological and organic in nature?12
Rather, the bodies one finds in such texts exist in complexly positional relationships to 
their environments. Their contours could be described not as integral and closed, but integrated 
and open. To draw on a figure from Plessner, the border of the instrumental body is an interface 
that connects rather than armor that separates. The specifics of this body differ according to 
context, of course. In Döblin, what links bodies and subjectivities is related to a principle of 
organic growth that challenges corporal distinctions between individuals and conceptual and 
scalar distinctions between parts, wholes, particles, and masses, while Jünger tends to join the 
bodies of his workers more through an elemental logic of electrification, within a larger 
biological context of an entelechical development towards organic unity. Nevertheless, what 
these instrumental bodies share is an attack on the sovereign, individual, contained body of 
12 While many of the key features of Donna Haraway’s cyborg, and particularly its anti-dualist impulses, fit well 
with the figure I identify in Weimar culture, its liminality and transgressions still depend on a logic of hybridity 
that doesn’t quite cover the textual manifestations of the organic machine and the instrumental body. 
Furthermore, her specific historicization, which traces the ambiguity of organisms and machines to late-
twentieth century technologies such as electronics and information technologies, cannot apply to Weimar; the 
ambiguities of the instrumental body depend rather on different historical discourses about nature and 
technology. While Biro at times also seems to suggest a logic of synthesis or hybridity – both of which 
necessitate the convergence of previously distinct spheres – to describe the Weimar Cyborg, his focus on a logic 
of montage suggests a different picture, one in which the juxtaposition of elements is useful not because the 
isolated elements are so different, but because the changed context challenges the original reception of the 
separate montage elements. Montage used in this way, “to destabilize the everyday and instrumental meanings 
of worldly objects,” Biro dubs a “negative dialectic,” following Adorno, to indicate a non-hierarchical 
presentation of elements which cannot be resolved into a single reading” (1994 81). This logic of the cyborg, 
which he takes up in his 2009 book, fits well with the figures of the organic machine and the instrumental body 
in this study, where the technological and natural elements constitute each other to the extent that none can be 
said to be strictly one or the other. Nonetheless, the cyborg’s emphasis on the individual body (rather than the 
mass or agglomerate body) and on the liminality of the border (rather than the positional use of the border to 
decenter the embodied individual) make it a somewhat different figure than those that comprise this dissertation.
Therefore, to avoid the connotations of hybridity and the directionality suggested by the figure of the cyborg, I 
choose to bracket out the term in what follows.
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bourgeois subjectivity.
In this way, the instrumental body served not merely as a way to critique the political and 
cultural hypocrisy of bourgeois ideology in the wake of the carnage of the World War, but 
thereby sought to challenge what was perceived as a deeper, structuring principle of bourgeois 
thought as such: the autonomous, transcendental subject. Figures of ecological integration and 
the dense discursive entwinement of mechanical and organic logics, the instrumental body and 
the organic machine undermined the idea of a centered ego and the cultural depictions of this ego
that privileged psychological interiority and conscious self-reflection. In a sense, this is a 
materialist challenge to the primacy of Geist, but beyond that, the instrumental body provided 
various ways of relocating Geist and subjectivity in material bodies, in biology, and in Leben.13 
The figures of the instrumental body and the organic machine, by destabilizing and undoing 
dichotomies between nature and technology, were also able to challenge distinctions between 
mind and matter, subject and object, and in this way can be seen as an early anticipation of 
poststructuralist critiques of the category of the human. By locating human subjectivity within 
bodies that could not or would not sustain either their physical separation from other bodies or a 
homogeneous, self-sufficient relationship to themselves, the instrumental body and the organic 
machine challenged not only the sovereign “I” but also the primacy of the human.14 Crucially, 
however, this challenge did not primarily take the form of a critique of the relationship between 
subjectivity and language, as did the various poststructuralisms identified with the linguistic turn,
but came as a subversive exploration of spatial, topological, positional, and material 
13 As Joachim Fischer describes the project of philosophical anthropology, “Im Entschluss, ‘Geist’ im ‘Leben’ 
aufzubauen, den Spieß des 19. Jahrhunderts mit seiner Leidenschaft des Abbauens, der Demaskierung, 
umzudrehen, wird die Denkungsart der unter dem Titel einer Philosophischen Anthropologie sich einfinden, 
einander erkennenden Denker sichtbar.” (515)
14 Petrus Liu (2012) discusses the implications of poststructuralism’s image of humanism in the context of queer 
human rights in China, arriving at a recuperation of the concept of the human through Marx that has greatly 
helped me think about, if not yet quite through, some of these issues.
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embodiments of subjectivity in the context of the primacy of a discourse of Leben.
Ultimately, I hope this dissertation will contribute to our understanding of Weimar culture
as a complexly interdisciplinary moment of self-aware modernity. The intensely self-reflective 
nature of Weimar culture and thought15 means that we must attend to the period’s own self-
understanding and to the tropes, rhetoric, and discourse it drew on in equal measure; the way it 
used language as much as the way language used it.16 This dense overlay of discourses from 
various cultural, scientific, and philosophical domains, constituting and being constituted by each
other, is partly a synchronic question, in that interpreting the culture and thought of Weimar 
suggests the need for an interdisciplinary approach that can uncover how thinkers used 
photography to think through questions of literary theory, for example, or biology to think 
through history. Yet it is also necessarily a diachronic problem, as the various strands of aesthetic,
scientific, social, political, and philosophical discourses are much longer than suggested by an 
interpretation of Weimar that foregrounds the sense of crisis or the teleology of collapse. Each 
figure in this study serves as a nexus linking various concerns over the years and decades. 
Döblin’s Schicksalsreise brings a particular vein of postwar conservatism into contact with a 
prewar avant-garde critique of bourgeois humanism, for example, while Jünger’s collaborative 
work with Renger-Patzsch during the 1960s enables the former to further develop a theory of 
typology that recalls the biological dimension of Der Arbeiter without being assimilable to it. In 
this sense, the various interdisciplinary experiments I’ve grouped under the tropes of the 
instrumental body and the organic machine are not reducible to each other under a master figure, 
either these two tropes or other figures, such as the armored body, kynik, or cold persona. In the 
15 As Sloterdijk puts it, “Man kann nicht ohne weiteres über diese Zeit reden, als hätten ihre Zeitgenossen nicht 
schon genug über sich selbst gedacht.” (708)
16 As Döblin writes in“Der Bau des epischen Werks,” “man glaubt zu sprechen und man wird gesprochen, oder 
man glaubt zu schreiben und man wird geschrieben” (243).
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spirit of the open contours of the instrumental body, I would like to use it to open questions about
Weimar culture, rather than assimilate its articulations under a constraining master trope. 
To inquire how the instrumental body and the organic machine served as a privileged site 
for a self-reflective, interdisciplinary critique, for the retheorization and reconfiguration of the 
human, and for a complex negotiation of the relationships among discourses and media – these, 




Human incorporation and positionality in Karl Marx, Ernst Kapp, and Helmuth Plessner
In this chapter I will consider the presence of what we might provisionally call a 
technological anthropology in the work of Karl Marx, Ernst Kapp, and Helmuth Plessner. While 
the commitments, topics, disciplines, and presuppositions of the texts Ökonomisch-
philosophische Manuskripte of 1844, the Grundrisse (1857-1858), Kapital I (1867), Grundlinien
einer Philosophie der Technik (1877), and Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch (1928) 
vary widely, all establish, in their various ways, a particular history of human subjectivity as a 
technological relationship between subject and environment that manifests itself in a positional 
way, drawing upon differing logics of incorporation and externalization. All three figures are 
working through subjectivity after Hegel, and each draws, to various extents, on a dialectical 
presentation and a dialectical conception of the relationship between subject and world, body and
environment, making and knowledge. All three present a picture that is thus also an 
epistemological one – the way they relate human embodiment to human making bears directly on
questions of self-consciousness, technological knowledge, and their vision of intersubjectivity 
and politics. At the risk of reductionism (but in the interest of clarity), it could be said that for 
Marx, Kapp, and Plessner, a spatial, positional, and relational account of human existence – 
rather than a strong dichotomy between the human and natural worlds – enables a theory of 
technology that is also to varying extents a philosophy of nature and a vision of politics. For the 
three writers, how humans position themselves vis-a-vis their environment is how they create; 
how they create is how they know; and how they know is how they exist.
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Yet within this loosely shared framework, the differences of approach and purpose are 
even more telling. If the commonalities among Marx, Kapp, and Plessner suggest ways of 
thinking about technology and nature in tandem, the differences can help shed light on the far-
reaching implications of competing conceptual emphases, disciplinary commitments, and 
varying degrees of methodological self-awareness. It matters a great deal not only that the three 
were thinking about technology in conjunction with other conceptual fields and disciplines (such 
as political economy, kinematics, state theory, and philosophical anthropology, to name only the 
most prominent reference points), but also to what extent they either treated technology as an 
autonomous field or contextualized it within a particular field for a particular purpose. What one 
finds in the technological anthropologies of Marx, Kapp, and Plessner is that both terms – 
technology and the human – grow increasingly elusive, not to mention of dubious utility, the 
more pressure one puts on them as autonomous conceptual fields. The purpose of this chapter, 
therefore, is to explore three different prominent technological anthropologies from the late 19th 
to the early 20th century in order to consider the implications of various configurations of the 
self, the body, the environment, nature, technology, and the human. While subsequent chapters 
on key moments in the culture and aesthetics of the Weimar Republic do not build on this chapter
directly, exploration of these three versions of a post-Hegelian dialectic will allow me to explore 
in some depth what “technology” might actually mean, and what its various embodiments and 
incorporations might have to say about the instrumental bodies that follow.
Karl Marx and the organic inversion of the factory body
In a sense, Marx does not have a theory of technology. More precisely, within the 
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framework of Marx’s critique of political economy, what is sought is not a theory of technology 
but rather a theory of capital, and the role of technology, knowledge, and labor within the context
determined by capital. What Marx’s treatment of the factory system in the Grundrisse and in 
volume I of Das Kapital suggests is that a theory of technology per se is meaningless outside of 
specific historic, social, political, and economic contexts. While Marx does offer a picture, in 
texts from the Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte of 1844 to the Grundrisse to Das 
Kapital, of human specificity understood in terms of the intentional shaping and appropriation of 
the natural world, this anthropology is as much a theory of nature as it is of technology. His 
nuanced and dialectical portrayal of the relationship between human subject, work, and 
environment is a useful place to begin reconsidering modern technological imaginaries, since it 
disallows from the outset any facile dichotomies between nature and technology, organ and 
machine, subject and environment.
Yet for the purposes of this chapter, even more interesting is the way that, in building on a
basic logic of appropriation, internalization, and externalization that characterizes all human 
labor as such, Marx offers a historically specific account of capitalism as the incorporation of 
human labor within a larger system that finds both concrete realization and symbolic fulfillment 
in the advanced factory system, where the human workers have been reduced to the “conscious 
linkages” (Grundrisse, 592) in the factory’s monstrous body. This process of incorporation is not 
just a historical, material, or economic process, but also reflects an epistemological dynamic of 
alienation in a couple ways. On the one hand, the human workers caught up in this process are 
deskilled and dispossessed not only of agency over the process, but also of the intentionality and 
knowledge that characterize for Marx human labor as such. On the other hand, in his critique of 
the prevailing accounts in contemporary political economy of the rise of the factory system, 
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Marx suggests a sophisticated approach to the relationship between a given technological state of
affairs and the conceptions of technology that arise to account for a present moment. His 
criticisms of figures like Andrew Ure already evinces a way of thinking about technological 
imaginaries that must make us wary of applying to Marx the same technological determinism 
sometimes ascribed to him, and explaining (away) the abstraction inherent to his idea of labor 
power, for example, as simply the result of a heightened 19th-century interest in 
thermodynamics, as Anson Rabinbach does in The Human Motor. Marx’s criticisms of his 
contemporaries, of Andrew Ure’s conflation of the possibilities of machinery of such with the 
function of machines under capitalism, for example,17 suggest on the contrary that we must bring 
a more flexible and open-ended set of approaches and inquiries to bear if we wish to ask how a 
given period conceived of its relationship to technology and, more importantly, what 
“technology” could actually mean at a particular time – how the language, discourses, metaphors,
and theories of a given moment were engaged in and responsible for constructing and 
interweaving ideas about labor, artifice, (re)production, nature, and the human.
In this section I will reconstruct Marx’s account of technology understood as a dialectical 
and flexible relationship between the human body and the natural environment, mediated by 
labor. This relationship is characterized by the appropriation and reworking of nature, which 
Marx dubs in the 1844 Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte “man’s inorganic body” (89). It 
17 When Marx suggests that Descartes, in viewing animals as machines, “saw with the eyes of the period of 
manufacture” (Das Kapital I, 512), or when he traces the contradictions in Andrew Ure’s depiction of the 
factory system (441-442), he exemplifies a kind of critique that views the relationship between a given historical
situation and its technological imaginary in critical, flexible terms. For Marx, Ure is able to describe the factory 
system in opposing ways – once characterized by the Promethean subjectivity of human labor, and in the second
instance marked by the monstrous, mechanical subjectivity of the machine – because he unwittingly conflates 
machines as such, as a new technology with vast potential, with machines as they exist under conditions of 
capitalism. Thus for Marx the terminology of subject and object becomes more self-aware than in Ure’s 
unreflected use, a use that unwittingly expresses a contradiction of capitalism. Marx takes up and uses the terms 
as part of his immanent critique, but only to show how they are historically and economically determined, not to
endorse a heroic subjectivity of labor.
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is not a relationship of static or dualistic opposition, but is rather flexible and positional, and is 
described by Marx as a “metabolism,” or “Stoffwechsel.” The labor process common to all 
human societies is marked by a flow of material and use-values. It is only under capitalism that 
Stoffwechsel becomes Formwechsel, as Marx dubs it in the Grundrisse: in other words, the 
emphasis of human making shifts from the qualitative production of use-values to the 
quantitative production of exchange values, and what flows is no longer primarily the useful 
objects made to satisfy human needs but rather value sedimented in commodities through the 
process of abstract labor. This culminates in the logic of the automated factory system. If the 
process of human making in general depended on the incorporation and appropriation of tools 
and materials – “organs,” in Marx’s terms – from nature, “man’s inorganic body,” then the 
valorization process (“Verwertungsprozeß”) that characterizes the capitalist mode of production 
inverts this bodily relationship. Human workers are incorporated as organs into the machine’s 
monstrous body, and this inversion both results from and symbolizes a specifically capitalist 
progression of the gradual incorporation of living, human labor into the larger framework of 
commodity production. Finally, brief discussions of Anson Rabinbach and Theresa Brennan’s 
readings of Marx’s concept of labor power in terms of an energeticist paradigm will allow me to 
better illustrate the necessity of viewing the abstraction of Marx’s concept in its specific role 
within his account of capitalism, rather than taking him to be presenting a theory of human labor 
as such. 
After establishing his account of the basic features and contradictions of the commodity 
and the exchange process in the first four chapters18 of volume I of Das Kapital, Marx proceeds 
18 Note that the English translation of Das Kapital adopts a different numbering system, so that what appears as 
chapter four in the edition published by Dietz as volume 23 of Marx Engels Werke (“Verwandlung von Geld in 
Kapital”) is broken up into three chapters in the English edition. This also means that the chapter I will be 
concentrating on in this section, “Maschinerie und große Industrie,” is chapter 13 of the German edition but 
chapter 15 in the Penguin edition of the English translation.
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to the central question of how value is produced within capitalism. Before arriving at the answer 
that guides the unfolding of the remainder of the volume – namely, value is the result of surplus 
labor, time worked over and above the necessary time to reproduce the worker’s capacity to labor
– Marx discusses the necessary features of human labor as such. The specific anthropology at 
play19 understands the human as that species that is also able to consciously produce its own 
means of production, or tools: “Der Gebrauch und die Schöpfung von Arbeitsmitteln, obgleich 
im Keim schon gewissen Tierarten eigen, charakterisieren den spezifisch menschlichen 
Arbeitsprozeß, und Franklin definiert daher den Menschen als ‘a toolmaking animal,’ ein 
Werkzeuge fabrizierendes Tier” (Das Kapital I, 194). Humans are not set off from other animals 
in an absolute way, but are understood as a particular kind of animal characterized by a particular
behavioral trait.20 This idea is in line with Marx’s portrayal of the close ecological relationship 
between human bodies and the surrounding environment. 
Die Arbeit ist zunächst ein Prozeß zwischen Mensch und Natur, ein Prozeß, worin der 
Mensch seinen Stoffwechsel mit der Natur durch seine eigene Tat vermittelt, regelt und 
kontrolliert. Er tritt dem Naturstoff selbst als eine Naturmacht gegenüber. Die seiner 
Leiblichkeit angehörigen Naturkräfte, Arme und Beine, Kopf und Hand, setzt er in 
Bewegung, um sich den Naturstoff in einer für sein eignes Leben brauchbaren Form 
anzueignen.” (Das Kapital I, 192)
19 If, that is, one may speak of an anthropology rather than a heuristic and logical minimum set of conditions 
necessary for the reproduction of the species through labor. In my discussion of Marx, I intend for 
“anthropology” to be meant in a weak sense, as a concept of the human and human labor that is also heuristic 
and minimalist rather than an ontological or essentialist definition of the human. In this I follow scholars such as
Moishe Postone who have emphasized how Marx unfolded the effects of labor as a necessary practice on human
society and subjectivity, rather than rooting the definition of the human as such in an ontology of labor. Petrus 
Liu (2012) expresses the distinction well when he writes, “By turning our attention to the social conditions that 
produce and reproduce the subject of labor, Marx does not seek to prioritize the ontological or ethical grounds of
material labor over other forms of social production. Instead, Marx demonstrates the dialectical process whereby
a human subject is constituted by forces and vectors of power that are beyond the immediate sense experience of
the subject.” (85)
20 As John Bellamy Foster writes in Marx’s Ecology (2000), “In drawing this comparison between ‘natural 
technology’ and human technology, Marx was of course aware that the Greek word ‘organ’ (organon) also 
meant tool, and that organs were initially viewed as ‘grown-on’ tools of animals – tools, as the artificial organs 
of human beings. As Engels stated, ‘animals in the narrower sense also have tools, but only as limbs of their 
body.’ Human technology was thus distinguished from natural technology in that it did not consist of such 
adnated organs, but rather occurred through the social production of tools: the ‘productive organs of man in 
society.’ (200-1)
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The use of the concept of Stoffwechsel indicates the necessary material exchange between 
humans and nature, understood as a process in which nature acts on itself. Michael Quante has 
suggested that, in adapting the Hegelian dialectic for his own purposes, Marx substitutes Natur 
for Hegel’s Geist, as a kind of prime mover and unifying agential force. In human action, nature 
thereby gains the possibility of acting on and modifying itself.21 This rejection of a strong 
dualism in Marx’s conception of the human relationship to nature continues key motifs 
announced two decades earlier, in the Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte. In that text, 
Marx describes the process that will later come to take the name Stoffwechsel in terms of the 
relationship between the human, bodies, organs, and nature.
Die Natur ist der unorganische Leib d[es] Menschen, nämlich die Natur, so weit sie nicht 
selbst menschlicher Körper ist. Der Mensch lebt von der Natur, heißt: die Natur ist sein 
Leib, mit dem er in beständigem Prozeß bleiben muß, um nicht zu sterben. Daß die 
physische und geistige Leben d[es] Menschen mit der Natur zusammenhängt, hat keinen 
andern Sinn, als daß die Natur mit sich selbst zusammenhängt, denn der Mensch ist ein 
Theil der Natur. (89-90)
Here again we see the idea that the human represents the space where nature interacts with and 
acts upon itself, yet the presence of a corporal vocabulary in the earlier text will help us make 
sense of the way that the factory system in Capital will come to incorporate and absorb the living
21 Tracing the different aspects of Marx’s concept of nature, Quante writes, “Natur fungiert als Nachfolger und 
materialistische Alternative zum Hegelschen Geistbegriff” (Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, 303). 
However, this lineage exists in tension, both in Marx’s thought and in the subsequent legacy of Marxist-
Leninism, with a more materialist, scientific concept of nature. “Eine an den Naturwissenschaften ausgerichtete 
Naturkonzeption paßt gut zu einem realistischen Naturverständnis, in dem der Natur die ontologische 
Unabhängigkeit vom Denken zugesprochen wird. Dagegen steht die erste Dimension der Marxschen 
Naturkonzeption, in welcher der Naturbegriff die Funktion des Hegelschen Geistbegriffs übernimmt, im 
Gegensatz zur dritten Dimension, da die Naturwissenschaften für diese philosophische Funktion des Marxschen 
Naturbegriffs keinen Platz haben.” (310) Yet, as Quante continues (and I follow this interpretation of the role of 
Stoffwechsel in Marx’s late work), “Wie gerade der letzte Satz dieses Zitats [from Das Kapital I, 528] belegt, 
liegt auch im Kapital noch die Dimension der Naturkonzeption als ein Selbstverhältnis vor, auch wenn Marx 
dies nicht mehr mit anthropologisch-philosophischen Kategorien, sondern mit der naturwissenschaftlichen 
Kategorie des ‘Stoffwechsels’ umschreibt” (312). 
The idea that human activity is a relationship of nature to itself, and that human thought and activity is 
where nature becomes self-aware, is one that will have an interesting trajectory in the popularization of science 
in the twentieth century, most memorably in Carl Sagan’s dictum that we are “starstuff, pondering the stars.”
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worker. Central to the relationship between human and nature in the 1844 manuscripts is the way
that the natural environment serves as a sort of second body, an inorganic Leib to the human’s 
organic Körper. The distinction between the organic and the inorganic in this context arises from 
the fact that non-human nature is not part of the human body proper, but nevertheless necessary 
to its survival, in a constant process of material ecological exchange.22 “Inorganic” thus denotes a
component of a process of material exchange that stands outside of the body proper but is 
nonetheless necessary to its functioning. This vocabulary and its underlying logic are crucial for 
understanding Marx’s depiction of the factory system, and how the modern machine is both a 
liberation from the “organic limits” (“organische Schranke”) of the human and how humans 
themselves come to be organs of a machine body. For if the human relationship to nature, in the 
labor process as such, is defined as the constant appropriation of elements of the human’s 
“inorganic body” in the form of tools (“So wird das Natürliche selbst zum Organ seiner Tätigkeit,
ein Organ, das er seinen eignen Leibesorganen hinzufügt, seine natürliche Gestalt verlängernd, 
trotz der Bibel” (Kapital I, 194)), and is thereby understood as a technological relationship, the 
functioning of technology under capitalism and the dominance of exchange- over use-values 
inverts this relationship such that human products absorb not only human labor but human 
knowledge and agency as well, making tools of the tool-makers. This is not just a rhetorically 
dramatic portrayal of the 19th-century factory, but has specific economic reasons in Marx’s 
account of the shift from the labor process to the valorization process, as we will see.
22 As Foster argues: “From the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts on, for the rest of his life, Marx always 
treated nature, insofar as it entered directly into human history through production, as an extension of the human
body (that is, ‘the inorganic body’ of humanity). The human relationship to nature, according to this conception, 
was mediated not only through production but also, more directly, by means of the tools – themselves a product 
of the human transformation of nature through production – that allowed humanity to transform nature in 
universal ways. For Marx, the relationship was clearly an organic one but one that physically transcended, while
at the same time practically extending, the actual bodily organs of human beings – hence the reference to nature 
as the ‘inorganic body of man.’” (72-73)
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What this means for Marx’s account of the human relationship to nature is that 
Stoffwechsel is the norm, rather than the exception; like animals, humans are characterized in the 
first instance by an ecological relationship with their surroundings rather than one of alienation, 
exceptionalism, or a fundamental, metaphysical lack. As Marx puts it in the Grundrisse:
Nicht die Einheit der lebenden und tätigen Menschen mit den natürlichen, unorganischen 
Bedingungen ihres Stoffwechsels mit der Natur, und daher ihre Aneignung der Natur – 
bedarf der Erklärung oder ist Resultat eines historischen Prozesses, sondern die Trennung 
zwischen diesen unorganischen Bedingugen des menschlichen Daseins und diesen tätigen
Dasein, eine Trennung, wie sie vollständig erst gesetzt ist im Verhältnis von Lohnarbeit 
und Kapital. (389)
Thus Stoffwechsel characterizes human existence and human labor as such. Capitalism interrupts 
this process because of its emphasis on exchange-values over use-values, but the metabolic 
exchange of material can only be interrupted because it is still a necessary part of the labor 
process as such. Thus it is inadequate to see in the terminology and concept of Stoffwechsel a 
way to periodize Marx’s thought as Rabinbach does:
Until 1857, Marx took as his model of nature the metabolic exchange of substances and 
forces, which reflected both the pantheism and the “metaphysical” materialism of his 
generation. We recall, for example, that the early Marx viewed nature as man’s “inorganic
body,” mediated through society as society is mediated through nature. The metabolism 
between man and nature is the framework for Marx’s view of labor as the paradigm of 
nature and led him to characterize this relation as a process of exchange. But nature is 
also a mirror of labor, insofar as “the exchange of commodities is the process in which 
the social metabolism takes place.” Labor is the model for all creative, life-generating, 
activity.
After 1859 Marx gradually redefined labor from a metabolic exchange of 
substances between man and nature to a conversion of force. (Rabinbach, 77) 
Apart from the fact that Marx refers to nature as man’s “inorganic body” in the 
Grundrisse, Rabinbach’s strong periodization elides, in my view, the distinction between the 
labor process and the valorization process, to be discussed in more detail below. Only by 
eclipsing the specific economic reasons behind the abstraction of labor power under capitalism 
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can Rabinbach assimilate labor power to energy expenditure. Marx does not abandon 
Stoffwechsel in his late work to adopt a new model of human labor influenced by the historical 
rise of thermodynamics,23 but rather develops an account of labor specific to capitalism that 
maintains Stoffwechsel as a necessary process fundamental to human labor as such, even if it is 
disrupted by results of capitalist production and exchange. As John Bellamy Foster has argued, 
much of Marx and Engel’s ecological thought in general, and their development of the concept of
Stoffwechsel in particular, was based on an ecological critique that drew upon the nascent soil 
science of Justus von Liebig. The language of Stoffwechsel that provides Marx with a way to 
think about the necessary a priori ecological integration of human existence also provided a tool 
to critique agricultural practices, for example, that extracted more nutrients from the soil than 
they returned to it, as in this passage from Capital: 
Mit dem stets wachsenden Übergewicht der städtischen Bevölkerung, die sie in großen 
Zentren zusammenhäuft, häuft die kapitalistische Produktion einerseits die geschichtliche
Bewegungskraft der Gesellschaft, stört sie andrerseits den Stoffwechsel zwischen Mensch
und Erde, d.h. die Rückkehr der vom Menschen in der Form von Nahrungs- und 
Kleidungsmitteln vernutzten Bodenbestandteile zum Boden, also die ewige 
Naturbedingung dauernder Bodenfruchtbarkeit. (528)24
The fact that a passage like this fits into Marx’s complex theoretical account of contemporary 
capitalism suggests that the concept of Stoffwechsel provided both a way to think about the sine 
qua non of human labor and human existence in ecological terms, and a point of critique with 
which to address fundamental contradictions of capital. The basic idea is that developments in 
the way human production and exchange are organized under capitalism tend to work against and
23 Rabinbach: “We recall, for example, that the early Marx viewed nature as man’s ‘inorganic body,’ mediated 
through society as society is mediated through nature. The metabolism between man and nature is the 
framework for Marx’s view of labor as the paradigm of nature and led him to characterize this relation as a 
process of exchange. […] After 1859 Marx gradually redefined labor from a metabolic exchange of substances 
between man and nature to a conversion of force.” (77)
24 For a discussion of the impact of Liebig’s discovery of chemical soil depletion on Marx’s theory of metabolism, 
see Foster, especially 149-170.
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undermine the necessary conditions for human labor, production, and exchange as such. 
Metabolism thus serves as a model of circulation, both in the primal scene of human labor
as the process of human appropriation, interaction, and reworking of nature as “inorganic body,” 
and in more complex ways to show how the flows of material, goods, and use values must be 
seen as a dynamic system. Among other things, this reinforces one of the core ideas of Das 
Kapital, that labor and exchange are always social processes, even when the objects under 
investigation are only objects. Describing the labor process as such (i.e., apart from any 
particular mode of production), Marx writes,
Im Arbeitsprozeß bewirkt also die Tätigkeit des Menschen durch das Arbeitsmittel eine 
von vornherein bezweckte Veränderung des Arbeitsgegenstandes. Der Prozeß erlischt im 
Produkt. Sein Produkt ist ein Gebrauchswert, ein durch Formveränderung menschlichen 
Bedürfnissen angeeigneter Naturstoff. Die Arbeit hat sich mit ihrem Gegenstand 
verbunden. Sie ist vergegenständlicht, und der Gegenstand ist verarbeitet. Was auf seiten 
des Arbeiters in der Form der Unruhe erschien, erscheint nun als ruhende Eigenschaft, in 
der Form des Seins, auf seiten des Produkts. Er hat gesponnen, und das Produkt ist ein 
Gespinst. (Das Kapital I, 195)
This shows the fundamentally positional and relational nature of Stoffwechsel, in the 
sense that human making and the made artifacts together constitute a flexible relationship, 
whereby the products of past processes go into future processes and other products. The logic 
here is one of flows and incorporation, where past work is embodied in present products, which 
themselves become part of a future labor process, etc. This logic, as we will see shortly, will be 
central to the transition to the rest of Kapital, where it becomes the abstract and quantified 
(exchange) value as measured by labor time that comprises the flows of capital and exchange, 
but here it is essential to mark the way that a kind of ecological metabolism characterizes human 
making and labor as such for Marx. One can even see this in the language Marx uses, and in 
particular the play of past participles (“gesponnen,” “vergegenständlicht,” “verarbeitet,” even 
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“Produkt,” if we take the Latin etymology). Human labor is necessarily a dialectical and ongoing
relationship between process and product for Marx, a relationship that meshes neatly with the 
metabolic logic of Stoffwechsel. Just as human existence as such is characterized by a constant 
exchange between humans and their inorganic body, or nature (“Der Mensch lebt von der Natur, 
heißt: die Natur ist sein Leib, mit dem er in beständigem Prozeß bleiben muß, um nicht zu 
sterben” (Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte 89-90)), labor as such is marked by a 
continual reworking or the environment that externalizes and concretizes the process of work 
into the products of work, which themselves feed into new processes, and so on. This metabolic 
circulation applies to the labor, the products produced, and to the use-values embedded in these 
products: “Wenn ein Gebrauchswert als Produkt aus dem Arbeitsprozeß herauskommt, gehen 
andre Gebrauchswerte, Produkte früherer Arbeitsprozesse, als Produktionsmittel in ihn ein. 
Derselbe Gebrauchswert, der das Produkt dieser, bildet das Produktionsmittel jener Arbeit. 
Produkte sind daher nicht nur Resultat, sondern zugleich Bedingung des Arbeitsprozesses” (Das 
Kapital I, 196).
It should be emphasized that, rather than describing a pristine state of nature, Marx is 
abstracting in order to characterize the logical minimum of what constitutes human labor as such.
As suggested in the passage above on the depletion of the soil and stated explicitly in the 
following quotation, Stoffwechsel is a logic that applies to all human social forms. 
Der Arbeitsprozeß, wie wir ihn in seinen einfachen und abstrakten Momenten dargestellt 
haben, ist zweckmäßige Tätigkeit zur Herstellung von Gebrauchswerten, Aneignung des 
Natürlichen für menschliche Bedürfnisse, allgemeine Bedingung des Stoffwechsels 
zwischen Mensch und Natur, ewige Naturbedingung des menschlichen Lebens und daher 
unabhängig von jeder Form dieses Lebens, vielmehr allen seinen Gesellschaftsformen 
gleich gemeinsam. (Das Kapital I, 198)
Stoffwechsel provides a way to think about human labor that sees it in terms of a system of 
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material flows in a way that also accounts for the logic of incorporation and appropriation central
to the conception of nature as the human’s “inorganic body.” Just as material from nature is 
incorporated into the laboring human apparatus in the form of tools crafted from natural material 
that then become part of the labor process, human labor can be purchased as a commodity and 
incorporated into the production process: “Der Kapitalist hat durch den Kauf der Arbeitskraft die 
Arbeit selbst als lebendigen Gärungsstoff den toten ihm gleichfalls gehörigen Bildungselementen
des Produkts einverleibt” (Das Kapital I, 200). In other words, the idea of Stoffwechsel provided 
Marx with a way of thinking about the basic human situation vis-a-vis nature in terms of an 
ecological dialectic, but it also establishes labor as a constant flow of material and values. 
This dual flow is essential in understanding the transition from the labor process to its 
specifically capitalist form, which Marx calls the “valorization process” (“Verwertungsprozeß”). 
If the relationship between process and product that characterizes the system of human work in 
general can be seen as a circulation of use-values, then the circulation of exchange-values that 
characterizes capitalism can superimpose itself in a parasitic fashion on the basic logic of human 
labor as such. This is a palimpsestic logic, in a way, where human labor never ceases to be 
predicated upon the basic metabolic circulation. Under capitalism, however, it takes on a 
formative emphasis that relies upon the circulation of useful things as a necessary substrate, but 
shifts the focus to exchange-values in a way that can disrupt the essential conditions necessary 
for its functioning.
The relationship between the labor process and the valorization process can be seen as 
part of an extended functional analogy as well. Where the focus and result of the labor process is 
use-value, or the particular utility of a thing that satisfies a particular human need, the product of 
the valorization process is exchange-value, an abstract quantity with no necessary connection to 
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the type of object that serves as its material substrate.25 And while the circulation of useful things 
produced in the labor process is a part of the Stoffwechsel Marx describes, exchange-values 
circulate in a way largely detached from their specific material bearers; hence the term 
Formwechsel, which Marx uses in the Grundrisse to characterize this sort of exchange. If what 
circulates is not material so much as abstract quantities of exchange value, then this value can be 
seen to move through the production process in a way that involves the flow of units of value 
through various forms. To take his famous example from the chapter on the Verwertungsprozeß, 
all the components that go to make up yarn – the value of the cotton, the value of the spindle, the 
value of the labor – pass their values into the finished product, even though only some (like the 
cotton) pass materially into the yarn while others (like the spindle and the labor) do not. Where 
the focus of the circulation described as Stoffwechsel, drawing on ecological processes of 
exchange, is on the particular objects, materials, and their concrete uses, the focus of capitalist 
production is on the quantities of values and how they can best be harnessed to create surplus 
values, entirely irrespective of what is actually being made or why. The two sides constitute a 
dialectical unity, in which both are necessary but they are also often at odds with each other. 
Marx’s presentation in Das Kapital heuristically brackets out one aspect or another for 
consideration, a kind of immanent view that has often led commentators to take one side or 
another of the presentation – rather than their contradictory relationship – for Marx’s position. 
“In der Tat, da es sich hier um Warenproduktion handelt, haben wir bisher offenbar nur eine Seite
des Prozesses betrachtet. Wie die Ware selbst Einheit von Gebrauchswert und Wert, muß ihr 
Produktionsprozeß Einheit von Arbeitsprozeß und Wertbildungsprozeß sein” (Das Kapital, 
25 “Gebrauchswerte werden hier überhaupt nur produziert, weil und sofern sie materielles Substrat, Träger des 
Tauschwerts sind” (Das Kapital I, 201).
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201).26
So it is not the case that Stoffwechsel is a different model of labor and exchange than that 
found in capitalism; both Stoffwechsel and Formwechsel are present in capitalism, but describe 
different aspects. “Bei der Zirkulation des Kapitals findet gleichzeitig statt Formwechsel und 
Stoffwechsel” (Grundrisse 559). It is useful to dwell on the distinction between Stoffwechsel and 
Formwechsel in order to see precisely where the abstraction of labor power originates. What for 
Anson Rabinbach are competing paradigms and periods in Marx’s view of labor from an early 
metabolic model (specific labor) to a late thermodynamic one (abstract labor power) can more 
accurately be seen as complementary aspects of labor. Considered from the material, stofflichen 
side, a specific product is produced, circulated, and consumed. Considered from the formal side, 
commodities are merely the vehicles of value and money merely a measure of self-valorizing 
capital: “Nach der stofflichen Seite des Kapitals betrachtet, erscheint das Geld bloß als 
Zirkulationsmittel; nach der Formseite, als das nominelle Maß seiner Verwertung und für eine 
bestimmte Phase als für sich seiender Wert” (560). And as the measure of value, abstract labor 
becomes a substance incorporated into all commodities and forms their common measure. Thus 
Marx describes the capitalist labor process as the process of setting “living labor,” that is, 
present-tense human labor, to work on “dead labor,” the other inputs such as raw materials or 
tools that as exchange-values already embody a quantum of past labor (Das Kapital I, 209). 
26 On the relationship between Marx’s dialectical mode of presentation and his method of immanent critique, see 
Postone, 141-5, 174-6. Several passages can be usefully read in dialogue with approaches such as Rabinbach’s 
and Brennan’s:
“The drawback of such a presentation is that Marx’s reflexive, immanent approach is easily subject to 
misinterpretation. If Capital is read as anything other than an immanent critique, the result is a reading that 
interprets Marx as affirming that which he attempts to criticize (for example, the historically determinate 
function of labor as socially constitutive)” (142).
“The problem, then, is to move beyond the physiological definition of abstract human labor provided by 
Marx and analyze its underlying social and historical meaning. An adequate analysis, moreover, must not only 
show that abstract human labor has a social character; it must also investigate the historically specific social 
relations that underlie value in order to explain why those relations appear and, therefore, are presented by Marx,
as being physiological – as transhistorical, natural, and thus historically empty” (145).
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Elsewhere he describes this process as a zymurgy of labor-power (Das Kapital I, 200) in which 
the yeast of living labor is pitched into the wort or grapes of dead labor to produce the ferment of
surplus value; while this biological register could lead one to suppose that the capitalist 
production process is a Stoffwechsel like any other, the key difference is that here, all 
commodities are dead labor in the sense that, as exchange-values they are quantifiable 
embodiments of past abstract labor, not qualitatively specific use-values.
The switch from concretely useful human labor, seen as the production of use-values, to 
the abstract labor that characterizes capitalism, means that the function of labor is no longer 
primarily to produce useful objects in a metabolic exchange with nature, but rather to produce 
surplus value in the valorization process. The basic reason for this is that, once human labor 
power is capable of being bought and sold like other commodities, it becomes the only 
commodity whose use-value (a full day of labor) quantitatively exceeds its exchange-value (the 
time necessary to reproduce the worker’s capacity to labor). In other words, it takes less time in a
day to reproduce the worker’s capacity to labor (defined as the time needed to produce the basic 
“wage bundle” of food, clothing, housing, etc.) than the worker is capable of working in a day; 
this is the source of the surplus-value that makes capitalist accumulation possible in the first 
place. The result of this switch to abstraction, in the context of technology, means that, rather 
than using the tool, the worker’s capacity to labor itself becomes the tool of the machine. The 
role of “living labor” as the engine of value guides Marx’s account, in chapter 13 of Das Kapital,
of the seeming paradox that labor-saving machines under capitalism in fact contribute to a 
lengthening and intensification of the working day. At heart, this shift from use-values to 
exchange-values is the origin of the organic inversion that takes on its concrete material form in 
the depiction of the factory system. 
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“Alle entwickelte Maschinerie besteht aus drei wesentlich verschiedenen Teilen, der 
Bewegungsmaschine, dem Transmissionsmechanismus, endlich der Werkzeugsmaschine oder 
Arbeitsmaschine. […] Dieser Teil der Maschinerie, die Werkzeugsmaschine, ist es, wovon die 
industrielle Revolution im 18. Jahrhundert ausgeht” (Das Kapital I, 393).27 Marx begins his long 
chapter on “Machines and heavy industry” by defining what makes a machine a machine. 
“Mathematicians and mechanics” and, following them, English economists, had tended to make 
a merely gradual distinction between a machine and a tool, according to Marx. The tool was a 
simple machine, the machine simply a composite tool. Even the simple mechanical aids – lever, 
inclined plane, and so on – were called machines (392). While granting the mechanical point that
all machines are indeed composed of such basic principles, Marx nevertheless rejects this 
explanation as economically worthless, because ahistorical. Another possible explanation he 
weighs draws on the distinction between human motive power and nonhuman motive power: a 
tool is that which is set into motion by a human, whereas a machine is set into motion by a non-
human force of nature. This is also woefully inadequate: 
Danach wäre ein mit Ochsen bespannter Pflug, der den verschiedensten 
Produktionsepochen angehört, eine Maschine, Claussens Circular Loom, der von der 
Hand eines einzigen Arbeiters bewegt, 96 000 Maschen in einer Minute verfertigt, ein 
bloßes Werkzeug. Ja, derselbe loom wäre Werkzeug, wenn mit der Hand, und Maschine, 
wenn mit Dampf bewegt. Da die Anwendung von Tierkraft eine der ältesten Erfindungen 
der Menschheit, ginge in der Tat die Maschinenproduktion der Handwerksproduktion 
voraus. (392)
This example makes clear that for Marx, it is precisely the tool end of the machine that 
differentiates it from a simple tool, and not the source of the power.28 The working machine, in 
replacing the human worker at the site of application of the “active organs,” constitutes the 
27 “All fully developed machinery consists of three essentially different parts, the motor mechanism, the 
transmitting mechanism and finally the tool or working machine. […] It is this last part of the machinery, the 
tool or working machine, with which the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century began.” (494)
28 For a thought-provoking historicization of the tripartite discussion of machines, see Müller-Sievers (14-15).
37
machine in the first place, because it overcomes the organic limits of the human body. “Die 
Anzahl von Arbeitsinstrumenten, womit er gleichzeitig wirken kann, ist durch die Anzahl seiner 
natürlichen Produktionsinstrumente, seiner eignen körperlichen Organe, beschränkt. […] Die 
Anzahl der Werkzeuge, womit dieselbe Werkzeugsmaschine gleichzeitig spielt, ist von 
vornherein emanzipiert von der organischen Schranke, wodurch das Handwerkszeug eines 
Arbeiters beengt wird” (394). Thus the distinction between the tool and the machine is both a 
technological one – the machine allows for a much greater scale unimpeded by the organic limits
of the human body – and a political-economic one, in that the machine, thus unimpeded, 
facilitates and demands an intensification of the absorption of value from living labor in the 
production process.29 While the basic conditions of human existence necessitate a metabolic 
interplay between the organic human body and nature as the “inorganic human body,” the 
liberation from the “organische Schranke” of the human body comes to constitute an organic 
inversion as well, resulting in the bodily incorporation of the human worker as a conscious 
appendage in the machine system and the violent rupture of the natural limits of the working 
day.30 
So it is not just that, in replacing the human worker as a tool-wielder, the machine now 
comes into competition with this worker, or even that, in reducing the human worker to a 
machine-minder, it makes the human into a machine; both of these are common tropes in 
nineteenth century technological discourse and can be found in Marx’s own early writings. In the
29 The relevant sections in Kapital I would be, in addition to chapter 13, the sections on absolute and relative 
surplus value, especially chapters six through ten (214-340). See also Fine and Saad-Filho (40-46) and 
Bottomore (331-332 and 528-531).
30 “Wenn die Maschinerie das gewaltigste Mittel ist, die Produktivität der Arbeit zu steigern, d.h. die zur 
Produktion einer Ware nötige Arbeitszeit zu verkürzen, wird sie als Träger des Kapitals zunächst in den 
unmittelbar von ihr ergriffnen Industrien zum gewaltigsten Mittel, den Arbeitstag über jede naturgemäße 
Schranke hinaus zu verlängern. […] Als Kapital, und als solches besitzt der Automat im Kapitalisten 
Bewußtsein und Willen, ist es daher mit dem Trieb begeistet, die widerstrebende, aber elastische menschliche 
Naturschranke auf den Minimalwiderstand einzuzwängen.” (Das Kapital I, 425)
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Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, for example, he writes, “Die Maschine bequemt sich 
der Schwäche d[es] Menschen, um den schwachen Menschen zur Maschine zu machen –” (137). 
Rather, at the site of the organ that can now be used regardless of the organic limitations of the 
human, an inversion takes place: the human laborer becomes the organ of an organ. Breaking the 
organic limits on the use of tools allows for a monstrosity of scale, work performed by systems 
rather than organisms, in which human, living labor is reduced to the role of minder, as in this 
passage from Das Kapital.
Als gegliedertes System von Arbeitsmaschinen, die ihre Bewegung nur vermittelst der 
Transmissionsmaschinerie von einem zentralen Automaten empfangen, besitzt der 
Maschinenbetrieb seine entwickeltste Gestalt. An die Stelle der einzelnen Maschine tritt 
hier ein mechanisches Ungeheuer, dessen Leib ganze Fabrikgebäude füllt und dessen 
dämonische Kraft, erst versteckt durch die fast feierlich gemeßne Bewegung seiner 
Riesenglieder, im fieberhaft tollen Wirbeltanz seiner zahllosen eigentlichen Arbeitsorgane
ausbricht. (402)
The corporeal inversion means that the body at issue is no longer the human body but the 
monstrous body of the machine system whose limbs, or “working organs,” include both human 
laborers and the individual working machines. Transgression of, or emancipation from, the 
organic limits of the human body yields a monstrosity of strength, scope, and size. For further 
elaboration of this mechanisches Ungeheuer that incorporates and appropriates living labor as its 
own organs, one must turn to the so-called “Fragment on Machines” from the Grundrisse.
The fragment on machines occurs in the context of a lengthy discussion of fixed capital, 
i.e. the means of production, such as machines, that do not materially reenter the circulation 
process.31 Analyzing the increasing importance to capitalism of fixed capital, Marx writes:
31 The distinction between fixed and circulating capital was one Marx had adopted from the classical political 
economists, and is prevalent throughout the Grundrisse; by the first volume of Capital, Marx will have shifted 
to the terminology of constant and variable capital, a change that will come to have important implications. 
Where the distinction between fixed and circulating capital pertains the the sphere of circulation, the later 
difference between constant (capital that merely transfers its own value to the commodity without adding a 
surplus) and variable capital (labor power, which adds a surplus to the value of the commodity) pertains to the 
production process. For more on these terms, see Bottomore (68-71) and Harvey (127-134).
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In den Produktionsprozeß des Kapitals aufgenommen, durchläuft das Arbeitsmittel aber 
verschiedne Metamorphosen, deren letzte die Maschine ist oder vielmehr ein 
automatisches System der Maschinerie (System der Maschinerie; das automatische ist nur
die vollendetste adäquateste Form derselben und verwandelt die Maschinerie erst in ein 
System), in Bewegung gesetzt durch einen Automaten, bewegende Kraft, die sich selbst 
bewegt; dieser Automat bestehend aus zahlreichen mechanischen und intellektuellen 
Organen, so daß die Arbeiter selbst nur als bewußte Glieder desselben bestimmt sind. 
(Grundrisse 592)
If in preindustrial production the tool had been a part of the production process characterized 
primarily by human labor, here it is the laborer who is used by the machine. Again the ambiguity 
of “organ” is significant. The human worker is literally incorporated into the machine system as a
conscious organ, or more precisely as a conscious linkage between organs, and by the same token
becomes an instrument of the instrument.
Nicht wie beim Instrument, das der Arbeiter als Organ mit seinem eignen Geschick und 
Tätigkeit geseelt, und dessen Handhabung daher von seiner Virtuosität abhängt. Sondern 
die Maschine, die für den Arbeiter Geschick und Kraft besitzt, ist selbst der Virtuose, der 
eine eigne Seele besitzt in den in ihr wirkenden mechanischen Gesetzen und zu ihrer 
beständigen Selbstbewegung, wie der Arbeiter Nahrungsmittel, so Kohlen, Öl etc. 
komsumiert (matières instrumentales). Die Tätigkeit des Arbeiters, auf eine bloße 
Abstraktion der Tätigkeit beschränkt, ist nach allen Seiten hin bestimmt und geregelt 
durch die Bewegung der Maschinerie, nicht umgekehrt. (Grundrisse 593)
The element of human labor, formerly the body that appropriated from nature with its natural or 
artificial organs, is now itself literally incorporated as an organ into the machine body. With this 
corporeal inversion comes an inversion in instrumentality marked by an externalization and 
alienation of soul, skill, and activity. Where previously the worker had controlled and guided the 
tool, here it is the human worker and his activity that is hemmed and regulated by the mechanical
laws of the machine: 
Der Produktionsprozeß hat aufgehört Arbeitsprozeß in dem Sinn zu sein, daß die Arbeit 
als die ihn beherrschende Einheit über ihn übergriffe. Sie erscheint vielmehr nur als 
bewußtes Organ, an vielen Punkten des mechanischen Systems in einzelnen lebendigen 
Arbeitern; zerstreut, subsumiert unter den Gesamtprozeß der Maschinerie selbst, selbst 
nur ein Glied des Systems, dessen Einheit nicht in den lebendigen Arbeitern, sondern in 
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der lebendigen (aktiven) Maschinerie existiert, die seinem einzelnen, unbedeutenden Tun 
gegenüber als gewaltiger Organismus ihm gegenüber erscheint. In der Maschinerie tritt 
die vergegenständlichte Arbeit der lebendigen Arbeit im Arbeitsprozeß selbst als die sie 
beherrschende Macht gegenüber, die das Kapital als Aneignung der lebendigen Arbeit 
seiner Form nach ist. (Grundrisse 593, some italics added)
With industrial production, the working machine transcends the organic limitations of the human 
organism, allowing for the proliferation of a monstrous system of automated machinery that 
incorporates human labor as one of its many organs. The objectified, past labor represented in the
machine and material inputs come to dominate the living labor of the human workers, yet 
crucially, this domination corresponds to a formal characteristic of capital.
Marx’s footnote from page 392 of Das Kapital had proposed a Darwinian lineage for 
human technology;32 capitalism thus makes for a strange evolution indeed by flipping the 
relationship between organism and organ inside-out. The inversion described in Grundrisse is 
also explicit in Das Kapital:
Die Maschinerie wird mißbraucht, um den Arbeiter selbst von Kindesbeinen in den Teil 
einer Teilmaschine zu verwandeln. […] In Manufaktur und Handwerk bedient sich der 
Arbeiter des Werkzeugs, in der Fabrik dient er der Maschine. Dort geht von ihm die 
Bewegung des Arbeitsmittels aus, dessen Bewegung er hier zu folgen hat. In der 
Manufaktur bilden die Arbeiter Glieder eines lebendigen Mechanismus. In der Fabrik 
existiert ein toter Mechanismus unabhängig von ihnen, und sie werden ihm als lebendige 
Anhängsel einverleibt. (445)
The conceptual and material inversions and incorporations are reinforced by the repetition of the 
chiastic parallelisms of this passage in a way that solidifies the overarching idea that the factory 
system under capitalism represents a structural inversion of the basic conditions of human labor 
32 “Eine kritische Geschichte der Technologie würde überhaupt nachweisen, wie wenig irgendeine Erfindung des 
18. Jahrhunderts einem einzelnen Individuum gehört. Bisher existiert kein solches Werk. Darwin hat das 
Interesse auf die Geschichte der natürlichen Technologie gelenkt, d.h. auf die Bildung der Pflanzen- und 
Tierorgane als Produktionsinstrumente für das Leben der Pflanzen und Tiere. Verdient die Bildungsgeschichte 
der Produktiven Organe des Gesellschaftsmenschen, der materiellen Basis jeder besondren 
Gesellschaftsorganisation, nicht gleiche Aufmerksamkeit? Und wäre sie nicht leichter zu liefern, da, wie Vico 
sagt, die Menschengeschichte sich dadurch von der Naturgeschichte unterscheidet, daß wir die eine gemacht und
die andre nicht gemacht haben? Die Technologie enthüllt das aktive Verhalten des Menschen zur Natur, den 
unmittelbaren Produktionsprozeß seines Lebens, damit auch seiner gesellschaftlichen Lebensverhältnisse und 
der ihnen entquellenden geistigen Vorstellungen.” (392-393)
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and existence. Furthermore, since Marx repeatedly insists that machine production is the 
materialization of the essence of capitalist production, the physical appropriation of the laborer 
into the machine system must be seen as the physical manifestation of a prior formal 
appropriation of living labor in the labor process. In Marx’s analysis, capitalism can be defined 
as the mode of production that appropriates living labor because, unlike production for use-
values, in which labor appropriates from nature as part of the human “metabolism” with nature, 
commodity production is geared towards the production of surplus value. From the standpoint of 
capital, the specific type of labor being performed is as irrelevant as the specific product being 
produced: the commodity is just a vehicle for surplus value, and the production process is just a 
way for the product to “soak up” living labor and, with it, value.33 “Die Aneignung der 
lebendigen Arbeit durch die vergegenständlichte Arbeit – der verwertenden Kraft oder Tätigkeit 
durch den für sich seienden Wert –, die im Begriff des Kapitals liegt, ist in der auf Maschinerie 
beruhenden Produktion als Charakter des Produktionsprozesses selbst, auch seinen stofflichen 
Elementen und seiner stofflichen Bewegung nach gesetzt” (Grundrisse 593). Here 
“vergegenständlichte Arbeit,” or objectified labor (which Marx will later come to call “dead 
labor”), means the product of past labor, namely, what enters the production process as, say, raw 
materials or the instruments of production. “Lebendige Arbeit” is the actual labor at work in the 
production process. This inverted appropriation “lies in the concept of capital” because, as Marx 
discusses in detail in the chapter from Das Kapital on “Der Arbeitsprozeß und der 
Verwertungsprozeß,” capital is concerned with the production of exchange values; the production
of use-values, that is, of specific things with specific functions that serve specific needs, is only 
33 Das Kapital I, 204.
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incidental.34 In lay terms, capital exists to make a profit, not to provide goods.35
The physical incorporation of the human worker as an instrumental component of 
machinery is the material expression of a formal process whereby specific labor to produce 
specific use-values is incorporated as a qualitatively indifferent moment in the service of 
producing surplus-value. To use the language of Kapital, the monstrous inversion detailed in the 
“Fragment on Machines” is a particularly visceral correlate of the appropriation of the production
process by the valorization process. By the time this appropriation appears in volume I of Das 
Kapital, the vocabulary has changed but the gist has not: “Durch seine Verwandlung in einen 
Automaten tritt das Arbeitsmittel während des Arbeitsprozesses selbst dem Arbeiter als Kapital 
gegenüber, als tote Arbeit, welche die lebendige Arbeitskraft beherrscht und aussaugt” (446). In 
both cases, the worker is dominated by the product of past labor; capital, in the form of dead 
labor or an automatic system of machinery, absorbs the living labor as surplus value. More 
precisely, the way the machine in the factory system incorporates living labor, becomes the agent
of the process, and even absorbs the collected social knowledge and skill necessary for 
production36 serves as the physical, material embodiment of the way that capitalism by its very 
34 In this I follow the reading of Moishe Postone, who sees Marx as primarily providing a critique of labor in 
capitalism rather than a critique of capitalism from the standpoint of labor, which for Postone is the view of 
“traditional Marxism.”
35 “Das Aufnehmen des Arbeitsprozesses als bloßes Moment des Verwertungsprozesses des Kapitals ist auch der 
stofflichen Seite nach gesetzt durch die Verwandlung des Arbeitsmittels in Maschinerie und der lebendigen 
Arbeit in bloßes lebendiges Zubehör dieser Maschinerie als Mittel ihrer Aktion. […] [D]er in der Maschinerie 
vergegenständlichte Wert erscheint ferner als eine Voraussetzung, wogegen die verwertende Kraft des einzelnen 
Arbeitsvermögens als ein unendlich kleines verschwindet; durch die Produktion in enormen Massen, die mit der 
Maschinerie gesetzt ist, verschwindet ebenso am Produkt jede Beziehung auf unmittelbaren Gebrauchswert; in 
der Form, wie das Produkt produziert wird, und in Verhältnissen, worin es produziert wird, ist schon so gesetzt, 
daß es nur produziert ist als Träger von Wert und sein Gebrauchswert nur als Bedingung hierfür.” (Grundrisse 
593-594). 
36 “Die Natur baut keine Maschinen, keine Lokomotiven, Eisenbahnen, electric telegraphs, selfacting mules etc. 
Sie sind Produkte der menschlichen Industrie; natürliches Material, verwandelt in Organe des menschlichen 
Willens über die Natur oder seiner Betätigung in der Natur. Sie sind von der menschlichen Hand geschaffne 
Organe des menschlichen Hirns; vergegenständlichte Wissenskraft. Die Entwicklung des capital fixe zeigt an, 
bis zu welchem Grade das allgemeine gesellschaftliche Wissen, knowledge, zur unmittelbaren Produktivkraft 
geworden ist, und daher die Bedingungen des gesellschaftlichen Lebensprozesses selbst unter die Kontrolle des 
general intellect gekommen, und ihm gemäß umgeschaffen sind. Bis zu welchem Grade die gesellschaftlichen 
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logic appropriates and harnesses living labor as the source of value. In this sense, the vivid 
depiction of factory conditions in 19th-century England is not primarily a graphic compendium 
of social commentary, but rather represents the material and historical culmination of the logic of
capital and value production as such. What is being inverted is more than simply the relationship 
between the worker and the machine, although the image of the human workers serving as the 
organs of their own tools certainly represents a high point in this relationship. Rather, the 
monstrous inversion detailed in Marx’s account of the factory system goes much deeper, and 
must for this reason be read in dialogue with the basic condition of human labor as such as a 
metabolic exchange with humanity’s inorganic body. The factory system’s monstrous body, in 
which human workers only fit in as conscious linkages, is the logical fulfillment of capitalism’s 
shift from the production of use-values in the labor process to the production of exchange-values 
in the valorization process, and is therefore a vivid (though not merely rhetorical) demonstration 
of the basic logic that incorporates living labor as the source of surplus value.
To recount the account thus far, then: I have focused on two key areas in Marx’s account 
of labor as such and the specific form it takes under capitalism, namely the idea of Stoffwechsel 
and the relationship between bodies, organs, and environment. These two areas are intricately 
related, as the dynamic relationship between humans and nature that characterizes human 
existence as such – a process of appropriation, reworking, and incorporation – is portrayed as a 
metabolic circulation in a way that undermines from the outset any easy dichotomies between 
human and nature, body and technology. Technology itself is rather understood as a bodily 
process whereby natural material is worked on, becomes an added human organ, and participates 
in the process of production and working on nature, humanity’s “inorganic body.” At the same 
Produktivekräfte produziert sind, nicht nur in der Form des Wissens, sondern als unmittelbare Organe der 
gesellschaftlichen Praxis; des realen Lebensprozesses. (Grundrisse 602)
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time, Stoffwechsel establishes a logic of flows and circulation that also comes to account for – 
and eventually be supplanted by – the circulation of exchange values that characterizes 
capitalism in particular. Because capitalism is marked by the production of exchange-values in 
the service of creating surplus value, and thus entails for Marx a historical process of the 
intensification of the appropriation of living labor by dead labor, this decentering of Stoffwechsel 
as an ecological exchange culminates in the factory system, where the basic picture of human 
labor as such is inverted, such that human workers become conscious organs in the machine 
body, and agency, knowledge, and skill are externalized into the machines. For Marx, the picture 
certainly neither ends nor begins here. In his dialectical account, the externalization of 
knowledge is also a socialization of knowledge that can ultimately take on a positive function, 
and the role of industrial technology is not limited to its function in capitalism, but only limited 
by this function.
Yet this cursory sketch of the technological body in Marx’s thought already suggests two 
related insights. Firstly, the historical and economic specificity of his account of the labor and 
valorization processes make it difficult if not impossible to understand this account in terms of an
energeticist paradigm, as Anson Rabinbach and Teresa Brennan do. I have already discussed 
some problems with Rabinbach’s historicist account. Teresa Brennan offers another example of 
an energeticist reading of Marx. In developing a feminist revision of Marx’s theory of value, 
Brennan has asserted that, because Marx relied on a strong subject/object dualism and because he
privileged the role of living, subjective, human labor power in the production of profit to the 
exclusion of an appreciation of the productive power of nature, he cannot but overlook the 
fundamental contradiction of capitalism, namely that contradiction between “the reproduction 
time of natural energy and the time or speed of exchange for profit” (177). By ignoring the 
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economic motivations for Marx’s reflective use of the terms “subject” and “object,” and by thus 
effacing the difference between Marx and his predecessors, treating his account of labor power as
an unreflective valorization of human labor rather than an immanent critique of this very view, an
analysis like Brennan’s risks falling back to the level of the classical political economists; the 
only difference is that the signs are reversed. If for them, labor is the sole source of value, for 
Brennan, labor isn’t the sole source of value. Crucially, Brennan’s criticism of Marx is compelled
to maintain the very separation between humans, nature, and technology that Marx’s own 
account of this relationship renders untenable. Reducing the language of “living” and “dead” 
labor to a simple vitalist metaphoric, Brennan writes: “But it comes down to this: labour power is
living energy, and its livingness distinguishes it from constant capital, (nature and technology) 
which is ostensibly dead. Its value accordingly is precisely constant. Being ostensibly ‘dead’, 
nature and technology can give no more than they cost” (177). Brennan thus transforms what for 
Marx is a positional, relational, economically specific relationship into a fixed opposition based 
upon a value judgment supposedly delivered in advance. Not only does this transformation 
obscure the specific contribution of Marx’s conception of labor power, but it relies on a 
preservation of a set of fixed oppositions – between subject and object, humanity and nature, 
humanity and technology, organisms and organs – which it was the contribution of Marx’s 
account of technology to have problematized.
There is an economic reason for the abstraction of his concept labor-power, and it has to 
do with the immanent unfolding of the logic of the commodity. Human labor-power for Marx is 
an abstract quantity because the value of all commodities is based upon the time needed to 
produce them, and not because Marx was borrowing from a new discourse of thermodynamics 
that saw all energy expenditure as qualitatively equivalent, or because he had an anthropocentric 
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commitment to only the subjective aspect of the labor process, as Brennan reads him.37 For many
reasons, labor-power for Marx cannot be equated to energy expenditure. This realization also 
necessitates a more nuanced account of the relationship between discourses of the natural 
sciences and discourses of the human sciences than the unidirectional transfer implied by 
Rabinbach. Marx does not abandon Stoffwechsel for energy as his dominant paradigm, but 
capitalism does; part of his point is to show the intrinsic processes of capitalism themselves 
responsible for this shift of emphasis.
Secondly and more generally, the ways in which Marx’s account is historically, 
politically, and economically specific suggest the problems with a philosophy of technology as 
such, outside of any specific context. The force of Marx’s theory in this context is that it can 
37 What the energeticist focus of Brennan’s and Rabinbach’s accounts share, in their reduction of labor-power to a 
question of energy expenditure, is that they focus only on the sphere of production at the expense of a 
consideration of exchange. Yet the account of surplus value is unintelligible unless one considers both 
circulation and production, the “freedom, equality, property, and Bentham” of the market (Das Kapital I 189) 
and the compulsion and unfreedom of the factory. Natural forces may well be “productive” in a general sense, 
and Marx’s account acknowledges this. They cannot, however, take themselves to market. For a more recent 
thorough account of why Marx’s theory of value does not make sense unless one considers both production and 
circulation, see Clover, Joshua. “Value | Theory | Crisis.” PMLA 127.1 (2012): 107-114.
Helmut Müller-Sievers does something similar to Rabinbach by running Marx through the interpretive 
matrix of a guiding technological trope (in this case, the cylinder) and finding him to be deficient. The massive 
technological change wrought by kinematics, as depicted by Müller-Sievers, should certainly not be 
underestimated and it is the contribution of his book to have recovered the mechanical and rhetorical linkages 
enabled by this figure. Yet it is not at all clear why Marx should run afoul of this account. In suggesting that it 
was Marx’s innate anthropocentrism that led to his suspicion of modern machines like the self-acting lathe or the
slide rest, Müller-Sievers seems to want to assimilate Marx to a theory of organ projection (96-97). Yet Marx is 
quite clear that the slide rest replaces – but does not imitate – the human hand in the very general, functional 
sense of the ability to produce a given form (Das Kapital I 406). For Marx, the emphasis is much more on the 
economic factors that determine labor time (factors that cannot be reduced to the “capitalist desires to shrink the 
workforce” (Müller-Sievers 92), but which rather stem from heterogeneous yet immanent necessities built into 
the dynamics of commodity production and exchange). So while any technological advance will generate its 
own set of constraints on production, it misses the thrust of Marx’s argument, in my opinion, to write the history 
of labor in the 19th century in terms of demands imposed strictly by the material. Marx in fact frequently 
discusses time needs imposed by the material of different processes of production, whether these are the natural 
cycles of agricultural production and winemaking or newer industrial phenomena of chemical production. Yet 
for Marx these time constraints provide a frame for struggles over value and time, but not an unambiguous 
determination of how work is arranged. To return to Müller-Sievers’ example, the needs of the production 
process – the qualities of hot steel, for example (69) – may well dictate how and how quickly the material needs 
to be worked at a given moment (this was also true of traditional hand-smithing); yet it is other, not strictly 
technological conditions that govern whether the machinery is to run all night, how long the shift of the 
individual worker is, how many people will be assigned to one task, and what kind of safety precautions are in 
place.
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account for the way that a human relationship to nature, mediated by artifacts and organs, can 
become its opposite, and this includes specific details of the picture (such as the way that labor-
saving devices under capitalism tend to result in the intensification and lengthening of the 
working day) as well as the larger narrative of organic inversion I’ve reconstructed above. In this 
context, it is important that Marx is sensitive not just to economic nuance but also, through this 
nuance, to questions of agency. The awareness that the modern factory system externalizes 
agency and knowledge from the human laborers to the machines they serve, on both the level of 
graphic social detail and on a deeper functional level with roots in commodity production per se, 
sets Marx’s account off starkly from that of Ernst Kapp. This difference stems from Kapp’s 
failure to consider questions of economic and historical specificity, favoring instead a longer, 
continual ontology of technology. In narrative terms, Kapp’s account seems to only ever consider
the single human as an agent, even when the artifactual worlds he describes are invariably social.
This inevitably results in a picture of technology where the creation and use of technology feeds 
back into an epistemological accumulation of knowledge such that technology is ultimately 
always empowering. Where Marx’s account of political economy shows the fractured nature of 
human agency, knowledge, and technology under capitalism, Kapp’s grandiose picture doesn’t 
leave any room for specific economies, nor for consideration of the questions of agency and 
conflict, so that human making becomes a triumphant narrative of self-realization, from the stone
hammer to the Prussian state. Yet Kapp’s account of technology as organ projection is also a 
story of appropriation and incorporation, and the strong Hegelian influence here too means that 
his picture of the human troubles any easy dualisms between human and environment. It is 
precisely the boundaries of the organic human body that for Kapp form a productive interface 
between internal and external worlds, in a way that generates the progression of technology, 
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society, and human knowledge, and it is to his account that I now turn.
The kinematics of harmony: Ernst Kapp and organ projection
Ernst Kapp is known as one of the first thinkers to attempt a systematic theory of 
technology as such, and his 1877 Grundlinien zur Philosophie einer Technik stands as a 
foundational text in the history and theorization of technology. Like Marx, Kapp left Germany in 
the aftermath of the 1848 revolution; unlike Marx, he went further abroad, settling as a pioneer in
one of the German “Latin Settlements” in central Texas. His nearly two decades there left their 
mark on his work,38 and in 1865 he returned to Düsseldorf, where he took up a position as 
Privatdozent and wrote Grundlinien. His early liberal aspirations found, in that book, 
comfortable accommodation within a theory of the Prussian state as the fullest teleological self-
realization of the dialectical subject. Because his theory of organ projection grapples with the 
relationship between the mechanical and the organic across the interface of the working human 
body, his account is essential to setting the stage for a consideration of early 20th-century 
technological imaginaries. For Kapp, the human body is not only the origin of all tools, but exists
in a reciprocal relationship with technology, since the unconscious projection of organs as tools 
into the physical world provides the structures and analogies necessary for understanding the 
human body. In this upward spiral of internalization and externalization, technology and 
knowledge, projection and realization, the human is, as Kapp says in an early methodological 
section, “the measure of things.”39 Kapp’s work is interesting for the way that it relates bodily 
action and dynamics of thought: the dialectic he unfolds between tools, organs, and knowledge, 
38 Most explicitly in Grundlinien in the depiction of the American ax, a tool superior for Kapp than its German 
cousin because of its closer adherence to the laws of harmony derived from the proportions of the human body 
(241-244).
39 “Der anthropologische Maasstab” (1-28)
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is an epistemological one as much as it is a historical, material, and technological one. Yet his 
circular insistence on an absolute primacy of the human and his theory’s blindness towards social
antagonism, class dynamics, or any sort of intersubjective relations at all apart from the 
harmonious Gliederung of castes means that, for all its inventiveness in bringing different strands
of contemporary science together to create a total picture of the human, his account remains 
curiously stuck in the 19th century, if one considers the political imaginary that results from his 
narrative of human progress.40 In this section, then, I will reconstruct Kapp’s theory of 
technology as organ projection, with a particular emphasis on the slippage between morphology 
and metaphor, in order to show how his anthropomorphic theory of technology results in a theory
of society and the state that privileges harmony, discipline, and subordination.
Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik is organized in part according to a 
developmental logic. While the book begins with the human (“Der anthropologische Maasstab”) 
and ends with “Der Staat,” most chapters unfold the logic of the thesis of organ projection in 
view of technologies of increasing complexity and the relationship between the human body and 
the perception or measuring of the external world. Other chapters along the way present 
excursions on topics such as language, the golden ratio, and the implications of kinematics in a 
way that reinforces what must be described as an anthropocentric cosmology.41 The human being 
is not just a culmination of a natural development for Kapp, but is on every level the measure of 
all things. His account is a history of Geist, but it ties this history to human corporeal 
morphology, proportion, and movement. Like Marx, Kapp emphasizes the material, bodily 
40 And given the strong teleological drive of his theory, without which the basic features of organ projection would
not really make sense, it seems that one cannot avoid considering the politics of his anthropology.
41 The names of the chapters of Kapp’s book are instructional: “I. Der anthropologische Maasstab; II. Die 
Organprojection; III. Die ersten Werkzeuge; IV. Gliedmaassen und Maasse; V. Apparate und Instrumente; VI. 
Die innere Architektur der Knochen; VII. Dampfmaschine und Schienenweg; VIII. Der elektromagnetische 
Telegraph; IX. Das Unbewusste; X. Die Maschinentechnik; XI. Das morphologische Grundgesetz; XII. Die 
Sprache; XIII. Der Staat.” 
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aspects of the human subject:
Das Selbst hat aufgehört, der Inbegriff eines nur geistigen Verhaltens zu sein. Eine 
wunderliche Täuschung geht mit der Einsicht zu Ende, dass der leibliche Organismus der 
nächste und der eigentliche Bestand des Selbst ist. […] Erst mit der Gewissheit der 
leiblichen Existenz tritt das Selbst wahrhaft ins Bewusstsein. Es ist, weil es denkt, und es 
denkt, weil es ist. ‘Selbst,’ nach der Ableitung des Wortes von si liba, heisst “Leib und 
Leben.”42 Mit dieser seiner Grundbedeutung is nunmehr vollständig Ernst zu machen. 
(2)43
Broadly working in the aftermath of the Cartesian dualism between mind and body, 
Kapp’s theory of organ projection posits a reciprocal relationship between the “Aussenwelt” and 
“Innenwelt,” externalization and internalization. The human fashions a tool in unconscious 
imitation of a bodily organ. The hand holding the stone, for example, serves as the model for a 
primitive hammer, each new perfection and advancement of which maintains the original organic
impulse. Other examples Kapp dwells on include the relationship between the invention of 
achromatic lenses and insights into ocular anatomy, stringed musical instruments, principles of 
harmonic frequency and the organ of Corti in the inner ear, the pump and the heart, the steam 
engine and metabolism, the telegraph and nervous system, and so on. Technological artifacts, 
existing in the world for humans to see and contemplate, in turn advance human consciousness 
and self-consciousness, as the tools provide the models for understanding mechanical principles 
and, by extension, anatomical structures in the human body.
42 Not actually. DTV’s Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Deutschen has the following gloss: “Man zieht gewöhnlich
venetisch sselboi-sselboi Plur. ‘sich selbst’ (vgl. ahd. der selbselbo ‘der sich selbst gleiche’) heran und denkt an 
eine Verbindung des Pronomialstamms ie. *se- (s. sich) mit dem in Pronominalbildungen auftretenden l-
Formans (vgl. lat. talis ‘so beschaffen, solcher’, qualis ‘wie beschaffen, von welcher Art’), die um das Suffix ie. 
-bho- ‘von der Art des Grundworts seiend, dessen Qualität habend’ (s. Sippe) erweitert ist.” Pfeifer, Wolfgang. 
Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Deutschen. Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2005. 1276. Of course, the
etymology Kapp provides is all the more interesting for being incorrect. I haven’t been able to determine the 
source of Kapp’s etymology, but it doesn’t seem to be from the Grimms’ Deutsches Wörterbuch, which doesn’t 
mention a possible bodily origin for “selbst.”
43 The bodily nature of the human subject structures, in a way, Kapp’s book from beginning to end. In a later 
discussion of the relationship among the unconscious, consciousness, the self-consciousness, he writes, “Da nun 
das Unbewusste gleichermaassen in der Leiblichkeit wie im Geist zur Erscheinung kommt, so ist das 
Selbstbewusstsein nicht nur Bewusstsein vom Subject der Geistesthätigkeit , sondern ebensowohl Bewusstsein 
von dem das Selbst wesentlich constituirenden Leibesleben.” (163)
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Das Selbstbewusstsein erweist sich demnach als Resultat eines Processes, in welchem das
Wissen von einem Aeussern zu einem Wissen von einem Innern umschlägt. Dieses 
Wissen, wieder auf das Aeussere sich kehrend, und dessen Kenntniss erweiternd, giebt 
hinwiederum neue Aufschlüsse über das Innere und producirt in dem endlosen Herüber 
und Hinüber der Orientirung über die Welt und der Selbstorientirung überhaupt den Inhalt
alles Wissens, die Wissenschaft. (22)
Knowledge is here positioned as the movement between the exterior and the interior of the 
human body, a self-magnifying process that results in self-consciousness and science. For Kapp, 
this is a dialectical process that leads from the first rudimentary stone tool to modern anatomical 
insights about the nervous system and spongy microscopic structure of Cancellous bone. After 
briefly recounting the history of the concept of the anthropologische Maasstaab in Western 
philosophy, Kapp describes the steady accumulation of knowledge and the relationship between 
consciousness and self-consciousness in this way: “Der im Denken von sich ausgehende Mensch 
ist die Voraussetzung des zu sich selbst zurückkehrenden Menschen. So ist das Denken gleich 
dem Athemholen ein Process ununterbrochenen Einnehmens und Ausgebens” (12). This 
movement of departure and return also stands for the process of externalization and 
internalization that marks for Kapp the relationship between technology and self-consciousness.
The very way that organs and tools can model and inflect each other depends on the 
limits between inside and outside not being strictly coterminous with the physical boundaries of 
the human body, but rather being a positional and relational interplay of forms across the porous 
medium of the human body. Indeed it would seem that it is only the fact that the human body and
its extremities can count as both “inside,” as part of the subject, and “outside,” as part of the 
environment, that makes the unconscious morphological borrowing and reflective conceptual 
incorporation that comprise organ projection possible in the first place. A longer passage will be 
useful here.
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Man hat sich vor Allem über den Begriff “Aussenwelt” vollständig klar zu werden. Das 
“In uns” und das “Ausser uns” ist selbst für die Sinnesauffassung nicht so glatt 
geschieden, wie gewöhnlich angenommen wird. Hier giebt es ein streitiges Grenzgebiet. 
Das Ich dictirt, was ihm, je nach gegebenen Relationen, als Aussen gilt. 
Einmal beansprucht das nur in einem bestimmten leiblichen Organismus oder 
vielmehr nur als Organismus existirende Ich den gesammten leiblichen Gliederbestand 
als Innenwelt, ein andermal erklärt es Hand und Fuss zur Aussenwelt gehörig, für 
“Extremitäten,” welche gleich anderen natürlichen Dingen, Steinen etwa und Pflanzen, 
ebenfalls sinnlich wahrgenommen werden. 
Und doch gehört ohne Frage der ganze Leib auch wieder zur inneren Welt. Wird 
auch das Gehirn als alleiniger Denksitz angesehen, als das intellectuelle Innere, so dürfen 
darum z. B. Herz und Rückenmark nicht ausser Acht bleiben, denn nimmermehr vermag 
ein Gehirn für sich allein zu denken, ihm hilft ja der ganze Organismus unbewusst 
mitdenken.
Zunächst ist für uns wichtig eine andere Unterscheidung im Begriff “Aussenwelt,”
sofern für diese die übliche Bezeichnung “Natur” keineswegs ausreicht. 
Zur Aussenwelt des Menschen gehören nämlich eine Menge Dinge; welche, 
abgesehen davon, dass die Natur allerdings das Material für sie liefert, mehr Menschen- 
als Naturwerke sind, und welche als Kunstproducte im Unterschied von Naturproducten 
den Inhalt der Culturwelt ausmachen. Was ausserhalb des Menschen ist, besteht demnach 
aus Natur- und Menschenwerk. (23-24)
In his suggestion that, even for perception, corporal boundaries are not absolute but rather
position the body ambiguously vis-a-vis the perceiving subject, Kapp looks ahead to later 
influential theories of perception and embodiment such as those of Ernst Mach and Helmuth 
Plessner. More significantly for the present context, the terminology of the “Aussenwelt” and 
“Innenwelt” unsettles any strict separation between human subject and non-human nature. Not 
only are the extremities rightly perceived to belong to the external world, available to perception 
like other phenomena, but much of what comprises the external world are in turn cultural, 
human-made artifacts. This result of the externalization involved in human production becomes 
part of a surrounding environment, cognition of which then feeds back into the formation of 
human self-consciousness and knowledge. When making a primitive tool like a stone hammer, 
the projection from the organ the tool is implicitly modeled upon – in this case the arm with the 
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clenched fist or stone at its end44 – is an unconscious one. Yet for Kapp, the very act of thought 
involves a Vorstellen that is already a kind of projection. After reviewing various definitions of 
“Projection,” he defines it spatially, as a kind of externalization in a way that pertains to both 
making and thinking: “In allen diesen Fällen ist Projiciren mehr oder weniger das Vor- oder 
Hervorwerfen, Hervorstellen, Hinausversetzen und Verlegen eines Innerlichen in das Aeussere. 
Projection und Vorstellung sind dem Wortlaut nach eigentlich wenig verschieden, insofern der 
innerliebste Act des Vorstellens nicht frei ist von einem dem vorstellenden Subject gleichsam vor 
Augen gestellten Object” (30).
Yet what this movement of imagination, projection, and realization also means is that, for 
Kapp, nothing can be made by the human that isn’t already ‘in’ the human in some sense. The 
anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism of his theory are necessarily linked in a way that 
already suggests the methodologically circular nature of the teleological progression he 
describes. A short description of the progression between human production and human self-
consciousness illustrates the tautological pitfalls of a conception of a dialectics that sees human 
technological behavior purely in terms of an externalization:
Nachdem hierauf das Selbstbewusstsein, auf Grund seiner Unterscheidung vom 
Unbewussten und vom Bewusstsein, in seinem Zustandekommen durch die äussere Welt 
der Objecte, in deren Bereich namentlich die freien mechanischen Gestaltungen gehören, 
beleuchtet war, erfolgte der Rückschluss auf die Menschenhand, aus der alles Geräthe 
und Werkzeug hervorgeht, und überhaupt auf den leiblichen Organismus, der, wie er sich 
selbst aufbaut, stets auch nur sich selbst producirt und projicirt, nach dem Ursatz, dass 
aus Jeglichem immer nur das, was in ihm liegt, heraustreten kann! (28)
This picture is far removed from a Hegelian or Marxist version of the dialectic. By excising the 
question of intersubjectivity, Kapp also sidesteps the encounter with alterity that characterizes the
44 “Ist demnach der Vorderarm mit zur Faust geballter Hand oder mit deren Verstärkung durch einen fassbaren 
Stein der natürliche Hammer, so ist der Stein mit einem Holzstiel dessen einfachste künstliche Nachbildung. 
Denn der Stiel oder die Handhabe ist die Verlängerung des Armes, der Stein der Ersatz der Faust” (42).
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former’s work and the problems of alienation and conflict uncovered by the latter. Kapp’s picture
of a historical dialectic is a tautology of self-fulfillment, where what is ultimately produced is 
merely a realized version of what was latent from the beginning.45 This allows him to frame 
human history as the culmination and meaning of natural history in a different way than Marx’s 
more nuanced picture of human action as a form of nature acting upon itself:
Wie in der embryonalen Zelle der erwachsene Mensch als Uranlage vorhanden ist, so ist 
die Idee des Menschen der Keim, oder die Uranlage der ganzen organischen Schöpfung. 
Wie immer ist das Ziel zugleich der Uranfang, und der Uranfang zugleich Zweck und 
Ziel der Entwickelung, diese selbst die Einheit eines Weiterschreitens sowohl nach 
rückwärts wie nach vorwärts – die alte schon von Aristoteles ausgesprochene Wahrheit: 
‘Das der Entstehung nach Spätere ist der Idee und der Substanz nach das Frühere.’ (20)46 
For Kapp, the human is the origin and the end of all things. As the crown of organic creation, the 
human body – unconscious source of mechanical principles and forms, embodiment of 
mathematical harmony47 – is also the idea that guides the unfolding of that creation from the 
start.
This more metaphysical side of the theory of organic projection indicates a deeper 
ambivalence in Kapp’s theory between the morphological emphasis on the way that technology 
is modeled after the form of human organs, and a more symbolic connection between the world 
of human products and the natural world. This ambivalence can be seen in Kapp’s threefold use 
of the human hand. As described, the first tools Kapp mobilizes for his account are primitive 
45 The concept of latency is important to his understanding of the relationship between unconsciousness and self-
consciousness, since unconsciousness seems to be that which is simply not yet conscious; the directionality of 
the progression of knowledge also implies a directionality of externalization. The unknown is that which is not 
yet known, but awaits knowledge and externalization. “Da von einem Unbewussten überhaupt nur insofern die 
Rede sein kann, als wir uns bewusst werden, dass ein Unbewusstes ist, und dass unser Bewusstsein nach 
unbewusst in uns wirkenden Vorgängen zu Tage tritt, so ergiebt der Mittelbegriff des Bewusstseins die Einheit 
von Selbstbewusstsein und Unbewusstsein in der Weise, dass unter Geist die sich ihrer bewusst gewordene 
Seele, unter Seele der im Unbewussten latente Geist zu verstehen ist.” (160)
46 Intriguingly, however, expressions like these of Kapp’s teleological solipsism vaguely prefigure later 
developments in theoretical biology, such as the reappropriation of the notion of entelechy by Hans Driesch or 
Ernst Haeckel’s dictum that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.
47 See chapter XI (209-277).
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hammers and axes. These come about through a natural, unconscious extension of the form and 
function of the working hand.48 Yet the hand is not just the model for primitive tools, but the 
origin of a technological stance as such. The relationship for Kapp between the hand and 
technology is not just analogical, but also metonymic: 
Unter den Extremitäten gilt die Hand wegen ihrer dreifachen Bestimmung im verstärkten 
Sinne als Organ. Einmal nämlich ist sie das angeborene Werkzeug, sodann dient sie als 
Vorbild für mechanische Werkzeuge und drittens ist sie als wesentlich betheiligt bei der 
Herstellung dieser stofflichen Nachbildungen, wie Aristoteles sie nennt, – “das Werkzeug 
der Werkzeuge.”
Die Hand ist also das natürliche Werkzeug, aus dessen Thätigkeit das künstliche, 
das Handwerkzeug hervorgeht. Sie liefert in allen denkbaren Weisen ihrer Stellung und 
Bewegung die organischen Urformen, denen der Mensch unbewusst seine ersten 
nothwendigen Geräthe nachgeformt hat. (41)
As technology advances, the ambivalence becomes more pronounced. Examples are marshaled 
to demonstrate the reciprocal morphological connection between products of the human hand and
organs of the human body, such as the relationship between the organ of Corti in the inner ear 
and the harp, the eye and the camera, the nerves and telegraph wire, the bones and principles of 
architecture, and Kapp insists that the development of technology maintains the elementary 
forms of the original organ projection,49 yet the morphological emphasis of the theory becomes 
strained when the book turns to technologies such as language and the state. In these cases, Kapp
48 “Unter Benutzung der in der unmittelbaren Umgebung nächst ‘zur Hand’ befindlichen Gegenstände erscheinen 
die ersten Werkzeuge als eine Verlängerung, Verstärkung und Verschärfung leiblicher Organe.
Ist demnach der Vorderarm mit zur Faust geballter Hand oder mit deren Verstärkung durch einen fassbaren 
Stein der natürliche Hammer, so ist der Stein mit einem Holzstiel dessen einfachste künstliche Nachbildung. 
Denn der Stiel oder die Handhabe ist die Verlängerung des Armes, der Stein der Ersatz der Faust Es ist die 
Gruppe der Hämmer, Aexte und deren nächste Formen aus der Steinzeit, auf welche wir mit Rücksicht auf deren
hervorragende Bedeutung die Auswahl einiger Abbildungen von Werkzeugen beschränken.” (42)
49 “Die bisher aus einem unübersehbaren Vorrath herausgerissenen Beispiele werden genügend darthun, dass die 
elementare Beschaffenheit des Werkzeugs in allen spätern Metamorphosen des Gegenstandes wieder zu 
erkennen ist.
“Die Producte der gesteigertsten Industrie verleugnen nicht ihren Ausgang und ihre wesentliche Bedeutung.
Die Dampfmahlmühle und die Steinhandmühle des Wilden sind eben Vorrichtungen zum Mahlen. Die Seele 
beider ist und bleibt der Mahl- oder Mühlstein, und die beiden concav und convex zusammenpassenden 
Feldsteine, sie waren die erste Vorrichtung zum Ersatz der die Körner zerreibenden Mahlzähne des Gebisses. In 
allen Transformationen der Wasser-, Wind- und Dampfmühlen ist der Theil, welcher sie zu dem macht was sie 
sind, der Mahlstein, der nämliche, wäre er auch wie in der eisernen Handmühle durch Metallscheiben ersetzt.” 
(47) 
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must instead foreground the importance of self-consciousness and the teleological progression of 
Geist.50 Despite the element of analogy involved in the idea of organ projection, Kapp insists it is
not merely a question of analogy, but that there are deeper causal principles at play, linking the 
products of human invention with the anatomical intricacies of human organs.51 The organ of 
Corti in the inner ear and the principles of tonal frequency made manifest in the harp or piano are
not just accidentally similar, but are connected in a deeper way.52 As he writes, “Der Rapport 
zwischen der mechanischen Vorrichtung und einem bestimmten organischen Gebilde ist 
prädestinirt. So finden sich Lupe und Auge das eine im anderen, die schwingende Saite und das 
Ohr, das Pumpwerk und das Herz, die Pfeife und der Kehlkopf, der Brückenträger und der 
Oberschenkelknochen, ebenso wie Handwerkzeug und Hand” (122-123).
The basic working principles of organs and tools are due, in Kapp’s account, evidently 
not to the fact that forms that work based on patterns or principles of nature, whatever their 
origin, are preserved and modified, but to a deeper teleological convergence that links 
mechanical perfectibility and organic evolution.53 What this means is that the concept of organic 
projection is also gradually unmoored from the evidence of formal similarity; what is projected is
50 “Aber nicht allein in dieser stofflichen Welt, sondern auch da, wohin der Schluss unserer Betrachtung drängt, in 
der Welt des Geistes, die uns, mit C. G. Carus zu reden, einen ‘mit dem palpablen Gliederbau in Substanzeinheit
sich darlebenden spirituellen Organismus zum Bewusstsein bringt,’ breitet sich ein Analogon aus, dessen 
logische Momente, zwar nicht so sinnenfasslich wie die Movimente der harten Materie, aber um so 
durchsichtiger und bleibender in stets höheren Graden der Energie des Selbstbewusstseins teleologisch zur 
Erscheinung kommt.” (91)
51 “Demgemäss hat alles Spielen der Phantasie mit beliebigen durch ‘gleichwie,’ ‘gleichsam,’ ‘gewissermaassen’ 
eingeführten Vergleichen der Thatsache der Organprojection Platz zu machen. Denn sie ist es, auf deren Grund 
die Lehre von den Tonempfindungen den Faden entdeckt hat, an dessen Führung die weitere Forschung im 
‘Labyrinth’ des Gehörsinnes vor Verirrung geschützt ist.” (91)
52 Quoting Helmholtz, Kapp writes, “‘Ein solches Miniaturclavier mit Nerven ist in der That die Schnecke, die wir 
im Ohre haben’” (86).
53 “So entspricht der organischen Entwickelungstheorie eine mechansiche Vervollkommnungspraxis vom 
Steinhammer des Urmenschen aufwärts durch alle Werkzeuge, Apparate und Maschinen einfacherer 
Construction hindurch bis zu demjenigen complicirten Mechanismus, in welchem man die Mustermaschine 
anerkennt, deshalb weil sie von der Wissenschaft gewürdigt ist, als Werkzeug und als eine Art physikalischen 
Apparates zum Verständniss der Wechselwirkung der Naturkräfte und der Lebensvorgänge im Organismus zu 
dienen.” (133)
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not the unconsciously intended physical form of a human bodily organ, but rather, the extended 
mental apparatus of intentionality, instrumentality, and conceptualization as such, to the point 
where technology is a sheer expression of spirit:
Unsere Betrachtung kommt dem Punkt immer näher, wo der Begriff des Werkzeugs über 
die seinen Inhalt ausmachenden, aus dem Rohstoff geformten Mechanismen hinweg seine
gewöhnliche Fassung so zu erweitern beginnt, dass er sich auch auf weniger sinnlich 
greifbare Formirungen erstreckt, bis er schliesslich, sublimirt zum Begriff von Mittel und 
Werkzeug in höchster und allgemeinster Bedeutung, seine Stoffe sich unmittelbar aus der 
Werkstätte des Geistes selbst liefern lässt. (150)
Likewise, language is both an example of organ projection and stands on its own because of its 
comparative immateriality. 
Wenn nun derselbe Gang in der Entwickelung der Sprache sich kundgiebt, so 
unterscheidet sich diese von allen anderen Gestaltungen der Organprojection doch 
wesentlich dadurch, dass sie frei von den Hemmungen ist, welche der Widerstand des 
festen Materials dem Gestaltungsbedürfniss verursacht. In dem gefügigsten und einem 
gewissermaassen geisthaften Elemente sich bewegend, lässt sie das Werkzeug und die es 
formende organische Thätigkeit in einheitlichem Verband erscheinen. Hiervon kann man, 
ohne gerade paradox zu sein, sagen, das Denken sei eben so wohl Werkzeug der Sprache, 
wie diese das Werkzeug des Denkens. (289)
Language is necessarily a kind of organ projection, in the sense detailed earlier, of the spatial 
relationship between projection and thought, making and externalization. Yet this does not 
entirely explain how projection is to be understood at all if it can also work “unencumbered” by 
the very material, morphological dimension that has been necessary to its functioning (and 
identification) up to this point. It seems clear that Kapp wants to mark, in the chapter on 
language, a turning point in his account where the progression reaches a kind of fulfillment. This 
could be a way of accounting for the chiasmus at the end of the passage quoted above, expressing
a reciprocal and dialectical relationship between thought and language, whereby each is able to 
use the other as its instrument. Yet given the fact that the progression of anthropological history 
up to this point in the book had depended on material production taking the forms of anatomical 
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organs, and thereby serving as visible products of human interiority (the “Innenwelt”) in the 
external world and thus sparking the realizations that had led to self-consciousness and, beyond, 
to science, it is unclear how language is able to work in a similar way through its purported 
immateriality, let alone why it shouldn’t have played this function earlier on. In other words, if 
language is able to be the tool of thought and also use thought as its own tool, the entire premise 
of the theory – that unconscious organ projection leads to self-conscious awareness of anatomy, 
science, and everything else – seems unnecessarily circuitous. Put slightly differently, the way 
Kapp’s accounts culminates in a few choice organic unities undermines the historical progress of 
organs presumably necessary to attain these unities in the first place.54 This tension would seem 
to be another manifestation of the methodological circularity of his anthropocentric teleology, 
where the human is both the culmination of an organic drive and is presumed at the outset as a 
kind of guiding idea in nature.
When the discussion turns to machines, the focus shifts away from anthropomorphic 
projection in favor of an extended consideration of the nature of machines. Yet after a lengthy 
engagement with Franz Reuleaux’s theory of kinematics, Kapp arrives again at the human. As 
was the case with Marx, Kapp describes modern machines as assemblages that incorporate living
labor, yet lacking any economic dimension and foregrounding instead kinematic motion, Kapp 
derives from modern machinery a symbolic justification of the modern state as a force of 
limitation on individual freedom. While at first glance the contemporary specificity with which 
he addresses machines and kinematics might seem to avoid some of the hoarier spirituality 
54 “Die Sprache unterscheidet sich aber von den übrigen Gestaltungen der Organprojection sehr wesentlich 
dadurch, dass sie das Abbild nicht bloss einer für sich in Betracht gezogenen Organgruppe, sondern einer 
Totalität organischer Funktionsbeziehungen ist. Als die durchsichtige Form eines organischen Gesammtbildes 
würde sie, in solcher Abstraction von der auch ihr zu Gebote stehenden Technik, immerhin nur als Schemen 
eines Organismus gelten dürfen, wenn nicht die Thatsache der Entwickelung der Technik durch die Sprache und
der Sprache durch die Technik beide als Seiten derselben organischen Einheit erscheinen liesse.” (308, italics 
added)
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involved in his transfer of a material logic of projection to the domain of pure Geist, the function 
of the discussion of machines is ultimately to arrive at the state as the organic unity of human 
existence and the triumphant resolution of the divide between the organic and the mechanical. 
Following Reuleaux, Kapp describes the machine chiefly in terms of transmission and 
especially in terms of the basic unit of paired elements.55 Marx, it should be recalled, defined the 
machine in terms of the working end of the machine, as opposed to either the source of power or 
means of transmission, because the working end of the machine liberated the labor process from 
the organic limits of the single human body, and thereby allowed the individual worker to 
produce more value in a given amount of time. Where Marx thus discussed machines in terms of 
the changing value relationship between human bodies and labor, Kapp is more interested in the 
kinds of motion allowed for and limited by the machine. Where the machine becomes for Marx 
the materialization of the incorporation of living labor by capital, for Kapp the machine is a 
model of the state. The basic logic of organ projection is preserved in the development of the 
machine – Kapp identifies the stick spun back and forth by human hands in order to start a fire as
the origin of the machine56 – yet it should be noted that the logic has shifted somewhat. The tool 
is no longer the projection of a particular anatomical organ, but the idea of two connected parts in
relative motion to each other is emphasized instead. Gone is the need for tools to physically 
resemble parts of the human body, but the developmental logic of complex from simple 
technologies is preserved.57
55 “Der Grundzug der Maschine ist nämlich ihre Zusammensetzung nicht sowohl aus Element, sondern aus 
paarweise zusammengehörenden Körpern oder Elementenpaaren. Von diesen bildet eins die Umhüllungsform 
des anderen, so dass, wenn man das eine feststellt, das andere beweglich bleibt, aber nur in der einzigen, dem 
Paare eigenthümlichen Weise, wie dies ersichtlich ist z.B. an der Schraube und der Schraubenmutter. Die 
Bewegung des einen Elementes verhält sich relativ zu dem zugehörigen Element, absolut aber zu dem Punkte 
der räumlichen Feststellung.” (175-176) 
56 “Demnach wäre also das Doppelholz des Reibholzfeuerzeuges in seiner quirlartigen Drehbewegung die 
allererste Maschine oder die erste Vorrichtung, welche diesen Namen verdient.” (180)
57 Kapp’s other examples of circular motion – potters’ wheels, water wheels, lathe – similarly elide the 
morphological requirements of organ projection, shifting the emphasis instead to the development of a kind of 
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Also maintained is the reflective process whereby technology illustrates facets of the 
human, yet here too what is illustrated is not a principle of anatomy (as it was with the organ of 
Corti, the lenses of the eye, or the fine structure of bones) but rather symbolic traits of the human
soul. “So mögen denn Kraftschluss und Paarschluss in Zukunft ihre psycho-physische 
Würdigung finden, indem der in der Culturwelt vorhandene machinale Gedanke in der 
erklärenden Rückbeziehung auf seinen Urgrund neue Schlaglichter auf das Wesen der 
menschlichen Seele und auf die Geisteswelt überhaupt zu werfen berufen ist” (188). 
“Kraftschluss” is the name given by Reuleaux to a mechanical configuration such as that found 
in a water wheel, where the axle is unsecured and would be expected to rise were it not for the 
counteracting weight of the water wheel itself. A “Paarschluss,” on the other hand, is a pair of 
elements such as found in a bolt and nut arrangement, where the connection is fully closed to 
outside disruptions (184). Quoting Reuleaux, Kapp identifies in the progression from the former 
to the latter a model of progress: “Der Fortschritt nun in der Vervollkommnung der Maschine 
besteht ‘in der abnehmenden Verwendung des Kraftschlusses bei zunehmender Ersetzung 
desselben durch den Paarschluss und den Schluss der dabei sich bildenden kinematischen 
Kette’” (184).
The way that the openness of the Kraftschluss gives way to the closed kinematic linkage 
of the Paarschluss becomes a parable of human society and a metaphysics of power and 
discipline.58 The gradual perfection of machines on the kinematic level implicates an ideal of 
human society and reinforces the teleological motion towards a version of the Prussian state. The
circular motion from simple tools to complex machines. On the Gedankenfigur of circular motion in the 19th 
century and the kinematics of Reuleaux in particular, see Helmut Müller-Sievers, The Cylinder: Kinematics of 
the Nineteenth Century (2012)
58 On the relationship between the two kinds of pairs and their relationship to “freedom” (in an engineering sense) 
in Reuleaux’s work, see Müller-Sievers (34-36): “One way of describing this development in kinematic terms – 
and in terms provocatively contrary to liberal philosophies of history – is to chart is as the successive 
elimination of freedoms.” (36)
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human is not merely the source of machines and technology in general, but is understood as a 
machine system.
Die erhabene Warte für eine weite Rundschau ist errichtet. Unter Beziehung auf die an 
sich unabhängig von einander wirkenden kosmischen Kräfte und auf die der Einwirkung 
eines Motors entgegenwirkenden, im Bestand der Maschine verborgenen 
Molecularkräfte, sowie mit der Erinnerung daran, dass der Kraftschluss die Form ist, in 
welcher ein Rest kosmischer Freiheit den machinalen Systemen beigemengt ist, wird auf 
das Uebergangsgebiet hingedeutet, welches aus dem ideal machinalen System in das 
kosmische überleitet. Fügen wir hinzu, dass dem Kosmos der Mikrokosmos eingeboren 
ist, und dass der Mensch selbst, wie er leibt und lebt, das ideal machinale System 
darstellt! (188)
In order for this culmination of the integration between the human and the machine to be 
realized, the literal incorporation of humans and machines must first be portrayed. Where Marx 
had analyzed the incorporation of the worker within the machine system as the concretization of 
a value relationship between living and dead labor, Kapp emphasizes by contrast the kinematic 
incorporation of the living body into the machine, in order to present a parable of power.59
Yet this picture of human society as a disciplined body is not an only insight that comes 
about through a consideration of kinematics, but is in a way presupposed by the beginnings of 
labor, in Kapp’s account. History begins with human labor, and recognizable history is marked 
by the division of labor into castes and an organization (“Gliederung”) into estates. 
Insofern man die Geschichte als die Aufeinanderfolge der menschlichen Arbeit auffasst, 
ist auch die erste Arbeit, um das Geringste davon auszusagen, der geschichtartige Anfang,
und die Urgeschichte selbst lässt sich weiterhin erst von da zu erkennbarer Geschichte an,
wo eine berufsgleiche Scheidung der Arbeitenden in der Arbeitstheilung zu erscheinen 
beginnt, und die allmälige feste Sonderung in Kasten und die staatliche Gliederung zu 
Ständen vorbereitet. (34)
If by definition human work and human society are characterized by static caste divisions, 
59  “Bei der Analysirung der vollständigen Maschine kommt die Menschenhand selbstverständlich nach einer 
hiervon verschiedenen Richtung in Betracht. Sie fügt sich nämlich dem Maschinengetriebe als Organ ein, ja es 
betheiligt der Arbeiter, z. B. am Spinnrad oder am Schleifstein, seine Gliedmaassen unter der Leitung der 
Willenskraft derart an dem Getriebe, dass er seinen organisch arbeitenden Körper als ein für sich bestehendes 
kinematisches Getriebe mit der leblos arbeitenden Maschine in geschlossene kinematische Verkettung setzt.” 
(197)
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modeled after the limbs of a human body, then we may speak of a different sort of organ 
projection than that involved in the development of tools, technology, and self-consciousness. 
This anthropocentrism is less methodologically self-aware than axiomatic. If human history is 
determined by human labor, and the latter in turn necessitates a fixed division into castes (rather 
than the more relational, antagonistic idea of classes, for example), then the version of a state that
is the telos of Kapp’s account cannot come as a surprise. And indeed, just as the limitation of 
power in order to harness it is a key feature of the modern machine, limitation and discipline 
come to be the hallmarks of a state, which in turn is seen as the entity that can restore balance to 
the unfortunate disharmonies of industrialization.
Die Extreme der Anhäufung von Lebenssäften auf Einen [sic] Arbeitspunkt und die 
Verödung auf allen übrigen laufen hier wie dort schliesslich stets auf Verkümmerung 
hinaus. Das heilsame Gleichgewicht muss sich herstellen, wenn der Ueberfluss an 
Arbeitskräften in friedlicher Ablösung theils der benachtheiligten Agricultur 
zurückgegeben, theils in die durch Arbeitsmaschinen regenerirten häuslichen Werkstätten 
übergeleitet sein wird. 
Die Dampfmächte, welche den socialen Sturm heraufgeführt haben, sie allein 
können und werden ihn wieder beschwören. Allen, die da berufen sind, die schwüle 
Zeitfrage vorurtheilsfrei zu betrachten, wird es im Lichte der Theoretischen Kinematik60 
wie Schuppen von den Augen fallen, wenn es heisst: “Weise Beschränkung schuf den 
Staat, sie allein erhält ihn und befähigt ihn zu den grössten Leistungen; Beschränkung 
hat uns in der Maschine allmälig die gewaltigsten Kräfte unterworfen und lenksam an 
unsere Schritte gefesselt.” (201)
Without an idea of modernization that sees its disruptions as momentary breaks in an equilibrium
that can be restored by the same forces that disturbed it, it is difficult to see how Kapp could have
arrived at the notion of the state that he does. The greater usefulness of Marx’s account of 
technology, compared to that of Kapp’s, can perhaps also be seen in the fact that he provided a 
model of modernization, urbanization, and accumulation that still has analytic traction today, 
while it is difficult to imagine what might be salvaged from Kapp’s essentially harmonious 
60 i.e., Reuleaux’s 1875 book, Theoretische Kinematik.
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picture of labor crises and the relationship between agriculture, industry, and technology. Yet 
aside from questions of usefulness, it is essential to recognize the figure structuring Kapp’s 
account of modernization, for in it we can see the same logic of Gliederung that informs the 
picture of castes that mark for him human labor as such.
In other words, while the emphasis on paired machine elements need not reinforce the 
holistic integrity of the integral body (and indeed, one can imagine many versions of the 
relationship between machines and bodies that disrupt the boundaries of the individual body, as 
in Döblin’s novel discussed in my next chapter), Kapp connects the idea of kinematic linkages to 
the organization (Gliederung) of the individual body in order to reinforce its integrity and the 
resemblance between machines and organisms.
Das kinematische Getriebe ist der reale Fortsatz der leibhaftigen organischen Kinese,61 
welche Reuleaux als die lebendige Arbeitsmaschine von jener als der leblosen scharf 
unterscheidet.
Die lebendige Arbeitsmaschine ist also, um einmal figürlich weiter zu sprechen, 
jedenfalls Maschine, aber sie ist die Maschine, welche vor allen durch Menschenhand 
gebildeten Maschinen vorhanden war, die allgemeine Maschine, das allen besonderen 
Formen der Maschinentechnik gemeinsame Ur- und Musterbild, die leibhaftige 
Maschine, eine aus organischen Gliederpaaren bestehende kinetische Gelenkverkettung, 
kurz der leibliche Organismus oder die Idealmaschine, mit dem Willen als eingeborenem 
Motor für sie selbst, und als Universalmotor für die Gesammtheit der machinalen 
Erzeugnisse!
Wo jedes Glied eines untheilbaren Ganzen ein elementares natürliches Werkzeug 
ist, da erscheint das Ganze als Gliederung. Die lebendige kinetische Gliederung des 
Organismus ist in machinaler Entäusserung kinematische Verkettung von Stücken und 
Theilen. (205)
Kapp is preserving a distinction between living organism and machine, but he is differentiating 
between them in order ultimately to insist on the primacy of the integral living body over the 
61 In defining these terms on the previous page, Kapp had assigned the organism to the active pole and mechanism 
to the passive pole in this relationship. “Vorausgesetzt die Beschränkung auf das Gebiet der Artefacte, gehört 
daher das Wort Kinematik (von ϰίνημα, das Bewegte) dem Mechanismus an, wie das von uns mehrfach 
gebrauchte Kinese (von ϰίνησις, das Bewegen) dem Organismus. Diese Zerlegung des Begriffes der Bewegung 
in active und passive dürfte einer befriedigenden Erklärung des Verhältnisses von Organismus und Maschine 
wesentlich zu statten kommen.” (204)) In this way he is able to both preserve the projective connection between 
the machine and the human hand, and also maintain the priority and agency of the organic.
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machine within the shared space of their fundamental similarity. In other words, he needs to be 
able to both show that the machine is made in the image of man and to maintain the organic 
superiority of the human – in this way, the juxtaposition of Gliederung and Verkettung is both 
contrastive and analogical. 
Furthermore, the resemblance he identifies between the organism and the machine 
ultimately allows for an analogy between the body and the state. This analogy is not however a 
rewarmed version of the older idea of the body politic, but also depends on features of organ 
projection and particularly the logic of externalization.62 By this logic, then, the state is both a 
technology and is itself a kind of body, with its own division of labor, its own organs fulfilling 
their assigned functions, and its total functional harmony: “Im Staat giebt es so viele 
Grundthätigkeiten wie im leiblichen Organismus. An ihnen hat er sein Bestehen, seinen Bestand, 
seine Stände. Sie sind ihm von der Natur vorgedacht und vorgegliedert. Ihren Reflex nach oben 
bilden die Fachministerien” (318).63 
The logic of the nexus Kapp has arrived at, connecting the conceptual and metaphorical 
62 While the basic contours of organ projection up to this point, as seen in the example of the hammer, had 
suggested the absence or at least unimportance of social exchange and intersubjectivity, here the importance of 
Gemeinschaft makes a strong appearance, as Kapp leads the reader in short order from human action to the 
necessity of the state:
“Die Thätigkeit des Menschen überhaupt, auch die artefactische (hantalunga ahd. die Bearbeitung einer 
Sache) wird zur Handlung (handelunge mhd. die Behandlung, Verhandlung), zum beabsichtigten Handeln.
“Wie einem Einsiedler sein Thun oder seine Beschäftigung vorkommt, ist durchaus gleichgültig, da der 
Mensch nur in der menschlichen Gemeinschaft als solcher Geltung hat. Nur ihr steht es zu, mit Urtheil und 
Gegenhandlung das Thun des Einzelnen abzuweisen oder sich gefallen zu lassen.
“In jedem menschlichen Gemeinwesen aber setzt sich das fort, was allen Individuen das Gemeinsamste ist, 
der menschliche leibliche Organismus. Daher ist auch der Staat der werdende Organismus, d.h. er ist die zur res 
publica und externa werdende res interna der Menschennatur und ihre organische Totalprojection.” (309)
63 Kapp describes the social body of the state as follows: “Wie nun mit der Thätigkeit der Gliedmaassen die 
Sonderarbeit der Individuen, so stimmen die Functionen der grossen einheitlichen organischen Heerde 
(Ernährungs-, Gefäss-, Athmungs- und Nervensystem) mit der auf Arbeitsiheilung basirten berufsständischen 
Gliederung der Massen, je nach deren Richtung auf Ackerbau, Gewerbfleiss, Handel und Pflege der Intelligenz. 
Auch die Erweiterung der berufsständischen Thätigkeit und ihre Fortsetzung nach aussen, sowohl die Gründung 
von Pflanz- und Töchteransiedlungen, das Colonialwesen, als auch das die Existenz der Gesellschaft schützende
Heerwesen, haben beide ihre organischen Analoga. Diese bestehen theils in den Einrichtungen zur 
Fortpflanzung der Gattung, theils in dem Knochengeitige, welches, in seiner nunmehr erkannten Bestimmung 
als Organ der Fest- und Selbständigkeit, den gliederigen Unterschied und den Aufrechthalt des Ganzen 
ausmacht.” (318)
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fields of bodies, organs, machines, and the state, means that the state is thus also both a 
harmonious well-ordered whole and a model of mechanical integration, in the form of discipline. 
Just as the increasing perfection of the machine constrains the kinematic connections in 
increasingly closed paired connections,64 the state as telos of human existence subordinates 
individuals to the needs and form of the whole.
Es ist eine höchst überraschende Thatsache, dass auch die Entwickelung der 
menschlichen Gesellschaft das nämliche Fundament hat. Es ist die Unterordnung des 
Einzelwillens unter den höheren, und kommt am schärfsten ausgebildet als militärische 
Disciplin zur Erscheinung. Dies vorausgeschickt nennen wir geradezu den Theil und 
Vollschluss des Elementenpaares die Disciplin der Maschine, und bezeichnen dem 
entsprechend die Disciplin des Heeres als Vollschluss von Befehl und Gehorsam. Wir 
halten ausserdem bei dieser Verwendung des Ausdrucks Disciplin dessen 
Doppelbedeutung fest, einerseits die paarige Uebereinstimmung der Elemente, welche 
sowohl die Dienstordnung der Maschine als auch die des Heeres bedingt, andererseits die 
Kenntniss und die Wissenschaft von der Erzeugung und Aufrechterhaltung dieser 
Erfolge.” (339)
The proto-Foucauldian ambivalence of “discipline” is worth noting here, because it affirms the 
two strands of the book that converge in Kapp’s picture of the state: from the beginning, the 
process of organic projection has been both a material process and an epistemological one. These
two dimensions come together in a teleological fulfillment that incorporates the subject of 
technological organ projection – namely, the human – within that subject’s own fully realized 
projection. As in Marx, we have a kind of organic inversion that incorporates the human within 
the machine, but here the process is welcomed. And because Kapp has from the beginning 
insisted upon a strong anthropocentrism, the mechanical, disciplinary aspects of the state are 
64 “Wie sich oben, S. 184, herausgestellt hat, beginnt die Entwickelung der Maschine mit dem Elementenpaar, 
dessen charakteristische Eigenschaft darin besteht, dass das eine Element die Umhüllungsform des anderen ist 
und dass ihre Bewegung nur in der Einen, der paarigen Aneinanderschliessung eigenthümlichen Weise vor sich 
gehen kann. Ist das eine Element festgestellt, so ist die Bewegung des anderen eine absolute zum Punkte der 
räumlichen Feststellung; ohne solche Feststellung bewegen sie sich relativ zu einander.
Die Form ihrer Zusammenschliessung mag hier, je nach Befund einer nur theilweisen oder einer vollständigen 
Umhüllung als Theilschluss und als Vollschluss bezeichnet werden. Da nun die zwangsläufige Bewegung des 
theilschlüssigen Elementenpaares nie ganz sicher ist, die des vollschlüssigen aber Störungen fernhält, so beruht 
überhaupt auf der zunehmenden Ablösung des Theilschlusses durch Vollschluss der Fortschritt in der 
Vervollkommnung der Maschine.” (338-339)
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recuperated within a larger, transcendental organic logic. Notably, however, the organic quality of
the state is due precisely to its status as the expression of human action and purposes: 
Wie nun im Einzelorganismus, dessen ursprünglich anorganische oder chemische 
Bestandtheile kraft der organischen Idee andere Verbindungen eingehen, als sie je im 
Bereiche der Chemie möglich sind: so gewinnt auch der stoftliche Bestand des Staates, 
sein Grund und Boden nämlich und sein gesammter technischer Inhalt, in der 
Betheiligung an organischem Leben eine Bedeutung, welche ihn wesentlich von allem 
dem unterscheidet, was nie mit menschlichen Zwecken in Berührung war. (343)
Human historical existence is by definition an existence in the context of the state for Kapp, and 
the state, as the depository of all human action and organization, has the organic qualities of the 
whole, despite the fact that it is also a technological artifact made by humans.65 As the 
culmination and framework of all human making, the state is the organic unity of all machines 
and mechanical endeavors, and thus also the resolution of the contradiction between the 
mechanic and the organic.
Der Staat, wenn auch noch so unvollkommen oder verkommen, bleibt 
Organismus und ist nie eine Maschine. Ueberhaupt bezeichnet das Maschinenmässige, 
auf den Einzelnen wie auf die Gesellschaft angewandt, meistentheils nur einen hohen 
Grad von Gedankenlosigkeit und gewohnheitlichem Schablonenthum. Staat sein heisst 
sich als Organismus verhalten. Deshalb kann er nie ganz mechanisch sein, wohl aber 
giebt es innerhalb seiner Maschinen, die als Einzelmechanismen vom Einzelorganismus 
unterschieden werden müssen, die aber als Ganzes im Ganzen der vom Staate selbst 
tauglich zum Angeeignetwerden zugerichtete Stoff seiner Selbsterhaltung sind. 
Wir sind nunmehr auf dem Höhenpunkt unserer Untersuchung angelangt und 
sehen das Product der Menschenhand, das in seiner Form von Einzelmechanismen bisher 
vor jeder Vermengung mit organischen Gebilden behütet war, in seiner Gesammtheit mit 
der Gesammtheit der menschlichen Individuen zu organisch gesellschaftlicher Einheit 
verschmolzen. In dieser Form also, im stofflichen Bestand des Staatskörpers, ist der in 
den Einzelartefacten sich forterhaltende Gegensatz von Mechanismus und Organismus 
65 “Wo nur immer der historische, d. h. der in staatlicher Gemeinschaft lebende Mensch einem Gegenstand Spuren 
des Geistes aufgeprägt hat, da erscheint ein solcher Stoff an der Geschichte betheiligt und ist, weil der 
historische Process und die Entwickelung des Staatsorganismus identisch sind, in staatsorganischer Verbindung. 
“So wenig also ein lebendiger Menschenkörper existirt ohne sinnliche Realität, eben so wenig giebt es 
einen Staatskörper ohne sinnliches Material zum Selbstaufbau. Der von Menschenhand geformte Stoff in seiner 
Gesammtheit ist demnach als staatsorganischer Bestand frei von mechanischer Besonderheit, gleich wie 
Anorganisches, dem lebendigen Körper nach der organischen Idee eingeordnet, ebenfalls zu organischer 
Constitution wird.” (344)
Earlier Kapp had made explicit the centrality and necessity of the state for his idea of human historical 
development: “Denn eine staatlose Cultur und culturlose Staaten hat es niemals gegeben.” (334)
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aufgehoben. ” (344-345)
The state for Kapp is a particular kind of second nature, one that recapitulates the organization 
and unity of the individual human body. The lengthy mediation from the body to the state passes 
through technological production. Unconsciously projecting the forms of their organs into tools 
from the stone hammer to the telegraph network, humans externalize what is latent and 
unconscious, so that it becomes a part of the external world and can be reincorporated into 
consciousness and self-consciousness. This process allows for aspects of technology not only to 
illuminate features of human anatomy, but to generate a kind of ethics of discipline and 
limitation. Kinematics not only tells us about how human limbs and joints work together, but 
provides a model of connection, linkage, and control that inflects the picture of the state. Thus by
the time Kapp’s account reaches its culmination in the state’s organic body, it is an organic body 
that has thoroughly incorporated the lessons of the machine. The primacy of the organic was 
never in doubt in this narrative – Kapp’s methodologically tautological anthropocentrism had 
insisted upon it from the beginning. But the passage through technology, machines, and 
kinematics means that this organicism is also deeply mechanical. The particular way Kapp yokes 
the organ to the machine means that modern industrial society can be seen ultimately as a 
harmonious whole, for example, but also that his anatomical picture of state order can count on 
the precision and control of machine linkages.
His account is interesting because it represents a deliberate reconsideration of the 
relationship between the mechanical and the organic66 and an attempt to reseat the organic as the 
origin of the mechanical, to show their deeper unity. Contrary to the Cartesian relegation of 
66 In his 1848 critique of Prussian bureaucracy, Kapp had described the state in negative terms as a machine and 
freedom positively, as an organism: “Also Mechanismus gleich Despotismus, Organismus gleich Freiheit.” See 
Hans-Martin Sass’ introduction to Grundlinien (xxiv).
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bodies to extension and thus to a mechanical logic, or La Mettrie’s radical materialism in 
L’Homme Machine, Kapp resituates all machines as organic projections within an organic unity. 
To historicize Kapp would be to see him as presenting a synthesis of contemporary scientific 
discourses such as medicine and anatomy (Virchow, e.g.) and kinematics (Reuleaux), but in 
doing so the larger project is to square the conceptual realms of the organic and the mechanical 
as key dimensions of human existence per se. His tautological insistence on the primacy of the 
organic over the mechanical may ultimately limit this project, however, and it, coupled with his 
blindness towards class, social antagonism, or economic specificity leads to the now charmingly 
steampunk culmination of his account in the railroad, the telegraph network, and the disciplined, 
militarized Prussian state. Ultimately this seems to be a vision that cannot leave the 19th century, 
even while its consideration of the relationship between the organic and the mechanical is useful 
for considering the relationship between body and tool as a question of philosophical 
anthropology. It is also a vision in which technology is more clearly (albeit implicitly) gendered, 
I would argue, than in Marx’s or Plessner’s theories. By making artifacts like the hammer and ax 
the primal manifestations of human technology – manifestations that lessened the need for the in-
built weapons of tooth and claw (36) – Kapp essentializes technology not only as a projective 
force, but also as belonging to a particularly aggressive, bellicose, and male sphere. The agent of 
technology and making implied by Kapp’s theory of organ projection is the solitary maker and 
fighter. The primal technologies that comprise his evidence are tools that cleave and break. As a 
thought experiment, it is instructive to consider the impact on the possibilities for organ 
projection if one considered technologies – equally primal in a chronological sense – more often 
coded as female, technologies of weaving, binding, tying, and the like.67
67 While the archaeological record of organic materials less long-lived than stone is notoriously patchy (and thus 
whole histories of different forms of early technology have likely been lost), Kapp could have turned to 
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Kapp’s account of the relationship between the human body, technology, and environment
is flexible to the extent that the border between Innenwelt and Außenwelt is not firmly fixed, but 
rather has a tolerable margin of conceptual movement, such that anatomical organs and 
technological artifacts can occupy both sides of the border at once. This has the useful effect of 
problematizing any fixed dualism between nature and culture, human and environment. Yet 
despite the opening of this conceptual space, Kapp maintains a hierarchy based upon the primacy
of the human and the organic over the non-human and mechanical. Ultimately, the limitation of 
his account stems from its methodological circularity, where the human is his alpha and omega, 
the pinnacle that is presupposed.
Helmuth Plessner, the levels of the organic, and the natural artificiality of the human
Half a century later, Helmuth Plessner will offer a theory of the human that also places it 
at the top of a series of Stufen. But unlike Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik, Plessner’s 
1928 Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch carefully elaborates this anthropological 
position out of a theorization of various kinds of life. Far more methodologically rigorous than 
Kapp’s work (and, to be sure, having the advantage of fifty years of theoretical and empirical 
biology), Plessner’s book articulates the status of the human as part of a logical continuum, not 
only with other kinds of living beings such as animals and plants, but with phenomenologically 
accessible things in general. Out of this positionality he develops a theory of consciousness and a
picture of the human that necessitates a technological attitude towards the world – humankind’s 
literature for a logic of tools other than the hammer and the ax. Penelope’s burial shroud or Philomela’s narrative
tapestry, for example, suggest an idea of human making that involves weaving, narrative, and social – rather 
than individual – action: textiles as text.
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“natural artificiality.” This avoids the metaphysics and methodological circularity of Kapp’s 
account, and it is working in a different area than Marx’s picture. Yet a certain similarity between
Marx’s picture of technology and Plessner’s is instructive. Where for Marx, technology is 
inextricable from its role in a specific political economy, Plessner’s anthropology – and 
especially his famous dictum that the human being is artificial by nature – depends on its position
within his philosophical biology. Thus compared to Kapp’s elevation of the technological within 
a predetermined anthropocentric framework, Marx and Plessner seem to suggest the drawbacks 
of an account that conceptually isolates “technology” as a category of inquiry. The fact that the 
human for Plessner is artificial and technological because of biological facts rather than in spite 
of them, and Plessner’s distinction of his positional account of the human from the pessimistic 
anthropology of the Mängelwesen, cause problems for Helmut Lethen’s mobilization of 
Plessner’s anthropology in the service of a cold persona against the expressive logic of the 
creaturely. The particular way that Plessner develops his conception of the human as eccentric 
being out of a logic immanent to living creatures in general may shed some needed light onto the 
technological (and political) imaginaries of the Weimar Republic. As we will also see in the cases
of Döblin and Jünger, Plessner’s human is technological not in opposition to organic, natural, or 
creaturely logics and registers, but precisely through them. 
Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch leads the reader to a picture of the human in 
a way that each step – from thing to living thing, from plant to animal, from animal to human – is
marked by a positional shift in an entity’s relationship to itself. In establishing the parameters of 
the problem, Plessner lays out the philosophical context as a broadly post-Cartesian one.68 By 
retracing various answers to and dilemmas of the dualism between the res extensa and res 
68 “...immer natürlich im Geiste der catesianischen Alternative und nicht nach dem historischen Descartestext 
gesprochen,” as Plessner puts it in an early aside. (87)
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cogitans, Plessner introduces the question as one of positionality. The original ontological 
distinction between the res extensa and the res cogitans had come to be mapped onto a 
methodological and disciplinary distinction between physical matter and selfhood, quantity and 
quality,69 and (by implication) the natural and the human sciences.70 In light of this, Plessner asks,
how is it possible to account for the non-quantifiable aspects of the physical world and 
particularly of living bodies?71 And is there a way to account for intersubjectivity, given that the 
radical doubt of the Cartesian framework can be said to consign other selves to the realm of 
extension?72 And finally, within the context of the ontological rift of Doppelaspektivität between 
mind and matter and the concomitant rupture between the human and natural sciences, is there a 
69 “Ursprünglich zwar ist die Scheidung allen Seins in res extensa und res cogitans ontologisch gemeint. Sie erhält 
jedoch von selbst eine methodologisch fortwirkende Bedeutung, die sie in gewissem Sinne der ontologischen 
Kritik entzieht. Mit der Gleichsetzung von Körperlichkeit und Ausdehnung ist die Natur ausschließlich der 
messenden Erkenntnis zugänglich gemacht. Alles, was an ihr zur intensiven Mannigfaltigkeit der Qualitäten 
gehört, muß als solches für cogitativ gehalten werden, da zur einzigen Gegensphäre der Ausdehnung die res 
cogitans bestimmt ist. Es gibt demnach nur die beiden Möglichkeiten, entweder die qualitativen Daseins- und 
Erscheinungsweisen der Körper mechanisch aufzufassen, sie also in Quantitäten aufzulösen, oder aber bei 
Vermeidung dieser Analyse sie für Inhalte von Cogitationen, für Inhalte und Produkte unserer Innerlichkeit zu 
erklären.” (79-80)
70 “Als das zunächst Wichtige darf man festhalten: Daß das Bewußtsein, das eigene Ich die Verantwortung für die 
nichtquantitativen Phänomene des Naturmechanismus überhaupt tragen kann, liegt in der dem Ausdehnungssein
völlig widersprechenden Gedankenhaftigkeit, Innerlichkeit des Ichseins begründet. Man begreift: Ein Verfahren,
die Erscheinungen vor der Auflösung ins ausdehnungshafte Sein, die Qualitäten vor dem Mechanismus zu 
retten, ist mit der Gegeninstanz des res cogitans gefunden. Zwei ineinander nicht überführbare 
Erfahrungsrichtungen haben Urteilskompetenz bekommen, das Selbstzeugnis der inneren und das Fremdzeugnis
der äußeren Erfahrung. Vergröbernd heißt das Aufteilung der Welterkenntnis in Erkenntnis der Körper und 
Erkenntnis des Ichs, modern gefaßt: in Physik und Psychologie.” (81)
71 “Wogegen sich eine anticartesianische Bewegung richten muß, ist die Identifizierung von Körperlichkeit und 
Ausdehnung, physichem Dasein und Meßbarkeit, die es verschuldet hat, daß wir für die meßfremden 
Eigenschaften der körperlichen Natur blind geworden sind.” (83)
72 “Als cogitans ist das Ich jedoch nur in Selbststellung, d. h. sich faßbar. Von einer res cogitans kann nur auf 
Grund der Zuwendung zu sich selbst gesprochen werden. Ein jeder darf darum die Zugehörigkeit des eigenen 
Ichs zum Sein der res cogitans annehmen, weil er in der (ausschließlich ihm selbst möglichen) Blickwendung zu
sich als einem Ich, zum Ich als ihm selbst kommt. Auf das Cogitanssein stößt ein jeder also in einer ihm allein 
vorbehaltenen, auf ihn eingeengten Wahrnehmungsweise. Bloß in sich selbst faßt er es. Bloß als solches ist es 
unbezweifelbare Wirklichkeit. Andere Ichs, in einer nicht ausschließlich einem jeden selbst möglichen 
Wahrnehmungsweise anzutreffen, sind daher vor Anzweiflung nicht geschützt. Aus der ontologischen 
Konzeption einer res cogitans ist unter Beachtung des Weges, auf dem man zu ihr kommt, eine methodologische
Konzeption geworden. Der Satz, daß ich als Ich in der ihm eigentümlichen Selbststellung zur Innerlichkeit 
gehöre, hat die Umkehrung erfahren, daß die Innerlichkeit nur zu mir selbst gehört.” (80-81)
For a very brief summary of the Cartesian implications for subjectivity with which Plessner was taking 
issue, see Fischer (2000), 266-267.
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way to ask questions about the status of the human that also accords with the discoveries of the 
physical sciences?
So ergab sich die Frage: unter welchen Bedingungen läßt sich der Mensch als Subjekt 
geistigeschichtlicher Wirklichkeit, als sittliche Person von Verantwortungsbewußtsein in 
eben derselben Richtung betrachten, die durch seine physische Stammesgeschichte und 
seine Stellung im Naturganzen bestimmt ist? […] Gelingt die Wahrung des Einen 
Grundaspekts nicht, so folgt unmittelbar daraus eine doppelte Wahrheit, die 
Bewußtseinsansicht und die Naturansicht der Welt, der Mensch als Selbst, als Ich, als 
Subjekt eines freien Willens und der Mensch als Natur, als Ding, als Objekt kausaler 
Determination. Dann hat man die unwürdige und unerträgliche Lage, die zugleich von 
unwiderstehlicher Komik ist, den Menschen als Produkt einer Phylogenie und die 
Phylogenie als Produkt des Menschen, des irgendwie im Menschen Ereignis gewordenen 
schöpferischen Geistes gelten zu lassen. (40-41)
Here Plessner is reconstructing the context of Lebensphilosophie, but the final sentence of the 
passage could apply to Kapp’s book. The way he frames the problem foregrounds the pitfalls of a
methodological circularity that has no trouble arriving at the Geist with which it set out in the 
first place. Kapp’s book represents an attempt to relate human Geist and making to the natural 
world, but Plessner’s methodological considerations suggest the problems and presuppositions of
an account like Kapp’s.
In a sense, Plessner’s project is to bring the discoveries of theoretical and experimental 
biology to bear on longer-standing philosophical questions, and, conversely, to open the question 
of the biological status of the human to rigorous philosophical inquiry.73 A mind-matter dualism 
cannot for Plessner account for the origin of the specifically human nor can logics of mechanical 
causality or quantification fully satisfy on the terrain to which they’ve been assigned, especially 
73 Plessner himself emphasizes the need for this disciplinary encounter: “Also nicht naturalistisch argumentiert: 
weil der Mensch das höchst entwickelte Wesen auf der Stufenleiter der Organismen ist und am spätesten zu 
seiner jetzigen Wesensform gelangte, und weil alle seine geistigen Lebensäußerungen auf seinen körperlichen 
Eigenschaften beruhen, muß eine Anthropologie von einer Biologie unterbaut werden, philosophisch wie 
emprisch, sondern: weil der Aufbau einer philosophischen Anthropologie zur Voraussetzung die Untersuchung 
jener Sachverhalte hat, die um den Sachverhalt ‘Leben’ konzentriert sind, wird das Problem der organischen 
Natur aufgerollt werden. Nicht die naturwissenschaftliche Erfahrung - von ihrer Verabsolutierung überhaupt 
nicht zu reden -, die geisteswissenschaftliche Erfahrung ist es, der die Initiative zum Aufbau einer konkreten 
Naturphilosophie zufällt.” (123) On Philosophical Anthropology’s central linkage between philosophy and the 
natural sciences in the wake of Lebensphilosophie, see also Joachim Fischer (2009) 36-37, 512-515, and 519.
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when it comes to understanding biological life:
Nur da hat bisher die Philosophie Antworten auf die nach der cartesianischen Alternative 
unlösbaren Fragen gefunden, wo sie den Mut aufbrachte, die ausschließliche 
Sachdienlichkeit der exakten Methoden für die Naturerkenntnis zu bestreiten. Die 
Wiederbelebung der Naturphilosophie im deutschen Idealismus gewann allerdings keine 
erhebliche Durchschlagskraft. Daran waren weniger die schwierigen Gedankengänge der 
Philosophen als die zur damaligen Zeit noch unentwickelten Zustände der exakten 
Naturwissenschaft schuld. Es bedurfte erst einer gewaltigen Durchführung der 
Auffassung, die Natur sei nur als Ausdehnung zu behandeln – mit allen cartesianischen 
Konsequenzen –, um die Gelehrten besonders auf dem Gebiete der Biologie und 
Psychologie stutzig zu machen. An diesem Punkte sind wir heute angelangt. Die Losung: 
“Los von Descartes” würde heute schon eine große Anhängerschar aus den 
verschiedensten Zweigen der organischen Naturwissenschaft, der Medizin und 
Psychologie gewinnen, wenn endlich die Philosophie nach dem Vorgang einzelner 
mutiger Denker sich entschließen könnte, den ganzen großen Problemkomplex von 
neuem in Angriff zu nehmen. (82)
In this context, then, Plessner arrives at the figure of the border as a way of redefining the
specificity of living creatures against the dualism of mind and matter. The category of 
Doppelaspektivität is still preserved as the necessary framework, but Plessner’s project is to 
unseat the central dualism of cogitans and extensa in a way that will be able to account for the 
existence of the Doppelaspekt in the human in accordance with the lessons learned from 
theoretical biology.74 The border is able to do this, in Plessner’s use, because it offers various 
possibilities for the relationality among an object, its properties, how it is perceived, and the 
external environment. While all things have both a spatial border – a simple contour marking 
where they end and other things begin – and a non-spatial kind of interiority anchoring their 
perceptible qualities,75 only living things have a relationship to their own border.
74  As he describes the goal of Stufen, “Nicht auf die Überwindung des Doppelaspekts als eines 
(unwidersprechlichen) Phänomens, sondern auf die Beseitigung seiner Fundamentalisierung, seines Einflusses 
auf die Fragestellung ist es im folgenden abgesehen. Nur auf die Entkräftung dieses Doppelaspekts als eines die 
wissenschaftliche Arbeit in Naturwissenschaft, d. h. Messung, und Bewußtseinswissenschaft, d. h. 
Selbstanalyse, zerreißenden Prinzips kommt alles an.” (115)
Fischer (2000) summarizes Plessner’s challenge to dualism as follows: “Um einen Begriff des Menschen 
gewinnen zu können, der ihn aus einer Erfahrungsstellung denkt und zugleich die Doppelung seiner 
Beschreibung erklärt, will Plessner operativ an dem Phänomen ansetzen, das durch die cartesianische 
Alternative von Geist oder körperlichen Ding nicht verstanden werden kann: am ‘Leben.’” (270)
75 Plessner begins to unfold the distinction between physical bodies in general and living bodies in particular by 
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In order to understand what this might mean, we have to retrace Plessner’s use of the 
concept of the Doppelaspekt. While originally this word refers in his use of it to the basic 
Cartesian dualism of extension and thought,76 Plessner reworks it in a phenomenological vein to 
address the problem of perception and thereby tie extension to thought in a strong sense. In order 
for a thing to be perceived as part of the world of extension, it has to be perceived by something 
else. 
Gegenständlich ist ein Ding nur, wenn es einem gegenständlich ist. Zur 
Gegenständlichkeit gehört ein Wogegen, wie eine Front nur Front gegen etwas, gegen 
eine Sphäre ist, nach der sie hinschaut. Objiziertsein des Körpers ist nur in einer Situation
möglich, die dem Dasein des Körpers Anwesenheit ermöglicht. Gegenwärtigkeit, 
Anwesenheit heißt mehr als nur Dasein. Anwesendsein ist eine besondere Relation des 
Daseienden zu etwas, für welches es dann anwesend ist und Gegenwart hat. Da die res 
extensa nur als Qualitätensystem gegenwärtig ist, muß die einzige Gegensphäre der res 
cogitans zum Wogegen seiner Gegenwart, zur (vorgegebenen) Bezugssphäre seiner 
Gegebenheit werden. Körperliches Dasein erscheint mithin nur der Innerlichkeit. Dem 
physischen Objekt ist das innerliche Sein vorgelagert, vorgegeben, der erscheinenden 
Körperwelt das Selbst vorgeschaltet. (86)
In this way, Plessner is able not merely to link extension and cogitation, but to develop their 
relationship in spatial terms. The res cogitans, interior, and self must necessarily be placed in 
front of (vorgelagert) physical, extensive objects if the latter are to appear at all, since they can 
only appear as a system of qualities that presuppose a perceptual apparatus capable of perceiving 
differentiating purely spatial extension (“raumerfüllenden Körper”) from bodies with a relationship to space 
(“raumbehauptende Körper”), a distinction he expresses in the terms räumlich, on the one hand, and raumhaft, 
on the other: “Jedes physische Körperding ist im Raum, ist räumlich. Seine Lage besteht, was ihre Messung 
angeht, in Relation zu andern Lagen und zur Lage des Beobachters. Von dieser Relativordnung sind auch die 
lebendigen Körper als physische Dinge nicht ausgenommen. Aber erscheinungsmäßig unterscheiden sich die 
lebendigen von den unbelebten als raumbehauptende von den nur raumerfüllenden Körpern. Jedes 
raumerfüllende Gebilde ist an einer Stelle. Ein raumbehauptendes Gebilde dagegen ist dadurch, daß es über ihm 
hinaus (in ihm hinein) ist, zu der Stelle ‘seines’ Seins in Beziehung. Es ist außer seiner Räumlichkeit in den 
Raum hinein oder raumhaft und hat insofern seinen natürlichen Ort. 
“Wenn ein unbelebtes Ding zerbricht, so fragt man wohl auch: wo ist ‘es’ jetzt ? Von dem Gelehrten wird man 
freilich zu hören bekommen, ein ‘es’ habe da gar nicht existiert, sondern nur eine bestimmte Konstellation von 
Elektronen und Energie, die jetzt eine Umlagerung erfahren habe. Die Frage ist der Erscheinung gegenüber trotz
allem berechtigt gewesen. Dem Lebendigen gegenüber könnten wir uns aber mit jener Antwort auch dann nie 
zufrieden geben, wenn wir wüßten, daß sie objektiv die richtige ist.” (186-187)
76 The first mention of the word in Stufen is simply of the “Doppelaspekt Körper-Geist” (40).
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them. In this way, the Doppelaspekt no longer merely stands for the dualism of mind and matter, 
but comes to inhere in the logic of perception itself, which Plessner describes as comprised of 
thought and thinker, pure gaze and origin of the gaze. The appearance of extension depends on a 
subjective act;77 this in turn bifurcates into origin and return, act and realization, as two 
complementary sides of perception:
Das Selbst steht im Doppelaspekt des Fortgangs “von” ihm (Akt, reiner Blick, cogitatio) 
als des Rückgangs “zu” ihm (Ich als Vollzugszentrum der Akte, Blicksender, res 
cogitans). Man darf die Schärfe dieser Bestimmung nicht dadurch verwischen, daß man 
die Spaltung in die Subjekt-Objektivität nur als Betrachtungsweise des Ichs auffaßt. Es ist
lebendige Einheit durch Entgegensetzung von Ausgangsselbst (Akt) und Rückgangsselbst
(Aktzentrum) und zwar Vollzug dieser Spaltung als ihrer Aufhebung. (89)
Here the Doppelaspektivität concerns the act of perception and the organizing center that 
receives, guides, and organizes perception. This duality carries over to the body itself, which as 
an object in the world of extension is both available to self-consciousness as an object of 
perception and, as containing the organs of perception, provides the self with the material basis 
for its ideas.78 Because of the tight linkage Plessner elaborates between the perceiving subject, 
the body, and the external world, the Doppelaspekt that originally referred to the dualism of the 
res cogitans and the res extensa is seen as inherent to perception and to objects as such.79 Every 
77 “Nur wenn die res extensa gegen die cogitatio steht, erscheint sie. Zum ausgedehnten Ding ist allein der Akt des 
Subjekts absolut polar. Denn unter welchen Umständen verliert die Innerlichkeit den Charakter der 
Seinshaftigkeit und erfüllt damit die Bedingung einer echten Wogegensphäre zur gegenständlichen 
Erscheinung? Sobald sie in Selbststellung als Vollzugszentrum der Akte (cogitationes) verharrt, rein als Ich dem 
Sein gegenüber sich behauptet und auslebt. Nur insofern, als die res cogitans selbstmäßig, ichhaft der res 
extensa entgegengestellt ist, hat diese die Möglichkeit der Erscheinung. Woraus nach den oben dargelegten 
Konsequenzen wiederum folgt, daß nur ich selbst als Ich das entscheidende Glied in der Kette der Bedingungen 
für die objektive Erfahrbarkeit der Welt bin.” (87)
78 “Der Körper als ausgedehntes Ding gehört dann allerdings schon zum Selbstbewußtsein, und zwar zur Sphäre 
äußerer Wahrnehmung, vermittelt aber offenbar doch dem Ich, der Sphäre innerer Wahrnehmung, Materialien 
zum Aufbau seiner Vorstellungen. In diesem Doppelaspekt präsentiert sich, idealistisch oder nichtidealistisch 
angesehen, das psychophysische Gesamtselbst, dessen äußerste Zone seiner eigenen Organe das reine Hier des 
Ichs in beständiger Bindung umschließt. Einmal bildet der eigene Körper die Peripherie der Immanenzsphäre, 
weil er sowohl Teil an der Außenwelt als auch Teil an der Innenwelt hat. Dann wieder umschließt die Innenwelt, 
als Selbstbewußtsein die Gebiete innerer und äußerer Wahrnehmung enthaltend, im Schatz ihrer Vorstellungen 
die Außenwelt. Wie soll aber eine Sphäre zugleich mit ihren Grenzen in der Außenwelt geborgen sein und die 
Außenwelt in sich bergen?” (100-101)
79 Joachim Fischer (2009) summarizes how the Doppelaspekt applies to things in general when he writes, “Um 
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thing evinces this relationship, in the form of a split between its perceptible qualities and the non-
spatial interior that acts as the substantial kernel or substrate for these qualities.80 This split takes 
the form of a border that has something to do with a thing’s physical contours but is not reducible
to them.81 The border is therefore, in a spatial, phenomenological, and perceptual sense, where a 
given thing ends and its surroundings begin.82
What distinguishes a living body from other things is that the living body incorporates the
border as an aspect, such that the border necessary for any object to appear itself appears in the 
living object. “Infolgedessen darf man dem Satz, daß lebendige Körper erscheinungsmäßig eine 
prinzipiell divergente Außen-Innenbeziehung als gegenständliche Bestimmtheit aufweisen, die 
Form geben: lebendige Körper haben eine erscheinende, anschauliche Grenze” (151). The border
of the living thing (“lebendiges Ding”) is therefore not just a spatial or phenomenological 
boundary between it and what is not it, but serves as a kind of interface that mediates between 
the living body and the environment. This is what Plessner means when he writes that the living 
body has its border as a characteristic; and to do this, it must have a relation to its border that 
dem Phänomen des Lebendigen in diesem Streit gerecht zu werden, baut Plessner folgende Argumentation auf: 
Demnach erscheint bereits das unbelebte ‘Wahrnehmungsding’ (also jedes einer Wahrnehmung gegebene Ding) 
kraft eines inkongruenten ‘Doppelaspekts,’ in der für die Wahrnehmung das Körperding mit seinem Außen 
(erster Aspekt) auf ein verdecktes Inneres, einen unerreichbaren Wesenskern (zweiter Aspekt) verweist. Als den 
‘Grundaspekt,’ der den ‘Doppelaspekt’ von Körper und Geist auf der Ebene des Menschen vermitteln soll, setzt 
Plessner innerhalb der philosophischen Biologie nun von unten her für die Schicht des Lebendigen – statt wie 
Driesch ‘Ganzheit’ oder Köhler ‘Gestalt’ – den Begriff ‘Grenze’ (SO 100): der ‘Doppelaspekt’ erscheint in der 
‘Grenze’ selbst als eine Eigenschaft des Dinges (und nicht mehr nur für die Wahrnehmung).” (76-77)
80 “Das reelle (belegbare) Phänomen weist auf dieses tragende Ganze von sich aus hin, es überschreitet 
gewissermaßen seinen eigenen Rahmen, indem es als Durchbruch, Aspekt, Er-Scheinung, Manifestation des 
Dinges selbst sich darbietet. In dieser Transgredienz des Erscheinungsgehalts besteht die sinnlich nicht 
belegbare Weise der Zugehörigkeit des reellen Phänomens zum Ganzen Dinge.” (130)
81 “Anschauliche Grenzen liegen bei allen Dingkörpern da, wo sie anfangen oder zu Ende sind. Die Grenze des 
Dinges ist sein Rand, mit dem es an etwas Anderes, als es selbst ist, stößt. Zugleich bestimmt dieses sein 
Anfangen oder Aufhören die Gestalt des Dinges oder den Kontur, dessen Verlauf man mit den Sinnen verfolgen 
kann. In den Konturen, innerhalb seiner Ränder ist der Dingkörper beschlossen und als dieser bestimmt, oder, 
was hier dasselbe heißt, mit den Konturen, an seinen Rändern ist das Ding als dieses bestimmt. Der Kontur kann
nur in vager und abstrakter Redewendung von dem, dessen Kontur er ist, abgehoben gedacht werden.” (151)
82 See Fischer (2000) for the origin of the figure of the border in Plessner’s thought. Fischer glosses it as an answer
to the problem of differentiating living bodies from other things. By using the figure of the border to make this 
distinction, Plessner sidestepped what he saw as the drawbacks of Köhler’s Gestalt theory and the 
Ganzheitstheorie of Hans Driesch, which had to posit a vitalistic notion of entelechy. (272)
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includes transgression. Only in this way can an object be a whole, with contours that both mark 
its spatial extension and its perceptual aspects.
Welche Bedingung muß erfüllt sein, damit in einer relativen (räumlichen) Begrenzung 
das nichtumkehrbare Grenzverhältnis zwischen einem Außen und einem Innen vorliegt? 
Die Antwort lautet paradox: wenn ein Körper außer seiner Begrenzung den 
Grenzübergang selbst als Eigenschaft hat, dann ist die Begrenzung zugleich Raumgrenze
und Aspektgrenze und gewinnt der Kontur unbeschadet seines Gestaltcharakters den 
Wert der Ganzheitsform. 
Auf das Verhältnis des begrenzten Körpers zu seiner Grenze kommt es also an. 
(154)
Plessner outlines two possibilities for the relationship between a physical thing and its border. In 
the first one, the border is merely a virtual liminality, belonging to both the thing and its 
environment, and to neither of them: “Sie ist reiner Übergang vom Einen zum Anderen, vom 
Anderen zum Einen und wirklich nur als das Insofern eben dieser wechselweisen Bestimmtheit” 
(154). The border marks the limit of the physical body, but does not belong to it. In the second 
possibility by contrast, the border belongs to the object demarcated.
Die Grenze gehört reell dem Körper an, der damit nicht nur als begrenzter an seinen 
Konturen den Übergang zu dem anstoßenden Medium gewährleistet, sondern in seiner 
Begrenzung vollzieht und dieser Übergang selbst ist. Deshalb wird hier die Grenze 
seiend, weil sie nicht mehr das (als Linie oder Fläche vorgestellte und darin eigentlich 
verfälschte) Insofern der wechselweisen Bestimmtheit, der selbst nichts für sich 
bedeutende leere Übergang ist, sondern von sich aus das durch sie begrenzte Gebilde als 
solches von dem Anderen als Anderem prinzipiell unterscheidet. (154)
The first scenario is that of non-living objects, and the second is that of living things. To 
differentiate these two possibilities, Plessner uses the schematic K ← Z → M for the first, to 
mark the border as a “Zwischen” between the “Körper” and the “Medium,” and K ← K → M for
the second, to show that in the case of the living thing, it is the body itself that mediates between 
the body and its environment. Because the border and the transgression of the border belong to 
the living thing as its properties, it is more complexly spatial and positional than dead objects, 
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which go as far as their physical extension and no further.83 The living thing, by contrast, is on 
either side of its border at once; and the border of the living thing, rather than being an 
indifferently spatial transitional zone between object and environment, both distinguishes the 
object from its environment and opens it up to it.
Ein Körper, der sich entsprechend der Formel K ← K → M zu seinen eigenen Grenzen 
verhält, ist, da ihn seine Grenzen nicht nur einschließen, sondern ebensosehr dem 
Medium gegenüber aufschließen (mit ihm in Verbindung setzen), über ihm hinaus. Denn 
die Grenze, welche im andern Fall, ausgedrückt in der Formel K ← Z → M, das weder 
(sowohl) dem Körper noch (als auch) dem Medium angehörende, also rein virtuelle 
Zwischen, die bloße Möglichkeit des Übergehens vom Einen zum Andern bedeutet, 
gehört hier reell dem einen der beiden angrenzenden Größen an. Besteht das Wesen der 
Grenze aber im Unterschied zur Begrenzung darin, mehr als die bloße Gewährleistung 
des Übergehens zu sein, nämlich dieses Übergehen selbst, so muß ein Ding, welchem 
Reich des Seins es auch zuzurechnen sei, wenn es die Grenze selbst hat, dieses 
Übergehen selbst haben.” (181-182)
The border of the living body belongs to the body, and is not merely the transitional space 
between a body and its medium. It is a kind of interface that belongs to the body and also opens 
the body to the surrounding medium; transgressing the border thereby becomes a property of 
living bodies. Plessner reaffirms this positional status of the living body vis-a-vis its border in a 
late Nachtrag to Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch from the 1960s. Discussing recent 
research on organic membranes that was not available to him when he wrote Stufen, Plessner 
describes membranes as fitting his earlier idea of the border – they are not merely the spatial 
delimitation of an organic body, but are rather a functional interface that determine the 
83 “In seiner Lebendigkeit unterscheidet sich also der organische Körper vom anorganischen durch seinen 
positionalen Charakter oder seine Positionalität. Hierunter sei derjenige Grundzug seines Wesens verstanden, 
welcher einen Körper in seinem Sein zu einem gesetzten macht. Wie geschildert, bestimmen die Momente des 
‘über ihm Hinaus’ und das ‘ihm Entgegen, in ihn Hinein’ ein spezifisches Sein des belebten Körpers, das im 
Grenzdurchgang angehoben und dadurch setzbar wird. In den spezifischen Weisen ‘über ihm hinaus’ und ‘ihm 
entgegen’ wird der Körper von ihm abgehoben und zu ihm in Beziehung gebracht, strenger gesagt: ist der 
Körper außerhalb und innerhalb seiner. Der unbelebte Körper ist von dieser Komplikation frei. Er ist, soweit er 
reicht. Wo und wann er zu Ende ist, hört auch sein Sein auf. Er bricht ab. Ihm fehlt diese Lockerung in ihm 
selber. Da sein System die Grenze nicht zu eigen hat, ist sein Sein ohne die doppelsinnige Transzendierung. Es 
kann also nicht zu der doppelsinnigen Rückbeziehung auf das System, nicht zu der Selbstbeziehung des Systems
kommen (wenn es gestattet ist, an Stelle des schwerfälligen Ausdrucks Ihmbeziehung dieses gangbarere Wort zu
verwenden).” (184, some italics added)
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relationship between body and medium.84
The fact that the border of the living thing belongs to the body, mediating between it and 
the external world, already suggests the dual nature of the human body as both the seat of the self
and a tool of the self, a core aspect of Plessner’s anthropology. The doubling of the body, seen 
typographically in the schematic K ← K → M, is notably already present in every living thing.85 
This is the logic at the core of Plessner’s book, and it is worth noting that he locates this doubling
already in the difference between things as such and living things – more precisely, this aspect of 
living things builds upon a duality already present in things as such, inasmuch as they are present
to perception. The doubling of the body becomes more pronounced when we make the transition 
from plants to animals, and again from animals to humans. The Doppelaspekt that marks 
phenomenas as such becomes an embodied characteristic of living beings, leading to an excess 
over and against their nature as “phenomenal things”; this excess is couched in the terms of a 
positional transgression.86
84 “Membranen sind nicht bloße Oberflächen die jeder Körper je nach seinem Aggregatzustand gegen angrenzende
Medien eines anderen Aggregatzustandes hat. Sie sind vermittelnde Oberflächen. An ihnen ist der Körper nicht 
einfach zu Ende, sondern zu seinem Medium in Beziehung gesetzt. […] Der Effekt solcher strukturbedingten 
Bindekräfte auf die Oberfläche ist das Entscheidende. Denn er macht aus der Umrandung eine Grenze, in 
welcher zwei aufeinander wirkende Bereiche zu einer gegenseitigen Vermittlung gebracht werden, ohne den 
Eigenbereich des umrandeten Körpers in seiner Struktur anzutasten. Dieser Tatbestand gibt dem Körper 
Positionalität, d.h. setzt ihn gegen den Außenbereich ab. So gewinnt er am Medium eine Umgebung, in späteren 
Entwicklungsstadien u. U. eine Umwelt. Mit der Positionalität ist der sog. Ganzheitscharakter gegeben, der sich 
als Form, nicht notwendig übrigens als eine konstante Form, ausprägt. Membranen begünstigen natürlich die 
Stabilisierung der Form.” (437-38) 
85 What this means, among other things, is that Plessner’s concept of life is quite different from that of 
Lebensphilosophie. Fischer (2000) describes it in this way: “Wenn er Lebendiges durch ‘Grenze’ bestimmt, die 
Inneres vom Äußeren abschließt und zugleich Inneres und Äußeres gegeneinander aufschließt, dann entkräftet er
auf der Ebene des Lebendigen, für die der Dualismus cartesianischer Prägung keine adäquate Beschreibung 
geben kann, das cartesianische Alternativprinzip – entweder Innen oder Außen –, und führt zugleich die 
metaphysiche Lebensphilosophie aus ihrer spekulativen ‘Verzauberung’: Leben ist dann nicht der einheitliche 
Strom, der sich nur am Dinglichen bricht, am Nichtlebendigen, am Erstarrten und Verdinglichten, sondern 
Leben selbst ist der Sache nach nur möglich durch Unterbrechung – in Form von ‘Grenzrealisierung.’” (273)
86 “Als Körperding steht das Lebewesen im Doppelaspekt ineinander nicht überführbarer Richtungsgegensätze 
nach Innen (substantialer Kern) und nach Außen (Mantel der eigenschaftstragenden Seiten). Als Lebewesen tritt 
das Körperding mit dem gleichen Doppelaspekt als einer Eigenschaft auf, der infolgedessen das phänomenale 
Ding in doppelter Richtung transzendiert, es einerseits über es hinaus setzt (streng genommen: außerhalb seiner 
setzt), andrerseits in es hineinsetzt (in ihm setzt), – Ausdrücke, die gleichbedeutend mit den früher gebrauchten 
Ausdrücken sind: über es hinaus sein und ihm entgegen, in es hinein sein.” (183)
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This in turn moves the structuring idea of the Doppelaspekt to the duality of Körper and 
Leib. The former represents the material, mechanical side of bodies – bodies as physical objects –
while the latter expresses their status as living wholes, not entirely reducible to component matter
or mechanical laws.
Leib – diese Erkenntnis findet man schon bei Hegel – ist nicht dasselbe wie Körper, mit 
dem er doch objektiv identisch ist. Wenn ich den Arm hebe oder wenn das Kind laufen 
lernt, so werden zwar die entsprechenden Muskeln innerviert. Und doch ist damit nur der 
körperliche Vorgang, nicht der leibliche charakterisiert. Der Vorgang am Leib ist von 
anderer Art. Natürlich spielen dabei die Organ- und Gelenkempfindungen eine 
wesentliche Rolle, ebenso die Empfindungen der Haut, der Spannung, die verschiedenen 
Formen des Tastsinnes. Aber der Leib ist darum doch nicht bloß Empfindung oder das 
Bewußtsein des eigenen Körpers, der aus Knochen, Sehnen, Muskeln, Gefäßen, Nerven 
usw. besteht. Er ist eine lebendige Realität. Das zeigt sich gerade in der Art, wie man ihn 
beherrscht. Gehen, Heben, Setzen, Aufstehen, Liegen sind lebendige Verhaltungsweisen 
(die natürlich durch körperliche Funktionen vermittelt, unter Umständen also auch 
unterbunden werden), die in der lebendigen Position des Individuums aber einen 
besonderen Aspekt bedingen, auf den es sehr wesentlich immer Rücksicht zu nehmen hat,
der also in Wesenskorrelation zur Person bzw. zum Lebewesen als einem Lebendigen 
steht. (74-75)
Crucially for the present context, actions such as walking, lifting, standing up, lying down, etc., 
cannot sensibly be reduced to mechanical processes but encompass meaningful unities Plessner 
refers to as Verhaltungsweisen. It is notable, in the context of Lethen’s reading of Plessner, that 
the latter’s deployment of the concept of Verhalten arises as a way of conveying a basic 
meaningful unit of the action of animals, the sense of which dissolves if the action is understood 
purely mechanistically. This insight is connected to Plessner’s work on animal behavior and 
expression87 and, pace Lethen, does not have so much to do with rigid forms of behavior as with 
87 See his “Die Deutung des mimischen Ausdrucks. Ein Beitrag zur Lehre vom Bewußtsein des anderen Ichs” 
(1925), especially the section, “Die Schicht des Verhalten” (77-89), in which he describes an overlay of the 
mechanical Körper, which can be analyzed in terms of purely “kinematic” physiological processes (78. 83) and 
the living Leib, which must be seen in terms of meaningful wholes of expression and behavior. “1. Durch 
physiologisches Wissen um die Kinematik der lebendigen Körper darf man sich den schlichten Blick für die 
Bewegungsformen des anschaulich gegebenen Leibes nicht trüben lassen. 2. Der Leib und seine 
Bewegungsformen, verschieden je nach der biologischen Art, bilden eine Einheit, von der man weder sagen 
kann, sie sei physisch, noch sie sei psychisch. Sie liegt in keiner der beiden Seinsebenen, ist aber darum nicht 
weniger reell.” (83)
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the attempt to provide a framework for thinking about behavior and expression as meaningful 
units. As in the above passage, the terms Leib and Verhaltungsweisen express an organic unit that
exceeds the physical and mechanical properties of thinghood.
The doubling of the body as a border, and the doubling of the body into Körper and Leib, 
also inflect the Ausgangsproblematik of the mind-matter dualism. Since the body is both a part of
the world of extension or Außenwelt,88 on the one hand, and the means with which the subject 
interacts with the world, the body itself becomes the bridge between Innenwelt and Außenwelt:
Als ein von innen her durchfühlbares und impulsiv mehr oder minder beherrschbares, 
nach außen gewandtes und teilweise als Außen gegebenes System, dessen Zentrum das 
Ich, dessen binnenhafte Mannigfaltigkeit dem Ineinander der Akte und Vorstellungen 
völlig eingeschmolzen erscheint und dessen Grenzflächen bei aller Gegenständlichkeit 
(also trotz ihrer Vorstellungsnatur) von innen her die Bedeutung von Sinnes- und 
Bewegungsfeldern, von Einmündungs- und Ausmündungszonen der Wahrnehmungs- und
Impulsakte zeigen, gibt er [i.e., der Körper –CG] sich selbst als die gesuchte Brücke von 
der Innenwelt zur Außenwelt zu erkennen. (101)
For “closed” organizational forms of life such as found in animals and humans, the body is a 
mediating tool between organism and environment. While the border and its transgression are 
characteristics of all living things, plants are characterized by a relationship between their bodies 
and the surrounding medium Plessner describes as “open” – that is, plants are integrated into 
their medium in an immediate way, marked by the absence of a sensory-motor center, the strong 
division of functions into discrete organs, a relative lack of differentiation in metabolic functions,
and a kind of movement that follows the laws of organic growth rather than reactions to an 
objective situation.89 Animals, by contrast, are marked by a relationship to their environment 
88 See 92 ff.
89 On plants as “open” forms, see especially 282-291. The reason for the characterization is positional, with the 
plant seen as one logical formal possibility for the relationship between the living organism and the surrounding 
environment. The openness of plants has effects and correlates, however, on the morphological, metabolic, 
motor, and developmental levels (283-286). As he writes,
“Offen ist diejenige Form, welche den Organismus in allen seinen Lebensäußerungen unmittelbar seiner 
Umgebung eingliedert und ihn zum unselbständigen Abschnitt des ihm entsprechendenden Lebenskreises macht.
“Morphologisch prägt sich das in der Tendenz zur äußeren, der Umgebung direkt zugewandten 
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mediated through the relative closure and autonomy of their bodies.90 It is important to note here 
that Plessner’s account works through the category of positionality in a couple discrete and 
interlocking ways. Firstly, it is a particular positionality of the individual body that determines its
status as a living thing, and, within that group, as a plant, animal, or human.91 Yet in a more 
general sense, his account of life is positional inasmuch as the different varieties of life represent 
logical permutations, differing possible solutions to a formal dilemma (282-283). The “radikaler 
Konflikt zwischen dem Zwang zur Abgeschlossenheit als physischer Körper und dem Zwang zur 
Aufgeschlossenheit als Organismus” (283) can find an open solution, as in the case of plants, or 
one predicated on closure, as with animals. This formal approach to biology is, in the context of 
the broader presentation of the book, merely an intensification of the particular 
phenomenological approach to things in general; each transition, it must be emphasized, from 
thing to living thing, from plant to animal, from animal to human, proceeds in a logical, formal 
way according to shifts in an object’s relationship to the world – or, more precisely, an object’s 
relationship to its relationship to the world.
Once we have arrived at the centrally-organized, closed form of the animal, resulting in 
the intensification of the body’s doubling and its concomitant status as a tool to be used, we are 
(positionally speaking) not very far from the human’s natural eccentricity. A rather long passage 
will be useful here, because it spells out the way the body itself becomes a kind of 
Flächenentwicklung aus, die wesensmäßig mit der Unnötigkeit einer Bildung irgendwielcher Zentren 
zusammenhängt.” (284)
90  “Geschlossen ist diejenige Form, welche den Organismus in allen seinen Lebensäußerungen mittelbar seiner 
Umgebung eingliedert und ihn zum selbständigen Abschnitt des ihm entsprechenden Lebenskreises macht. 
Wenn es zur offenen Form gehört, den Organismus mit allen seinen an die Umgebung angrenzenden Flächen 
Funktionsträger sein zu lassen, so wird die geschlossene Form sich in einer möglichst starken Abkammerung des
Lebewesens gegen seine Umgebung äußern müssen. Diese Abkammerung hat dabei den Sinn der mittelbaren 
Eingliederung in das Medium. Auf Grund des vermittelten Kontaktes bleibt dem Organismus nicht nur eine 
größere Geschlossenheit als den pflanzlichen Lebewesen gewahrt, sondern er erhält echte Selbständigkeit, d.h. 
Gestelltheit auf ihm selber, die zugleich eine neue Existenzbasis bedeutet.” (291-2)
91 For an account of the origins and function of Plessner’s use of the category of positionality, see Fischer (2000), 
274-276.
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representational organ for the organism.
Dadurch ist der lebendige Organismus als Ganzer nicht mehr unmittelbar die (in ihr selbst
natürlich vermittelte!) Einheit der Organe, sondern er ist sie nur auf dem Wege über das 
Zentrum. Er steht also gar nicht mehr direkt mit dem Medium und den Dingen um ihn 
herum in Kontakt, sondern lediglich mittels seines Körpers. Der Körper ist die 
Zwischenschicht zwischen dem Lebendigen und dem Medium geworden. So ergibt sich 
die Lösung des oben gestellten Problems seiner mittelbaren Eingliederung in den 
Lebenskreis: das Lebewesen grenzt mit seinem Körper an das Medium, hat eine Realität 
“im” Körper, “hinter” dem Körper gewonnen und kommt deshalb nicht mehr mit dem 
Medium in direkten Kontakt. Infolgedessen ist der Organismus auf ein höheres 
Seinsniveau gelangt, das mit dem vom eigenen Körper eingenommenen nicht in gleicher 
Ebene liegt. Er ist die über die einheitliche Repräsentation der Glieder vermittelte Einheit 
des Körpers, welcher eben dadurch von der zentralen Repräsentation abhängt. Sein 
Körper ist sein Leib geworden, jene konkrete Mitte, dadurch das Lebenssubjekt mit dem 
Umfeld zusammenhängt. […] 
Physisch betrachtet verdoppelt sich mit der Entstehung eines Zentrums der Körper: er ist 
noch einmal (nämlich vertreten) im Zentralorgan. Jene “Mitte,” nun, die zum Wesen eines
jeden lebendigen Körpers gehört, jene kernhafte Einheit für sich gegenüber der 
Mannigfaltigkeitseinheit, die doch eine rein intensive Größe bedeutet, wird natürlich 
nicht von einem räumlichen Gebilde ausgefüllt. Sie bleibt raumhafte Mitte als 
Strukturmoment der Positionalität des lebendigen Körpers. Aber der Charakter dieses 
Körpers, welcher sie raumhaft umschließt, hat sich geändert, weil er in ihm real 
vermittelt, vertreten ist. Er ist von ihm selber abgehoben und abhängig als Körper. Rein 
physisch schon ist er “sein Leib.” Die raumhafte Mitte, der Kern oder das Selbst “liegt” 
also nicht mehr unmittelbar “im” Körper. Genauer gesagt, sie nimmt eine doppelte 
raumhafte Lage zum Körper ein: in ihm (sofern der ganze Körper einschließlich des 
Zentralorgans nicht sein Leib ist und nicht von ihm abhängt) und außer ihm (sofern der 
Körper vom Zentralorgan als sein Leib abhängt). 
Auf diese Weise bekommt die Mitte, der Kern, das Selbst oder das Subjekt des 
Habens bei vollkommener Bindung an den lebendigen Körper Distanz zu ihm. Obwohl 
rein intensives Moment der Positionalität des Körpers, wird die Mitte von ihm 
abgehoben, wird er ihr Leib, den sie hat. […] 
[…] Über eine Kluft hinweg sind das Selbst und das Medium als das Andere in 
Relation. Haben oder Besitzen ist nur als diese das Zwischen bestehen lassende 
Überbrückung des Selbst und des Anderen möglich.
In der Distanz zum eigenen Leib hat der lebendige Körper sein Medium als 
Umfeld. Die Abgehobenheit vom eigenen Leib ermöglicht den Kontakt mit einem vom 
Leibe abgehobenen Sein. Der Körper “merkt” das Sein und “wirkt auf” das Sein. Über 
eine Kluft hinweg steht er mit dem Anderen in sensorischer und motorischer Verbindung. 
Wollte man diesem ganzen Wesenskomplex der geschlossenen Form nach dem Prinzip 
der Stufen den Wesenskomplex des “lebendigen Dinges überhaupt” gegenüberstellen, so 
müßte man sagen, hier sei noch alles gebunden, nur an sich vorhanden, nur impliziert und
die Struktur der Lebendigkeit bedingend, was in der geschlossenen Form entbunden, für 
sich selbständig geworden, expliziert worden sei. Auch die Pflanze hat Stengel, Blätter, 
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Blüten und Früchte, aber weder ihr Selbst noch sein Haben treten zu ihrem Körper als 
einem Leib in wirklichen Gegensatz. (295-298, some italics added)
A key feature of Plessner’s account is the way that the progression from one level to the next 
depends on a process of realization, whereby features that were present in an earlier stage are 
concretized, made explicit, and self-reflective in a later stage.92 In this regard, the movement 
through Stufen resembles the progression in Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes from the in-
itself to the in-and-for-itself. As the final sentences of the above passage make clear, the 
transition from animal to plant depends on latent aspects of the plant’s corporality becoming 
explicit and autonomous. A plant may “have” various parts, but it does not actually “have” them 
like an animal has its, as mediating organs controlled by a central instance in a way that 
necessarily both distances the animal from the medium and integrates it into it. Just as the shift 
from things to living things depended on the relationality of the border becoming a functional 
characteristic of the living thing (rather than just an accidental spatial demarcation), here too the 
various doublings of the organism’s body represent a necessary mediation between organism and 
environment in a way that also implies a nascent subject position (“Sein Körper ist sein Leib 
geworden, jene konkrete Mitte, dadurch das Lebenssubjekt mit dem Umfeld zusammenhängt” 
(296)).
This is a shift that intensifies with the transition from the animal to the next and final 
formal, positional possibility, namely: the human.93 Because the human represents the full 
92 A longer example of this dynamic of realization comes later in the book: “Bei der Pflanze tritt eine positional 
begründete Beziehung zwischen Lebenssubjekt und Medium nicht auf. Eine (direkte) Beziehung spricht sich am
Organismus zwar aus, aber sie ist nicht als Beziehung da. Beim Tier ist dies erreicht. Die Beziehung zwischen 
ihm und dem Umfeld spricht sich zwar am Organismus unabhängig davon, ob er dezentralistisch oder 
zentralistisch orgarnisiert ist, gemäß dem Gesetz der geschlossenen Form als indirekte Beziehung aus. Für das 
Tier selber bedingt dagegen der Unterschied in der Organisationsweise einen Unterschied in seiner 
Positionalität. Im Fall der Dezentralisation findet direkte Zuordnung von Reiz und Reaktion statt. Die Beziehung
zwischen Subjekt und Umfeld ist unmittelbar. Im Fall der Zentralisation erfolgt die Zuordnung von Reiz und 
Reaktion durch das Subjekt. Die Beziehung zwischen Subjekt und Umfeld ist mittelbar.” (400-401)
93 Plessner makes it clear that the human being is a formal, positional category rather than a metaphysical or 
morphological one when he writes, “Wenn der Charakter des Außersichseins das Tier zum Menschen macht, so 
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realization of the positionality of the living thing, being human is at once the awareness of one’s 
own positionality, and a distancing from it.94 The human for Plessner is a sort of second order 
animal that experiences its experience: “Er ist in seine Grenze gesetzt und deshalb über sie 
hinaus, die ihn, das lebendige Ding, begrenzt. Er lebt und erlebt nicht nur, sondern er erlebt sein 
Erleben” (364). Yet as a living thing the human is also centered immediately within its Umfeld.95 
Both centered and decentered, present and absent, in its body and out of its body, the human is 
the concrete realization of the Doppelaspekt.
Ihm [i.e., dem Menschen –CG] ist der Umschlag vom Sein innerhalb des eigenen 
Leibes zum Sein außerhalb des Leibes ein unaufhebbarer Doppelaspekt der Existenz, ein 
wirklicher Bruch seiner Natur. Er lebt diesseits und jenseits des Bruches, als Seele und als
Körper und als die psychophysisch neutrale Einheit dieser Sphären. Die Einheit 
überdeckt jedoch nicht den Doppelaspekt, sie läßt ihn nicht aus sich hervorgehen, sie ist 
nicht das den Gegensatz versöhnende Dritte, das in die entgegengesetzten Sphären 
überleitet, sie bildet keine selbständige Sphäre. Sie ist der Bruch, der Hiatus, das leere 
Hindurch der Vermittlung, die für den Lebendigen selber dem absoluten Doppelcharakter 
und Doppelaspekt von Körperleib und Seele gleichkommt, in der er ihn erlebt. 
Positional liegt ein Dreifaches vor: das Lebendige ist Körper, im Körper (als 
Innenleben oder Seele) und außer dem Körper als Blickpunkt, von dem aus es beides ist. 
Ein Individuum, welches positional derart dreifach charakterisiert ist, heißt Person. Es ist 
das Subjekt seines Erlebens, seiner Wahrnehmungen und seiner Aktionen, seiner 
Initiative. Es weiß und es will. Seine Existenz ist wahrhaft auf Nichts gestellt. (364-365)
The fragmentary nature of the relationship between “Körperleib” and “Seele” is due to the 
positional intensification of the relationship among body, subject, and environment – specifically 
ist es, da mit Exzentrizität keine neue Organisationsform ermöglicht wird, klar, daß er körperlich Tier bleiben 
muß. Physische Merkmale der menschlichen Natur haben daher nur einen empirischen Wert. Mensch sein ist an 
keine bestimmte Gestalt gebunden und könnte daher auch (einer geistreichen Mutmaßung des Paläontologen 
Dacque zu gedenken) unter mancherlei Gestalt stattfinden, die mit der uns bekannten nicht übereinstimmt. 
Gebunden ist der Charakter des Menschen nur an die zentralistische Organisationsform, welche die Basis für 
seine Exzentrizität abgibt.” (365-366)
94 “Als Ich, das die volle Rückwendung des lebendigen Systems zu sich ermöglicht, steht der Mensch nicht mehr 
im Hier-Jetzt, sondern ‘hinter’ ihm, hinter sich selbst, ortlos, im Nichts, geht er im Nichts auf, im raumzeithaften
Nirgendwo-Nirgendwann. Ortloszeitlos ermöglicht er das Erlebnis seiner selbst und zugleich das Erlebnis seiner
Ort- und Zeitlosigkeit als des außerhalb seiner selbst Stehens, weil der Mensch ein lebendiges Ding ist, das nicht
mehr nur in sich selber steht, sondern dessen ‘Stehen in sich’ Fundament seines Stehens bedeutet.” (364)
95 “Als Ich dagegen, das sich in voller Rückwendung erfaßt, sich fühlt, seiner inne wird, seinem Wollen, Denken, 
Treiben, Empfinden zusieht (und auch seinem Zusehen zusieht), bleibt der Mensch im Hier-Jetzt gebunden, im 
Zentrum totaler Konvergenz des Umfeldes und des eigenen Leibes. So lebt er unmittelbar, ungebrochen im 
Vollzug dessen, was er kraft seiner unobjektivierten Ichnatur als seelisches Leben im Innenfeld faßt.” (364-365)
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to the way that life in the tripartite scheme detailed above is ejected from the body in the course 
of a self-awareness of the dual positioning between the living being and its body.96 Yet the 
culmination of this relationship in the human means that the sense of a breach, in depriving the 
human of full immanence, is experienced as fundamental to human existence. This constitutive 
self-externality of the human, although it arises from causes immanent to life itself in Plessner’s 
account, means that human existence is distanced from the naturalness that seems to belong to 
non-human nature. Rather than an immanent property or a surrounding condition, “life” for the 
human is something that needs to be lived. 
Der Mensch lebt nur, indem er ein Leben führt. Mensch sein ist die “Abhebung” des 
Lebendigseins vom Sein und der Vollzug dieser Abhebung, kraft dessen die Schicht der 
Lebendigkeit als quasi selbständige Sphäre erscheint, die bei Pflanze und Tier 
unselbständiges Moment des Seins, seine Eigenschaft bleibt (auch da noch, wo sie die 
organisierende, konstituierende Form für einen Seinstypus des Lebens bildet, nämlich für 
das Tier). […] Für die Philosophie erklärt sich diese ‘Querlage’ des Menschen aus der 
exzentrischen Positionsform, aber damit ist ihr nicht geholfen. Wer in ihr ist, steht in dem 
Aspekt einer absoluten Antinomie: Sich zu dem erst machen zu müssen, was er schon ist, 
das Leben zu führen, welches er lebt. (384)
The progression that has led from the thing to the living thing, from the plant to the animal, now 
leads from the animal to the constitutive eccentricity of the human. This is the cause of the 
“natural artificiality” of the human.
Diese Ansicht, oft auch in mythischer Form geprägt, gibt einer tiefen Erkenntnis 
Ausdruck. Weil dem Menschen durch seinen Existenztyp aufgezwungen ist, das Leben zu
führen, welches er lebt, d. h. zu machen, was er ist – eben weil er nur ist, wenn er 
vollzieht – braucht er ein Komplement nichtnatürlicher, nichtgewachsener Art. Darum ist 
er von Natur, aus Gründen seiner Existenzform künstlich. Als exzentrisches Wesen nicht 
im Gleichgewicht, ortlos, zeitlos im Nichts stehend, konstitutiv heimatlos, muß er “etwas 
werden” und sich das Gleichgewicht – schaffen. Und er schafft es nur mit Hilfe der 
96 “In Wirklichkeit ist die Sache gerade umgekehrt: nicht ist das Bewußtsein in uns, sondern wir sind ‘im’ 
Bewußtsein, d.h. wir verhalten uns als eigenbewegliche Leiber zur Umgebung. Das Bewußtsein kann getrübt, 
eingeengt, ausgeschaltet sein, seine Inhalte wechseln, seine Strukturhängt ab von der Organisation des Leibes, 
aber seine Aktualisierung ist immer da gewährleistet, wo die einheitliche Beziehung zwischen Lebenssubjekt 
und Umwelt in doppelter Richtung, rezeptiv und motorisch, durch den Leib besteht. Bewußtsein ist nur diese 
Grundform und Grundbedingung des Verhaltens eines Lebewesens in Selbststellung zur Umgebung (111-112)
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außernatürlichen Dinge, die aus seinem Schaffen entspringen, wenn die Ergebnisse dieses
schöpferischen Machens ein eigenes Gewicht bekommen. (384-385)
Awareness of the lack of immediacy generates a response to attempt to overcome the eccentricity
by creating a sense of balance.97 The result of this is the history of human making, namely, 
technology and culture per se. 
Yet this is not something that can be explained in psychological terms, as a kind of 
compensation, but results directly from the positional situatedness of the human as a body, in a 
body, and behind the whole process, as observer. It is perceived as a deficit, but Plessner is 
careful to say that it is not a deficit. Rather, it is the positionally necessary consequence of self-
awareness in the broader framework: the task of living life, for the human, becomes precisely 
that. With the human’s positional eccentricity with regard to its own body comes the 
epistemological consequence of a particular kind of conscious knowledge of that body and its 
existence; with that knowledge comes the need, knowing, to live.
Der Mensch will heraus aus der unerträglichen Exzentrizität seines Wesens, er will die 
Hälftenhaftigkeit der eigenen Lebensform kompensieren und das kann er nur mit Dingen 
erreichen, die schwer genug sind, um dem Gewicht seiner Existenz die Waage zu halten. 
Exzentrische Lebensform und Ergänzungsbedürftigkeit bilden ein und denselben 
Tatbestand. Bedürftigkeit darf hier nicht in einem subjektiven Sinne und psychologisch 
aufgefaßt werden. Sie ist allen Bedürfnissen, jedem Drang, jedem Trieb, jeder Tendenz, 
jedem Willen des Menschen vorgegeben. In dieser Bedürftigkeit oder Nacktheit liegt das 
Movens für alle spezifisch menschliche, d. h. auf Irreales gerichtete und mit künstlichen 
Mitteln arbeitende Tätigkeit, der letzte Grund für das Werkzeug und dasjenige, dem es 
dient: die Kultur.” (385)
This picture of the human is quite different from the pessimistic anthropology of the 
Mängelwesen, a concept originally proposed by Herder and reworked (and popularized) by 
97 “Wie angegeben, ist diese exzentrische Position im Menschen verwirklicht. Er steht im Zentrum seines Stehens. 
Er bildet den Punkt der Vermittlung zwischen ihm und dem Umfeld und er ist in diesen Punkt gesetzt, er steht in
ihm. D.h. einmal: Seine Beziehung zu anderen Dingen ist zwar eine indirekte, er lebt sie aber als direkte, 
unmittelbare Beziehung ganz wie das Tier –, soweit er wie das Tier dem Gesetz der geschlossenen Lebensform 
und ihrer Positionalität unterworfen ist. Und es heißt zum anderen: Er weiß von der Indirektheit seiner 
Beziehung, sie ist ihm als mittelbare gegeben.” (401)
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Arnold Gehlen.98 Where the idea of the human as deficient being presupposes a kind of expulsion
from the natural world – left weak and defenseless by comparison to other animals, humans must
turn to technology to supplement their natural lack – Plessner’s account shows how the perceived
sense of expulsion arises, but elaborates the human situation by contrast from the logic of living 
beings as such.99 The theory of the human as deficient being seems therefore necessarily 
susceptible to the charge of exceptionalism; as a developmental account that portrays how and 
why technology arose, it seems to beg the question of how the situation of a deficient being 
developed in the first place. While Plessner’s existential Bedürftigkeit has commonalities with 
the idea of the human as the Mängelwesen – broadly speaking, both accounts see culture and 
technology as the response to a fundamental disjoint between humans and non-human nature – 
the shift in emphasis between the two theories is crucial. The theory of the Mängelwesen 
emphasizes morphological evolution and the absence of instincts, where the human lack of 
natural defensive weapons or fleet-footedness renders them uniquely vulnerable in the animal 
world. While further work would be needed to tease out the presuppositions and implications of 
this hypothesis in the historical context of philosophical anthropology, the basic premise of the 
theory seems to import a culturally specific and exceptionally bellicose idea of evolution as a 
98 On the concept of the Mängelwesen see Fischer (543-546, 174-177). Fischer too seems to assimilate this concept
to categories in Plessner such as Hälftenhaftigkeit and natural artificiality, but this is inadequate. Gehlen himself 
(1950) makes clear that his theory is opposed to a view of the human, such as Scheler’s or Plessner’s, that would
situate it on a continuum of levels (Stufen) with other forms of life. He justifies this absolute distinction by 
rejecting approaches like Scheler’s that move from the animal to the human in terms of instincts. For Gehlen, 
instinctual behavior is an automatism irreconcilable with human intelligence. The human is lacking in instincts, 
too (21-28). 
For a survey of creative appropriations of the figure of the Mängelwesen, see Fore (2012) 7-8. While he 
seems to assimilate Weimar philosophical anthropology tout court to Gehlen’s concept in a way that overlooks 
Plessner’s contribution, many of the positive aspects of the appropriations of the Mängelwesen he lists would in 
fact fit well with Plessner’s theory.
99 “Nur weil der Mensch von Natur halb ist und (was damit wesensverknüpft ist) über sich steht, bildet 
Künstlichkeit das Mittel, mit sich und der Welt ins Gleichgewicht zu kommen. Das bedeutet nicht, daß Kultur 
eine Überkompensation von Minderwertigkeitskomplexen darstellt, sondern zielt auf eine durchaus 
vorpsychologische, ontische Notwendigkeit.” (396)
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bellum omnium contra omnes; more specifically, it isn’t clear why only physical means of attack 
and defense count as inborn advantages, but social features shared by many species besides 
humans – group organization, cooperation, language – are a priori transferred from the natural 
realm to the cultural sphere.
Plessner’s account, by contrast, elaborates the concept of artificiality in stages, from the 
Doppelaspekt inherent to the perception of objects as such through the relationship found in 
various forms of life between body, border, and environment.100 The end result is a natural 
artificiality, to be sure, and something like a vertiginous disorientation – “Seine Existenz ist 
wahrhaft auf Nichts gestellt” (365). But given its place within the broader context of Die Stufen 
des Organischen und der Mensch, this result does not square neatly with Lethen’s use of 
Plessner, precisely because the emphasis the former places on the latter’s concept of artificiality 
strips it from its context in the service of a strong dichotomy that privileges separation, masking, 
and armoring.
It is notable that Lethen, in his reconstruction of four Lesarten of Plessner’s dictum, “Der 
Mensch ist von Natur aus künstlich,” does not arrive at the emphasis suggested by Stufen, 
namely: “Der Mensch ist von Natur aus künstlich.” While my reading of the 1928 book has 
attempted to show how the eccentricity and artificiality of the human stem from a positional 
100 And indeed, Plessner considers other accounts of the origins of the human and culture, criticizing the tendency 
to focus on one feature of human existence or to situate the human in relationship to other animals only for the 
juxtapositional effect of incongruity (385-393). “Eine biologistisch-utilistische steht einer psychologistischen 
Auffassung der geistigen Welt gegenüber, die erste macht den Menschen zu einem gesunden, die zweite zu 
einem kranken Tier. Beide sehen ihn primär als Tier, als Raubtier oder als Haustier, und versuchen, die 
Epiphänomen der geistigen Äußerungen seines Wesens aus biologischen Prozessen herzuleiten. Darin liegt ihr 
Kardinalfehler (der aufs Schlagendste die Unfähigkeit demonstriert, den Menschen als Menschen und doch als 
Naturwesen in Einer Perspektive zu sehen, solange man naturwissenschaftliche mit geisteswissenschaftlichen 
Vorstellungen zusammenkoppelt). Sie verabsolutieren ein Symptom des menschlichen Daseins und wollen 
damit alles andere für den Menschen Bezeichnende erklären. Die einen führen das Menschliche auf das 
Allzumenschliche, den Sexualtrieb oder den Ernährungstrieb oder den Machttrieb, zurück. Die anderen wieder 
konstruieren einen Erlösungstrieb. Die dritten sehen alles unter dem Aspekt der Intelligenz und der Berechnung. 
So bewegen sich alle in Zirkeln und kommen aus dem Empirismus biologischer oder psychologischer 
Symptome nicht heraus.” (390)
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logic immanent to living things as such, Lethen is working from the opposite direction, arguing 
that Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch represents the “Naturalisierung einer 
exzentrischen Verhaltenslehre” (80). That is, in Lethen’s reading Plessner starts from a position 
that is both anthropological and political, descriptive and prescriptive – to avoid the shame and 
risibility of expressive immediacy, one needs the protection of distance, masking, armoring, and 
tact – and inscribes it onto the natural world for a broader justification. It is quite possible that 
these two Lesarten of Plessner are determined by which works are prioritized, and that the 
disciplinary commitments of the various works to biology, anthropology, politics, and social 
commentary are in tension or even incongruous. That must remain a question for another context.
For the present, it is worth considering the nature and implications of Lethen’s reading of 
Plessner in the context of Stufen.
In the various figures and images he examines in Plessner’s work – the border, the mask, 
the armored body – Lethen invariably emphasizes the aspects of separation, distance, and 
conflict. The polemic thrust of Plessner’s 1924 social critique Grenzen der Gemeinschaft – 
Lethen’s primary textual reference – encourages these emphases, and yet reading them into 
Stufen contorts the later text, rendering it a usefully piecemeal illustration of a cold anthropology 
at the cost of any overall coherence or even differentiation from other tendencies in philosophical
anthropology. Plessner’s use of the border becomes, in Lethen, a border imposed by a sovereign 
ego that contains and protects the living body.101 Likewise Lethen emphasizes the mask as the 
101 “Sein zentraler Begriff der ‘Grenze’ bezeichnet jetzt nicht länger eine Zone des Austauschs. Vielmehr tritt nun 
eine hochreflexive Person auf den Plan, die über ein Ich verfügt, das sich nach Innen scharf gegen das 
Unbewußte des Leib-Seins abgrenzt. […] Die Aufgabe der Bewachung der Grenzziehung, mit der das Ich sich 
seiner Identität vergewissert, versetzt es in einen chronischen Alarmzustand.” (84) Conspicuously absent is the 
border’s function as an interface between organism and external world. Lethen had previously quoted a 
summary of Plessner’s theory by Joachim Fischer, only to likewise elide the necessarily dual function of 
Plessner’s concept of the border: “‘Im abkammernden und zugleich aufschließenden “Grenzübergang” ist ein 
Lebewesen vom Zentrum aus gegen eine korrelierende Umgebung gestellt...’” (83, italics added)
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figure of a baroque dance of power, obscuring and protecting, rather than the more complex 
mediation of mediacy and immediacy found in Plessner, where phenomenal appearance is like a 
face that hides in the act of revealing.102
What is lost is the more nuanced relationship between mediation and immediacy, the way 
that the border common to all living things both differentiates it from its environment and 
integrates it; absent in Lethen is the insight that the idea of a border is already its transgression.103
And for Plessner, this transgression is a necessary feature of both the border and eccentricity, and
not simply a threat to subjectivity autonomy and dignity. Similarly, where Lethen sees figures of 
polarity, fragmentation, and separation, it would perhaps be more accurate to identify the 
acknowledgment of the need for mediation. Quoting Macht und Menschliche Natur (1931), 
Lethen writes, “‘Deshalb ist der Mensch “von Natur” künstlich und nie im Gleichgewicht’” 
(Lethen 77). In Plessner’s book, the quote continues, “Deshalb kommt ihm jede Unmittelbarkeit 
nur in einer Vermittlung, jede Reinheit nur in einer Trübung, jede Ungebrochenheit nur in einer 
Brechung zustande” (Macht und Menschliche Natur 199). Isolating only the second moment of 
each pair elides the possibility of mediation; a Brechung is not a Bruch but a necessary feature of 
any optics. We can also see this in Plessner’s view of contemporary animal psychology – while it
is true that the observer has no immediate access to an animal’s interiority, mediated knowledge 
of knowledge is nevertheless possible through observation of behavior, or Verhalten (Stufen 106-
102 “Darum ist die Exzentrizität, auch wenn sie sich im Vollzug des Wissens (der Vermittlung) vergißt, nicht getilgt. 
Kraft ihrer faßt das Wissen unmittelbar etwas Mittelbares: Die Realität in der Erscheinung, das Phänomen der 
Wirklichkeit. Erscheinung ist ja nicht wie ein Blatt, wie eine Maske zu denken, hinter der das Reale steckt und 
die man von ihm ablösen kann, sondern ist wie das Gesicht, welches verhüllt, indem es enthüllt.” (405)
103 Fischer (2000) reconstructs the genealogy of Plessner’s concept of the border as follows: “Er zieht hier 
(ungenannt) Hegels idealistische Bestimmung der ‘Grenze’ (als inner Bestimmtheit, die etwas mit seinem 
Anderen (Medium) sowohl zusammenschließt als es davon abscheidet) und Simmels lebensphilosophische 
Charakterisierung der ‘Grenze’ (Leben als ‘Mehr-Leben’ und ‘Mehr-als-Leben’) in die biologische Konkretion 
des Organischen, wie sie ihm durch Buytendijks ‘Anschauliche Kennzeichen des Organischen’ präsentiert war.” 
(272-273)
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107).104 This term brings us to a key point: Verhalten in Plessner is not assimilable to Verhalten in
Lethen. In the latter’s framework, Verhalten is connected to codes of conduct, prescriptive forms 
of behavior that work to protect the autonomy of an individual. For Lethen, it is a figure of 
separation. For Plessner, on the other hand, Verhalten is the necessary mediation between an 
organism and its environment, and can in fact reveal much about intention and motivation; it is as
much a figure of connection as it is the methodological acknowledgment of the inevitability of 
mediation.
Where Lethen foregrounds separation, isolation, and fragmentation, Plessner’s 
anthropology proposes mediation, eccentricity, and relation. Because Lethen privileges only 
moments of separation, coldness, and artificiality, he collapses the large distinction between 
Plessner’s anthropology and the theory of the Mängelwesen – this makes perfect sense if the 
lesson from Plessner is simply that humans are artificial, but then it also reduces Plessner’s 
contribution to anthropology to a trivial statement about a gulf between the human and the 
natural world. The fact that Lethen can find Plessner’s failure to mention Herder “astonishing” 
(91) suggests quite tangibly how little the former engages with the specificity of the latter’s 
anthropology, and particularly its connection to biology.105 
104 “Nicht die ewig verborgen bleibende Innenwelt der Tiere mit ihrem uns unzugänglichen Empfinden und 
Befinden, sondern die Umwelt, d. h. die jeweilig verschiedene Gestalt der Einheit derjenigen Momente, die für 
sie wirksam werden und auf die sie wirken können, sei das wissenschafthebe Programm des ‘Tierpsychologen.’ 
Keine Kryptopsychologie, sondern Phänologie des lebendigen Verhaltens: Erklärung des uns s1chtbaren 
Gebahrens der Tiere aus sinnlich wahrnehmbaren Faktoren.” (107) What observation of Verhalten can in fact 
reveal is suggested in a passage where Plessner supports the use of words to describe animal behavior that 
would be dismissed as anthropomorphic by a strictly mechanical view of stimulus and response: “Insofern ist 
Wasmann im Recht gewesen, wenn er gegen Uexkülls tierpsychologiefeindliches Programm zum wenigsten die 
wissenschaftliche Rechtmäßigkeit von Ausdrücken wie Sehen, Hören, Tasten, Riechen usw. bei Tieren 
verteidigte. Diese Arten der Bewußtheit sind Arten und Bedingungen lebendigen Verhaltens, das eine 
Überbrückung des Zwiespalts zwischen dem Eigensystem des Leibes und der Umwelt bedeutet.” (112)
105 And in fact, Plessner does mention the Gehlen-Herder connection in the preface to the second edition, declaring 
the deficient being hypothesis of “begrenzter Tragkraft” (23). Elsewhere, Plessner considers other pessimistic 
anthropologies and various exceptionalisms of the human, in order to contrast them to his own theory. See 
Stufen, 387-391.
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Paradoxically, in reading the border as a form of armoring and containment the sovereign 
self imposes on itself for protection, Lethen ultimately recenters the eccentric subject within the 
well-defined body. The insistence on separation, coldness, and distance actually has the effect of 
undoing the one part of Plessner’s Gedankengut Lethen needs most, namely, the insight into the 
fundamental eccentricity of the human. This concept is not reducible to a cold distance that 
would shield individuals from excess emotiveness and risibility, but is rather a complex 
positional logic that understands humans as both in their bodies and outside of them, being 
bodies and having them, and behind the whole dual relationship as its observers. This is a model 
of embodiment, and of culture and technology, too large for the tight confines of the armored 
ego.
In a sense and despite its emphasis on distance and armor, despite its attack on expression
and warmth, Lethen’s version of Plessner remains a deeply subjectivist one. In this account, 
Plessner presents the reader with a sovereign and calculating subject that draws and polices the 
border of its corporal and affective autonomy. This subjective decisionism implies, as I have 
suggested, a body recentered within its armor and neatly delineated from other subjects, and from
its own risky and creaturely nature. Yet what one finds in Plessner instead is the border that 
connects, the subject that is multiply positioned within, without, and behind its body, and 
contours that are spatial and phenomenological interfaces as much as demarcations. A guiding 
commitment of Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch is to objectivity and the necessary 
relationality between subject, body, and environment. We see this in Plessner’s picture of 
technology and culture too. Where Lethen’s reading implies technology as calculation, distance, 
armor, Steuerung, and a kind of traffic-control for individual subjects – all of which emphasize 
and connote subjective aspects of technology – what we find in Plessner is an insistence on the 
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co-presence of invention and discovery, making and finding, creation and expression, subjective 
and objective dimensions.106 In other words, Plessner is careful to emphasize the close connection
between human artificiality and the structures of objective reality. This is fully in accordance 
with the method and focus of the rest of the book, where features that distinguish the human are 
not the markers of an absolute breach or ejection from the natural world, but are rather the 
dialectical realization and self-fulfillment of tendencies already present in nature. Eccentricity, 
for example, is the result of an incremental and progression realization of a tendency already 
latent in living things and, at base, already present in unrealized form in the split at the core of 
phenomenal objects available to perception. It is also closely connected to the idea of expression,
a linkage that does not really seem to have a place in Lethen’s account.107
This is a pattern we will see recur in the following chapters. The fact that Lethen ignores 
or suppresses the way that, for Plessner, humans are not just artificial but artificial by nature, and 
that eccentricity yields not just the necessity for mediation, but for mediated immediacy, has as a 
broader correlate the way that nothing ultimately seems to be strictly technological for the writers
106 “Denn ebenso wesentlich ist für die technischen Hilfsmittel (und darüber hinaus für alle Werke und Satzung aus 
menschlicher Schöpferkraft) ihr inneres Gewicht, ihre Objektivität, die als dasjenige an ihnen erscheint, was nur 
gefunden und entdeckt, nicht gemacht werden konnte. […] Der Mensch kann nur erfinden, soweit er entdeckt. 
Er kann nur das machen, was es ‘schon’ an sich gibt – wie er selbst nur dann Mensch ist, wenn er sich dazu 
macht, und nur lebt, wenn er sein Leben führt. […] Das Prius von Suchen und Finden dagegen ist die 
Korrelativität von Mensch und Welt, die auf die Identität seiner exzentrischen Positionsform und der Struktur 
dinglicher Realität (die eben auch ‘exzentrische’ Form zeigt) zurückweist. […] Der schöpferische Griff ist eine 
Ausdrucksleistung. Dadurch erhält der realisierende Akt, der sich auf die von der Natur dargebotenen 
Materialien stützen muß, den Charakter der Künstlichkeit.” (397-398)
107 “Hier geht es um die den Ausdrucksweisen vorgelagerte Notwendigkeit des Ausdrückens überhaupt, um die 
Einsicht in den Wesenszusammenhang zwischen exzentrischer Positionsform und Ausdrücklichkeit als 
Lebensmodus des Menschen. […] 
Mitteilungsbedürfnis und Gestaltungsbedürfnis deuten also selbst auf existentielle Mächte zurück, die in ihnen 
sich nur auswirken. Ob diese mit der Sozialität der menschlichen Lebensform direkt oder indirekt 
zusammenhängen, ob nicht noch andere Seiten der Form ins Spiel treten, bleibe unerörtert. Eins ist durch die 
bisherigen Untersuchungen gesichert: Die exzentrische Positionsform bedingt die Mitweltlichkeit oder Sozialität
des Menschen, macht ihn zum ζῶον πολιτιχόν [sic], und bedingt gleichursprünglich seine Künstlichkeit, seinen 
Schaffensdrang. Es fragt sich, ob aus der Exzentrizität ebenso ursprünglich – nicht diese oder jene Art von 
Ausdrucksbedürfnis, sondern ein Grundzug menschlichen Lebens folge, den man als Expressivität, als 
Ausdrücklichkeit menschlicher Lebensäußerungen überhaupt bezeichnen muß. Ein derartiger Grundzug macht 
sich natürlich für den Menschen auch als Zwang geltend, der nicht nur in seinem Leben aufgeht, sondern darin 
gegen sein Leben angeht, lebend sein Leben führt.” (399)
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and intellectuals of Weimar considered in this study, but is always technological in way that 
stems from a given logic or register of the natural world or the natural sciences. What we find in 
Plessner is similar to what we will see in Döblin and Jünger, and suggests an important 
dimension of the technological imaginaries of the Weimar period – because of a particular kind 
of human embodiment within its environment, human activity, labor, and technology are 
themselves understood as outgrowths of natural and biologic forces. The bodies here are not in 
the first place armored, contained, and divided off, but integrated, positional, and ecological in 
various ways.
What the comparison of externalization, embodiment, and incorporation in the 
technological anthropologies of Marx, Kapp, and Plessner suggests is that consideration of terms 
such as the human, nature, labor, and the body were crucial to modern articulations of a newly-
autonomous concept of technology.108 In none of these three thinkers does technology stand on its
own legs. Where it comes closest, in the work of Kapp, is where it becomes most 
methodologically and philosophically suspect. Put differently, the methodological level 
influences the conceptual and philosophical levels. Where a discourse of technology, such as that
of machines in Marx or of the Hälftenhaftigkeit of the eccentric human in Plessner,109 articulates 
its connection to a related discourse and inquiry (political economy in Marx, philosophical 
anthropology and biology in Plessner), it has both a heuristic value as a tool of inquiry and finds 
a useful – because contextually specific – theorization. Where it is absolutized in the service of 
foregone conclusions about the centrality of the human, as in Kapp, technology is unable to tell 
us much about itself except in a haplessly historicist way: that people thought a certain way about
108 For the history of the development of technology/Technik as an emergent autonomous concept, see Leo Marx 
(2010) and Eric Schatzberg (2006).
109 (385)
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the topic at a certain time.
But despite their differences in method and utility, what we see in Marx, Kapp, and 
Plessner is a concept of the human that articulates it as a relationship between biology and 
technology, organ and machine. None of the three figures ultimately draws a strict dichotomy 
between the terms, although Kapp’s insistence on the primacy of the organic comes close. 
Rather, they offer three sketches of the human as a liminal figure between self and other, body 
and environment, subject and substance, Innenwelt and Außenwelt, nature and technology, a 
figure whose primary action, when reduced to its most basic terms, consists in a kind of border 
crossing across the bounds of the individual body, externalizing itself and incorporating its other. 
The differences among the three show the necessity of context-specificity and methodological 
function in constructing (and parsing) accounts of technology. And, in a way that complements 
this insight, their commonality suggests the rough conceptual coordinates of the space in which 
the human body was being reconceived in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in its 
relationship to nature, technology, organs, machines, labor, production, and the newer semantic 
and social fields of industrialization, capitalism, colonialism, urbanization, and modern sciences 
such as experimental biology. For a much closer view of the way that the instrumental body was 
serving as a site to reimagine human subjectivity in the 1920s, let us now turn to Alfred Döblin’s 
1924 science fiction epic, Berge Meere und Giganten.
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CHAPTER TWO
“Jetzt kommt das Leben”: The Technological Body in Alfred Döblin’s Berge Meere und Giganten
Alfred Döblin occupies a curious position in the landscape of German modernism. If it 
weren’t for the canonical status of Berlin Alexanderplatz he could easily pass for a “forgotten 
author,” as one critic pointedly put it, and this in spite of a complex and diverse oeuvre that 
stretches over half of the twentieth century.110 Such lopsided reception stems in part from the 
difficulty of accounting for the vicissitudes of a biography that intersects with major moments in 
twentieth-century literary and cultural history without being readily assimilable to any of them.111
From his early engagement with Expressionism and Futurism to the literary celebrity that 
attended publication of his city novel in 1929 and his alienating wartime conversion to 
Catholicism;112 from his avant-garde embrace of technological modernity to a monist philosophy 
of nature,113 from his exploration of Eastern Jewry to his sustained engagement on behalf of the 
110 While a recent biography by Oliver Bernhardt concludes with a chapter on Döblin as the “vergessene Dichter,” 
this is a situation that may well be changing, as Gabriele Sander argues in the introduction to her invaluable 
critical overview of Döblin’s life and work (2001). And to be sure, recent critical interventions into Döblin 
scholarship, such as Devin Fore’s article “Döblin's Epic: Sense, Document, And The Verbal World Picture” 
(2006) and Stefanie Harris’ Mediating Modernity: German Literature and the “new” Media, 1895-1930 (2009), 
consider lesser known works by Döblin to complicate and deepen our understanding of his contribution to 
German modernism, yet the city novel continues to be the horizon that orients these approaches. 
111 Klaus Müller-Salget, in his seminal account of Döblin’s development, describes the two predominant ways of 
accounting for Döblin’s oeuvre: on the one hand, there is the view that his entire work represents an unchanging 
continuity, and on the other, the idea of “Proteus Döblin” emphasizes the author’s radical shifts between 
movements and styles, viewing each individual work in isolation (1). While this dichotomy no longer aptly 
characterizes the scholarship on Döblin, a sense persists that the milestones, reference points, and termini of his 
life and work are not to be reconciled, and indeed a recent biography draws on the figure of “Proteus Döblin” 
(Schoeller 16).
112 Gabriele Sander describes the scene in Santa Monica in 1943 amongst the exiles who had assembled to celebrate
Döblin’s 65th birthday: “Heinrich Mann hielt die Begrüßungsrede, Fritz Kortner, Peter Lorre und Alexander 
Granach lasen aus Döblins Büchern, es erklangen teilweise eigens für ihn komponierte Werke von Hanns Eisler 
und Ernst Toch, und ‘die Blandine Ebinger sang Berliner Chansons’ (Br 292). Mit den in seiner Dankesrede 
gemachten Andeutungen über seine neugewonnenen religiösen Auffassungen stieß Döblin dann jedoch auf 
totales Unverständnis bei der knapp zweihundert geladenen Gästen.” (70)
113 For example, in “Der Geist der naturalistischen Zeitalters” (1924) and Das Ich über der Natur (1927), 
respectively.
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disenfranchised and suspicion of the organized politics of the left,114 Döblin’s heterogeneous 
array of positions has prompted critics to elide the incongruous aspects of his thinking to 
highlight his contribution to German modernism.
This chapter focuses on one of the most confounding and complex works in Döblin’s 
œuvre, his 1924 science fiction novel Berge Meere und Giganten, a sprawling narrative 
chronicling the future history of humanity between the 20th and 27th centuries. Scholars have 
endeavored to make sense of its conceptual and aesthetic incongruities by reading it as a 
cautionary tale about the fateful struggle between nature and technology in industrial 
modernity.115 The novel would thus fit into a dichotomous discourse organized around a set of 
neat polarities between nature and technology, the organic and the mechanical, the armored body 
and the Kreatur, that supposedly dominated the cultural and political imaginary of Weimar 
culture.116
114 See Reise in Polen (1926) and “Wissen und Verändern!” (1931).
115 Roland Dollinger, for example, describes it as Döblin’s “grandiose vision of the heroic struggle between the 
ratio-technological impulse of modern man and nature” (95). Gabriele Sander, who edited the critically revised 
Neuausgabe of 2006, has dubbed it an “Epos über den Konflikt zwischen Natur und Technik” (154-5). Irmgard 
Hunt has written that “[m]an and nature, or man against nature, is obviously Döblin’s overall theme in all its 
possibilities” (65), and Ritchie Robertson has called the central theme of the work “man’s urge to control 
nature” (216). In “Bemerkungen zu Berge Meere und Giganten Döblin describes how, although he originally set 
out to write the novel in order to settle accounts with his creeping “nature complexes,” the process of writing it 
yielded the opposite effect, namely a deliberate paean to nature. In general, the development of Döblin’s attitude
towards modern technology is a vexed question. In the dedication to Die drei Sprünge des Wang-lun (1915), 
Döblin describes the disruptive audial impact of modern technology that enters the window from the street. The 
vibrations, noise, and chaos of urban modernity that will be welcomed into Berlin Alexanderplatz’s montage of 
voices are here juxtaposed to the less ephemeral acts of remembering and bearing witness. The novel Wadzeks 
Kampf mit der Dampfturbine (1918) and especially the programmatic essay “Der Geist des naturalistischen 
Zeitalters” (1924) represent a more enthusiastic approach to modern technology. The question of technology is 
implicitly central for Müller-Salget’s account of Döblin’s trajectory in the sense that Müller-Salget’s focus is the 
shifting role of the “Ich” in the context of Döblin’s “Naturalismus.” Yet for reasons that will become clear over 
the course of this essay, I do not follow Müller-Salget in many of his points, particularly in the way that he sees 
a strong transition in Döblin’s view of technology between Berge Meere und Giganten and “Der Geist des 
naturalistischen Zeitalters” – I do not think we are justified in seeing, as he does, the science fiction novel as 
representing “eine absolut gesetzte Technik und die daraus resultierende Antinomie zwischen Mensch und 
Natur” (13).
116 Various accounts of Weimar culture foreground the discursive centrality of the body and dichotomies such as 
that between nature and technology. Most important for this study is Helmut Lethen’s Verhaltenslehren der 
Kälte (1994), but Peter Sloterdijk’s Kritik der zynischen Vernunft (1983) and Jeffrey Herf’s Reactionary 
Modernism (1984) should also be mentioned in this context.
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In this chapter I argue that the novel’s repeated disarticulation and reassemblage of 
bodies, far from constituting a warning against the Promethean hubris of the technological 
impulse, instead undermines conceptual dichotomies pitting nature against technology, the 
organic against the mechanical, and the human against the non-human.117 That is, the novel stages
the literal entwinement, rupture, and fusion of human organs with technological apparatuses in 
order to allow immanent conceptual tensions to play out on the narrative level.
Scholars of Weimar culture and the avant-garde have shown how the technological body 
was mobilized to rework categories of subjectivity, experience, gender, society, labor, and media,
among others, as part of a larger critique of a bourgeois humanism that privileged psychological 
interiority.118 While Döblin’s Zukunftsroman appropriates terms and tropes from this tradition, its 
aesthetic negotiation of the body’s dual status – as both a tool and the seat of the self – offers a 
far more complex figuration than the trope of the armored or prosthetic body that circulates in 
other modernist art and fiction. Even the newer figure of the cyborg is insufficient to account for 
Döblin’s depiction of technology, since Berge Meere und Giganten disrupts the very distinction 
between biology and technology on which the cyborg is necessarily based.
117 My reading thus builds and expands on Peter Sprengel’s original and nuanced reading of Berge Meere und 
Giganten as a text in which Döblin’s vitalism leads to the dissolution of boundaries between the organic and 
inorganic, and between different living beings. For more on the centrality of the concept of Lebens to Döblin’s 
early work, see Ernst Ribbat’s seminal monograph Die Wahrheit des Lebens im frühen Werk Alfred Döblins.
118 Of particular interest in this connection is the work of Helmut Lethen, Andreas Huyssen, Andrew Hewitt, and 
Matthew Biro. Lethen’s Verhaltenslehren der Kälte (1994) proposes a cooly inorganic anti-subjectivism in 
discussions of Ernst Jünger, Helmuth Plessner, and the “radar type.” In “The Vamp and the Machine: 
Technology and Sexuality in Fritz Lang’s Metropolis” (1981) Andreas Huyssen argues that Metropolis’s 
syncretist mixture of an Expressionist technophobia with the technophilia of neue Sachlichkeit is explained by 
the film’s reliance on technological imagery to negotiate competing models of female sexuality. His essay on 
Ernst Jünger (1993) analyzes the latter’s dependence on technological armoring to shore up the privilege of 
individual experience in the face of its erosion by modern technology and warfare. Hewitt (1993) situates the 
importance of the machine for Marinetti’s Futurism in the way that the machine can model a harmonious 
antagonism, a “struggle without protagonists” (142) that displaces class conflict onto a conflict between man 
and nature in the service of “capitalism’s libidinal project of self-destruction” (17). And most recently, in The 
Dada Cyborg (2009) Biro has shown how the Berlin Dadaists drew on the post-WWI glut of prosthetic bodies to
appropriate the figure of the cyborg as a way of rethinking “representation, perception, and identity in the 
modern world” (257).
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This chapter has three objectives. Firstly, to show that Döblin’s position is fundamentally 
coherent and continuous; seemingly incongruous moments within his oeuvre, such as his monist 
philosophy of nature and his avant-garde critique of the autonomous bourgeois subject, are not so
many revisions of his position but rather varying expressions of a set of common impulses. 
Secondly, I argue that Döblin’s science fiction novel forces us to rethink the relationship between
nature and technology within German modernism: this relationship cannot be characterized as 
one of polarity or dichotomy so much as of mutual discursive and tropological dependency. And 
finally, rather than evincing a wishful (and ideologically dubious) desire for reconciliation, the 
novel’s embrace of an organic understanding of technology and the human communities that 
arise at the end of the narrative suggest an undertheorized aspect of Weimar literature. Here 
violence is inflicted on the human body not to repress organic, creaturely vulnerability in the 
service of the armored persona, but to undermine the very polarities upon which such constructs 
are based in order ultimately to articulate a new kind of relationship between individual and 
collectivity.
My analysis begins by examining how the text’s dedication already constructs the body as
a relationship between the perceiving, writing subject and its environment rather than as a clearly
bounded entity. Then I turn to the novel’s progressive penetration, rupture, dissolution, and 
reconstitution of the human body, in order to both account for the way that it furthers Döblin’s 
critique of the autonomous individual and to show how, far from evincing a pessimistic view of 
nature’s domination by technology, Berge Meere und Giganten instead shows the inseparability 
of these two terms. I then analyze the eponymous giants to suggest how Döblin’s reconfiguration 
of the human body is tied to the novel’s political vision, in which a reworked subjectivity enables
the kind of collectivities depicted at the end of the text. I conclude by considering Berge Meere 
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und Giganten in light of Helmut Lethen’s characterization of the Weimar Republic as determined
by the frozen polarity of “Entmischung,” in order to suggest how Döblin’s novel can challenge a 
received understanding of Weimar culture.
***
To say that Berge Meere und Giganten does not lend itself to summary is something of an
understatement. Döblin’s novel spans the 20th to the 27th centuries with a geographic scope to 
match, and depicts a future history of power struggles, war, technological innovation, and 
rebellion. Because of its epic temporal scope, the episodic narrative is not so much character-
driven as it is anchored to other types of continuity, whether geographic or thematic. The novel 
thereby departs from the typical, popular Zukunftsromane of the period, which centered on 
strong-willed, calculating heroes engaged in ultimately successful monumental technological 
projects, like the related genre of the Ingenieurroman. While Berge Meere und Giganten does 
feature engineers and scientists involved in Promethean ventures, they are decentered both by the
sweeping diachrony and the epic role played by mass processes and movements. Yet the novel 
goes even further by insistently rupturing the individual bodies in which characters are 
necessarily located. In so doing, it both shares a thematic focus of contemporary Zukunftsromane 
on technological advances and war, and radically differs from other early texts of the genre in the
way it undermines rather than reinforces the autonomous individual. Both the decentering effects
of the epic narrative and the insistent ruptures of individual human bodies rework the literary 
category of character and the bourgeois ideal of the contained individual with which Döblin 
associated it.119
119 On the relationship of early Zukunftsromane to the Ingenieurroman and its strong-willed protagonist, see Brandt 
(2007), especially pp. 14, 69-71, and 117-121; for an overview of the formal and thematic characteristics of 
early German science fiction, see Innerhofer (1996), especially pp. 20-29; for a discussion on the thematic and 
political differences between Berge Meere und Giganten and contemporary nationalist Zukunftsromane, see 
Peter Fisher (1991), pp. 151-156. For Döblin’s own take on the relationship between the literary category of 
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A few of the more notable events in the novel include a renewed Völkerwanderung, the 
invention of synthetic food production, known as Mekispeise, indefinitely capable of sustaining a
thereby redundant population, a world war between Europe and Asia that chars and floods much 
of Russia, the struggle between the urban, technocratic centers of power and several waves of a 
back-to-the-land movement, the cataclysmic harvesting of Iceland’s lava to melt Greenland’s ice,
the torrent of hitherto icebound prehistoric monsters thus revived, and in response to these, the 
cultivation out of human, animal, vegetable, and mineral elements of living defense turrets (the 
titular giants). This sequence of events ultimately yields the new egalitarian collectivities that 
arise in Europe at the end of the narrative, and I will show how the intertwined challenges to the 
individual body and its instrumental use lay the necessary groundwork for the conceptions of 
subjectivity and community that enable these collectivities. The episodes my analysis will focus 
on are distributed throughout the novel (in the dedication, and in books two, three, seven, and 
eight out of nine) in order to reconstruct the development of the relationship between technology,
instrumentality, and the human body.
“Die dunkle rollende tosende Gewalt.” The dedication’s writing body
“Jede Minute eine Veränderung. Hier wo ich schreibe, auf dem Papier, in der 
fließenden Tinte, in dem Tageslicht, das auf das weiße knisternde Papier fällt. Wie sich 
das Papier biegt, Falten wirft unter der Feder. Wie die Feder sich biegt, streckt. Meine 
führende Hand wandert von links nach rechts, nach links vom Zeilenende zurück. Ich 
spüre am Finger den Halter: das sind Nerven, sie sind vom Blut umspült. Das Blut läuft 
durch den Finger, durch alle Finger, durch die Hand, beide Hände, die Arme, die Brust, 
den ganzen Körper, seine Haut Muskeln Eingeweide, in alle Flächen Ecken Nischen. So 
viel Veränderung in diesem hier. Und ich bin nur ein Einzelnes, ein winziges Stück 
Raum” (8).120
character and the concept of the individual, see “An Romanautoren und ihre Kritiker.”
120 Döblin, Alfred. Berge Meere und Giganten. München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2006. All further citations
of the novel are to this edition.
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This scene of writing occurs in the middle of the unusual dedication to Berge Meere und 
Giganten and follows a sustained encomium to the recipient of the dedication – an all-pervasive 
force of change and becoming that Döblin dubs “das Tausendnamige.” This description of what 
the authorial voice sees in the moment of writing – the pen, the paper, the May sunlight and later 
the flowers on the desk – at first recalls a familiar moment of writerly self-reflection: before the 
novel, the novelist. Yet while the indexical, declarative quality of “Hier wo ich schreibe” may 
seem to foreground the writing self, the quick shifts from the paper to the pen to the hand to the 
anatomic close-ups soon dissolve any sense of centered subjectivity.121 The metonymic chain that
links sunlight, paper, pen, fingers, nerves, blood vessels, and all organs of the writing body 
establishes a relation that interweaves body, instrument, environment, writer, and writing, 
effacing the distinctions between them. The organs of the body themselves become media 
technologies through which knowledge is recorded and transmitted and thus no different from the
pen, since the integration of the body with its environment undermines any easy demarcation 
between subject and medium or perception and production.122
In the space between the initial “ich schreibe” and the “ich bin” at the end of the passage, 
the meaning of “ich” undergoes a curious transformation. The active quality of “ich schreibe,” 
once this action is situated along a linkage of bodily and environmental processes, becomes 
121 While Döblin commonly uses the term “das Ich,” the development of his terminology from “An Romanautoren 
und ihre Kritiker” onward makes it appropriate, in my opinion, to speak of subjectivity in a broader sense to 
characterize his ideas on this score. Part of the thrust of such programmatic essays, as well as of Berge Meere 
und Giganten, is to undermine atomistic notions of the “Ich,” in order to create a picture of subjectivity, 
perception, embodiment, and environment as entwined concepts. Thus when I refer in this essay to 
“subjectivity,” this is not meant to be taken in a dualistic sense but rather refers to the way that Döblin situates 
the “Ich,” the self, and the subject in the dispersed relationships that connect the individual unit to the 
surrounding environment.
122 Given Döblin’s programmatic linkage in the early “An Romanautoren und ihre Kritiker” between technology, a 
dispersed subjectivity, and elemental, natural forces, the dedication’s subversion of a clear delineation between 
body, medium, and environment can be seen as a fundamental aspect of his thought, and already signals the way
that he will portray thought as a process of corporal integration with one’s environment in Das Ich über der 
Natur (44, 84-90).
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something that happens to the body as much as it is something the body does. The apposition to 
“ich spüre” – “das sind Nerven” – dislocates the agency of the “ich” in both perceiving and 
guiding the pen, a dislocation subtly reinforced by the image of the blood vessels weaving 
throughout the body. By the time we read, “ich bin nur ein Einzelnes,” it is clear that the “ich 
bin” is not the expression of a grounded, autonomous selfhood but rather a statement of 
subjective implication in a relationship that transcends the limits of the individual body. 
Similarly, “Einzelnes” is not a contained, monadic individual, but exists in a synechdochal and 
material relationship to the wider world; the “winziges Stück Raum” that is the self both 
recapitulates and decenters the initial “hier.”
While this scene of writing fails to produce or stabilize a writing subject, it also 
conspicuously avoids partaking of the modernist discourse of a Sprachkrise made familiar by 
Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s Chandos, Rainer Maria Rilke’s Malte, or Robert Musil’s Törless. The 
breakdown of a sovereign, writerly subjectivity does not correlate here to an inability to write or 
convey meaning.123 Rather, it is precisely the act of writing, conceived as something that takes 
place along a dispersed network of corporal and environmental media technologies, that 
constitutes a new model of decentered subjectivity. A key feature of this model is the ambivalent 
role of the body as both the tool that carries out the act of writing that generates the self and, on 
the other hand, the entity in which the self is most commonly located. It is this paradoxical, dual 
status of the body both as a tool for producing the self in interaction with the environment and as 
123 In Hofmannsthal’s text, Lord Chandos cannot articulate the very words – “Geist,” “Seele,” “Körper” – whose 
relationship Döblin’s text reconfigures. As we will see, Döblin is concerned with elements that occur in the 
Chandos letter, such as endless fragmentation and the (un)knowability of the interior of the body, but uses them 
in a completely different way. In Rilke’s novel, the pervasive motif of bodily and architectural penetration 
produces the sense of fragmentation that makes the production of meaning a nearly impossible project. As is 
already evident from the dedication to Berge Meere und Giganten, Döblin is also invested in transgressing 
corporal contours, but in contrast to Malte, the relationship established between the Eingeweide and what Döblin
elsewhere calls the Ausgeweide is the very condition for the possibility of writing. For a reading of the 
relationship between Chandos and Malte in the context of new media technologies, see Stefanie Harris (2009).
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the self’s metonymic representative that Döblin’s novel probes. 
In the 1920s Helmuth Plessner attempted to account for this paradoxically dual 
relationship between subject and body by splitting the notion of the body into the two concepts of
Körper and Leib. The Körper is the more mechanical body, location of the subject and subject to 
the same physical laws as all objects, while the Leib is the living body through which the subject 
interacts with its environment.124 For Plessner, the human is at once located inside and outside the
body: the human is a body and has a body that it deploys instrumentally, and is also outside of 
the whole process as a self-reflective subject.125 Plessner’s technological anthropology is based 
upon a positional relationship among the body, the subject, and instrumentality, and thus shares 
key terms with Berge Meere und Giganten’s corporal explorations, yet the latter pushes the 
tension between being and having a body further on the topological level by staging the clash 
between being and using a body in the ruptured and reconstituted interfaces between organs and 
organisms, body and environment. In Döblin’s novel, instrumentality is not only a decentering or 
eccentric feature, as with Plessner, but also ruptures the very bounds that eccentricity, needing a 
center, still needs.126
In this sense, the scene of writing from Döblin’s dedication can be understood as a 
microcosm of the novel as a whole. Where the former traces a movement from the body that 
writes to the self that is inscribed across a media relationship consisting of corporal, 
technological, and environmental elements, ending in an image of dispersed subjectivity,127 the 
124 See Die Stufen des Organsichen und der Mensch (1928), especially 291-302, and “Die Deutung des mimischen 
Ausdrucks” (1925), especially 77-89.
125 Die Stufen des Organsichen und der Mensch (365)
126 In a sense, the basic unit of Plessner’s anthropology is the experience of individual organism; part of Döblin’s 
radicality is to unsettle the automatic centrality of the individual by insisting that the individual is one level 
among many, and nothing more than an arbitrary heuristic organizing principle. This is indeed a thematic motif 
of his work from “An Romanautoren und ihre Kritiker” to Das Ich über der Natur.
127 As Döblin will write in “Der Bau des epischen Werks,” “man glaubt zu sprechen und man wird gesprochen, oder
man glaubt zu schreiben und man wird geschrieben” (243).
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fate of instrumentalized bodies in Berge Meere und Giganten’s plot runs a similar dialectic in 
dramatizing, at the novel’s end, a deindividualized collective freed from the instrumentality that 
was originally tied to the contours of the individual body. Crucially, Döblin’s topological strategy
of rupturing the bounds of the individual body also produces the dissolution of any conceptual 
boundary between nature and technology as separate spheres; more precisely, the novel’s 
extended de- and reincorporations demonstrate that nature and technology cannot coherently be 
conceived as separate spheres in the first place. Thus while the violent fantasy of the avant-garde 
armored body may well gain a shock value by assimilating nature to technology, Berge Merge 
und Giganten unfolds the immanent implications of the trope of the body-as-tool to recognize the
inseparability of the two spheres and reformulate the question accordingly as an exploration of 
the body’s ambivalent instrumentality.
“Drähte und Röhrchen führten in ihr Inneres.” The technological body in the laboratory 
An early scene in the novel renders the convergence of nature and technology graphic by 
depicting the literal wiring-together of organic and technological elements. Meki’s laboratory, in 
the vicinity of 26th-century Edinburgh, is the leading center of global research in synthetic food 
production, and this section of the novel sets the tone for much of what follows. The production 
of synthetic food eliminates agriculture’s dependency on unpredictable natural cycles, thereby 
creating the material surplus and attendant bodily and spiritual torpor that results in the global 
“Ural War” and subsequent bloody chaos. Moreover, the entire project of synthesizing food 
requires the total instrumentalization of organic bodies. Yet as later episodes will show, this is the
beginning of a relationship between bodies, growth, and instrumentality that ultimately results in 
the defeat of instrumentality, since the disruption of the distinction between individual bodies 
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undoes the distance necessary for these bodies to be controlled in the service of a rational end.
Meki’s researchers, called “Grünen” after the uniforms they wear, conduct experiments 
on the at first unwitting human test subjects, the “guests” or “Violetten,” experiments that shift 
the scale from the organism to the organ.128 The body itself is not a privileged site – “Die 
Physiker und Chemiker emanzipierten sich vom Tier- und Pflanzenkörper” (84) – but the organs 
are, as the “guests” are habitually vivisected and incorporated into various apparatuses.
Um [die Gäste], in gläsernen Schränken, in Kästen Wasserbetten, bei wechselnder 
Temperatur von Erdkälte bis zu hoher Wärme lagen auf Watte, schwammen in Behältern 
umhüllt und bloß, weiße und rote Organe und Organteile. Aus Standgefäßen floß ihnen in
dünnen Röhren die ernährende Durchblutungsflüßigkeit zu. [...] An alle, lebende 
Organismen, lebende Organe, durchpulste Organteile waren die beobachtenden Apparate 
herangeschoben. […] Die ungeheuer hohen Glaszylinder, in denen sich weiße rotgeäderte
Därme an ihrem Gekröse langsam wurmartig bewegten, getrennt oder verbunden mit dem
Organismus. Substanzen goß stäubte strich man auf sie, beobachtete die Verwandlung, 
die sie auf der triefenden Schleimhaut, an der dünnen Darmwand erfuhren. Die Schädel 
waren manchen der Menschen geöffnet, die behaarte Kapsel lag neben ihnen. In ein 
flüssiges warmes Bett war nach rückwärts das vorquellende pulsierende Gehirn gelagert. 
Dick zogen sich die blauen strotzenden Venen über die weißliche gefurchtete Masse; sie 
war auseinander gezogen, Drähte und Röhrchen führten in ihr Inneres. Drähte und 
Röhrchen führten auch zu den Därmen, in das Blut, in die Leber. (87–88)
This total, capillary interpenetration of organic elements and scientific apparatuses is 
characteristic of the technology depicted in Döblin’s novel. It is not just the image of tubes and 
wires leading into human organs that gives this scene its particular quality, but the repetitive 
stylistic insistence with which laboratory equipment is interlayered with living organs. The 
enumeration of body parts and components – livers, muscles, cells, intestines, mesentery, mucous
membrane, skull, brain, scalp – gives an impression of completeness, which paradoxically 
reinforces the sense of fragmentation. The body parts are spread out from one another and 
interspersed with apparatuses, observing scientists, and purposive bustle; the end effect is an 
128 For an exposition of the various scientific and medical discourses that facilitated Döblin’s focal shift from the 
organism to the organ, see Annette Ripper (2007).
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image of an entity or system that is as technological as it is biological. There is a circulation and 
a metabolism of a sort, but these can only be described as biological processes mediated by 
technological apparatuses, or technological processes mediated by organs.
The “Wirrsal” of tubes and wires running through the “Glassärgen” in Meki’s laboratory 
is connected to a greenhouse of sorts, in which plants and trees are similarly innervated through 
their leaves, trunks, and roots. “Auch sie waren umgeben von einem Wirrsal von Drähten und 
Röhren. Sie waren gespalten, angebohrt; in die Kronen Stämme Wurzeln führten Leitungen. 
Kühl waren einzelne hohe Säle durchweht; in anderen brütete die Luft; rote grüne 
phosphoreszierende Lichter lagen auf den Pflanzen” (88). Here again an enumeration of parts – 
crown, trunk, root – creates a sense of fragmentary accumulation rather than organic wholeness. 
This fusion of animal, vegetable, and mineral foreshadows the even more monstrous 
agglomeration of the giants toward the end of the novel. To the extent that Meki’s violent 
dismembering and coupling of organs and plants represents a Promethean quest for knowledge, it
could be certainly seen as the domination of nature by technology. Yet the textual emphasis on 
interpenetration and interwiring challenges the very distinction on which this hierarchical 
antagonism would need to be based. Seen in this way, the gruesomely literal interpenetration of 
technology and nature in the Mekiwerke serves as a model for the way that nature and technology
are interwoven in the instrumental body throughout the novel. Furthermore, it seems as though 
technology can only be technology in this novel to the degree that it becomes nature. The awed 
popular reaction to the rumors, and then the products, of the Mekiwerke suggests as much. “Man 
träumte, war in einem Schlaraffenland. ‘Sie haben künstliche Tiere. Sie können Bäume machen’”
(93). It is not simply the domination of nature that is at stake in this passage, but its literal 
production. What the dissection and reconstruction of life in Meki’s laboratory shows is 
109
emblematic of Berge Meere und Giganten as a whole. The literal fusion of nature and technology
mirrors the conceptual breakdown of the distinction between the two, and these radical mergers 
rely on or produce the rupture of individual bodies.129
Seen in this light, the dismemberments and their emphasis on organs over organisms 
depicted in Meki’s laboratory become ambivalent. On the one hand, the violent integration of 
organs and apparatuses is in the service of a rational procedure with a clearly defined 
instrumental end. While the “guests” are forcibly deindividuated, this rationalistic procedure 
solidifies the technocratic selfhood of Meki, whose name will be associated with the synthetic 
food for the remainder of the novel. On the other hand, the rupture of human bodies and their 
integration into technological, biological assemblages, in keeping with Döblin’s programmatic 
critique of the sovereign individual, will generate its own logic, which will come to undermine 
both individuation and instrumentality.
“Die Erde muß wieder dampfen. Los vom Menschen!” Döblinismus as program
The destruction of individual bodies in Meki’s laboratory must be read in the context of 
Döblinismus, the programmatic theorization of the novel form set forth in essays such as “An 
Romanautoren und ihre Kritiker. Berlin Programm” (1913) and “Der Geist des naturalistischen 
Zeitalters” (1924). In these essays Döblin mounts a critique of the autonomous bourgeois 
individual, the traditional psychological novel that privileges this individual, and the humanistic 
129 The experimental procedure portrayed in this episode bears strong similarities to the antihumanism of 
programmatic aesthetic essays by Döblin such as “An Romanautoren und ihre Kritiker. Berliner Programm” 
(1913) and “Der Geist des naturalistischen Zeitalters” (1924). In these essays Döblin mounts a critique of the 
autonomous bourgeois individual, the traditional psychological novel that privileges this individual, and the 
humanistic world view of the German Bildungsbürgertum that centers on both of these. This critique is enacted 
by a shift in scale away from the level of the individual. On the one hand, the focus becomes microscopic by 
moving to the sub-individual level of the physiological process or complex. Simultaneously, Döblin suggests a 
telescopic view that zooms to the supra-individual level of the mass or collective. Either way, the defined 
contours of the individual are blurred in the service of an attack on an understanding of subjectivity that relies 
on this contained, isolated individual. See Schriften zu Ästhetik, Poetik und Literatur, pp. 121, 171-172, 188-189.
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world view of the German Bildungsbürgertum that centers on both of these. Crucially, this 
critique is enacted by a shift in scale away from the level of the individual. On the one hand, the 
focus becomes microscopic by moving to the sub-individual level of the physiological process or
complex. Simultaneously, Döblin suggests a telescopic view that zooms to the supra-individual 
level of the mass or collective. While Döblin grounds the need for the shift away from the 
individual in a historical narrative – in the face of the massive social and technological changes, 
traditional art has become anachronistic – the result is not a technophilic modernism but rather, 
and perhaps surprisingly, a return to nature.
“Der Künstler arbeitet in seiner verschlossenen Zelle. Sein Persönliches ist zwei drittel 
Selbsttäuschung und Blague. Die Tür zur Diskussion steht offen” (119). With this topological 
gesture of opening, Döblin begins his short essay from 1913, “An Romanautoren und ihre 
Kritiker. Berliner Programm,” in which he spells out his critique of much contemporary 
novelizing and his vision of a renewal of the form. For Döblin, changed times demand a changed
art. Raising a common avant-garde plaint against contemporary art, he charges the latter with a 
laughable anachronism: “die Arbeitsmethode ändert sich, wie die Oberfläche der Erde, in den 
Jahrhunderten; der Künstler kann nicht mehr zu Cervantes fliehen, ohne von den Motten 
gefressen zu werden. Die Welt ist in die Tiefe und Breite gewachsen; der alte Pegasus von der 
Technik überflügelt, hat sich verblüffen lassen und in einen störrischen Esel verwandelt” (119). 
The challenge presented to traditional aesthetic modes by technological modernity is explicit; 
Cervantes is mothridden, and Pegasus, traditionally associated with Hippocrene, the holy spring 
of the muses, is now a stubborn ass in the face of technology that can fly higher than he. “Der 
Geist des naturalistischen Zeitalters” takes up this theme again, eleven years later. “Es gehört 
eine gewisse innere Verdunkelung (sagt einer Verblödung) dazu, Kunstwerke in die Welt zu 
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setzen. Nur so ist es verständlich, daß Deutschland schon 1890 ein stark industrialisiertes Land 
war, die Künstler aber, Maler und Literaten, noch bei Sonnenaufgängen und Gänsehirten 
verweilten” (185). 
The object of Döblin’s critique is a bourgeois humanism that would maintain older 
approaches and topoi amidst processes of modernization that are, for Döblin, far more 
compelling than these fusty idylls. “Es ist freilich schon heute ein Unfug, eine Säule von Phidias 
anhimmeln zu lassen und die Untergrundbahn ein bloßes Verkehrsmittel zu nennen. Keine höhere
Schlosserei ist die Technik, sondern vom Blut dieser Epoche” (“Der Geist,” 173). The new type 
of human that embodies this epoch, the “Großstädter,” has solved the philosophical, aesthetic, 
and religious quandaries of the humanists in the simplest possible way: namely, by abandoning 
them (174-5). The technological character of an age necessitates, and produces, a new type of 
human with its own particular Geist: “Unzweifelhaft ist der Kölner Dom die Äußerung eines 
starken bestimmten Geistes. Die Dynamomaschine kann es mit dem Kölner Dom aufnehmen” 
(176).
If the dynamo is an expression of the spirit of what Döblin calls the “naturalistic age,” 
then it is not just aesthetic forms that have become outmoded, but a particular understanding of 
Geist and human subjectivity more generally. Just as he rejects a conventional understanding of 
the literary category of plot as a post-hoc attempt to provide a rational, orderly flow to 
complexes, processes, and occurrences that are much messier,130 Döblin dismisses concepts such 
as “Zorn,” “Liebe,” and “Verachtung” as convenient fictions that serve to mask the underlying, 
130 “Viele als ‘fein’ verschrieene Romane, Novellen, – vom Drama gilt dasselbe – bestehen f[a]st nur aus Analyse 
von Gedankengängen der Akteure; es entstehen Konflikte innerhalb dieser Gedankenreihen, es kommt zu 
dürftigen oder hingepatzten ‘Handlungen’. Solche Gedankengänge gibt es vielleicht, aber nicht so isoliert; sie 
besagen an sich nichts, sie sind nicht darstellbar, ein amputierter Arm; Atem, ohne den Menschen der atmet; 
Blicke ohne Augen” (120).
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concrete, and much more interesting realities of human behavior.131 “Man lerne von der 
Psychiatrie, der einzigen Wissenschaft, die sich mit dem seelischen ganzen Menschen befaßt; sie 
hat das Naive der Psychologie längst erkannt, beschränkt sich auf die Notierung der Abläufe, 
Bewegungen, – mit einem Kopfschütteln, Achselzucken für das Weitere und das ‘Warum’ und 
‘Wie’” (121). Words like “Zorn” and “Liebe” are flawed in part because they rely on the 
conscious motivations of individual subjects and, in so doing, embed human actions within an 
implicit narrative framework.132 They are “blinde Scheiben” that could never serve as 
microscopes or telescopes into human behavior – the object of the novel should be “die entseelte 
Realität” (121). Psychiatry thus provides a model for a depsychologization of literature that 
discards subject-oriented and teleological accounts of human action in favor of what Döblin 
famously called a “Kinostil,” the principle of which is construction rather than narration.
Yet despite the call for a Kinostil and the essays’ emphasis on the ways that modern 
technology forces us to rethink our ideas about art, affect, and the human, Döblin is not interested
in establishing a dichotomous understanding of the relationship between nature and technology. 
131 “Die sprachlichen Formeln dienen nur dem praktischen Verkehr. ‘Zorn’, ‘Liebe’, ‘Verachtung’ bezeichnen in die
Sinne fallende Erscheinungskomplexe, darüber hinaus geben diese primitiven und abgeschmackten 
Buchstabenverbindungen nichts. Sie geben ursprünglich sichtbare, hörbare, zum Teil berechenbare Abläufe an, 
Veränderungen der Aktionsweise und Effekte” (121).
132 An implication of the claim that psychic or affective entities are narrative fictions is, somewhat paradoxically 
considering the critical force of this idea’s articulation, that the psyche must be depicted through narrative 
strategies. This insight is developed in sophisticated detail in Veronika Fuechtner’s work on the relationship 
between Döblin and Berlin psychoanalysis. In her chapter on Döblin, she traces a shift in his work “from a late-
nineteenth-century psychiatric understanding of mental illness to a psychoanalytic conception of the soul,” 
which “changed his medical practice and simultaneously drove his search for radical new forms of narration in 
his fiction” (18). She demonstrates convincingly throughout the chapter why it is inadequate to fully assimilate 
Döblin’s literary production and theory of the 1920s to an antipsychological program. Yet at the same time, her 
reading of the ways in which Berlin Alexanderplatz and Die beiden Freundinnen und ihr Giftmord interrogate 
the dimensions and contours of collective and individual subjectivity in fact supports the idea developed in this 
chapter, that Döblin was exploring models of subjectivity that moved beyond the atomized individuation he 
critiques consistently (albeit differently) in works from the 1913 “Berliner Programm” to Das Ich über der 
Natur. The full implication of the shift Fuechtner identifies in Döblin’s thought from psychiatry and physiology 
to psychoanalysis, however, is something that still needs to be worked through, given the primacy of the body in
his literary texts of the 1920s and especially Berge Meere und Giganten. My argument at this point is therefore 
that Döblin’s “psychiatric” suspicion of such verbal units and individualizing fictions finds accommodation with
(and expression in) his work of the later 1920s precisely in the reconceptualization of the individual psyche as 
part of a dispersed, collective subjectivity, influenced by his monist philosophy of nature.
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“Der Geist des naturalistischen Zeitalters” clearly affirms technological modernity, but it is a 
technological modernity that is an expression of nature; a biological approach offers a way for 
him to arrive at this portrait of an era without recourse to the humanist, traditional, or 
anthropocentric arguments he wishes to call into question in the first place. “Ich spreche von 
einer neuen ‘Kraft’, wie auch andere tun, vom humanistischen ‘Geist’, vom mönchischen, 
naturalistischen. Was ist das biologisch gesehen? Das ist nichts als eine besondere Einstellung 
der Menschengruppe unter der Einwirkung des Gesellschaftstriebes” (171). Thus his essay is a 
paean to modernity as the expression of a natural force and a hymn to nature as the fitting 
paradigm for the technological age. When he writes, at the end of an essay that calls for a greater 
attentiveness to modern technology, “Man wird immer mehr und durchaus neu in die Natur 
eindringen, deren Zeit erst anbricht” (190), this is only an apparent paradox. The naturalistic era 
is at once the era of technology and of nature, because Döblin’s “technology” is a thoroughly 
natural phenomenon. When he writes in “An Romanautoren” that the novelist should refrain 
from judgment or commentary and let the work speak for itself, adding, “Die Fassade des 
Romans kann nicht anders sein als aus Stein oder Stahl, elektrisch blitzend oder finster; sie 
schweigt” (121), we should now hear the dual register at work. The novel suited to the 
naturalistic era is to be of stone (nature) or steel (technology), flashing with the electricity that 
ties the two registers together.133 When we read, “Die Erde muß wieder dampfen,” is this the 
“Dampf” of a Dampfturbine, perhaps that steam turbine from the title of the Großstadtroman he 
would pen the following year, or is it the “Dampf” of the geological cataclysms that shake the 
futuristic prehistory of Berge Meere und Giganten? The use of “wieder” suggests that these are 
133 On the figurative importance of electricity for discourses of Leben around this time, see Lindner, Martin. Leben 
in der Krise. Zeitromane der Neuen Sachlichkeit und die intellektuelle Mentalität der klassischen Moderne. 
Stuttgart: Metzler, 1994, esp. p. 180.
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but instances of one and the same primal steam.
A key feature of Döblin’s aesthetic program, as evinced in “An Romanautoren und ihre 
Kritiker” and “Der Geist des naturalistischen Zeitalters,” is a drastic change of scale from the 
limits of the individual body. Just as the conceptual fusion of nature and technology in Berge 
Meere und Giganten relies upon the rupture of the individual body, Döblin’s attack on 
humanistic, bourgeois individual interiority proceeds by shifting the scale both up and down, 
topologically breaking open the confines of the individual body, in the same way that his opening
move in the 1913 essay is to rupture the space of the “locked cell” of the artist (119). Crucially, 
Döblin accomplishes this programmatic shift in scale by both natural and technological means.
“Das mammutische triefende krachende Wachsen”. Marduk and organic growth
The ambivalence of the disruption of bodies seen in Meki’s laboratory is magnified in a 
subsequent scene, where it is no longer the body that is instrumentalized but rather the principle 
of organic growth itself. Marduk, second Consul of Berlin and one of the most prominent 
characters in Berge Meere und Giganten, ascends to power through an act of what might best be 
dubbed dendromancy. After the death of Marke, the first consul, Marduk seizes power with a 
decisive action – he takes forty-two leading researchers by surprise, imprisoning them in an 
enclosed forest of beech trees near his Brandenburg laboratory. The hostages, not expecting 
further hostilities since Marduk was a researcher like them, nevertheless begin to notice strange 
features of the surrounding trees (138). The trunks are split in places, and the fissures are leaking 
a strange yellow slime. They dimly recall Marduk’s experiments with plants. “Er sollte in den 
Mekilaboratorien an tierischen Organteilen, besonders an Pflanzenstücken eigentümliche 
Wachstumsveränderungen erzeugt haben” (139). As they speculate what preventive measures 
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might have led Marduk to confine them there and when he might arrive, they notice that the trees
are warm in places, and seem to be making noise. “Wie sie die Köpfe an die Rinden legten, 
schnurrte surrte summte es drin. Das waren die Säfte; es war Frühling. Nur war es merkwürdig, 
wie scharf es sich im Mark und im Holz bewegte” (139). The steam that erupts from a broken 
branch sends one of the party into unconsciousness. Overnight, the trees grow at an alarming 
rate, cutting off what had recently been open space. “Die offenen Plätze suchten sie zwischen den
dicken, immer dickeren Bäumen, als wenn sie nicht wüßten, daß jeder Raum vor Stunden noch 
offen war” (141). One woman’s arm is pinioned and crushed between two trees; in desperation, 
two men first kill her to silence her cries before strangling themselves with their belts. The trees 
continue to grow, accompanied by fluid and splintering sounds and sporadically ejecting fatal 
juices. Birds wandering into the canopy fall into the trees and are consumed by the wood. The 
section ends with this passage:
Das mammutische triefende krachende Wachsen zerpreßte klemmte malmte manschte die
Menschen, knackte die Brustkörbe, brach die Wirbel, schob die Schädelknochen 
zusammen, goß die weißen Gehirne über die Wurzeln. Die Stämme berührten sich. 
Wurzel Stamm Krone eine Masse, ein verschmolzener wogender wühlender dampfender 
Klotz. Oben barst er, zischte. Unten trieb schluckte drang es auf, drang seitwärts bis an 
die Mauer. (143) 
The disturbing character of this passage relies on the way that the destructive fusion 
between individual organisms stems from a tendency innate to these organisms: the technological
upper-hand that allows Marduk to carry out his coup is the principle of organic growth itself. 
“Ein fürchtbares inneres Leben dehnte die brünstigen aufgeregten Pflanzenwesen” (142). Just as 
in Meki’s laboratory, here the progress of technology depends upon a violent rupturing of 
individual forms. The same components of a tree – “Wurzel Stamm Krone” – enumerated in 
Meki’s laboratory recur here, and again the result is the disruption of an integral form; if in 
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Meki’s laboratory the end effect was a ghastly fragmentation, here it is a no less monstrous 
agglomeration.
Shortly before his death Marduk, now a penitent renegade, returns to the theme of bodily 
integrity. He has taken up with Elina, the former lover of Marduk’s now dead companion 
Jonathan. Marduk’s actions as Consul had led to Elina’s capture and torture, including the laming
of one arm, but they have reached a reconciliation of sorts. At the edge of a wood, Marduk 
expresses a hitherto uncharacteristic aesthetic sensibility. “‘Schönes Leben’ flüsterte er, ‘schöne 
Bäume, schöne Nebel […] Schöner Nebel, schöner Baum’, er hielt sie an sich, ‘schöner Mensch. 
Schöner Mensch. Menschenhaare. Menschenfinger. Menschenohren. Menschenhals. […] 
Menschenhaare. Menschenhand. Kranke Schulter. Was hab ich gesündigt’“ (274-5). Is Marduk 
naming the body parts as parts, reinforcing a disintegration in language that he has already made 
in practice, or is he attempting to make atonement by delineating the contours of a healed whole?
His mention of a wounded shoulder might refer either to Elina’s shoulder or the shoulder of the 
woman pinioned between the trees; in either case, it is an injury to be reckoned against Marduk, 
which would support the reading that his enumeration is an attempt to think broken bodies back 
together again. Similarly, the appreciation of natural beauty is strikingly uncharacteristic for the 
aging Consul and scientist. Yet the things he mentions, life, trees, fog, in addition to being what 
he sees at the moment he says the words, all have another meaning that undermines a restorative 
interpretation. Fog is a dissolver of forms, trees are the weapon of his first battle, and life, as the 
principle of growth, is what elsewhere causes the dissolution of individual forms.
Even the way Marduk speaks these items and organs bears upon the relationship between 
integrity and dissolution. His paratactic listing – “Schöner Mensch. Menschenhaare. 
Menschenfinger. Menschenohren. Menschenhals. […] Menschenhaare. Menschenhand. Kranke 
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Schulter” – echoes the most striking aspect of the novel’s prose, evident for example in the 
sentence “Wurzel Stamm Krone eine Masse, ein verschmolzener wogender wühlender 
dampfender Klotz”: namely, the way Döblin stacks parallel syntactic units, whether nouns, verbs,
or adjectives, without connectors or commas.134 The expected boundaries of the sentence unit are 
sundered by the repetitive introduction of multiple semantic possibilities requiring not a decision 
between them but an acceptance of all of them in sequence. The rapid parataxis here must be 
read in the context of his call for a Kinostil in “An Romanautoren und ihre Kritiker,”135 and here 
as in the earlier essay the purpose of this style is to undermine a narrative unity that serves to 
reinforce the stability of the individual subject. What we can see here that was less apparent in 
the earlier essay is the thoroughly organicist mode of this Kinostil – the parataxis and deemphasis
of the individual subject have their fitting analogue in an unconstrained principle of growth, or 
Leben, that ruptures both the boundaries of individual bodies and the defined contours of a linear 
narrative syntax. The dense and often bewildering style of Berge Meere und Giganten must 
therefore be understood as the joint product of Döblin’s early critique of the psychological novel,
his linguistic skepticism, and his monistic vitalism.136
134 In the novel’s manuscripts at the Deutsches Literaturarchiv in Marbach, the visible deletions of commas and 
syntactic connectors such as ‘und,’ ‘aber,’ and the like, show that the production of this style was a relatively late
development. This suggests that the characteristic style of the 1922 novel must be considered on its own terms 
and in its own right, in relationship more to other aesthetic and thematic aspects of the novel than to the 
inheritance of Döblin’s earlier connections to Expressionism. (Thanks to a travel grant provided by the 
American Friends of Marbach in the summer of 2013, I was able to access the manuscripts in person.) For more 
on the characteristic features of the manuscript, see Gabriele Sander’s “Alfred Döblins Roman ‘Berge Meere 
und Giganten’ – aus der Handschrift gelesen.”
135 “Die Darstellung erfodert bei der ungeheuren Menge des Geformten einen Kinostil. In höchster Gedrängtheit 
und Präzision hat ‘die Fülle der Gesichte’ vorbeizuziehen. Der Sprache das Äußerste der Plastik und 
Lebendigkeit abzuringen. […] Knappheit, Sparsamkeit der Worte ist nötig; frische Wendungen. Von Perioden, 
die das Nebeneinander des Komplexen wie das Hintereinander rasch zusammenzufassen erlauben, ist. 
umfänglicher Gebrauch zu machen. Rapide Abläufe, Durcheinander in bloßen Stichworten; wie überhaupt an 
allen Stellen die höchste Exaktheit in suggestiven Wendungen zu erreichen gesucht werden muß. Das Ganze 
darf nicht erscheinen wie gesprochen sondern wie vorhanden.” “An Romanautoren und ihre Kritiker” (121-122)
136 Just “An Romanautoren und ihre Kritiker” rejects a conventional understanding of the literary category of plot 
as an attempt to provide a rational, orderly flow to complexes, processes, and occurrences that are much messier,
it also dismisses concepts such as “Zorn,” “Liebe,” and “Verachtung” as convenient fictions that serve to mask 
the underlying, concrete, and much more interesting realities of human behavior. (120-121). These terms are 
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In his study of Döblin’s engagement with Fritz Mauthner’s theory of language, Devin 
Fore (2006) argues that the shift in Döblin’s prose that culminates in Berlin Alexanderplatz 
should be seen as the adaptation of a “verbal” over a “substantival” world picture, “oriented not 
toward ontology (Sein, a word that Mauthner despised) but toward morphology (Werden), toward
transformation and mutability, toward time and action” (202). The style of Döblin’s 1924 science
fiction novel shows not only that this shift towards a verbal and morphological perspective is 
found significantly earlier than Fore locates it, but also just how strongly key terms of his 
aesthetic program such as Kinostil and Tatsachenphantasie reflect an organicist vitalism with 
roots in Döblin’s philosophical monism. Thus while Döblin’s later turn to mysticism is often seen
as a repudiation of his earlier avant-garde leanings, Berge Meere und Giganten demonstrates, in 
its deindividuated bodies and the prose that both echoes and produces their deindividuation, that 
the vitalist seeds of this mysticism informed his avant-garde critique of language, subjectivity, 
and the psychological novel from the beginning.
“Ihr werdet mich auflösen. Laß nur. Ich will dahin.” The giants as models of dissolution
If the dissections and capillary penetration of body and apparatus in Meki’s laboratory 
represent an instrumental dismemberment of the human body that ruptures the physical contours 
of the individual; and if Marduk’s manipulation of runaway organic growth is still an 
instrumental use of a biological phenomenon that completely destroys the corporal substrate of 
selfhood; then the giants invoked by the novel’s title demonstrate a paradoxical culmination of 
flawed because they rely on the conscious motivations of individual subjects and, in so doing, embed human 
actions within an implicitly explanatory narrative framework. The dismissal of such terms as “Zorn,” “Liebe,” 
and “Verachtung” is thus not just the rejection of hackneyed poetic topoi, but must be seen in the context of his 
linguistic and philosophical critique of the individual semantic or ontological unit as a convenient poetic fiction. 
Likewise, Döblin’s refusal in “Das Wasser” (1922) and Das Ich über der Natur of the word “Meer” to refer to an
amassed “Wassergewalt” (22) recapitulates his rejection in the early aesthetic essay of words like “Liebe” as the 
misleading condensation of a host of psychic and physiological processes.
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technological development that undermines the very conditions of its own instrumentalization. 
While the giants are marked as the most advanced and powerful technology in the novel, the very
principle of unconstrained growth needed to produce them ultimately dissolves their individual 
subjectivities into that of a collective organism. As their autonomous selves fade into the 
collective biological assemblages that compose them, their ability to function instrumentally 
melts away as well.
Enormous defensive towers constructed out of humans, animals, and plants, the giants are
intended as a desperate response to the onslaught of the monsters (Untiere) unleashed by the 
rapid melting of Greenland’s ice cap. The lengthy scenes that describe the birth of the monsters 
advance the logic of dissolution and rampant growth now familiar to the novel’s reader. Stirred 
into new life, prehistoric remnants of bones and seeds begin to grow towards one another, 
forming, breaking apart, and reforming instinctively-driven biological assemblages. It will be 
useful to cite a longer passage here.
Die zermürbten Trümmer der Kreidezeit, Knochen Pflanzensplitter fanden wieder Leben. 
Dies wütende Licht backte zu Leibern zusammen, was es fand. Die Knochenwirbel, die 
zertrümmerten Skelette tranken in dem Lehm die Gletschernässe, zogen sich aneinander. 
Aus dem Lehm strömten ihnen Stoffe zu, die sie zu ihren Leibern machten, die sie um 
sich legten; Erde, quellendes Wasser, Salze. Es wandelte sich in ihnen und an ihnen schon
um zur Art ihrer Körper. 
Um alle Reste und Trümmer ballte sich die Erde zu Lebendigem, quoll auf. So wild war 
der Drang zu Leibern zu finden, zueinander zu fließen und sich zu bewegen, daß überall 
auf den Inseln das bloßliegende Land in ganzen Strichen barst, sich hier zusammenrollte 
zu einer wimmelnden Masse, dort wie vom Regen getroffen aufwucherte unter 
baumartigen Gebilden. Es waren keine Wesen, wie sie die Erde früher getragen hatte. Um
bloßliegende Glieder, Köpfe Knochen Zähne Schwanzstücke Wirbel, um Farnblätter 
Stempelteile Wurzelstümpfe sammelten sich die Wasser die Salze Erden; oft wuchs es 
sich zu Geschöpfen aus, die den alten dieser Erdzeit ähnelten, oft drehten sich sonderbare 
Wesen, sogen an der Erde, tanzten. Das waren Köpfe Schädel, deren Kiefer Beine 
geworden waren, der Rachen ein Darm, die Augenlöcher Münder. Rippen rollten sich als 
Würmer. Um eine Wirbelsäule strömte zusammen die lebendige Erde, befestigte sich. Es 
war als wenn ein Adergeflecht nach allen Seiten ausschoß von den Knochenresten, als 
wären sie Kristalle, Keimpunkte in der übersättigten Lösung. Und was um die 
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Wirbelwesen lag, von den Adern berührt wurde, faßte es an, zog es zu sich her, ob es 
selbst Leib gewinnen wollte oder nicht. Die Würmer, die sich um die Rippen gebildet 
hatten, zog, wenn sie nicht flohen, das Wirbelwesen an seinen Mund, pflanzte sie sich 
neben seine Lippen ein; sie schluckten vorverdauten für ihn. (487-8)
If in earlier sections such as those depicting Meki’s laboratory or Marduk’s dendromancy the 
rupturing of bodily integrity had been a spectacular, violent event, here it is the medium of life 
itself. In representing the principle of indiscriminate, blind growth, this passage imbues parts, 
bones, seeds, organs, in short, matter at any scale but that of whole bodies, with motive force, as 
the paleontological dregs glom to one another, incorporate each other, break, dissolve and 
reform. As Döblin writes in Das Ich über der Natur, “Innerhalb der Natur wird also nichts zur 
Form, es wird nur Geformtes umgeformt” (40). Even rock and stone burst into dissolution in this 
orgiastic miasma of a protoplasmic nightmare. Verbs indicating fluidity abound (trinken, 
strömen, aufquellen, fließen, bersten, schlucken, träufeln), lubricating the image of a riot of 
forms in manic flux.
As the monsters – now enormous bricolages of various components – float or fly to 
Europe, their destructive effects are homologous to their own genesis. Whatever they come into 
contact with is submitted to the same somatoclastic growth that produced the monsters in the first
place. Near Hamburg, the first human casualties occur. Those unlucky enough to be caught in the
vicinity of other species fuse with them, spectacularly and agonizingly: “die Krallen des Vogels 
durchwuchsen die Arme der schreienden gellenden schlagenden bald ohnmächtigen. Das Tier lag
auf dem Weib, wuchs auf ihm, über Menschengröße” (502). In response, researchers begin 
constructing the Giganten by fusing humans, animals, plants, inorganic material together. More 
than any previous technological endeavor portrayed in the novel, the giants embody nothing so 
much as the force of a rampant growth that destroys the barriers between individuals, bodies, and
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species. “Das fürchterlich Zerstörende dieser Gewalt wurde bei den Versuchen klar: sie 
zersprengte jeden Zusammenhang, trieb Teile hervor, unter Vernichtung des Organismus” (515). 
Here the instrumentalization of the human body is pushed to an immanent consequence, namely, 
the total dissolution of that body.
Yet in contrast to earlier scenes of terror, in the formation of the giants dissolution gains a
positive function. The instrumentalization of human bodies proves to be self-defeating, as the 
principle of dissolution ultimately renders a sustained instrumentality impossible. The man 
chosen by the scientist and technocrat Delvil to be among the first implanted into a giant 
addresses Delvil defiantly. “‘Wenn ich deinen Turm sehe, Delvil, so preise ich die Macht der 
Erde. Du wirst sie nicht besiegen. Ich preise die große Macht. Ich fühle mich in ihr. Es ist keine 
Grenze zwischen ihr und mir. Ich fürchte mich nicht. Ihr werdet mich auflösen. Laß nur. Ich will 
dahin’” (516). Dissolution struggles with identity, as was the case with the Untiere. All elements 
of the giants tend towards fusion, but they are still at least partly recognizable as elements, and 
the scientists strive to keep the Menschenwesen of the growing giants awake so that they can 
fulfill their instrumental deployment against the Untiere. “Sie waren oft im Begriff, ihren Geist 
und ihr Menschenwesen aufzugeben und ins bloße Wuchern und Wachsen einzudämmern” (517).
Like the monsters, the parts of the giants grow towards each other in omnivorous need, once the 
principle of growth has been provided by the tourmaline veils. Animal, vegetable, and mineral 
elements merge as the giants grow into creatures, scenes of struggle, and even landscapes.
Ihre Augäpfel waren größer als ein lebender Mann; sturmartig blies der Atem aus ihrem 
Mund, den sie offen hielten, als wenn sie schrien. […] Wenig und selten wurde Nahrung 
in ihren Mund, über die hängenden Kiefer gefahren und gestürzt; die Riesenwesen, 
mühselig gurgelnd und schluckend, wurzelten in dem Tier- und Pflanzenboden. Ihre 
Beine waren von den Hüftgelenken, dem Becken an knollig versteift; breit standen die 
Beine, verbreiterten sich massig nach abwärts, gingen in Stränge aufgelöst, ihren 
Fleischcharakter verlierend, in die Bodenmasse über. Von da strömten Säfte und 
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Nährmassen in ihren Leib. Durch ihre Bauchdecken, in die Weichen wucherten 
Baumstämme und Tierrümpfe in sie, breiteten sich in dem Gekröse aus, brachen in die 
Därme ein, verlöteten mit ihnen. Tierblut, Pflanzensäfte ergossen sie in die Därme, die 
sich langsam hoben senkten, wurmartig zusammenzogen und streckten. Dies war die 
Bewegung, die man in halber Höhe der Menschentürme sah: das langsame Hin und Her 
der Därme, die sich versteiften hoben und ihren Krampf lösend wieder herunterstiegen. 
Mit sich zogen sie jedesmal den schwankenden lockeren Abhang an sich, den 
aufklimmenden Wald, die hingedehnten, aus dem Wald sprießenden Tierleiber: die 
übergroßen Pferde, die aufrecht standen, die Vorderbeine in den Leib des Tiermenschen 
vergraben, mit ihren Hälsen sich aus seinem Leib windend und bewußtlos an den 
Blättern, dem weichen Baumholz kauend. […] Die Hoden der Männer verschmolzen mit 
Baumwipfeln und Blüten; sie strömten ihren Saft in die runden Körper, die sie wie 
Beeren trugen. Oft sah man die Riesen unter der Überfülle der Säfte sich biegen, stöhnen 
und ihren Samen vergießen. (517-8)
This passage is, in a sense, the culmination of autographic ekphrasis from the novel’s 
dedication. Where the hand holding the writing instrument invoked an image of the human body 
as a nexus of sensory and physiological flows, the giants push this immanent logic of the 
instrumental body to a point where distinctions between bodies, organs, organism, and 
environment are no longer tenable. The self is not something that is distinct from the body or 
located within the body, but is rather dispersed throughout the body and its environment.
As in Döblin’s 1927 treatise Das Ich über der Natur, here there is neither interior nor 
interiority, only an endless entwinement.137 And it is not just corporality or contained subjectivity 
137 In Das Ich über der Natur, Döblin characterizes thought not as an immaterial cognitive affair but rather as 
something situated in the body – or, more precisely, in the body’s integration with the surrounding environment. 
Accordingly, Döblin refers to sense organs and the central nervous system as Ausgeweide: like digestive organs, 
sense organs are used to break down, incorporate, and interact with the environment (44). In line with the 
topological challenge to a dualistic view of subjectivity, even interiority becomes a problematic category. Döblin
at first considers that the soul must lie somewhere within the body, since all the sense organs seem to lead from 
the outside in; yet once within the body, all the narrative voice sees are:
“Nervenzentren und Verbindungsfasern. Es ist da ein geschlossenes System, das mit Nervenfasern, 
Sinnesorganen, Muskeln völlig in sich verläuft, ein System, das sehr übersichtlich und fein konstruiert ist, aber 
in sich. Eigentlich führen die Nervenfasern gar nicht ins Innere, sie führen ins Gehirn, etwa in die Rinde, fasern 
sich da auf, bilden Verbindungsfasern mit anderen Bahnen, und weiter ist nichts. Was habe ich eigentlich 
erwartet? Ein Loch für die denkende Seele?” (114-5)
Topologically stymied by the absence in the human body not only of a soul but even of an interior, Döblin 
returns to the surface, concluding that the individual only has a soul “als Ganzes” and not in any one part of the 
body. In a similar vein, “thought” is understood as a bodily process of integration, the active integration of the 
body with its surroundings; not just the capacity of the individual to perceive, recognize, or cogitate the outside 
world, but to act upon it. “Thought” thus seems to be a nodal point between the competing tendencies of 
individuation and deindividuation: “Mit unseren Muskeln und Knochen denkt das Weltwesen wie mit der 
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that this image of the body-as-tool undermines, but instrumentality as well – while the giants do 
battle and ultimately defeat the monsters, the deindividuation required for their production results
in their gradual drift away from all matrices of instrumental control. Shortly before the novel’s 
conclusion, the now only vaguely humanoid giants dissolve into the earth, forming a new 
mountain range in Cornwall.
In a curious twist, the organic agglomeration of the giants and the monsters provides a 
model for the human communities that arise in their wake. These communities should not be 
seen as a naively primitivist stasis (let alone as a reactionary organicism) but as a gesture towards
the kind of collectivity that would incorporate the critiques of individual subjectivity raised in 
Döblin’s programmatic essays and Das Ich über der Natur and enacted in the rupture of 
individual bodies in Berge Meere und Giganten.138 The organic dissolution of individual bodies 
throughout Berge Meere und Giganten, at first portrayed in scenes of terror, thereby comes to 
provide a utopian model of collectivity and deindividuated subjectivity.
“Was ist das: Meer? Wer ist das?”: Water as image for the relationship between individual and
mass
As the passages dealing with the organic fusion of the Untiere and the Giganten suggest, 
images of fluidity and dissolution provided Döblin with the descriptive tools needed to rupture 
individual bodies in a way that also integrated them with one another. In this context, a brief 
Dunkelheit und dem Licht und den Elementen und unseren Seelen. Und was ist das: Wir haben Organe? Das ist: 
wir strahlen. Wir fließen in die Welt ein. Wir sind am Bau, am Dasein, an der Realität und dem Realisieren des 
geistigen Weltwesens beteiligt” (93).
138 In this regard I follow Hannelore Qual’s reading of the novel. Qual has demonstrated the linkages in the novel 
between Döblin’s philosophy of nature and his political and social thought, arguing that Berge Meere und 
Giganten advances an ecologically minded anarchism in the spirit of Gustav Landauer and Pyotr Kropotkin. 
Rather than being a fundamentally pessimistic or fatalistic work, Döblin’s novel would thus represent an open, 
dynamic utopianism that supports a view of human society as ultimately perfectible.
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excursus on the role of water in his thought will be helpful. It would not be an exaggeration to 
say that Döblin had a fascination with water as an element both literally ungraspable and 
incomprehensibly vast; he locates the genesis of the idea for Berge Meere und Giganten during a 
1921 visit to the Baltic, and extended scenes of water as something still, ominous, and violent 
can be found in novels such as Wadzeks Kampf mit der Dampfturbine,139 Wallenstein,140 Berge 
Meere und Giganten, and Berlin Alexanderplatz. In the dedication to the science fiction novel, 
water is used as a metaphor for the amorphous ground of existence that supports the individual: 
“Ich bin nur eine Karte, die auf dem Wasser schwimmt. Ihr Tausendnamigen Namenslosen hebt 
mich, bewegt mich, tragt mich, zerreibt mich” (7).
In Schicksalsreise. Bericht und Bekenntnis, his 1948 memoir of wartime exile, Niagara 
Falls are described thus: 
Von der Ungeheuerlichkeit der sich hier heranwälzenden Wassermassen versagt das Wort.
Das sind Wassermassen in drängender, treibender, stürzender, tobender Bewegung, die 
mit resoluter stoßender und mahlender Kraft arbeiten. Davor verstummt und versagt, ja 
erstarrt unsere Phantasie. Das hat schon keinen irdischen Maßstab mehr, keinen 
tellurischen, sondern einen kosmischen. Hier ist die Erde noch Kind des Weltalls, noch 
Stern. (299)
Water here serves as a model for a chaotic formless power; in the subsequent sentences, water is 
the medium for as yet unglimpsed forms of being, but the difficulty of grasping the fluid medium
139 “Träge, flüssige Masse, graugrün, schwarzgrau, eine Last wie Eisen, meilentief. Von der Sonne angestrahlt, vom
mond beleuchtet, unberührt, immer fließend, drehend, lastend; Geräusche, Grunzen und Murren. / Das Schiff 
schrammt die Oberfläche; das Meer leckt an dem beteerten Holz, wirft Wasser über Bord, versteckt sich, 
brummt, wartet lautlos.” (321)
140 Wallenstein himself, more used to solid roads, has an aversion to water. “Jetzt fehlte das Einfachste, der Weg, 
eine flüssige, schwere Masse schwamm vor seinen Füßen; die Herren, kraftstrotzend, standen mit einem Strick 
am Bein am Küstenrand. Gegen sein neues Herzogtum Mecklenburg schwankte das zerquellende 
widerstandslose Element an, er beobachtete es widerwillig.“(382-3) 
“Der graue träge Wasserrücken. Auf ihn geladen wie auf eine Tischplatte mit wallender Decke der fuderhohe 
ganze blinkende Reichtum der Menschen. Hier rann es wie in einem Engpaß vorüber, versucherisch; sie hingen 
am Fels darüber. Die Ausdehnung der Länder war verschwunden; Livland die Wolga Smolensk Stettin Wiborg 
Saragossa Ofen Venedig stießen aneinander. Und so nah, so schutzlos wie kichernde Weiber, die baden gehen 
und spritzen.“(450)
“Das Meer, das Verhängnis. Nicht die Reichtümer, es war der Weg: das Land war nicht zu halten ohne das graue,
weißzottelige, schäumende Untier. Es rannte gegen seine Feste an, brachte sie zum Schaukeln.“(452)
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provokes a question often asked in Döblin’s works, “Aber was ist das?” In Das Ich über der 
Natur, he asks “Was ist das: Meer? Wer ist das? Es ist gar nicht ‘das Meer’. Es ist die 
Wassergewalt. Diese Wellen sind keine Einzelwesen. Ich treffe im Wasser nie auf Einzelwesen. 
Es ist so biegsam, ineinander geschmolzen, ineinandergehend. Ich komme auf keinen Teil, den 
ich isolieren kann” (22). Water serves as a model for the relationship between individual and 
mass, demonstrating a tendency towards aggregation that stymies the search for isolated units. 
He continues, marveling at the way that the fluid medium dissolves the isolation of individual 
bodies: “In der Flüssigkeit sinken die Grundteile zu tieferer Anonymität zurück. Die schärfere 
hitzigere Wallung der Körper, ihre Isolierung und Flucht voneinander nimmt ein Ende” (24-5).141
Generally speaking, Döblin uses the image of water to represent the relationship between 
individual and mass. In passages from Das Ich über der Natur at times reminiscent of variously 
anxious depictions of water in his novels, Döblin shows a fascination with this unsettling element
that is at once composed of innumerable parts and is also a seamless mass. “Nicht zu fassen ist 
diese Form des Flüssigen, die das Wasser und auch andere Körper gefunden haben: glashell, 
durchsichtig, ohne Naht zusammenlaufend, von einer unglaublichen Weichheit und 
Nachgiebigkeit, dabei spürsam und fügsam. […] Was aber so fließt, schäumt und verdunstet, 
solche Formen annimmt, sich so verändert, solche zauberhaften Kristalle bildet, ist nichts 
Dummes, Totes, Anorganisches, wie man sagt” (12-3). Döblin’s scalar leaps refuse the self-
evidence of everyday concepts like “sea.” “Was ist das: Meer? Wer ist das? Es ist gar nicht ‘das 
Meer.’ Es ist die Wassergewalt. Diese Wellen sind keine Einzelwesen. Ich treffe im Wasser nie 
auf Einzelwesen. Es ist so biegsam, ineinander geschmolzen, ineinandergehend. Ich komme auf 
keinen Teil, den ich isolieren kann” (22). He continues, marveling at the way that the fluid 
141 This language in the 1927 treatise comes directly from a 1922 essay called “Das Wasser,” published in Neue 
Rundschau 33, 853-858.
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medium dissolves the isolation of individual bodies: “In der Flüssigkeit sinken die Grundteile zu 
tieferer Anonymität zurück. Die schärfere hitzigere Wallung der Körper, ihre Isolierung und 
Flucht voneinander nimmt ein Ende” (24-5). Here the topological concerns of the programmatic 
essays reappear in a different form. It is not specifically the closed integrity of the individual 
human body or psyche that is ruptured, but rather the very concept of the individual verbal and 
physical unit – water, sea, part – that is being undermined, as any single unit is both constantly 
dissolving back into a Massenwesen and is itself comprised of many Massenwesen. This constant
dissolution and flow is a problem both for any clear-cut relationship between part and whole, but 
also for language itself, as the words commonly used to identify discrete entitities obscure the 
way that these entities are not so readily graspable: “Was ist das: Meer? Wer ist das?”142
“Ein lebendiges Wesen die Welt.” Life in the ruins
The logic of corporal dissolution and reintegration that culminates in the creation of the 
giants serves to effect a deliberate movement away from the authoritarian centralism that has 
been the dominant political form up to this point. The alternative forms of subjectivity invoked 
by the giants’ monstrous bodies are carried forward by the societies that arise in the giants’ wake.
Not only do the survivors develop ways of living explicitly tied to the catastrophic lessons of the 
142 A metaphor of fluid also provided Döblin with an image for the reserve potentiality of the individual for 
renewal, change, and formation. Describing in Schicksalsreise (1948) the way that the individual becomes more 
fixed and determined with age, Döblin writes that there is always a measure of undetermined potentiality: a 
“mother liquor” that allows for creation and change: “Man ist bestimmter geworden, aber man ist nie völlig 
durchbestimmt, ausbestimmt, so wie eine Salzlösung sich auskristallisiert. Man behält durch alle Umstände, alle 
Lebensalter hindurch eine Portion Mutterlauge. Das ist eine schwebende, wolkenartige, keimträchtige Masse 
[…] Diese Masse hat die Zeit nicht zu fürchten, sie ist nie auf der Flucht vor der Zeit. Sie schenkt ihr immer 
neue Bestimmtheiten und Formen.” (285) A “Mutterlauge” is a term from chemistry that refers to the part of a 
solution left over from crystallization, and thus fits well with the paradigmatic relationship of Lebensideologie 
(Lindner) between form and flow. It is also a word Döblin uses in the manuscripts of Berge Meere und Giganten
to describe the liquid formative chaos on Greenland as the tourmaline veils bring the prehistoric assemblages to 
life. The sentence that in the published version of the novel reads, “Es war als wenn ein Adergeflecht nach allen 
Seiten ausschoß von den Knochenresten, als wären sie Kristalle, Keimpunkte in der übersättigten Lösung” 
(488), ends in the manuscript thus: “in der übersättigten Lösung der Mutterlauge.”
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expedition that had melted Greenland’s ice and unleashed the monsters on Europe, but the 
decentered subjectivity that allows for these social forms is itself produced by the ecological 
integration announced in the novel’s dedication and taken to an extreme in the depictions of the 
giants. 
This utopian vision of ecological integration is ultimately embraced by the populations 
that have abandoned Europe’s fortified, underground cities, populations constituted by a mixture 
of the remnants of the Iceland expedition and various settlers and sects. “Wie am Spinnrad hob 
und senkte sich die Brust, sog Luft ein, entließ sie. Unermüdlich sogen die Menschen sich an der 
Luft fest, durchtränkten sich mit unsichtbaren Kräften. In ihre Därme ließen sie die Säfte vieler 
Pflanzen und Tiere fließen, nahmen an sich und ließen sich durchlodern von den Gewalten, die 
sich auf dem Erdboden niedergelassen hatten” (547). The language used is strikingly similar to 
earlier passages depicting the giants’ monstrous bodies, yet here the metabolic processes of the 
body provide a model for ecological integration that will shape the novel’s later descriptions of 
their society.143 Similarly, the way that various organisms strive towards each other and combine 
is echoed in the portrayal of sexuality after the time of the giants: 
Mann und Weib zueinander. Dazu hatte man Füße und Knie, konnte gehen, sich nähern. 
Blicke zueinander, Hände zueinander, Münder zueinander. Und nicht nur Münder. Man 
hatte einen Leib; das einzige Wühlen. Was man tastete umfing: daß man nicht Wasser 
war, um mit ihm zusammenzuschmelzen. Daß man sich hielt, diese Beruhigung 
Besänftigung: dies Stieren und Vergehen im Feuerschein. (548)
Given the importance in the novel of the relationship between technocracy, biopolitics, 
violence, and the prevalence of reproduction in multiple senses of the word, it should not come 
as a surprise that the new societies and subjectivities arise in tandem with a sexual revolution. An
143 From the passage on the giants quoted above: “Durch ihre Bauchdecken, in die Weichen wucherten 
Baumstämme und Tierrümpfe in sie, breiteten sich in dem Gekröse aus, brachen in die Därme ein, verlöteten mit
ihnen. Tierblut, Pflanzensäfte ergossen sie in die Därme, die sich langsam hoben senkten, wurmartig 
zusammenzogen und streckten” (517-8).
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early counterpoint to the increasingly centralized power located in the cities of Europe is 
provided by the “Snakes,” wandering groups of people characterized explicitly by a liberated 
sexuality, and the key figure of the novel’s eponymous final book is Venaska, “eine schlanke 
Frau von braungelblicher Hautfarbe und schwarzem dichten Haar” (572), who embodies the 
force of sexuality associated with her namesake. Yet what is interesting here is not so much the 
relationship, somewhere between cause and analogy, of sexual and political liberation, but rather 
the way that this sexuality is conveyed in terms that both recapitulate scenes of corporal 
dissolution from the rest of the novel and announce a conception of dispersed, ecological 
subjectivity that will find its fullest expression in Das Ich über der Natur. In the 1927 treatise 
Döblin describes the tendency of things to grow towards each other, a fundamental 
“Aneinanderhaften der Dinge” that is a property innate to physical matter as such.144
In the way that this principle of “Aneinanderhaften” (Döblin also calls it a “Verzahnung” 
and “Verhakung”) demonstrates the tendency of all matter to grow towards and integrate other 
matter, it recalls the scene of writing from the novel’s dedication. The rampant growth that 
destroys any distinction between individual bodies in Berge Meere und Giganten and the 
suspicion of the very existence of individual units distinct from aggregate masses in Das Ich 
über der Natur ultimately issue in the vision of a collective, dispersed selfhood prefigured in the 
dedication, where writing and selfhood are distributed along a chain of corporal and 
environmental media technologies: ink, sunlight, paper, pen, hand, nerves, blood, muscles, 
intestines. This is not a blind organicism in which the individual disappears entirely into the 
mass, but rather an attempt to imagine what the relationship between individual and collective 
144 “So mächtig also sind die Dinge aneinander gegangen, so stark miteinander verzahnt und verhakt. Ich muß 
geradezu fragen, wenn ich die Organismen betrachte, deren Organe gänzlich der Verzahnung und Verhakung 
dienen: sind denn überhaupt Wesen da, die sich mit anderen verhaken – ist das Ganze nicht eine einzige 
Verzahnung und jede Isolierung von Einzelwesen Trug? Ist also an den Dingen eine Wesens- und eine Hafteseite
zu unterscheiden, oder ist nur ein dichtes unteilbares Netz da?” (202)
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could look like beyond the psychological primacy of the autonomous, monadic individual Döblin
criticizes as anachronistic in his programmatic essays. By the time we reach the end of the novel,
the depiction of the societies that have come after the giants echoes the corporal and 
environmental integration and the dispersed subjectivity developed in the giants.
Die Scharen der Menschen in Ruhe und Tod, in Werben und Brautkämpfen, unter 
Vulkanausbrüchen und Ertränkungen. […] Und immer sehnsüchtig die Gase der Luft in 
die Lungenbläschen hinein, und die kleinen Zellen, die Kerne, das weiche Protoplasma, 
immer angezogen und weiter gegeben. Und wenn die Herzen stillstanden, die Zellen sich 
trennten und auflösten, waren sie neue Seelen, zerfallendes Eiweiß Ammoniak 
Aminosäuren Kohlensäure und Wasser, Wasser das sich in Dampf verwandelte. Leid- und
lustbegierig, wanderungssüchtig, Seelenvereine in Schneelandschaften, in dem 
pendelnden weiten Meer, in den blasenden Stürmen, den Steinvölkern, die der Boden zu 
Bergen hochtrieb. (631)
As in the dedication, selfhood here is located along a material chain that links organism 
and environment. The language of this passage, by invoking a collection of elements in relation 
and flux in order to situate subjectivity in material processes of embodiment, suggests the extent 
to which this monism is central to both Döblin’s philosophy of nature and his avant-garde 
critique of the sovereign individual.145 More immediately, the location of this passage at the end 
of a long development that has seen bodies broken, joined, and reconstituted suggests that this 
development and its attendant violence were prerequisite to the creation of the egalitarian 
communities at the end of the novel. Reconfiguring the self within the individual body – so that 
“souls” are located within the metabolic play of matter – enables the shift in the relationship 
between individual and collective.
145 In Das Ich über der Natur, he writes, “Da bin ich Eiweiß, Protoplasma, Zellmasse, – bin Wasser, Kalk, Kohle, 
Salz, Phosphor, Eisen, Magnesium, Silizium, die sich überall draußen regen. […] Das bin ich alles, und das ist 
weither gekommen, Prärie, Berg und Tal, Sintflut, offene Natur … ” (119-20). This echoes the language from 
“An Romanautoren” where, calling for “Selbstentäußerung,” he writes, “ich bin nicht ich, sondern die Straße, 
die Laternen, dies und dies Ereignis, weiter nichts” (122). A 1922 essay called, “Die Natur und ihre Seelen” 
further challenges the relationship between the individual body and subjectivity, suggesting that even the human 
body is a convenient fiction: “Aus dem beobachtbaren Material isoliert man den Körper der Person. Von ihm, 
der nur ein einzelner Beobachtungsfall ist, sagt man, daß er es sei, der denke. Aber er selbst is etwas Gedachtes. 
Seine Isolierung ist nicht zu halten” (10-11).
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This utopian vision of egalitarian collectives predicated on a complexly distributed 
subjectivity bears implications for our understanding of Weimar culture, but not because it asserts
a final reconciliation between nature and culture. Rather, in drawing out the immanent 
consequences of the instrumental body, Berge Meere und Giganten seriously complicates what 
Helmut Lethen has dubbed “Entmischung,” a frozen polarity of separation on the one hand and 
fusion on the other, the armored body of the cold persona facing the passive organicism of the 
“Kreatur.”146 The loss of ethical orientation following the demise of the Kaiserreich led, 
according to Lethen, to Verhaltenslehren involving the radical and violent taming of the body’s 
organic, creaturely side in order to fortify this polarity.147 Like Döblin’s novel, Lethen’s account 
of the Weimar cultural and psychological landscape is concerned with a relationship among the 
body, subjectivity, technology, and violence, yet the 1924 Zukunftsroman poses a challenge to 
Lethen’s characterization of Weimar culture because it probes and problematizes the very 
categories with which Lethen draws his distinctions. The violence in Döblin’s novel does not 
ultimately protect the armored subject from internal and external threats, but on the contrary 
effects the dissolution of the isolated, autonomous subject in order to enable the new collectives 
at the end of the narrative. In this reading, Berge Meere und Giganten stands as an implicit 
critique of the discourse of Entmischung by staging the coalescence of the organic and the 
technological and demonstrating that they cannot coherently be thought separately in the first 
place.
146 “Der Schmerz der Trennung und die Sehnsucht nach Fusion – zwei Quellen der ästhetischen Faszination – 
werden in der Ära der Ersten Republik in extreme Ferne voneinander gerückt. Die bürgerliche Kultur der 
Schattierungen und gemischten Temperaturen weicht einer Ästhetik der Entmischung, der Polarisierung aller 
Lebenssphären, der Faszination der ‘scharfen’ Grenzziehung und klaren Kontur” (Verhaltenslehren der Kälte 
133).
147 “[Die Regeln der Verhaltenslehren] empfehlen Techniken der Mimikry an die gewalttätige Welt und legen alles 
darauf an, den Menschen in seiner schutzlosen Objektheit abzuschirmen” (36).
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The contours and borders of organic bodies are anything but clear in the face of the 
corporal ruptures and reconstitutions that run throughout the novel, and yet they are not merely 
dissolved in a ‘warm’ fusion either. Instead of the polar stasis Lethen identifies in the literature of
the 1920s, Berge Meere und Giganten presents us with a restless movement between contour and
dissolution, subject and object, organs and machines, digging in neither at the pole of 
Entblößung nor at that of Panzerung.148 Where Lethen’s cold persona ruthlessly instrumentalizes 
its own body, the bodies in Berge Meere und Giganten are ruptured and reconstituted in order to 
confound the corporal mastery necessary for their instrumental use. Because Lethen’s 
teleological characterization of the Weimar political landscape depends on the polarization 
between the “Trennungsspezialisten” of the left and the “Verteidiger des 
Verschmelzungswunsches” of the right, Döblin’s novel is a crucial document for thinking about 
the period’s political imaginary as well as its technological one, precisely because it explores 
logics of separation and dissolution on the literal, topological level.149 While the violence 
involved in this exploration has led critics to assess Berge Meere und Giganten as a cautionary 
tale about the dangers of the technological desire to dominate nature, the function of the violent 
destruction of individual bodies is in fact to advance the logic of corporal dearticulation and 
reassemblage that ultimately issues in the novel’s complex utopian vision. 
Rather than simply exemplifying the avant-garde trope of the armored, instrumental body,
Berge Meere und Giganten literalizes the figure in order to allow its implications to play 
themselves out on the diegetic level. It is thereby able to imagine the concrete, real bodies that 
could fulfill the avant-garde demand for depsychologization and deindividuation, yet these 
148 “Die Literatur dieses Jahrzehnts läßt die Bilder des ‘nackten Zeitgenossen’ zwischen extremen Polen schwingen:
zwischen Panzerung und Entblößung, zwischen ungehemmten Täterphantasien und Kreatürlichkeit zum 
Erbarmen.” (41)
149 Verhaltenslehren der Kälte, 133-134.
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bodies, precisely because of the way that the relationship among bodies, technology, and 
subjectivity is allowed to unfold over the course of the novel, are radically different from the type
of the cold persona detailed in Lethen’s study. By pushing the avant-garde trope of the 
technological or armored body to its necessary conclusion, the novel critiques a notion of 
autonomous subjectivity predicated on psychological interiority and the aesthetic forms that 
privilege this notion, without however falling prey either to a dissolute organicism or to a facile 
technological fetishism.150
The bodies ruptured, dissolved, and reconstituted in this science fiction novel, for all their
instability and frailty, thus serve as missing links among the array of questions and problems 
Döblin developed over the course of the 1910s and 1920s – his critique of the psychological 
novel and its version of interiority,151 his epochal considerations of technological modernity,152 
and his burgeoning philosophical monism.153 The dense interpenetration of body, apparatus, and 
environment we find throughout Berge Meere und Giganten signals the way that Döblin was 
rethinking issues of identity, subjectivity, technology, nature, politics, and media in tandem; in 
this sense, the significance of the novel rests on the extent to which it shows that these questions 
must be thought in relation to one another. 
The novel is thus exemplary of the way that discourses central to the culture of the 
Weimar Republic – discourses of the organic and the mechanical, technology and nature, 
progress, catastrophe, and society – could not but articulate themselves in shared terms, in each 
150 In his open letter to Marinetti, Döblin accuses the Italian Futurist of precisely such a tediously mimetic 
technofetishism: “Sie meinen doch nicht etwa, es gäbe nur eine einzige Wirklichkeit, und identifizieren die Welt 
Ihrer Automobile, Aeroplane und Maschinengewehre mit der Welt? […] Oder schreiben gar der kantigen, 
hörbaren, farbigen Welt eine absolute Realität zu, der wir uns ehrfürchtig als Protokollführer zu nähern hätten?” 
(Schriften zu Ästhetik, Poetik und Literatur 114)
151 Especially in “An Romanautoren und ihre Kritiker.”
152 In Wadzeks Kampf mit der Dampfturbine and “Der Geist des naturalistischen Zeitalters.”
153 Döblin’s monist philosophy of nature is spelled out most extensively in Das Ich über der Natur (1927).
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other’s words. Far from assuming conceptual dichotomies, it is the novel’s project to explore and 
collapse them. Those seeming incongruities in Döblin’s work that have made him consistently 
difficult to situate amongst a host of disparate disciplines, movements, styles, and commitments 
in fact demonstrate his importance for understanding German modernism: not just in the sense 
that he was an interdisciplinary thinker for all seasons whose texts are “paradigms and 
repositories of modernism”154 but above all because the interlocking multitude of his positions 
and approaches compels us to question their relationship to one another and the ways in which 
they necessarily articulated each other.
The relationship between violence and instrumentality in Berge Meere und Giganten, in 
allowing for a utopian vision that is not assimilable to the desire for organic fusion Lethen 
attributed to the political right, is more nuanced than an instrumental violence intended to repress
the self’s own vulnerability. Rather than standing in the service of the armored personality, the 
violence in Döblin’s novel, by collapsing the dichotomies between organic and technological, 
body and environment, subject and object, interrupts the cycle of instrumental exploitation on 
which the construct of the armored personality is necessarily based. The ideological and aesthetic
implications of the novel’s ending, which is also a new beginning, are undoubtedly ambivalent 
and call for further attention. Yet at this point it seems clear that the novel’s vision is 
symptomatic of a broader contemporary imaginary, the conceptual and political contours of 
which are perhaps better characterized as a dense Aneinanderhaften, a Verzahnung and a 
Verhakung, than as the sharp borders of the armored body.
154 Davies and Schonfield, p. 6.
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CHAPTER THREE
Natural Histories of the Image: Photography, physiognomy, and the meaning of the surface 
“Die Lage wird dadurch so kompliziert, daß weniger denn je eine einfache ‘Wiedergabe 
der Realität’ etwas über die Realität aussagt. Eine Fotografie der Kruppwerke oder der 
A.E.G. ergibt beihnahe nichts über diese Institute. Die eigentliche Realität ist in die 
Funktionale gerutscht. Die Verdinglichung der menschlichen Beziehungen, also etwa die 
Fabrik, gibt die letzteren nicht mehr heraus”155
In this well known quote from the Dreigroschenprozeß, Bertolt Brecht denies that a 
photograph can reveal anything meaningful about a factory. In problematizing the connection 
between visual representation and reality, Brecht is taking issue with physiognomy – the idea 
that visible appearance offers a privileged access to the truth of an object. As Richard Gray has 
argued, physiognomy was an underlying constitutive discourse for Weimar modernism. Beyond 
a limited, (pseudo-)scientific attempt to discern and categorize human character based on 
physical and especially facial features, 20th-century physiognomy provided what amounted to a 
worldview for Weimar culture.156 According to Gray, figures from Ludwig Klages to Béla Balázs
to Oswald Spengler drew on physiognomic logic to mediate between appearance and reality, 
interior truth and exterior surface, individual and type. Physiognomic discourse in turn allowed 
Lebensphilosophie’s emphasis on vital intuition (Spengler) and the methodological differences 
between the human and natural sciences (Dilthey) to be yoked to theories of history, human 
typology, and language,157 thereby promising access to historical, social, and philosophical truths
through visual appearance alone. Thus it is no accident that considerations of photography were 
155 (Grosse kommentierte Berliner und Frankfurter Ausgabe 21.469)
156 In describing the role of a “physiognomic worldview” in the early 20th century, Gray is borrowing a title from 
Rudolf Kassner, one of the best known practitioners of physiognomy during the period. Yet beyond the confines 
of physiognomy proper, Gray argues that it constituted a broader intellectual current in Weimar culture: “Indeed,
physiognomics takes on the character of a super-discipline. It is hypostatized as a universal theory of 
knowledge, perception, and instinctual understanding that presents a powerful counter-model to the 
Enlightenment narrative of a rationally endowed, historically progressive humanity” (181).
157 For Gray, 20th-century physiognomy thus represented a break with the earlier physiognomy of Lavater in that 
the later “surface hermeneutics” (xxix) broke with the discipline’s foundational emphasis on empirical 
investigation rather than intuitive reading of the human body (195-6).
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invariably influenced by questions of physiognomy, since the camera’s mechanical ability to 
reproduce the appearance of its object provoked debates about the value and veracity of visual 
representation as such. So the fact that physiognomy provided an implicit framework for media-
theoretical discussions of photography during the Weimar Republic is perhaps less surprising 
than the sheer irreconcilable plurality of positions this framework allowed for.
The aim of this chapter is to explore the different positions on physiognomy taken by key
theorists and practitioners of photography in the Weimar Republic. By attending to the ways a 
physiognomic discourse of the relationship between visual appearance and meaning was 
mobilized, adapted, subverted, rejected, or affirmed, I hope to reopen consideration of the way 
that photography – or ideas about photography – provided a space to negotiate shifting 
understandings of the relationship between aesthetic medium and society, nature and technology,
image and signification. Just as physiognomy classically provided a technique for decoding the 
underlying meaning of natural forms, photography was often granted privileged access to an 
experience of the natural world by both proponents of a physiognomic understanding of 
photography and skeptics of this approach. More importantly, discussions about photography 
demonstrate the extent to which nature and technology necessarily constituted each other as 
discourses within Weimar modernism, as ideas about the adequate representation of the natural 
world and competing claims about photography’s ability to reproduce the speed and dynamism 
of modern technology relied upon and reinforced one another.
Photography, though then nearly a century old, was central to the aesthetic discourse of 
the 1920s for a number of reasons. On the one hand, its mechanical reproduction of visual 
impressions made it foundational for discussions of the new medium of film, especially before 
the advent of sound film, and on the other, its supposed documentary veracity prompted 
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reexaminations of “older” media such as literature and painting.158 Because the discussion of 
photography involved a reappraisal of a medium that was coded as particularly technological, 
but also because discussions of photography tended never to remain discussions simply of 
photography, but to spill over into other media such as film, literature, and theater, not to 
mention other conceptual realms entirely, a closer look at a key moment of this debate is a 
prerequisite to understanding the ways in which technology and nature were reconceptualized 
and mutually reconstituted one another as discourses during the period.
Physiognomy provided a set of terms for talking about how the photographic image 
could mean anything beyond itself, yet as critics such as Sabine Hake and Matthias Uecker have 
pointed out, the physiognomic approach to photography itself rested on a host of problematic 
assumptions about the visible type – the only way that a photograph of an individual can 
represent a type at all is to the extent that it is able to access a host of cultural presuppositions 
and stereotypes. This is certainly true, but for the purposes of this chapter I am more interested in
pursuing the physiognomic logic, however imprecise, because of the discursive and disciplinary 
transferences, translations, and slippages it reveals. Thus it is no doubt incorrect when Alfred 
Döblin, for example, says in his introduction to August Sander’s 1929 Antlitz der Zeit that 
Sander’s photographs provide a visible history of the last several decades if one understands that 
claim in a universal vein; for a present-day viewer unversed in the visual codes, class 
composition, and structuring narratives of Weimar society the photographs are historically far 
less intelligible. Yet the suggestion, for example, that there is a connection between the strategies
158 On the resurgence of the theoretical debate surrounding photography in the 1920s, see Wilke, esp. 44-47: 
“Wenngleich [die Fotografie], anders als der Film, beileibe kein neues Medium mehr ist, wird sie doch einer 
umfassenden konzeptionellen Erneuerung unterzogen, einer Rückführung auf ihre technischen Gesetze, die nun 
gleichfalls als Bedingung und Gewähr ihrer Kunstfähigkeit erscheint. Schon in den 1920er Jahren selbst findet 
diese Korrelation eine medienhistorische Deutung: Gerade die Entwicklung der bewegten Bilder sei es, die auch
den Blick für die mediale Eigenart und das eigentliche ästhetische Potenzial ihrer statischen Vorläufer geschärft 
habe. In dieser Allianz gründet der Wirkungszusammenhang, der nun beide Medien gemeinsam als Agenten 
einer Wende zum Optischen figurieren lässt” (44-5).
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of representation and kinds of typification employed across such discourses as photographic 
portraiture, anatomy, and epic prose is itself more compelling than the fact that Döblin’s claim 
may be a bit too sweeping.
I will begin with a closer consideration of Döblin’s preface to August Sander’s 1929 
photobook, Antlitz der Zeit, in order to introduce the collusion of discourses that allowed the 
author to depict the portraitist’s work as a comparative anatomy. Döblin’s claims about the 
particularly representative evidentiary nature of the visible have a good deal, I argue, to do with 
his ideas about the relationship between the individual and the type in the context of his 
philosophy of nature. The bulk of this chapter will consist of a reconstruction of Brecht and 
Benjamin’s criticisms of Albert Renger-Patzsch in light of the latter’s own photographic theory. I
have chosen to use Renger-Patzsch as the exemplary photographic practitioner in this chapter not
only because he was one of the most prominent Weimar representatives of New Objectivity in 
photography, nor even because of the fortuitous reach of his personal entanglements with other 
figures of 20th century German culture, from Brecht’s and Benjamin’s rejection of his 
photography to his own later collaboration with Ernst Jünger. Rather, the tension between his 
photographic practice, his photographic theory, and Benjamin and Brecht’s characterization of 
him will provide the leverage to prise open key issues of visual representation. By attending to 
how exactly Renger-Patzsch understood the concept of Wiedergabe, I hope to show that the 
photograph for him was not a transparent window that immediately reveals its object, but rather 
a surface upon which formal play and visual analogy could work to train the viewer’s perception 
and recreate a kinaesthetic experience. The contrast to Renger-Patzsch will then provide the 
leverage to return to an unresolved tension in Brecht’s and Benjamin’s theories of photography 
between showing and telling. Then I will turn to Siegfried Kracauer’s essay, “Die Photographie,”
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in order to show how his subversion of the physiognomic discourse can help us think about the 
photographic surface not in terms of the individual image but as a historically specific media 
landscape, critical awareness of which is prerequisite to social transformation. And finally, I will 
look some thirty-odd years ahead to Ernst Jünger’s collaboration with Renger-Patzsch to show 
how Jünger develops a particular kind of physiognomy that, in contrast to Döblin’s description 
of Sander’s historically “comparative photography,” results in an essentializing and elemental 
transhistorical time, a temporality that will be central in the following chapter’s consideration of 
Jünger’s Weimar-era concept of the “organic construction.”
The purpose of this chapter is thus to contextualize and historicize the role that debates 
about photography played during the time, especially to the extent that they linked 
considerations of visual representation to broader questions about experience, historicity, and the
relationship between the individual and the type. These discussions on photographic 
representation were on the one hand a necessary theoretical confrontation with a modern mass 
medium that informed the way seeing worked in the Weimar period. Yet on the other, the 
language and registers available for talking about photography provided a way to work through 
issues of technology, perception, experience, mass society, and representation as such.159 In these
various theorizations of photographic representation, one can see the contours of a key feature of
Weimar culture: a discourse in which nature, technology, perception, and modernity were 
semantically and conceptually reconstituting and being reconstituted by each other, with no term 
functioning as a stable or independent variable. Where Döblin draws on the physical sciences to 
159 Mia Fineman has analyzed in detail how contemporary photographic discourses provided a way to rework the 
relationship between technology and the human, under the sign of “Homo prostheticus” in the wake of the First 
World War: “Homo prostheticus is a modem, masculine creature, a functional assemblage of organic and 
mechanical parts who laughs in the face of neohumanist laments about the loss of individuality with a more or 
less joyful affirmation of a new ontology of mechanized partiality. […] Homo prostheticus became the 
figurative embodiment of a new ideal of the human organism functionally enhanced through technology—
whether by a steel prosthesis or a Zeiss lens.” (32-34)”
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describe photography’s ability to represent a social history, Ernst Jünger will link physiognomy 
to a transhistorical, elemental temporality; where the photographs of Albert Renger-Patzsch 
indulge in formal play to undermine thematic and visual differences between natural and 
manmade forms, Brecht and Benjamin will take issue with the camera’s purported immediacy, 
an aspect of photography that for them has the effect of naturalizing history while claiming 
superior representative capacity. These differences in position had largely to do with the different
angles from which these various theorists approached the medium, the expectations they had of 
it, and the formal and medium-specific features they chose to emphasize. Yet the differences 
between them are worth attending to, particularly because none of these theorists were defenders
of pictorialism – that is, a practice of photography that drew on the compositional conventions 
and aesthetic codes of 19th century painting – and they all praised the modernity of the medium. 
In the differing demands they made of photography’s modernity, therefore, it is possible to 
reconstruct not only key media-theoretical aspirations of Weimar culture, but beyond this, 
differing configurations of the relationship among art, technology, politics, and society. In other 
words, at stake in competing ideas about the photographic image were ultimately different ways 
of imagining modernity.
“[Das] Meer, das uns alle schaukelt.” Döblin and photography as historical typology
In his introduction to August Sander’s 1929 collection of photographic portraits, Antlitz 
der Zeit, Alfred Döblin takes a curiously circuitous route to his subject matter. Döblin’s 
epistemological detour provides an apt point of entry into the complex and often contradictory 
discussion of photographic representation during the Weimar era precisely because of the way 
that, in extracting meaning from faces, Döblin navigates among various discourses of aesthetic 
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representation. In his praise of Sander’s portraits, Döblin suggests how we might rethink the 
issues at stake in period discussions of photography in a way that allows us to see how 
considerations of media, technology, and representation overlapped and interlocked with ideas 
about perception, experience, and the visible surface of things.
Before getting to Sander’s book, which he finally does about three quarters of the way 
through his essay,160 Döblin offers an extended meditation on representation couched in the terms
of the medieval debate between realism and nominalism. In his compact summary of the 
competing positions, he writes, “Die Nominalisten waren der Meinung, daß nur die Einzeldinge 
wirklich real und existent sind, die Realisten aber hielten dafür, nur die Allgemeinheiten, die 
Universalien, sagen wir die Gattung, sagen wir die Idee, sind eigentlich real und existent” (7). 
Döblin illustrates the differences between the two positions through the genre of the 
death mask. Although he does not mention the volume by name, the context makes it clear that 
he is referring to the popular 1927 collection of photographs of death masks, Das ewige Antlitz, 
published by Ernst Benkard.161 Death, as written on the faces of figures ranging from Frederick 
the Great to the young girl known as “L’Inconnue de la Seine,” has erased the accidental, 
momentary impressions, leaving a visible access to truth beyond the merely particular. Through a
process Döblin likens to erosion, the momentary movements of the human face have been 
erased, leaving only the “En-bloc-Resultat” (9). In the context of the medieval “Gelehrtenstreit” 
with which Döblin frames his discussion of visual representation, the truth left after the erosive 
forces of death have cleared away the particulars – “Es ist die ganze Unmasse des Momentanen, 
Beweglichen auf diesen Gesichtern wegradiert. Der Tod hat eine massive Retusche 
160 “Ich habe die Seiten nicht gezählt, oder die Sätze, die ich bisher gesprochen habe, aber wir können jetzt eine 
Flagge hissen, wir sind nämlich bei unserer Sache, bei unsern Bildern” (13).
161 Benkard, Ernst. Das ewige Antlitz. Berlin: Frankfurter Verlagsanstalt, 1927.
141
vorgenommen” (9)162 – is the triumph of realism over nominalism. Yet, he continues, it is not just
death that brings out the veracity of the human face: the forces of society, class, and epoch also 
share these powers of creative erosion with death. Turning from Benkard’s volume to Sander’s, 
Döblin draws a parallel between the leveling powers of death and those of social life:
“Hier liegt vor mir eine andere Mappe, Bilder von Lebenden. Diese sind noch nicht in 
den großen Bottich gefallen, wo das Persönliche und alle Aktivität von ihnen 
abgewaschen wird. Das Wasser, das diese Steine abschleift, ist noch an ihnen sichtbar. 
Sie rollen noch in dem Meer, das uns alle schaukelt. Und während uns aus den 
Totenmasken überwältigend die eine gleichbleibende Anonymität entgegentritt – wir 
blicken in eine große eigentümliche Mondlandschaft –, so sehen wir – Individuen? 
Merkwürdig. Man würde glauben, man sieht Individuen. Aber plötzlich – merkt man, 
man sieht auch hier keine Individuen! Es ist zwar nicht die große, eintönige 
Mondlandschaft des Todes, deren Licht auf allen Gesichtern liegt, es ist etwas anderes. 
Und was? Wir sprechen jetzt von der erstaunlichen Abflachung der Gesichter und Bilder 
durch die menschliche Gesellschaft, durch die Klassen, durch ihre Kulturstufe. Dies ist 
die zweite gleichmachende oder angleichende Anonymität.” (10)
In a way that recalls his own theory of the epic, Döblin’s discussion of photographic “realism” 
makes it clear that this is a form of representation that privileges the type and the mass over the 
isolated, autonomous individual.163 Compared to what he sees as the unfortunate proliferation of 
“nominalist” photographers – those whose approach to verisimilitude seizes on personal, private,
and unique details of their subjects164 – photographic realism as practiced by Sander is able to 
show the truth of the type.
162 Retusche, or retouching, is of course a photographic term referring to modifications of the photographic negative
or print that alter the final image.
163 As I discuss in the previous chapter, water is a crucial motif throughout Döblin’s work and served him elsewhere
as it functions here: to undermine fixed boundaries between the individual person or particle and the larger 
mass. As we will see, Döblin differs from Jünger in that he does not oppose the mass to the type. Both concepts 
work to undermine the isolation of the sovereign, bourgeois individual. In this context, both his praise of Sander 
and his aqueous approach to the book’s introduction make sense.
164 “Dann gibt es Photographen, die als Wald- und Wiesenpflanzen auf allen Straßen gedeihen. Die sind, obwohl sie
so viele sind, doch in unsern Augen mehr als jene künstlerischen Herren. Sie wollen ein möglichst ‚ähnliches‘ 
Bild von dem Menschen geben, der sich ihnen stellt. Es soll möglichst ‚ähnlich‘ sein, das heißt, das Persönliche,
Private, Einmalige an diesem Menschen soll auf der Platte festgehalten werden. Wir kurbeln ein bißchen zurück 
und erinnern uns unserer Eingangssätze: diese Ähnlichkeitsphotographen, das sind die Nominalisten, die keine 
Kenntnis von den großen Allgemeinheiten haben. Wir tun den Herren wohl zu viel Ehre an, wenn wir sagen, sie 
haben in dem großen Streit der Geister Stellung genommen und sich entschlossen auf die Seite der Nominalisten
gestellt. Unbestreitbar und sicher vorhanden ist immerhin ein bestimmter Realismus dieser Gruppe 
Photographen, nämlich Geld zu verdienen.” (12-13)
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Döblin’s argument is, characteristically, somewhat ambiguous at this point. Having 
suggested here and in other essays165 that modern, mass society is responsible for creating the 
type as the truth of the era, he then – disarmingly and seamlessly – claims that the photographic 
realism practiced by Sander is the privileged aesthetic representation of the type. In other words, 
Sander’s “Geist, seine Beobachtung, sein Wissen und nicht zuletzt sein enormes 
photographisches Können” (13) are able to bring out the truth of an age through an aesthetic 
strategy that both reflects and captures the fundamental processes of that age. If it is the “Meer, 
das uns alle schaukelt” that is responsible for their anonymity, it is Sander’s visual idiom that 
bestows this social erosion of the individual with a representative capacity. The ambivalence in 
Döblin’s praise is worth maintaining because it foregrounds Sander’s photographic practice 
while raising broader questions about the ways in which visual representation was theorized 
during the period. Where the claim that the typical nature of these faces was brought about 
through the erosive, leveling vicissitudes of society, class, and history would seem to suggest 
that the photographer only has to record these eloquent faces for their representative potential to 
be made visible, Döblin’s distinction between “nominalist” and “realist” photographers, and his 
assignment of Sander to the latter category, hints that the camera itself plays a guiding role in 
visual typification.
And indeed, Döblin likens Sander’s photographic practice to a science rather than an art:
“Wie man Soziologie schreibt, ohne zu schreiben, sondern indem man bilder gibt, Bilder 
von Gesichtern und nicht etwa Trachten, das schafft der Blick dieses Photographen, sein 
Geist, seine Beobachtung, sein Wissen und nicht zuletzt sein enormes photographisches 
Können. Wie es eine vergleichende Anatomie gibt, aus der man erst zu einer Auffassung 
der Natur und der Geschichte der Organe kommt, so hat dieser Photograph vergleichende
Photographie getrieben und hat damit einen wissenschaftlichen Standpunkt oberhalb der 
Detailphotographen gewonnen.” (13-14)
It is tempting to say that Döblin is able to compare Sander’s images to a comparative 
165 Most notably in “Der Geist des naturalistischen Zeitalters.”
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anatomy because Sander was already framing his subjects as specimens. Clearly, it is not just 
historical processes that have stripped the contingent, momentary particulars, but Sander’s 
compositional technique has done this as well. Figures are often posed against a neutral white or 
grey background or they are arranged indoors or outside, but the shallow depth of field and the 
lack of visible clutter suggest, to borrow a term from another photographic discourse, that the 
punctum has been studiously removed – for Sander’s sitters, backgrounds are precisely that. 
Occasionally, subjects such as a baker or a Tapeziermeister will wield the tools of their trade, but
far from adding individual color, these emblematic implements only serve to reinforce the 
typicality of the people photographed. Photography can work like a history of organs because of 
the fundamental recognizability of Sander’s specimens. 
In this sense, Antlitz der Zeit – and Döblin’s reading of it – can be situated within a 
discursive tradition centering on the privileged evidentiary nature of the visible. In their 
dissociation from a rich visual context and in the tacit narrative implied by the way they are 
serially mounted within the volume, Sander’s portraits recall Karl Blossfeldt’s collection of plant
images, Urformen der Kunst (1928) or, reaching back to the work referenced by Blossfeldt’s 
title, Ernst Haeckel’s 1904 Kunstformen in der Natur. While not working with photographs, 
Haeckel deployed a similar strategy of visual representation throughout his work to convey – and
demonstrate – truths about biological life, most famously his thesis that ontogeny recapitulates 
phylogeny. His lush, vibrant zoological illustrations were to bear the burden of proof in making 
claims about evolution and taxonomy.166 Likewise Blossfeldt’s book Urformen der Kunst, 
although a collection of art photography rather than scientific illustration, sought to demonstrate 
by means of carefully manicured close-ups that key formal patterns in nature were the origin of 
166 For more on Haeckel’s practices and theories of scientific illustration, see Daston and Galison, especially pages 
160-161, 189-192, and 247-250, and Kreinik, 232-247.
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similar forms in art and culture.167 
These resonances between diverse genres, disciplines, and media introduced by Döblin’s 
comparison of August Sander’s method to that of the anatomist should alert us to two key 
aspects of photographic theory and practice during the Weimar Republic. First, what we find are 
often strategies of representation and discussions of photographic meaning that have little to do 
with such hallmarks of photographic theory as indexicality, verisimilitude, or the aleatory.168 
Rather, the discussion of the camera’s putative objectivity was often more complex and 
contradictory than a simple assumption based on the purely technical dimensions of the 
instrument such as its speed and precision (although these are also broadly emphasized). As 
Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison have argued in Objectivity (2007), the set of scientific 
strategies and practices of observation and depiction they dub “mechanical objectivity” had less 
to do with an accurate portrayal of reality and more to do with an ideal of non-intervention on 
the part of the scientific subject.169 This historical notion of objectivity arose over the course of 
the nineteenth century as a reaction to to the Enlightenment ideal of “truth-to-nature.” Where the 
latter required the learned intervention of the subject to eliminate the accidentals of a given 
image in order to allow its exemplary larger truth to become apparent, the former approach 
sought to excise precisely this intervention in order to minimize the risk of an unconscious 
manipulation of the data to conform to preformed hypotheses or images. Yet what one often 
167 For a thorough discussion of the relationship between Blossfeldt’s image-making practices and his ideas about 
fundamental botanical types, see Kreinik, 257-263. For a discussion of how his images joined considerations of 
form and function in a way that reconciled organic nature and modern technology for his contemporaries and 
drew on Meurer’s idea of “Urformen” and Haeckel’s monism, see Fineman, chapter 3, especially 93-98.
168 The idea of the index, drawn from C.S. Peirce’s semiotic theory, has proven variously fruitful for theorizing the 
relationship between the photographic image and its object. As Clive Scott writes, “The index […] is the sign in 
which the relationship between sign and object, or signifier and signified, is one of causal, sequential, or spatial 
contiguity” (27). For more on the role of the index in photographic theory, see Scott’s The Spoken Image, 
especially pages 17-45. For a further critical assessment of the usefulness of indexicality for understanding film 
and digital photography, see Tom Gunning (2008).
169 “Nonintervention ― not verisimilitude ― lay at the heart of mechanical objectivity, and this is why 
mechanically produced images of individual objects captured its message best” (187).
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finds in the photographic discourse of the Weimar era, exemplified in Döblin’s praise of Sander’s
visual typologies, is a combination of the exactitude of mechanical objectivity with a premium 
placed on strategies of typological representation that accord with truth-to-nature. If we take this 
convergence of strategies of representation seriously, we are compelled to reconsider how terms 
such as “objectivity,” “realism,” and “reproduction” functioned as multivalent and at times 
contradictory concepts. In the case of Brecht’s criticism of Renger-Patzsch, it is the enabling 
assumptions behind these terms and all they entail that are at issue, far more than critical 
judgments on specific photographic practices.
The second point, which follows in part from the first one, is that it is impossible to fully 
distinguish those aspects of Weimar photographic discourse that are entirely medium-specific. 
One the one hand, discussions of photography drew on the mechanical nature of the camera and 
film’s ability to capture light, often relying upon an implicit analogy between the camera as 
modern medium and the characteristic mechanization and heightened tempo frequently taken to 
define modern life. For almost all parties except those still invested in pictorialism, photography 
was supposed to neither resemble nor imitate painting. Yet on the other hand, discussions of 
photographic meaning were often anything but medium-exclusive, drawing on strategies of 
visual representation from across disciplines and media.170 Between scientific illustration and 
photography, there was a visual language available for making claims about the type in light of 
the individual specimen, which is exactly what Döblin emphasized in regard to Sander’s 
portraiture. The truth of the individual photograph, in this case, is less a question of its 
indexicality and supposed immediacy than its capacity to represent a type.
170 Juliana Kreinik, for example, has traced a genealogy of the photography of Neue Sachlichkeit to strategies and 
practices of scientific illustration. Her dissertation represents a ground-breaking study of the relationship 
between visual representation in the natural sciences and the aesthetic conventions of photographic New 
Objectivity, and has been invaluable in helping me sort out some of the key ideas of this chapter.
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“Der Reiz der Oberfläche.” Wiedergabe, Form, and Perceptual Training in the Work of Albert
Renger-Patzsch
Returning to the indirect debate on photographic representation staged by Bertolt Brecht, 
Walter Benjamin, and Albert Renger-Patzsch will involve a good deal of reconstruction and, to 
be fair, a bit of construction as well, since it was not actually a debate in any meaningful sense of 
the word. While Benjamin and Brecht do mention Renger-Patzsch explicitly, they address the 
photographer’s work only obliquely and dismissively; it is fair to say that “Renger-Patzsch” or 
Die Welt ist schön (The World is Beautiful) – the title of his best-known photobook – came to 
stand in as a synecdoche for the photography of Neue Sachlichkeit more generally, and even for 
broader tendencies or possibilities of photography at large. Renger-Patzsch for his part never 
addresses either Benjamin or Brecht directly, although he does address criticism of his book and 
its title in a 1937 essay.171 His own writings on photography are largely of a practical nature and 
consist far more of tips for amateurs and professionals on composition, equipment, technique, 
filters, chemicals, proper tripod usage, how best to illuminate succulents, etc., than the sort of 
media-theoretical and aesthetic questions Benjamin and Brecht were addressing. But it may be 
the very fact that the two camps were talking completely past one another that makes this 
moment so interesting, and it is worth asking what it might mean that two of the most significant 
media theorists of the Weimar Republic had so little common discursive ground with its most 
prominent photographer and their main target.
Without muting the force of Benjamin’s and Brecht’s criticisms, I would nevertheless like
to suggest that their objections are not of necessity directed specifically at Renger-Patzsch: 
indeed, with a shift or two of rhetorical emphasis, the photographer’s work could have been the 
object especially of Benjamin’s praise, as was Renger-Patzsch’s colleague Karl Blossfeldt. It 
171 Renger-Patzsch, Albert. “[Beitrag zu:] Meister der Kamera erzählen.” Die Freude am Gegenstandi, 150.
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should be clear from the start that neither side upheld what were seen as the aesthetic values of a 
previous age: like Benjamin and Brecht, Renger-Patzsch was interested in the ways that 
photography could train a new kind of perception. Neither was he invested in preserving received
ideas of art or beauty, and indeed, he explicitly bracketed out the question of whether 
photography could be considered art.172 Nevertheless, Renger-Patzsch came to serve as a 
necessary placeholder of sorts, a provocation and an aid to navigating the ambivalence of the 
photographic medium. In this vein, it is perhaps not too much of a stretch to say that if Renger-
Patzsch hadn’t existed, it would have been necessary for Benjamin and Brecht to invent him. 
Thus – inversely – another look at the indirect debate on photography amongst Benjamin, Brecht,
and Renger-Patzsch might provide the leverage needed to pry open the ambiguities in Benjamin’s
and Brecht’s own conceptualizations of the medium. At issue is not just a disagreement on the ins
and outs of photographic representation, but competing paradigms of the relationship between 
surface appearance and reality and, by extension, divergent discourses on technology. 
Renger-Patzsch’s 1928 photobook, Die Welt ist schön, is a collection of 100 black and 
white images, each presented in numbered sequence without caption on a single recto page of the
volume, facing a blank verso page. A table of contents identifies each image concisely, naming 
the depicted object or landscape and only rarely giving geographic information. While Carl 
Georg Heise’s introduction organizes the book into eight thematic sections (“Pflanzen,” “Tiere 
und Menschen,” “Landschaft,” “Material,” “Architektur,” “Technik,” “Bunte Welt” and 
“Symbol”), the collection proceeds by formal rhyming and visual analogy as much as it moves 
thematically from one image to the next.173 Through careful composition and lighting Renger-
172 Albert Renger Patzsch, “Photographie und Kunst,” in Die Freude am Gegenstand. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur 
Photographie, ed. Bernd Stiegler, Ann Wilde, and Jürgen Wilde (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2010), 83.
173 On the narrative structure of Die Welt ist schön, see Michael Jennings, “Agriculture, Industry, and the Birth of 
the Photo-Essay in the Late Weimar Republic.” October 93 (2000): 47. “The volume is organized rather 
statically into clearly defined groups of images: plants, animals, and humans; landscapes, commodities, 
architectural details, technological details, and industrial landscapes; and, finally, a last series of ten images that 
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Patzsch is able to isolate striking formal aspects and visual details of such diverse subjects as 
agave, sheep, coffee beans, human faces, the rooftops of Lübeck, industrial forges, gear belts, 
sludge tanks, and much else. This encyclopedic inclusiveness, isolating disparate objects from 
their contexts and uniting them all, without explicit commentary, as objects of aesthetic 
appreciation under the title “Die Welt ist schön,” earned Renger-Patzsch Brecht’s and Benjamin’s
accusations of Verklärung, or aesthetic transfiguration.
Brecht refers to Renger-Patzsch in a 1928 fragment called “Über Fotografie.” Criticizing 
photography’s unwillingness to move beyond displays of technical proficiency and attempts to 
mimic painting, he charges avant-garde photography with an obsessive and fetishistic focus on 
visual appearance: “Es kommt da aus den Bildern der Avantgarde oft so eine naïve Frage heraus: 
‘Wissen Sie eigentlich, wie der hintern einer Frau aussieht, nein, ich meine, wie er wirklich 
aussieht?’”174 Yet the obsession with the visual is not Brecht’s primary gripe with the 
photography of the avant-garde or of Neues Sehen, but rather the suspicion that it is a 
disingenuous obsession, in that its true object is not a renewed confrontation with visual 
appearance at all, but rather a roundabout preservation of an aestheticist, traditional conception 
of art. “Das wäre noch nicht verstimmend,” continues Brecht, “wenn man nicht den Eindruck 
hätte, sie seien nicht einmal so sehr an der Beantwortung dieser bescheidenden Frage interessiert,
sondern mehr daran, daß ein Kunstwerk entsteht, etwas, für das dieser Hintern nur ein Anlaß ist. 
Es handelt sich hauptsächlich wohl darum, zu zeigen, daß ‘das Leben doch schön ist’.”
mixes shots from most of the foregoing. Yet sustained consideration reveals connections both within and 
between groups of images. These connections are only in the rarest of cases thematic. Instead, Renger-Patzsch 
constellates groups of pictures exclusively through formal rhyming, and these rhymed constellations are almost 
always self-referential, in that they suggest to the viewer the manner in which the visual information is to be 
assimilated.”
In a somewhat similar vein, Matthew Simms sees the organizing principle of Renger-Patzsch’s book in its use of
serial and radial structures. Matthew Simms, “Just Photography: Albert Renger-Patzsch’s Die Welt ist schön.” 
History of Photography 21, no. 3 (1997): 197–204.
174 Bertolt Brecht, “Über Fotografie,” (“On Photography”) in Werke: Grosse Kommentierte Berliner und 
Frankfurter Ausgabe, Schriften I, ed. Werner Hecht, Jan Knopf, Werner Mittenzwei, and Klaus-Detlef Müller 
(Berlin: Aufbau, 1988), 264.
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Brecht’s rendering of Renger-Patzsch’s title is telling, and it is tempting to say that Brecht
has transfigured the title of the photobook into what he sees as its essential enunciatory force. 
Where “Welt” might be taken in a more neutral sense as referring to the world of possible 
images, “Leben” suggests a glib judgment on social actuality, reinforced by the way the “doch,” 
in foregrounding the question of beauty, serves as the programmatic gesture of Verklärung. In a 
1930 fragment, Brecht elaborates on the connection between photographic reproduction and 
Verklärung, echoing the first epigraph above: “Die Fotografie ist die Möglichkeit einer 
Wiedergabe, die den Zusammenhang wegschminkt. Der Marxist Sternberg […] führt aus, daß aus
der (gewissenhaften) Fotografie einer Fordschen Fabrik keinerlei Ansicht über diese Fabrik 
gewonnen werden kann.”175 The criticism here is that photographic representation presents 
aspects of a larger whole without gesturing towards that whole in a meaningful way, so that the 
broader social context is erased rather than invoked.
Photography by its very medial nature has the possibility to extract visual data from a 
given social and historical context and present it in isolation, as a static, supratemporal image; for
Brecht and Benjamin, the contemporary tendency represented by Renger-Patzsch makes this 
moment central. Benjamin:
“Die Welt ist schön” – das ist der Titel des bekannten Bilderbuchs von Renger-Patzsch, in
dem wir die neusachliche Photographie auf ihrer Höhe sehen. Es ist ihr nämlich gelungen,
auch noch das Elend, indem sie es auf modisch-perfektionierte Weise auffaßte, zum 
Gegenstand des Genusses zu machen. Denn wenn es eine ökonomische Funktion der 
Photographie ist, Gehalte, welche früher dem Konsum der Massen sich entzogen – den 
Frühling, Prominente, fremde Länder – durch modische Verarbeitung ihnen zuzuführen, 
so ist es eine ihrer politischen, die Welt wie sie nun einmal ist von innen her – mit 
anderen Worten: modisch – zu erneuern. (“Der Autor als Produzent,” II.2 693)
Thus it is not simply that photography removes the photographed object from its historical 
175 Bertolt Brecht, “[Durch Fotografie keine Einsicht]”, in Werke: Grosse Kommentierte Berliner und Frankfurter 
Ausgabe, Schriften I, ed. Werner Hecht, Jan Knopf, Werner Mittenzwei, and Klaus-Detlef Müller (Berlin: 
Aufbau, 1988), 443-444.
150
context, thereby obscuring this context; for Benjamin, it has the additional function of 
repackaging existing reality (“die Welt wie sie nun einmal ist”) in modish luster, turning the 
photographed object into an object of consumer pleasure. That which exists is sold, with 
photography’s help, as something new. This is, of course, the logic of the advertisement, and 
Benjamin had linked photography, fashion, and advertising in his earlier “Kleine Geschichte der 
Photographie,” where his target is likewise Albert Renger-Patzsch: “Weil aber das wahre Gesicht 
dieses photographischen Schöpferturns die Reklame oder die Assoziation ist” (II.1 383). To be 
sure, many of the images in Die Welt ist schön were produced for industrial and commercial 
clients, and the relatively new medium of advertisements illustrated by photographs certainly 
informed contemporary discourse on photography.176 Yet even if we bracket out the question of 
advertising and the ready judgments on consumer culture that may accompany it, it is clear that 
for Benjamin and Brecht the photographic surface itself obscures an underlying reality rather 
than providing access to it, as it supposedly does for Renger-Patzsch.
It is therefore worth mentioning that Benjamin’s argument that the economic role of 
photography is to offer the consumer images of commodities not actually attainable presages 
John Berger’s claim in Ways of Seeing (1973) about the historical affinity between the rise of 
European oil painting and that of commodity capitalism.177 Indeed, the commodity is an 
important if never fully visible term in Benjamin’s and Brecht’s critiques, and the charge that the 
image obscures rather than reveals a functional reality bears strong similarities to a basic 
176 On photography, advertizing, and the avant-garde in Weimar Germany see Sherwin Simmons, “Advertising 
Seizes Control of Life: Berlin Dada and the Power of Advertising,” Oxford Art Journal, Vol. 22, No. 1. (1999), 
121-146, and Maud Lavin, “Photomontage, Mass Culture, and Modernity: Utopianism in the Circle of New 
Advertising Designers,” in Maud Lavin and Matthew Teitelbaum, Montage and Modern Life: 1919-1942. 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1992), 36-59.
177 “To have a thing painted and put on a canvas is not unlike buying it and putting it in your house. If you buy a 
painting you buy also the look of the thing it represents. […] Oil painting did to appearances what capital did to 
social relations. It reduced everything to the equality of objects. Everything became exchangeable because 
everything became a commodity. […] Oil painting celebrated a new kind of wealth – which was dynamic and 
which found its only sanction in the supreme buying power of money.” John Berger, Ways of Seeing (New York: 
Penguin, 1977), 83-90.
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Marxian dynamic: the relationship between surface appearance and structural reality, perhaps 
most well-known from the discussion of commodity fetishism in volume 1 of Das Kapital. The 
commodity is a fetish, for Marx, because it obscures the social relations that produced it; it is the 
tangible evidence of a complex, particularly historical system, and yet it seems to be merely an 
object. In Marx’s formulation, “Es ist nur das bestimmte gesellschaftliche Verhältnis der 
Menschen selbst, welches hier für sie die phantasmagorische Form eines Verhältnisses von 
Dingen annimmt” (86).
So the problem for Benjamin and Brecht is not just that photography can make the ugly 
beautiful nor even that it transmutes social or political concerns into aesthetic ones, but rather 
that, in so doing, it recapitulates an essential logic of capitalist modernity. If reification or 
Verdinglichung obfuscates the complex social relations of production behind the deceptive self-
evidence of a world of commodities, Verklärung obstructs access to functional social realities by 
presenting a world of things made beautiful. In this context, Verklärung for Benjamin and Brecht 
is not the necessary transfiguration of real-world material into a presentation suitable for an 
aesthetic medium, but is rather the obscuring aestheticization of complex social realities, 
performing on the level of images what Verdinglichung achieves on the level of things.178 Thus 
the problem with Renger-Patzsch’s photography for them is not just that it makes commodities 
beautiful, but that it duplicates the logic of the commodity fetish itself. A reproduction of visual 
appearance is just that – a doubling of visual appearance that offers no new insight into an 
already mystified and mystifying social order.
In Brecht’s Dreigroschenprozeß we read: “Die Lage wird dadurch so kompliziert, daß 
weniger denn je eine einfache ‘Wiedergabe der Realität’ etwas über die Realität aussagt. Eine 
178 My thanks to Johannes Wankhammer for this particular articulation of the relationship between Verdinglichung 
and Verklärung.
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Fotografie der Kruppwerke oder der A.E.G. ergibt beihnahe nichts über diese Institute. Die 
eigentliche Realität ist in die Funktionale gerutscht. Die Verdinglichung der menschlichen 
Beziehungen, also etwa die Fabrik, gibt die letzteren nicht mehr heraus” (21.469). Closely 
related to the accusations of Verklärung is the idea that the photographic image obscures the 
underlying reality. Contrary to a logic of physiognomy, which holds that visible form is an 
expression of a deeper truth of being, the surface tells us nothing about the interior, and the 
image is helplessly mute. A reproduction of visual appearance is just that – a doubling of visual 
appearance that offers no new insight into an already mystified and mystifying social order. For 
Benjamin, the photographic tendency represented by Renger-Patzsch senselessly reduplicates the
world of commodities, thereby obscuring any possibility for a deeper recognition of the human 
context behind those commodities: “In ihr [i.e., in the motto “Die Welt ist schön”] entlarvt sich 
die Haltung einer Photographie, die jede Konservenbüchse ins All montieren, aber nicht einen 
der menschlichen Zusammenhänge fassen kann, in denen sie auftritt, und die damit noch in ihren
traumverlorensten Sujets mehr ein Vorläufer von deren Verkäuflichkeit als von deren Erkenntnis 
ist” (II.1 383). The photographic image thus recapitulates a logic of commodification on multiple
levels.
For Brecht and Benjamin, then, Renger-Patzsch is both symptomatic and symbolic of 
photography’s innate capacity for Verklärung – in its essentially myopic focus on yielding up an 
aesthetically pleasing visual surface, it both distracts from and obstructs meaningful insight into 
the photographed object. In retrospect, it seems inevitable that Renger-Patzsch should have come
to play this role. Die Welt ist schön was a well-known work,179 and had its popularity, glossy 
images, and implicit unifying narrative not sufficed to earn it a representative status in late 
179 On the contemporary reception of Die Welt ist schön, see Claus Pfingsten, Aspekte zum fotografischen Werk 
Albert Renger-Patzschs (Witterschlick: M. Wehle, 1992), 168-171, and Ulrich Rüter, “The Reception of Albert 
Renger-Patzsch’s Die Welt ist schön.” History of Photography 21.3 (1997): 192-196.
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Weimar debates of photographic representation, the programmatic title alone may have been 
enough to guarantee it that role. Yet as has often been pointed out, “Die Welt ist schön” was not 
Renger-Patzsch’s choice of title, but that of his publisher, Kurt Wolff. The photographer’s own 
preferred title for his book was allegedly “Die Dinge” – one might imagine, all other things being
equal, that such a title would have been far more sympathetic to Benjamin and Brecht than the 
more saccharine moniker that ended up gracing the collection’s cloth spine. It would be tempting 
to explain away their criticisms of Renger-Patzsch as the result of a misunderstanding, but this 
would be inadequate. Renger-Patzsch’s book, once in circulation under its more marketable, 
innocently provocative title, was no longer a collection of technically superb photographic 
studies of various objects, but itself an object, participant, and prompt in the contemporary 
discourse on the photographic medium. 
And regardless of whether it had been dubbed “Die Welt ist schön,” “Die Dinge,” or 
anything else, the photographic practice it demonstrated represented an irritation for a critical 
photographic theory. Brechtian-Benjaminian hackles would have been raised, I propose, 
whatever the title of Renger-Patzsch’s photobook. This is not because his photography was 
simply incommensurable with their views of the medium’s potential – I don’t think that it was – 
but because of a fundamental ambivalence within contemporary photographic discourse between 
what we might provisionally dub its formal/pedagogical and its documentary/realist emphases. 
Both bear upon the question of photography’s relationship to technology: on the one hand, the 
program of Neues Sehen foregrounded the medium’s capacity to expand and train human 
perception in a way that fit with the rapid social and technological changes of the period. 
Photography, like film, was lauded as a medium that was up to the task of refunctioning human 
sight in an age of radical industrialization and urbanization. On the other hand, photography’s 
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putative mechanical exactitude inspired a whole body of claims and counterclaims about the 
camera’s superior representative potential. The tension between these poles has its counterparts 
in Benjamin and Brecht, but before addressing the ambivalence between photography’s various 
facets in their work, it will be useful to turn to the theoretic writings of Renger-Patzsch.
To be sure, Renger-Patzsch was interested in photography’s ability to reproduce 
(“wiedergeben”) a visual scene. But his understanding of what exactly constituted a photographic
Wiedergabe differed from the simply positivistic notion implied by Brecht’s critique in the 
Dreigroschenprozeß, as did his conception of what photography could and should portray. For 
Renger-Patzsch, the photographic image was neither merely an immediate reproduction of a 
visual impression, nor did photography aspire towards enunciatory force concerning functional 
social realities. Just as he bracketed art out of photography’s purview on the one side, he denied 
it access to discursive or conceptual claims on the other: “Mit dem Versuch, eine Idee 
darzustellen, überschreitet die Fotografie die ihr gezogenen Grenzen,” as he writes in a 1961 
essay called “Über die Grenzen unseres Metiers. Kann die Fotografie einen Typus 
wiedergeben?”180 In this sense, Renger-Patzsch on the one hand and Benjamin and Brecht on the 
other are talking past each other; since they disagreed on the very premises of what photography 
was and what it should be, they lacked the common ground upon which to work out how it could 
achieve its aims. In a sense, this is simply another way of stating the obvious – that Benjamin and
Brecht approached photography as critical media theorists while Renger-Patzsch spoke as a 
Berufsfotograf. Nonetheless, what is interesting is the way that both camps came up against the 
same ambivalences of the medium, each working in their own specific idiom.
Straight theoretical pronouncements from Renger-Patzsch are few and far between. The 
casual reader of Die Freude am Gegenstand, a recent collection of Renger-Patzsch’s writings on 
180 Renger-Patzsch, “Über die Grenzen unseres Metiers,” 222.
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photography, will immediately notice the prevalence of purely technical insights. Many of 
Renger-Patzsch’s pieces were written for other photographers, and often directed towards 
enthusiastic amateurs seeking to hone their landscape or botanical photography skills. There are a
few pieces that enter the discursive fray and address photography as a medium, such as 
“Ketzergedanken über künstlerische Photographie,” “Photographie und Kunst,” and “Ziele.” Yet 
even in the more technical texts it is possible to discern an implicit engagement with the 
questions being posed of and by the medium during the 1920s.
Photography indeed served a documentary purpose for Renger-Patzsch, but it was to 
document not simply reality-at-large, but rather forms per se. The Wiedergabe at stake was a 
reproduction of visual forms and, by way of these, sensory experience. As Claus Pfingsten has 
noted, “Dieser Anspruch der Fotografie auf Dokumentation der Wirklichkeit werde vom 
Fotografen durch die Inventarisierung und exakte Wiedergabe der Formen realisiert” (114). Yet 
as Bernd Stiegler has pointed out, even within the claim to exactly reproduce forms – what has 
often been called Renger-Patzsch’s realism – there lies a tension between the exact depiction of 
an object and formal play for its own sake, between identification and resemblance or visual 
analogy.181 Because Renger-Patzsch was not photographing with an eye towards the identification
of an object or scene but rather to draw out salient formal features, his more technical writings 
emphasize the initial composition of an image and its subsequent cropping in the darkroom. Thus
to take an example used by Thomas Janzen, an image that depicts an immediately recognizable 
quay wall above a canal is cropped to become the diagonal intersection of two surfaces – the 
stipple of brick and the ripple of water (figures 1-2). In Stiegler’s formulation, “kaum ein 
Photograph seiner Zeit hat sich so der Dingwelt verschrieben, aber auch kaum einer die formale 
Abstraktion so weit getrieben wie er” (2010, 305).
181 Bernd Stiegler, Afterword to Die Freude am Gegenstand, 305.
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Figure 1. Contact print of plate 49 from Die Welt ist schön (image from Janzen 1996)
Figure 2. Plate 49 from Die Welt ist schön
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The tendency towards formal play distances the photograph from any simple 
identificatory function that might be anticipated by the idea of Wiedergabe, and enables the 
photographed subjects to mingle more freely; natural and technological forms, for example, 
come to resemble one another.182 A close-up of a snake’s scales produces the formal repetition 
and burnished hardness of a machine, while images of industrial forges or warehouses take on an 
organic, creaturely quality. As Bernd Stiegler writes, 
Sein Konzept, das, so wie er es versteht, Kunst und Handwerk, Natur und Kultur, Subjekt
und Objekt, Technik und Flora miteinander verbindet, ist die Form. Die Form ist in seiner
Photographietheorie wie -praxis die zentrale vermittelnde Instanz, die dazu dienen soll, 
die Ambivalenzen seiner Bilder und seiner Texte aufzuheben. Sie soll es ihm gestatten, 
radikale Moderne und “elementare Räume” zu assoziieren. Die Photographie ist für ihn 
die eigentümliche wie besondere Begegnung des konkreten Gegenstandes mit der 
abstrakten Form – wie auch umgekehrt des abstrakten Gegenstandes mit der konkreten 
Form. (2009, 83)
Formal principles allow Die Welt ist schön to move between images of otherwise incongruous 
subjects, from the North Sea surf, for example, to rows of identical cobbler’s lasts, and form for 
Renger-Patzsch is closely linked to photography’s capacity for Wiedergabe – the well-chosen 
form is what brings the essence of the photographed object to the viewer.
Yet for Renger-Patzsch, Wiedergabe is not merely a visual duplication of what exists, but 
is rather the recreation of a perceptual experience for the viewer; likewise, the essence (“das 
Wesentliche”) is not conceived as a conceptual or critical knowledge of the object (Brecht’s 
factory, say) but is instead supposed to be a representative moment that makes a particular 
quality of the photographed subject present for the viewer. In a programmatic essay called 
“Ziele,” Renger-Patzsch speaks in favor of a kind of photographic realism that would be able to 
reproduce impressions (“Eindrücke”) and the “magic of the material” (“den Zauber des 
Materials”).183 The mechanical nature of photography means that it is the medium able to “do 
182 Stiegler, Die Freude am Gegenstand, 305.
183 Renger-Patzsch, “Ziele,” in Die Freude am Gegenstand, 91.
158
justice” to modern technology: “Dem starren Liniengefüge moderner Technik, dem luftigen 
Gitterwerk der Krane und Brücken, der Dynamic 1000pferdiger Maschinen im Bilde gerecht zu 
werden, ist wohl nur der Photographie möglich” (92). Expanding upon this idea in “Photographie
und Kunst,” he writes:
...so kann [der Photograph] Dinge im Augenblick hervorzaubern, mit denen sich der 
Künstler tagelang abmühen muß, wenn es sich nicht überhaupt um Gebiete handelt, die 
dem Künstler verschlossen sind, auf denen die Photographie sich aber auf ihrem 
ureigensten befindet. Sei es als souveräne Beherrscherin flüchtigster Momente oder in der
Analyse einzelner Phasen rascher Bewegung, sei es zur Fixierung der allzuschnell 
vergänglichen Formenschönheit der Blumen oder zur Wiedergabe der Dynamik im 
Reiche moderner Technik. (83)
The particular temporality involved in both “fixing” an evanescent moment in a 
biological process and reproducing technological dynamism is worth noting here; both punctual 
and sustained, it elicits an elemental dimension common to organic life and technological 
modernity alike. Likewise, the sensory experience that is the goal of Renger-Patzsch’s 
Wiedergabe is the experience of space, motion, and kinetic potential: “Worin liegen die Aufgaben
der Photographie, fragt man noch? Die Höhe eines gotischen Domes aufnehmen, daß man 
Schwindelgefühle bekommt, ein Auto aufnehmen, daß man die Schnelligkeit sieht, die ihm 
innewohnt, die Luft aufnehmen, daß man den Raum fühlt” (47).
That Renger-Patzsch’s Wiedergabe is the recreation of kinaesthetic and sensual 
experience rather than the duplication of the visible can be seen in his advice to amateur 
photographers on how to compose a landscape. While the photographic novice immersed in a 
natural landscape such as the Harz Mountains would tend to photograph a given scene 
indiscriminately, unwittingly influenced by the various sense impressions – the smell of the air, 
the vastness of the landscape, the pleasant fatigue of the hike, and so on – that subtly and 
momentarily contribute to making the landscape noteworthy, the finished photograph of course 
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conveys none of this, and may seem pale and bland in comparison to the original experience. By 
contrast the more experienced photographer, according to Renger-Patzsch, filters out the other 
sense impressions and carefully chooses a detail or form in the landscape that captures its 
particular quality, thus recreating the total sensory experience that the careless amateur, 
unknowingly influenced by it, actually destroys.184 “Whoever knows a landscape must also 
immediately recognize it in a photograph; whoever does not know it must get the correct idea of 
it.”185 When prescribing proper practice for landscape photography, Renger-Patzsch relies on the 
category of “Ähnlichkeit,” but this is no more a simple resemblance to the landscape than 
“Wiedergabe” is a duplication of the visual. Instead, “Ähnlichkeit” relies on an understanding of 
the perceived characteristic qualities of a landscape: “Uns muß also alles willkommen sein, was 
den Charakter unterstreicht, verdammen müssen wir das Zufällige, auf das wir überall stoßen” 
(138).
The photographed landscape must therefore resemble an ideal version of the actual 
landscape, a version that captures its essential qualities. Put this way, this photographic 
imperative could certainly be understood as the type of Verklärung criticized by Brecht and 
Benjamin, a smoothing over of the visible surface to make any subject more aesthetically 
appealing, extracting an “essence” cleansed of its historical and social context to present it as 
something eternal. But another reading of Renger-Patzsch’s landscape advice would see it as the 
kind of negotiation of the relationship between sense perception, formal play, and new media 
characteristic of other avant-garde discourse of the time. Discussing a key ambivalence in 
Renger-Patzsch’s theoretical writings between photography’s documentary and essentialist 
aspirations, Stiegler writes, “Einer Photographie als Dokumentation steht jene als Wesensschau 
184 Renger-Patzsch, “Ketzergedanken,” 46.
185 Albert Renger-Patzsch, “Vergewaltigung der Landschaft verboten,” in Die Freude am Gegenstand, 130.
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gegenüber” (2010, 306). This is an important point, and the two tendencies do exist side by side 
in Renger-Patzsch’s writings without being fully resolved, but one must go further. I would 
suggest that the tension between documentation and essence cannot be fully resolved in Renger-
Patzsch’s work because they are arguably never entirely distinct from one another. Photographic 
Wiedergabe is the documentation of an essence. As the advice on composing a landscape 
suggests, to accurately render the formal and surface qualities of an object is to reproduce “das 
Wesentliche,” and this type of photography, both “Dokumentation” and “Wesensschau,” is also a 
training of visual perception. In other words, to teach the viewer to see the “essential,” so little 
evident in a given photogenic object or scene that the amateur photographer may miss it entirely, 
is tantamount to training a new sort of perception. 
A just recreation of a landscape, a botanical specimen, or a modern machine necessitates 
a new kind of perception that, in foregrounding salient formal features, breaks with the encrusted
habits of an inherited aesthetics that takes its cues from painting. In this regard, Renger-Patzsch’s
photographic program shared key impetuses with that of László Moholy-Nagy, although his 
aesthetic strategy and practice were quite different.186 Like Moholy-Nagy’s 1925 Malerei 
Fotografie Film, Die Welt ist schön was understood by its author as an “ABC-Buch,” a 
photographic primer intended to train a heightened formal awareness, sharpening the eye to grant
it both a renewed perception of natural forms and aesthetic access to modern technology, a point 
emphasized by Heise in his introduction to the volume.187
186 On the relationship between Renger-Patzsch and Moholy-Nagy, see Jennings, who reads Renger-Patzsch as a 
major contributor to the avant-garde project: “Always considered the most ‘traditional’ Weimar photographer, 
Renger-Patzsch instead emerges here as a major modernist; in fact, only Moholy merits comparison.” Jennings, 
“Agriculture, Industry, and the Birth of the Photo-Essay,” 47. Virginia Heckert, in her 1997 essay, “Albert 
Renger-Patzsch as Educator,” also connects Renger-Patzsch to Moholy-Nagy and Blossfeldt in their projects to 
train viewers in a new visual culture (210-212). On the differences and dispute between Moholy-Nagy and 
Renger-Patzsch, whose views of photography were aired side-by-side in the winter, 1927 edition of Das 
Deutsche Lichtbild, see Fineman (2001), 80-87.
187 As Renger-Patzsch would write in 1937, “Ich glaube mit Recht sagen zu können, daß ich damals dieses Buch 
weniger im philosophischen Sinne (wie vielfach aus dem Titel falsch geschlossen worden ist) als vielmehr im 
lehrhaften Sinne aufgefaßt wissen wollte, als ein ABC-Buch, das zeigen sollte, wie man auf rein fotografischem 
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I have, I hope, sufficiently problematized the self-evidence of certain positions and 
presuppositions in Renger-Patzsch’s photographic practice and theory that we may return to 
Benjamin’s and Brecht’s criticisms. Without wishing to reconcile the various complex positions 
with one another without remainder, it nonetheless seems safe to say that Renger-Patzsch’s 
photographic project was not the glibly aestheticizing replication of surface appearance that their 
writings seem to imply, but is rather part of a contemporary discourse on perception, technology, 
and modernity invested in rethinking the possibilities of the photographic medium in opposition 
to what were seen as inherited, traditionalist, and still culturally dominant aesthetic norms. 
“Wiedergabe,” a term as central to Renger-Patzsch’s work as it is odious to Brecht, proves to be a
dense concept that is arguably compatible not only with an avant-garde program of “neues 
Sehen” but also with the very compositional principles of construction and dismantling that were 
key in Brecht and Benjamin’s conception of what photography should be. Given the emphasis in 
Brecht’s work, from epic theater to the Dreigroschenprozeß, on making social realities visible,188 
or Benjamin’s praise of the camera’s ability to discover hitherto hidden worlds,189 it becomes 
somewhat surprising that they would react so vehemently to a photographer who also thought of 
his work as perceptual training.
Even the accusation that Renger-Patzsch’s photography homogenizes everything it 
depicts under the rubric of aestheticization, thus eclipsing the social, historical, and economic 
contexts, becomes less damning when one considers that Benjamin praised another photographer
Wege bildmäßige Lösungen erreichen kann, und daß die Reize der Fotografie im Halbton, in der 
Flächenaufteilung und im Lauf der Linien verankert sind. Bewußt stellen diese Fotos den Reiz der Oberfläche 
zur Schau” (150).
188 For more on the role of visibility in Brecht, especially as it relates to defamiliarization, see Steve Giles, “Making
Visible, Making Strange: Photography and Representation in Kracauer, Brecht and Benjamin,” New 
Formations: A Journal of Culture/Theory/Politics 61 (2007): 65–75.
189 The best known example is almost certainly in the artwork essay, where Benjamin describes the perceptual 
access granted by both the still and the cinematic camera in terms of the “dynamite of the tenth of a second” and
the totally new structures that come to light under magnification. Walter Benjamin, “Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter
seiner mechanischen Reproduzierbarkeit,” in Gesammelte Schriften, Band I, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann 
Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1972), 499-500.
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precisely for the way his visual innovations blended natural and technological forms. In “Neues 
von Blumen,” a 1928 review of Karl Blossfeldt’s book Urformen der Kunst, Benjamin lauds 
Blossfeldt’s detailed photographic studies of botanical forms for expanding the contemporary 
“perceptual inventory” (“Wahrnehmungsinventar”).190 This is striking in light of Benjamin’s 
scornful dismissals of Renger-Patzsch’s work, not least because Renger-Patzsch conceived of his 
own work in similar terms. Benjamin’s review continues, in terms that could be applied nearly 
unaltered to Renger-Patzsch’s work: 
Ob wir das Wachsen einer Pflanze mit dem Zeitraffer beschleunigen oder ihre Gestalt in
vierzigfacher Vergrößerung zeigen – in beiden Fällen zischt an Stellen des Daseins, von
denen  wir  es  am  wenigsten  dachten,  ein  Geysir  neuer  Bilderwelten  auf.  Diese
Photographien  erschließen  im Pflanzendasein  einen  ganzen  unvermuteten  Schatz  von
Analogien und Formen. Nur die Photographie vermag das. (152)
While it might be argued that use of the camera’s ability to magnify is what constitutes 
the difference for Benjamin between Blossfeldt and Renger-Patzsch, since the former’s plant 
photography relied more upon larger-than-life depictions than the latter’s, such stylistic details in 
photographic praxis hardly seem able to account for Benjamin’s dichotomous characterization of 
the two photographers, especially since Renger-Patzsch’s photographic theory and practice, with 
its emphasis on formal analogy and perceptual training, coincided so neatly with precisely those 
aspects – especially the discovery of visual analogies and unexpected forms – that Benjamin 
praised in Blossfeldt’s work. Even the tropes Benjamin uses to describe the new access 
photography gives to the forms of the plant kingdom rhyme with Renger-Patzsch’s own 
depiction. Where Benjamin writes of Blossfeldt’s photographs that “Wir Betrachtenden aber 
wandeln unter diesen Riesenpflanzen wie Liliputaner. Brüderlichen Riesengeistern, sonnenhaften
Augen, wie Goethe und Herder sie hatten, ist es noch vorbehalten, alles Süße aus diesen Kelchen
190  Walter Benjamin, “Neues von Blumen,” in Gesammelte Schriften, Band III, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann 
Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1972), 151. On Benjamin’s use of Blossfeldt to discuss the 
idea of the “optical unconscious,” see Fineman (116).
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zu saugen” (153), Renger-Patzsch encourages those photographing flowers to see with the eyes 
of insects: “Das Reizvolle besteht darin, daß man beim Photographieren gezwungen ist, sich auf 
den mehr oder weniger kleinen Organismus, den eine Blüte darstellt, mit dem Auge einzustellen, 
daß man sozusagen gezwungen ist, mit dem Auge der Insekten zu sehen und ihre Welt einmal zu 
der unseren zu machen” (“Das Photographieren von Blüten,” 17).191 There are important 
differences between these two passages. Benjamin’s claim is in one respect more modest, since a 
fully adequate vision of the world of plant forms and their analogies is reserved for 
“Riesengeister,” where Renger-Patzsch implies that anyone can learn to see with the eyes of 
insects and be at home in their world. Yet what matters most in this context is that photography in
both quotes inhabits a drastic change of scale from everyday perception, defamiliarizing the 
visible world. This commonality demonstrates larger perceptual and experiential claims made in 
the name of photography that are compelling even though, for example, Blossfeldt’s work relied 
on extreme magnification while Renger-Patzsch’s photographs can seem almost 
claustrophobically confined to an everyday angle of focus.192
Furthermore, the discovery of artificial forms in natural phenomena that Benjamin sees in
Blossfeldt’s images could be seen as the very program of Die Welt ist schön. The most obvious 
counterpart to Benjamin’s description of this tendency193 is perhaps the stylized depiction of an 
191 Albert Renger-Patzsch, “Das Photographieren von Blüten,” in Die Freude am Gegenstand, 17. Note that the 
German word “Kelch” used by Benjamin means both “chalice” and “calyx,” a poetic ambiguity that suggests 
that the “sonnenhafte Augen” of Goethe and Herder may well have been compound.
192 Fineman summarizes the difference between the two photographers’ approaches in the following way: “Simply 
put, the essential difference between the two photographers is this: Whereas for Blossfeldt photographs of plant 
forms were means to an end, for Renger-Patzsch the photograph was an end in itself.” (105)
193 “In dem Bischofstab, den ein Straußfarn darstellt, im Rittersporn und der Blüte des Steinbrech, die auch an 
Kathedralen als Fensterrose ihrem Namen Ehre macht, indem sie die Mauern durchstößt, spürt man ein 
gotisches parti-pris. Daneben freilich tauchen in Schachtelhalmen älteste Säulenformen, im zehnfach 
vergrößerten Kastanien- und Ahornsproß Totembäume auf, und der Sproß eines Eisenhufes [sic] entfaltet sich 
wie der Körper einer begnadeten Tänzerin” (152-3). Fineman unfolds the contemporary reception of Blossfeldt 
in terms of the relationship between function and form: “What Blossfeldt’s magnifying lenses revealed to critics 
in the late 1920s was evidence of the primordial basis of functional form – a concept that provided a foundation 
for the utopian reconciliation of organic nature with the ‘second nature’ of modern technology.” (89)
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agave plant and a telegraph mast above the monogram on the cover of Die Welt ist schön. 
Representative of the book’s aesthetic program of cataloging visual forms from various realms 
usually considered distinct, the juxtaposition of agave and telegraph mast is, as Bernd Stiegler 
points out, by a surprising coincidence replicated in Benjamin’s short narrative from 1930, 
“Myslowitz – Braunschweig – Marseilles. Die Geschichte eines Haschischrausches.” Based on a 
September, 1928 hashish protocol, the text describes a “Nahkampf von Telegrafenstangen gegen 
Agaven, Stacheldraht gegen stachlige Palmen” to characterize the “große Entscheidungsschlacht 
zwischen Stadt und Land.”194 
Both resemblance and antagonism, substitution and equivalence, the relationship between
the agave and the telegraph masts signals a particular discursive configuration of Weimar culture,
a discourse in which nature, technology, perception, and modernity were semantically and 
conceptually reconstituting and being reconstituted by each other. In its emphasis on formal play 
and perceptual training, Die Welt ist schön was no less radical a contribution to this discourse 
than Benjamin’s and Brecht’s critiques of it. So what accounts for the vehemence of their 
dismissals?
I suggested earlier that Renger-Patzsch served as a foil for Benjamin and Brecht, allowing
them to work out their own photographic theories, although perhaps “strawman” would be the 
apter term. Die Welt ist schön could then stand in for the perceived tendency of contemporary 
photography to conflate unaltered surface appearance with deep structural insight, offering up 
whatever it photographs in a homogeneous and blandly affirmative aestheticization. It should be 
noted that Benjamin and Brecht were not simply measuring contemporary photographic praxis 
against the abstract and absolute mandate that it yield immediate insights, and necessarily finding
194 In Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften Band IV, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1972), 730. For a closer reading of this convergence of imagery, see Stiegler, 
“Albert Renger-Patzsch und Walter Benjamin,” 71-82.
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that it fell short, but were rather responding to what they perceived as the tendency to attribute to 
the camera a more immediate access to reality than other media were capable of. In this light, 
Benjamin and Brecht were each attempting to theorize how photography might regain some of its
inherent potential for disruption, against what they saw as the shortcomings of contemporary 
photographic praxis and theory.195 Their strong critiques of Renger-Patzsch and the photography 
of Neue Sachlichkeit more generally demonstrate a discursive constellation within Weimar 
discourse consisting of a renewed urgency of the visual, a heightened sense of the political, 
social, and technological stakes of late capitalism (including the rising threat of fascism), and a 
rethinking of technology, both as an aesthetic object and as the technological means of aesthetic 
production that Brecht called the Apparat.
Just before Brecht’s criticism in the Dreigroschenprozeß of photographs of factories, he 
states that it is more important for a filmmaker to understand his technological apparatus than to 
aspire to produce “art.”
Nur so kann der jeweilige Regisseur seine “Kunst” unter dem nachhelfenden Druck der
Verkaufsabteilung gegen die neuen Apparate durchsetzen: was er durchsetzt, ist das, was
er von dem, was er als Dutzendzuschauer unter Kunst versteht, selber machen kann. Was
Kunst soll, wird er nicht wissen. […] Auf dem Gebiet der kunst betätigt er den Verstand
einer Auster, auf dem Gebiet der Technik keinen besseren. Von den Apparaten vermag er
nichts zu begreifen: er vergewaltigt sie mit seiner “Kunst.”196 […] Also ob man von Kunst
etwas verstehen könnte, ohne von der Wirklichkeit etwas zu verstehen! Und hier fungiert
195 On Brecht’s, Benjamin’s, and Kracauer’s reactions to the contemporary discourse of photographic 
verisimilitude, see McBride: “As it has by now become clear, neither Kracauer’s nor Brecht’s indictment of the 
use of photographs in the press is driven by a traditional distrust of mimesis, that is, by the age-old wariness 
toward reproducing the world of appearances, which is repudiated for being a deceptive veil cast on the true 
essence of things. Rather, they are animated by awareness that photography’s potential does not lie in its ability 
to reproduce appearances in an exact way.” Patrizia McBride, “Narrative Resemblance: The Production of Truth 
in the Modernist Photobook of Weimar Germany,” New German Critique 115 (2012): 174.
196 “Vergewaltigung” has now come up twice, once here and once in the title of Renger-Patzsch’s essay, 
“Vergewaltigung der Landschaft verboten.” Add to these the example Brecht uses of the fatuously avant-garde 
female nude, and it seems fair to speak of a motif of gender hierarchies and violence. While I am still not 
entirely sure what significance this has for the claims of this chapter, at the very least one can say that the 
recurrence of “Vergewaltigung” suggests that gender provided a way of casting infidelity to the material 
(Renger-Patzsch) or the medium (Brecht) as a kind of sexualized violence. It would also be worth noting that for
both Brecht and Renger-Patzsch, “Vergewaltigung” represents a transgression, but an apparently inept, hapless 
one that comes about through an ovebearing lack of talent and knowledge.
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als Wirklichkeit gleichzeitig mit dem Stoff der Apparat. (21.468)
For Brecht, then, reality cannot be understood without an understanding of technology, and 
crucially, this includes the possibilities of the camera. Far from being exhausted by a 
reproduction of visual appearance, the camera for Brecht is an instrument of dismantling and 
construction. Further on in the Dreigroschenprozeß, he writes of the technological progress 
demonstrated by specific improvements to cameras and film, including increased sensitivity to 
light and other innovations facilitate in photographing faces:
aber die Bildnisse, die man damit herstellen kann, sind zweifellos viel schlechter. Bei den 
alten lichtschwachen Apparaten kamen mehrere Ausdrücke auf die ziemlich lange 
belichtete Platte; so hatte man auf dem endlichen Bild einen universaleren und 
lebendigeren Ausdruck, auch etwas von Funtion dabei. […] [Die neuen Apparate] fassen 
die Gesichter nicht mehr zusammen – aber müssen sie zusammengefaßt werden? 
Vielleicht gibt es eine Art zu fotografieren, den neueren Apparaten möglich, die Gesichter
zerlegt? (21.480-1)
The suggestion of a photography that dismantles and analyzes rather than composes is also 
contained in a short fragment called “Fotografie,” probably from 1928, in which Brecht proposes
a series of “essential portraits” created by the juxtaposition of multiple images: “Ein Kopf, 
aufgenommen an verschiedenen Tagen, in verschiedenen Jahren. Herauszuarbeiten die 
Verschiedenheiten. Studium der Angleichungen von Physiognomien. Gewisse Anzahl von 
Gesichtern von Männern und Frauen. Wer ist mit wem verheiratet? (Man sucht lange Verheiratete
heraus)” (21.265). The fragment continues by proposing “functional portraits” of hands – the 
hands of manual and intellectual laborers each holding the tools of their own trade, and then the 
tools of each other’s trade.
The analytic, dismantling approach to portraiture is reminiscent of Brecht’s sustained 
critique of bourgeois individuality, whether in the Dreigroschenroman or Mann ist Mann. 
Echoing the thematic focus in these texts on disassembling and demontage is a program of 
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artistic representation predicated not on reflection but on construction and analysis. “Die 
Verdinglichung der menschlichen Beziehungen, also etwa die Fabrik, gibt die letzteren nicht 
mehr heraus. Es ist also tatsächlich „etwas aufzubauen,“ etwas „Künstliches,“ „Gestelltes“. Es ist
ebenso tatsächlich Kunst nötig” (21.469). The artifice of a series of juxtaposed portraits 
assembled in an experimental vein might thus be able to access levels of social reality that a 
simple “Wiedergabe” cannot; the implication is that, for Brecht, portraits of hands may well be 
able to tell us things about capitalist labor where the picture of the factory remains mute. 
Benjamin likewise emphasizes the constructionist aspect in photography: “Weil aber das wahre 
Gesicht dieses photographischen Schöpferturns die Reklame oder die Assoziation ist, darum ist 
ihr rechtmäßiger Gegenpart die Entlarvung oder die Konstruktion” (“Kleine Geschichte der 
Photographie,” II 383).
Yet the sudden introduction of “Entlarvung,” unmasking, complicates things. What is the 
relationship between unmasking and revealing on the one hand, and construction, artifice, 
analysis, and dismantling on the other? “Unmasking or construction” – does the “or” mark an 
apposition or a choice between alternatives? Where Brecht’s suggestions for a serial, analytic 
portraiture imply the centrality of a functional relation, “Entlarvung” suggests at first glance a 
more immediate and visual access to reality. And if photographic practice is faulted for producing
a fetishization of surfaces, what might it mean, concretely, to unmask it, taking the surface off of 
a surface? While the possibilities of the technological Apparat seen by Brecht and Benjamin in 
Konstruktion and Zerlegung may well be compatible with Renger-Patzsch’s formal play and 
perceptual training, Entlarvung is an aspect that cannot so easily be meshed with his work, his 
emphasis on das Wesentliche notwithstanding. If it is still broadly true that, for Renger-Patzsch 
the visible surface grants access to reality while for Benjamin and Brecht the surface obscures 
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reality, nevertheless the terms have shifted somewhat. The reality accessed by the visible in 
Renger-Patzsch’s work is not an underlying, deep reality but rather an interplay of visual forms 
able to recreate a sensual, perceptual experience; by contrast, Benjamin and Brecht are now the 
ones who imply that photography, beyond its contemporary, flawed practice, might yield insights
into a deeper functional or structural reality.
Furthermore, what might intuitively seem like contradictory tendencies within each 
theorist’s work are perhaps better described as foundational tensions. On the one hand, Renger-
Patzsch’s “Wiedergabe” is not a strictly documentary impulse that contrasts with the more avant-
garde emphasis on perceptual training but is rather, with its focus on compositional selection and 
formal interplay, the very vehicle for this training. And in the case of Benjamin and Brecht, 
Konstruktion, Zerlegung, and Entlarvung are, of course, not in a contradictory relationship either.
Brecht’s fragment on serial portraiture suggests that dismantling and construction are in fact 
methods for photography to be able to reveal something about reality; the camera for Brecht 
should be an irritant, and the thrust of his photographic theory was to rethink how the Apparat 
could break through the glossy veneer spread by a profusion of images and a facilely mimetic 
photographic practice.197 For Benjamin, Entlarvung is not simply unmasking, but is related to a 
practice of satire and quotation that confronts ideology with its own premises by means of 
strategic juxtaposition.
Yet while these different photographic possibilities support one another, they still cannot 
be fully reconciled. Benjamin’s praise of the way that Blossfeldt’s category of plant forms adds 
to our Wahrnehmungsinventar cannot comfortably be squared with his accusations of Renger-
Patzsch’s Verklärung, nor is it apparent that Brecht’s proposed essential and functional portraits 
197 As Stefan Soldovieri argues, “all of Brecht’s reflections on photography involve drawing attention to the 
concealed ‘irritation’ of the camera in an effort to destroy the image’s apparent innocuousness.” Stefan 
Soldovieri, “War-Poetry, Photo(epi)grammetry,” in A Bertolt Brecht Reference Companion. Ed. Siegfried Mews 
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997) 146.
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would actually offer the insight he suggests, given his claim that “wer von der Realität nur das 
von ihr Erlebbare gibt, gibt sie selbst nicht wieder” (21.469). What may ultimately be at issue 
here is the same tension between the formal and documentary aspects of the photographic image 
that makes Renger-Patzsch’s “einfache Wiedergabe der Realität” not simply a reproduction of 
reality. At the same time that Benjamin and Brecht rely upon photography’s ability to depict 
visual forms, they also implicitly demand that it be able to make discursive statements about 
reality. Significantly, Benjamin and Brecht both suggest Beschriftung, or captioning, as a way out
of the impasse of photographic signification, and it is the strategy Brecht will ultimately use in 
his wartime Kriegsfibel, his most sustained contribution as a photographic practitioner.198 The 
written word is to offer both the clarity and the interruption not, or no longer, accessible to the 
photographic image alone. Yet inversely, the two theorists draw upon the visual to describe 
projects in other media. As Steve Giles has pointed out, Brecht uses “abziehen,” a verb used to 
describe the process of printing an image from a photographic negative, to characterize his 
method in the Dreigroschenprozeß of bringing bourgeois ideology to light.199 And in the same 
passage he denies revelatory force to a photograph of the factory, Brecht uses “fixieren,” which 
in German as in English can refer to the process of chemically fixing an image on a 
photosensitive medium, to describe how the new apparatuses (i.e. the camera) could have learned
something from the natural sciences about depicting human behavior: “das gegenseitige 
Verhalten der Menschen zu fixieren” (21.469). So at the same time that the visual image is 
deemed inadequate to convey discursive meaning, the revelatory or demonstrative function of a 
text has to draw upon a register of the visual: put bluntly, the text is to show, make visible, and 
198 On the ambiguity of Beschriftung as a political-aesthetic practice, see Matthias Uecker (2007): 477. On the 
relationship between the images and captions in Kriegsfibel, see J.J. Long, “Paratextual Profusion: Photography 
and Text in Bertolt Brecht’s War Primer,” Poetics Today 29.1 (2008): 197-224.
199 “This is the first of a series of metaphors emphasizing the need for Brecht’s sociological experiment to make 
social realities visible, ‘um das zu sehende jedermann sichtbar zu machen’” Steve Giles, Bertolt Brecht and 
critical theory : Marxism, modernity, and the Threepenny lawsuit, (Bern; New York: P. Lang, 1997) 74.
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fix, while the actual image alone seems able to do none of these.
This ambivalence towards the signifying capability of the visual can be situated within 
the larger context of the contemporary resurgence of physiognomic discourse. Where the 
camera’s mechanical exactitude generated a host of claims about its access to indexical truth, 
physiognomy linked visual appearance to an underlying reality. As argued by Sabine Hake and 
Matthias Uecker, the Weimar-era photobook often relied upon a physiognomic discourse 
whereby their photographic subjects were supposed to speak clearly about themselves through 
the image alone, and yet this project repeatedly ran into the dilemma that the intended 
unambiguous pronouncement – about an individual, a type, a social group, a historical or 
political narrative – found itself tripped up by the ambiguous muteness of the image, the slippery 
relationship between type and mass, or the instability of the very social consensus that originally 
guaranteed the physiognomic legibility of images.200 The visual surface of things that for 
physiognomy reveals their inner contours remained, frustratingly at times, just a surface. While 
Brecht and Benjamin responded to this context by rethinking the surface, challenging its putative
naturalness by pointing out and recreating its essential constructedness, Renger-Patzsch engaged 
in the process of exploring the imagistic surface by means of formal analogy, in order to 
challenge aesthetic and perceptual norms.
Renger-Patzsch’s photographic practice and particularly the emphasis in Die Welt ist 
schön on a formal movement across images from disparate realms both demonstrates the type of 
perceptual training I have outlined above and undermines the presumption of a static identity 
between image and reality implicit in Benjamin’s and Brecht’s critiques of him.201 In various 
200 Sabine Hake, “Faces of Weimar Germany,” in The Image in Dispute: Art and Cinema in the Age of 
Photography, ed. Dudley Andrew (Austin: University of Texas, 1997), 117–147.
201 Matthew Simms has argued quite compellingly that Benjamin’s objection to Renger-Patzsch can be located in a 
suspicion of an ontology of the copula linked to Heidegger. I agree with the basic contours of the critique he 
reconstructs with Renger-Patzsch, Benjamin, Adorno, Heidegger, and Bataille as key figures, but do not quite 
accept his conclusion: “that in Die Welt ist schön photography and ontology coincide. The question ‘What is 
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sequences of Die Welt ist schön, formal elements encourage the viewer to look for forms as such,
thereby disrupting the containment within the frame of a single image that would seem to be 
necessary for the facile aesthetic “reproduction of reality” variously alleged by Benjamin and 
Brecht. While one can certainly argue that it is precisely this connection across images that 
enables the uncritical leveling of the visible world in the service of a repressive harmony, 
Renger-Patzsch’s theoretical writings suggest to the contrary (and at times despite themselves) 
that these image sequences undermine rather than reinforce the apparent self-evidence of the 
world of things. 
A low-angle photograph of the nave of the St. Katharinenkirche in Lübeck, for example, 
echoes the vaulted arches, serial repetition, and inverted triangle of an array of industrial irons, 
while the light reflecting off a carefully arranged group at the forefront of the latter suggests the 
chiaroscuro of ecclesiastical space (figures 3-4). On the whole the irons are cleaner, lighter, and 
more neatly arranged, but the photograph of the church is exposed in a way that both recalls the 
serial forms of the irons and resembles the bright open spaces of modern design. This formal 
rhyming, which links the timelessness of a sacred space and the modular, regimented production 
time of industrial modernity, continues in the next two images, with a prominent diagonal 
originating in the lower right of the frame and a reconfiguration of similar oblique curves 
connecting palace steps to the sparse design of a modern ceiling. A similar movement from 
sacred to profane by means of a shared form can be seen in images 62 to 64, for example, where 
a gentle baroque curve is stretched and minimalized in the modernist contour of the Fagus 
factory in Alfeld (figures 5-7). To take another example, the struts and supports of an empty 
ferris wheel recall the lines and lattices of a preceding series of images of industrial equipment, a 
photography?’, therefore, receives from Renger-Patzsch the tautological answer that photography is precisely 
the ‘is’; or put less gnomically, photography is identified here with the power to recover certainty and solid 
ground in a world disturbingly off balance” Matthew Simms, “Just Photography: Albert Renger-Patzsch’s Die 
Welt ist schön,” History of Photography 21.3 (1997): 197–204.
172
Figure 3. Plate 93 from Die Welt ist schön Figure 4. Plate 94 from Die Welt ist schön
Figure 5. Plate 62 from Die Welt ist schön
Figure 6. Plate 63 from Die Welt ist schön
Figure 7. Plate 64 from Die Welt ist schön
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Figure 8. Plate 79 from Die Welt ist schön Figure 9. Plate 80 from Die Welt ist schön
Figure 10. Plate 81 from Die Welt ist schön Figure 11. Plate 82 from Die Welt ist schön
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point reinforced by the alienating framing and abandoned impression of the ferris wheel (figures 
8-11). An immediate association provoked by the visual similarity of these machines at rest is the
fundamental indistinction between machines that move material for production and those that 
move people for amusement. This association carries over to the following image of a merry-go-
round, where the close cropping, the prevalence of dark tones, and the stony folds of a lowering 
curtain add up to an eerie stasis rather than pleasant motion – the frozen rictus of the horses 
suggests the terror of impalement far more than the joy of galloping.
Since this chapter began with Brecht’s hypothetical image of a factory whose visible 
surface remained mute, perhaps it is fitting to end this section with two actual photographs of the 
sea, the guiding image for tropes of visible surface and hidden depths. The first one depicts a 
scene of rocky surf in the Kattegat, where several ships full of troops sank during the German 
invasion of Norway. It is the seventh image from Brecht’s Kriegsfibel (figure 12). While there are
no people visible in the image, Brecht’s quatrain lends voice to a collective speaker beneath the 
waves: “Achttausend liegen wir im Kattegat / Viehdampfer haben uns hinabgenommen / Fischer, 
wenn dein Netz hier viele Fische gefangen / Gedenke unser und laß einen entkommen.” The 
visible landscape is thus shown to be a screen that obscures the real significance of the scene: 
nature literally covers over history. The other image shows surf on a beach in the neighboring 
North Sea, and it is plate 40 from Die Welt ist schön (figure 13). There are no words, of course, 
but the following several images repeat visual elements from the photograph to transform the 
surface from a natural to a technological one. Plate 41 keeps the pattern of the surf but introduces
a diagonal row of wooden pilings; this configuration becomes a rickety wooden walkway over 
water in the next image, and plate 43 takes up the vertical iteration of the walkway’s planks and 
transforms it into a forest of young beech trees (figures 14-16). The multiple vertical elements 
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Figure 12. Plate 7 from Kriegsfi bel
176
Figure 13. Plate 40 from Die Welt ist schön
Figure 14. Plate 41 from Die 
Welt ist schön
Figure 19. Plate 46 from Die Welt ist schönFigure 17. Plate 44 from Die Welt 
ist schön
Figure 18. Plate 45 from Die Welt 
ist schön
Figure 15. Plate 42 from Die 
Welt ist schön
Figure 16. Plate 43 from Die Welt 
ist schön
Figure 20. Plate 47 from Die Welt ist schön Figure 21. Plate 48 from Die Welt ist schön
Figure 22. Plate 49 from Die Welt ist schön Figure 23. Plate 50 from Die Welt ist schön
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are preserved in tree shots through 45, whose starkly contrasting pattern of wood and snow 
becomes a “Fir, bent by a snowstorm;” its stark diagonal on a light background is echoed in the 
banks of the Trave in 47, becomes a pair of rails in 48, a quay wall in 49, and the next image, 
reversing the diagonal and preserving only the repetition of forms from the brick wall, depicts 
rows of identical shoe lasts (figures 17-23), signaling the thematic transition to a series of 
architectural and industrial images. Thus in a sense, both Brecht’s and Renger-Patzsch’s 
seascapes are able to serve as images of technological modernity; neither photograph lingers in 
its littoral isolation, but the way that they connect the image of nature to contemporary historical 
processes via their contrasting treatments of the visible surface says much about how they relate 
technology, nature, and the visual. Brecht’s ironic disruption of the surface plunges the poetic 
speaker beneath the waves to show that nature, and by extension any technological or historical 
constellation that may come to seem natural, is a constructed surface that must be teased apart by
the strategies available to the apparatus. For Renger-Patzsch, nature and technology are so linked
as elemental forms that they lack any categorical distinction at all; this is a paradoxical and likely
conservative logic that obscures the particular social and historical constructedness of each 
sphere, and yet it is precisely on the formal surface that Renger-Patzsch locates photography’s 
ability to forge a perception adequate to its historical moment.
While Renger-Patzsch was consigned by Benjamin and Brecht to the dustbin of a naïve 
and retrograde aesthetic realism, a closer look at his photographic theory and practice shows on 
the contrary just how complex, vexed, and interesting that most simplistic of photography’s 
aspirations and possibilities – namely, the exact mechanical reproduction of the visible surface of
things – can be. If photography served Renger-Patzsch, Benjamin, and Brecht in various ways to 
raise the question of a modern aesthetics and an artistic practice adequate to social and 
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technological modernity, we in turn must ask after the relationship between the modern 
perceptual apparatus that saw and depicted, on the one hand, and the modernity that was to be 
seen and depicted, on the other. The idea of technology served, in various ways and to varying 
degrees of conceptual precision, as a focal point and catalyst for these self-consciously modern 
aesthetic and media-theoretical discussions of technologically-enhanced vision. In this sense, the 
ambivalence of the demands made of the photographic image to document reality, train 
perception, and explore formal variations reflects deeper ambiguities embedded within the very 
ideas of technology and modernity. Weimar-era discourse on photography as the quintessentially 
modern medium shows the way that ideas about modernity and technology constitute a particular
discursive configuration of Weimar culture, a discourse in which nature, technology, perception, 
and modernity were semantically and conceptually reconstituting and being reconstituted by each
other, with no term functioning as a stable or independent variable. The modernity of 
photography is both the context it is tasked with documenting and the perceptual habits and 
formal discoveries it instantiates. Both preexisting the medium as its context and produced by it 
as its aesthetic legacy, “modernity” is on both sides of the camera and the photographic frame, 
and on neither side. 
“Es ist die Aufgabe der Photographie, das bisher noch ungesichtete Naturfundament 
aufzuweisen.” Kracauer, photography, and second nature
Siegfried Kracauer also locates photography’s importance in the way it generates a 
historically specific mode of perception and experience, but his approach is radically different to 
that of the other theorists. A brief look at his seminal essay, “Die Photographie,” is useful for the 
way that Kracauer inverts the physiognomic discourse and complicates the relationship between 
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image and nature. Where a physiognomic view of photographic representation might hold that 
the surface appearance reveals the truth of the photographed object, Kracauer suggests that 
photography’s meaning is to be found in the fact that photography is nothing but surface. In other
words, photography’s meaning is that it has no meaning, and the significance of the medium for 
Kracauer lies in the way that it makes this meaninglessness visible, leading to a recognition of 
historical contingency that might clear the way for a reconstitution of the social order.
The basic contours of Kracauer’s essay are well known: he begins by contrasting a 
photograph of a well-known film diva to a photograph of a grandmother as a young woman. 
While each photograph reproduces its sitter — in both cases a woman of twenty-four years — in 
full photographic detail, they signify in radically divergent ways by virtue of their different 
situations within contexts of media, experience, and meaning. The photographed diva is 
immediately recognizable as such, because the viewer can immediately identify the photograph 
with the image of the film star seen on the big screen — the “original,” in Kracauer’s 
formulation.202 The grandmother, on the other hand, is unrecognizable as such. This is due not 
just to the chronological fact that the viewer of the photograph has never seen his or her own 
grandmother as a young woman, but rather to the differing epistemological relationships between
image and knowledge in the cases of the film star and the grandmother. Where the former is 
always known and recognizable as image, the significance of the grandmother stems from the 
web of stories, experiences, and meaningful associations in which she is embedded.203 Absent 
these, the photograph of the grandmother appears as what it in fact is — a seamless assemblage 
202 "Jeder erkennt sie entzückt, denn jeder hat das Original schon auf der Leinwand gesehen" (21).
203 "Da Photographien ähnlich sind, muß auch diese ähnlich gewesen sein. Sie ist in dem Atelier eines 
Hofphotographen mit Bedacht angefertigt worden. Aber fehlte die mündliche Tradition, aus dem Bild ließe sich 
die Großmutter nicht rekonstruieren. [...] Daß die Photographie jene gleiche Großmuter darstelle, von der man 
das Wenige behalten hat, das vielleicht auch vergessen wird, muß den Eltern geglaubt werden, die es von der 
Mutter selbst erfahren zu haben behaupten." (21-22)
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of unfamiliar fashions that return the viewer’s gaze with the muteness of the outmoded.204
The process of constructing meaning — a process which Kracauer describes as the the 
liberation from nature and necessity — is central to his essay and its pivotal turn, which need to 
be worked through in order to foreground exactly how Kracauer reorients the media-historic 
significance of the photographic surface. But first we need to return to a moment at the beginning
of his essay, because in a quick, seemingly unimportant aside Kracauer shows the way that the 
surface is itself a dense phenomenon in a way that foreshadows the liberatory potential he will 
grant photography at the end of his essay.
So sieht die Filmdiva aus. Sie ist 24 Jahre alt, sie steht auf der Titelseite einer illustrierten 
Zeitung vor dem Excelsior-Hotel am Lido. Wir schreiben September. Wer durch die Lupe 
blickte, erkennte den Raster, die Millionen von Pünktchen, aus denen die Diva, die 
Wellen und das Hotel bestehen. Aber mit dem Bild ist nicht das Punktnetz gemeint, 
sondern die lebendige Diva am Lido. (21)
By shifting the reader’s attention to the mass of halftone dots that composes the image 
and then quickly away from this to the “living diva,” Kracauer adroitly introduces two key 
notions of the photographic surface that will be central to his argument. At first this bit of 
misdirection seems like a simple correction — when we speak of this picture, we are not talking 
about the concrete composition of the medium, but rather the living diva herself, a pure image, as
it were. In other words, Kracauer seems to be encouraging the reader to see beyond the 
contingent material factors of the photographic depiction – the mass of dots – in order to really 
see the details that matter: her face, her hair, the scene. Yet the fact that he brings up the 
overlooked Raster at all, when most readers of such a brief ekphrasis would not even think of it 
in the first place, should alert us to something rather more complex. By invoking the halftone 
dots that form the image on the printed page, a formal characteristic of the medium that has to do
precisely with the relationship between marks on a page and the spaces between them, Kracauer 
204 (22-23)
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is signaling a key motif in his essay — namely, the way that the photographic surface must be 
perceived as gapless (“lückenlos”) and, by extension, the idea that the photographic surface more
often conceals than reveals. Conversely, the media context that informs the setting for his essay –
the mass of photographs in the illustrated magazines of the day, a “flood” of images (34) without 
relation or gap – is subtly probed at the same time. When Kracauer writes that to speak of the 
image of the diva is not to speak of the mass of points but rather of the “living diva,” only to 
equate the “original” with her cinematic image a few sentences later, he is establishing, I suggest,
a second and broader understanding of the photographic surface – namely, the surface not of the 
individual image but of the broad media context of all photographic images. In this sense, and in 
the context of his essay as a whole, his redirection of our attention needs to be read not as a 
dismissal of the Raster but rather a subversive equation of the fragmentary mass of dots with the 
apparent solidity of the visual surface of the media context in which the diva appears as both 
living and meaningful. The language of his argument depends on a complex interplay of the 
surface as showing and obscuring, fragmentary and (apparently) homogeneous and gapless.205 By
foregrounding the mass of points that make up the printed image, Kracauer introduces an image 
of visual configuration as both arbitrary and contingent (for the dots themselves bear no 
significant relationship to the diva) and, by that same token, capable of being reconfigured. And 
this is the fundamental thrust of his whole essay: what photography ultimately shows is the 
extent to which visual representation has become divorced from meaning, not in order to bemoan
the loss of meaning but rather to clear the ground for the recognition that meaning and the social 
order are capable of being reconstructed according to human needs rather than the coercive 
strictures of history and economy.
205 Photography is a spatial continuum in contrast to the Lückenhaftigkeit of the memory image (24-25), and the 
arrangement of pictures in illustrated magazines extends this gapless spatial continuum to a broader context: 
“Ihr Nebeneinander schließt systematisch den Zusammenhang aus, der dem Bewußtsein sich eröffnet” (34).
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But before bringing the reader to this conclusion, Kracauer must first develop the 
historical relationship between image, surface, and meaning. He does this in part through a 
complex interplay of images invoking clarity and obscurity, transparency and opacity, in a way 
that links his discussion of signification as such to his discussion of the visual image. Far from 
being a window onto the visible world, the photograph is a surface that obscures meaningful 
perception of that world. Kracauer arrives at this claim by contrasting photographs to memory 
images (Gedächtnisbilder). The memory image of a person, for example, becomes significant by 
shedding all extraneous details that do not bear on the meaningful associations that sustain this 
memory. In contrast to the gapless spatial continuum of the photographic image – which 
Kracauer likens to a facile historicism concerned with amassing a seamless sequence of detail 
and event – the memory image works by building a web of meaningful associations that in the 
end resemble a monogram, a shape that identifies without resembling, condensing an individual’s
signature to its fundamental contours (25-26). The photograph, on the other hand, preserves all 
the meaningless dross (“Bodensatz”) that falls away from the memory image’s accretion of 
significance. In this sense the memory image has a clarity that stems not just from its superior 
ability to recognize and identify the remembered individual, but also from the concrete 
metaphors Kracauer uses to describe these processes. The memory image has a clarity that the 
photograph lacks because the former has cleared the ground in the act of creating the image. By 
contrast the photographic image covers the individual: photography is a Schneedecke (26) and a 
Schneegestöber (34). Photography, compared to the memory image, can only ever be a surface 
phenomenon (Oberflächenzusammenhang) that obscures the meaning of an object rather than 
revealing it. The artwork, by contrast, has a clarity that the photograph lacks because it does not 
present the appearance of the object in an attempt at verisimilitude, but rather conveys the 
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“transparent,” fundamental aspects of a thing.206 In other words, it is precisely the aspect of 
photography often touted as comprising its superior representative capacity — its ability to 
reproduce a visual scene completely and in full detail — that Kracauer identifies as the problem. 
Photographic verisimilitude, rather than making photography a superior window, turns it into a 
wall without break or gap.207 Compared to the transparency of the artwork, photographic 
resemblance obstructs recognition of the object208.
The metaphors of opacity used to describe the photographic image also and somewhat 
surprisingly apply to the natural world of drives that must be cleared and reorganized to make 
room for meaning in the first place, a process that Kracauer briefly glosses as a history of the 
relationship among consciousness, the sign, and nature.209 In this context the Schneegestöber of 
photography has its parallel in the frosted glass (Milchglas) of the memory images before 
recognition and selection clear away nature’s compulsion: 
Die Bedeutung der Gedächtnisbilder ist an ihren Wahrheitsgehalt geknüpft. Solange sie in
das unkontrollierte Triebleben eingebunden sind, wohnt ihnen eine dämonische 
Zweideutigkeit inne; sie sind matt wie Milchglas, durch das kaum ein Lichtschimmer 
dringt. Ihre Transparenz erhöht sich in dem Maße, als Erkenntnisse die Vegetation der 
Seele lichten und den Naturzwang begrenzen. Wahrheit finden kann nur das freigesetzte 
Bewußtsein, das die Dämonie der Triebe ermißt. (25, emphasis added)
Kracauer’s brief narrative of consciousness’ necessary detachment from nature and the 
rise of the signifying order represents a dialectic of enlightenment, of sorts. In the beginning, 
lacking any dissociation between consciousness and the immediacy of drives and physical 
206 “[Die Photographie] bezieht sich auf das Aussehen des Gegenstands, das nicht ohne weiteres verrät, wie er der 
Erkenntnis sich zeigt: allein das Transparent des Gegenstandes aber wird von dem Kunstwerk vermittelt. Es 
gleicht darin einem Zauberspiegel, der den ihn befragenden Menschen nicht so zurückwirft, wie er erscheint, 
sondern wie er zu sein wünscht oder von Grund auf ist.” (27)
207 "Das aus der Anschauung unserer gefeierten Diva geschöpfte Gedächtnisbild aber bricht durch die Wand der 
Ähnlichkeit in die Photographie herein und verleiht ihr so einige Transparenz" (29-30). (Break this down a little 
bit.)
208 "Denn in dem Kunstwerk wird die Bedeutung des Gegenstandes zur Raumerscheinung, während in der 
Photographie die Raumerscheinung eines Gegenstandes seine Bedeutung ist." (27)
209 (35-37)
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phenomena, meaning is not possible at all. The first step in escaping the grasp of the purely 
physical is the symbol. Yet the symbol itself is still too beholden to its material, natural substrate.
Over the course of consciousness’ coming to itself, the significant image becomes more abstract 
and less material, and eventually results in the concept.210 As Kracauer notes, this schematization 
of the development of the sign is a rough and provisional one, yet: “Genug, wenn er den Wandel 
der Darstellungen veranschaulicht, der das Zeichen für den Auszug des Bewußtseins aus seiner 
Naturbefangenheit ist” (36). Two things should be noted concerning Kracauer’s account of the 
trajectory of signification. First, it is represented as a process of clearing nature in order to make 
room for meaning. Second, in separating the bearer of meaning from nature, this process makes 
consciousness aware of its own natural origins: “Je entschiedener sich das Bewußtsein im Verlauf
des Geschichtsprozesses von ihr befreit, desto reiner bietet sich ihm sein Naturfundament dar” 
(36).211
In this sense, then, the metaphors of troubled vision that link photography and the 
“Naturbefangenheit” — “Milchglas” and “Schneedecke” — suggest that photography functions 
as a second nature for Kracauer, one that needs to be cleared away (again) in order for meaning 
to occur at all. This idea is underscored when he writes that photography’s spatial continuum is a 
fitting means of representation for a social order ruled by “ökonomischen Naturgesetzen” (38). 
Yet the significance of photography ultimately lies in its fundamental ambivalence. Unlike the 
first nature of drives and compulsion cleared to make room for meaning in the first place, 
210 “In dem Maße, als das Bewußtsein seiner selbst inne wird und damit die anfängliche ‘Identität von Natur und 
Mensch’ (Marx: ‘Deutsche Ideologie’) hinschwindet, nimmt das Bild mehr und mehr eine abgezogene, 
immaterielle Bedeutung an” (35-36).
211 Miriam Hansen characterizes the concept of nature in this essay in this way: “I would stress that in this phase of 
Kracauer’s work his concept of nature, including the bodily and instinctual nature of human beings, has a 
ferociously pejorative valence, lacking the philosophical solidarity with nature as an object of domination and 
reification one finds, for instance, in Benjamin and Adorno and, with a different slant, in Kracauer’s own Theory
of Film. As in the essay “The Mass Ornament” (published earlier the same year), nature becomes the allegorical 
name for any reality that posits itself as given and immutable, a social formation that remains “mute,” 
correlating with a consciousness “unable to see its own material base.” (102)
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photography, by making apparent both its own meaninglessness and the “natural foundation” that
has fallen away for meaning to be possible at all, can both be a kind of second nature and help 
consciousness clear away second nature. It is precisely in the way that photography, as used in 
the mass illustrated press, offers a visual representation of everything without selection or the 
meaningful association of the sign, that it is able to clear the ground for meaning. Abandoned by 
meaning, nature has become mute — this represents a risk for consciousness, to the extent that 
society falls prey to the muteness of what it has abandoned. But it also represents an immense 
opportunity, if consciousness is thereby freed to take an active and self-aware role in the 
construction of meaning and the (re)ordering of second nature.212 What photography represents 
for Kracauer is the visual capture of everything not capable of being comprehended by the sign 
or the monogram:
Die Totalität der Photographien ist als das Generalinventar der nicht weiter reduzierbaren
Natur aufzufassen, als der Sammelkatalog sämtlicher im Raum sich darbietenden 
Erscheinungen, insofern sie nicht von dem Monogramm des Gegenstandes aus 
konstruiert sind, sondern aus einer natürlichen Perspektive sich geben, die das 
Monogramm nicht trifft. […] Es ist die Aufgabe der Photographie, das bisher noch 
ungesichtete Naturfundament aufzuweisen. (37-38).
Photography is able to do this by virtue of precisely those characteristics that oppose it to 
the memory image — its lack of meaningful associations and selection. Tellingly, the 
homogeneous continuum of the photographic surface as seen in the flood of images that 
comprise the illustrated magazines actually collapses under its own weight. The pure 
juxtaposition of random elements and perspectives, rather than support the fantasy of a gapless 
visual space, tends to undermine it, turning the purported immediacy of photographic 
representation into a productive alienation. 
212 “...so ist dem freigesetzten Bewußtsein eine unvergleichliche Chance gegeben. Mit den Naturbeständen 
unvermischt wie nie zuvor, kann es an ihnen seine Gewalt bewähren. Die Wendung zur Photographie ist das 
Vabanque-Spiel der Geschichte.” (37)
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“[Die Photographie] zeigt die Städte in Flugbildern, holt die Krabben und Figuren von 
den gotischen Kathedralen herunter; alle räumliche Konfigurationen werden in 
ungewöhnten Überschneidungen, die sie aus der menschlichen Nähe entfernen, dem 
Hauptarchiv einverleibt. Wenn das Kostüm der Großmutter die Beziehung zum Heute 
verloren hat, wird es nicht mehr komisch sein, sondern merkwürdig wie ein submariner 
Polyp. Eines Tages entweicht der Diva die Dämonie, und ihre Ponny-Frisur bleibt neben 
den Chignons zurück. So zerbröckeln die Bestände, da sie nicht zusammengehalten 
werden. Das photographische Archiv versammelt im Abbild die letzten Elemente der dem
Gemeinten entfremdeten Natur. Durch ihre Einmagazinierung wird die 
Auseinandersetzung des Bewußtseins mit der Natur gefördert.” (38)
Ultimately, the interruptive capacity of photography’s visual surplus may be able to 
challenge the compulsion and unfreedom of second nature by pointing to the contingency and 
provisionality of both representation and the social order as such.213 “Dem Bewußtsein läge also 
ob, die Vorläufigkeit aller gegebenen Konfigurationen nachzuweisen, wenn nicht gar die Ahnung 
der richtigen Ordnung des Naturbestands zu erwecken” (39).
Thus Kracauer, by attending not to the signifying capacity of the individual image but 
rather to the way that images are embedded in a context that includes the mass of all other 
images as well as the temporal dimensions of historical reference, stands the physiognomic 
discourse on its head (or feet, as the case may be). Contrary to the physiognomic logic that 
invests appearance with legible meaning, for Kracauer the visual surface alone tells one nothing 
about the object depicted; taken in the historically-specific context of the medium, however, 
photography’s aggressive and rapacious “surfacing” of the visible world shows that the surface is
all there is, and it is precisely this insight that clears the ground for meaning and potentially for 
meaningful change. 
Seen in this light, the project of Die Welt ist schön becomes a paradoxical and perhaps 
quixotic one. Even if we disregard the complexity of Renger-Patzsch’s notion of Wiedergabe as 
213 “Die Bilder des in seine Elemente aufgelösten Naturbestands sind dem Bewußtsein zur freien Verfügung 
überantwortet. Ihre ursprüngliche Anordnung ist dahin, sie haften nicht mehr in dem räumlichen 
Zusammenhang, der sie mit einem Original verband, aus dem das Gedächtnisbild ausgesondert worden ist. 
Zielen aber die naturalen Überreste nicht auf das Gedächtnisbild hin, so ist ihre im Bild vermittelte Anordnung 
notwendig ein Provisorium.” (38-39)
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perceptual training and accept for the sake of argument the book’s project as Heise presented it 
(and Brecht and Benjamin understood it), Kracauer’s essay suggests a way in which this project 
might yet undermine itself. Where Renger-Patzsch’s collection would seek to harness and contain
the contingency and surplus of the Bilderflut in the closed narrative structure of a harmonious 
whole, the nature of the images themselves would explode this desired frame. It is not just the 
fact that many of these images are in fact stock photographs and came from various photo shoots 
and advertising campaigns Renger-Patzsch worked on, thus belying the artistic aspirations of the 
photobook format, but presumably contemporary readers of the volume could not but view the 
images informed by the media habits of the photographs’ original context, namely, illustrated 
magazines. Thus where Die Welt ist schön would aim to demonstrate sequence, connection, 
narrative, and analogy, the stock character of the images used would undercut this intended unity.
In Kracauer’s terms, instead of a unified project of visual harmony, we have fragments from the 
Hauptarchiv. Kracauer’s meditation on the meaning of the surface thus gives us the leverage to 
both critique Renger-Patzsch’s project and to situate it within the project of Neues Sehen in a way
that considers the broader historically medium-specific nature of how images worked together. In
other words, Kracauer helps us see how the project of juxtaposition in Die Welt ist schön can be 
read more dynamically than as an aestheticizing venture that seeks to level all differences under 
the guiding category of beauty. The visual analogies of Renger-Patzsch’s images would thus help
the viewer navigate critically among various disparate areas of the modern world, with the 
emphasis on fragmentariness or at least plurality, rather than wholeness.214
Indeed in another way, Kracauer’s photographic theory might not be that far from 
Renger-Patzsch’s. Where Kracauer’s 1927 essay privileges precisely those accidental aspects of 
the image that come to seem alien with time, adding to the assembled contingencies and 
214 In Döblin’s terms, we could also see this approach as the reassertion of nominalism over realism.
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particulars of our Wahrnehmungsinventar, a later version of his photographic theory shifts the 
emphasis decidedly to the question of realism. Realism, in the introduction to Kracauer’s 1964 
Theorie des Films, is defined as an aesthetic approach that oscillates between showing the known
and revealing unexpected dimensions of the visual (35-36).215 Here as in the earlier essay, realism
is understood, in Miriam Hansen’s terms, as an experiential rather than a referential realism.216 
For this conception of realism, formal beauty in fact plays an epistemological function, much as 
it does for Renger-Patzsch. “Das formgebende Streben braucht also mit der realistischen Tendenz
nicht in Konflikt zu geraten. Im Gegenteil, es mag sie verwirklichen und erfüllen – eine 
Wechselwirkung, deren sich die Realisten des 19. Jahrhunderts noch nicht bewußt sein konnten” 
(47). The revelatory potential of photographs is closely connected to their particular type of 
aesthetic appeal: 
Der ästhetische Wert von Fotos scheint bis zu einem gewissen Grad eine Folge 
ihrer aufdeckenden Kräfte zu sein. In unserer Reaktion auf Fotos durchdringen sich also 
Wißbegierde und Schönheitssinn. Fotos strahlen oft Schönheit aus, weil sie jene Begierde
befriedigen. Wenn sie dabei – und darüber hinaus – in unbekannte Welträume und die 
Schlupfwinkel der Materie vordringen, mögen sie uns Einblick in eine Formwelt 
gewähren, die in sich selbst schön ist. (57)
 For Kracauer, too, photography serves to expand human vision in accord with the 
demands of a technological age. “Erstens hat moderne Fotografie unsere Sicht nicht nur 
wesentlich erweitert, sondern eben dadurch auch unserer Situation in einem technologischen 
Zeitalter angepaßt. […] In derseben Weise hat die Fotografie unserem Bewußtsein die Auflösung 
215 Kracauer declares himself explicitly for realism as opposed to mere formal play; interestingly, he groups László 
Moholy-Nagy and other modern experimental photographers with 19th century art photography and pictorialism 
(39).
216 “Kracauer’s advocacy of realism in [Theorie des Filmes] remains tied to a historical understanding of physis and
a concept of reality that depends as much on the estranging and metamorphic effects of cinematic representation 
as on the role of the viewer. As the essay makes sufficiently clear, Kracauer’s conception of film’s relationship 
with photography is not grounded in any simple or ‘naive’ referential realism. On the contrary, it turns on the 
technological medium’s capacity to mobilize and play with the reified, unmoored, multiply mediated fragments 
of the modern physis, a historically transformed world that includes the viewer as materially contingent, 
embodied subject. The concept of realism at stake is therefore less a referential than an experiential one.” 
“Kracauer’s Photography Essay” (105).
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traditioneller Perspektiven eingeprägt” (2005 36-37).”
In the later text we thus see the emphasis on photography’s potential to train a 
historically-specific mode of perception and an understanding of photographic realism that 
emphasizes creating and incorporating a purely formal dimension. As in the writings of Renger-
Patzsch, in Kracauer’s film book photographic realism depends on the interplay between visual 
form, beauty, discovery, and perceptual training. Despite the apparent incongruity of the two 
figures, neither Albert Renger-Patzsch nor Siegfried Kracauer advances a naively realist 
physiognomy. Kracauer’s two texts suggest on the contrary the ways in which Die Welt ist schön 
attempts to reorient visual perception by means of formal play on the visual surface, both of the 
individual image and across the collection of images. The visual surface does not presume, in this
view, to be the outer expression of an inner truth but rather generates new modes of perception 
and experience precisely by virtue of its detachment from essential claims.
“Alles, was wir als Geschichte bezeichnen, ist im hohem Maß vom Stein abhängig.” Ernst 
Jünger, history as nature, and the recognizability of the visible
By contrast Ernst Jünger will insist, in the spirit of physiognomy, upon the necessary and 
transhistorical relationship between visual appearance and inner essence. Yet unlike Döblin’s 
comparative anatomy with which this chapter began, two essays written by Jünger in the sixties 
deploy a physiognomic discourse in order to arrive at a notion of elemental, transhistorical 
temporality. Of interest for the present context is the way that Jünger’s discussion of trees and 
stones develops a particular temporality from a notion of physiognomy, as does Döblin’s 
meditation on the typifying erosion of the individual face. Yet where Döblin claimed that 
Sander’s visible types make a social history manifest, Jünger sees the trees and rocks 
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photographed by Renger-Patzsch as the visible evidence and emblem of an ahistorical, elemental 
time. His essays accompanying Renger-Patzsch’s Bäume (1962) and Gestein (1966) unfold a 
logic of type, physiognomy, and character predicated on a particular relationship between form 
and essence in order to present an understanding of history as a kind of natural history.
The two books were published as a collaboration between Jünger and Renger-Patzsch by 
C.H. Boehringer Sohn. Each consists of approximately sixty high-quality black and white plates 
by Renger-Patzsch, a thematic essay by Ernst Jünger, and captions for each image of an 
informative geological or botanical nature. The collaborative nature of the oversized volumes 
begins to suggest some ways in which they occupy their own niche between fine art photography,
the popularization of science, and Jünger’s essayistic ontology. Neither the captions and other 
metatexts nor Jünger’s essays particularly encourage the reader to view the photographs outside 
the framework of the type so central to Renger-Patzsch’s earlier theoretic writings on 
photography. Bäume is subtitled, “Photographien schöner und merkwürdiger Beispiele aus 
deutschen Landen,” while Gestein is described as, “Photographien typischer Beispiele von 
Gesteinen aus Europäischen Ländern.” These subtitles mark the collections as compendia of 
representative examples. Despite the fact that the book about trees does not describe them as 
typical examples, they are examples nonetheless, and the captions emphasize this point by 
indicating aspects of landscape and weather capable of shaping trees in different ways, such that 
the viewer is encouraged to see Renger-Patzsch’s richly textured prints as illustrative of various 
possible dendritic morphologies.
Jünger’s essays develop the connection between the image and the type by insisting upon 
the fundamental recognizability of the visible. We are able, he writes, to distinguish a particular 
group of plants as trees despite vast differences in size and form and the shifting complexities of 
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botanical taxonomy because we recognize them as such:
Wenn wir bei alldem einen festen Begriff vom Baume haben, so deshalb, weil unsere 
Vorstellung die Natur ausrichtet. Diese, unsere Vorstellung von Baume ist eng mit dem 
verbunden, was die Alten Physiognomie nannten. Wir sehen den Baum als Größe, in der 
die natur Individualität oder besser Personalität gewinnt; sein Wuchs bezeugt uns Leben 
in einem höreren als dem rein vegetativen und auch zoologischen Sinn. 
And, although Linnaeus broke with taxonomic tradition by jettisoning the category of “tree” as 
distinct from herbs and bushes Jünger continues, “Die physiognomische Entscheidung wird 
dadurch nicht berührt. Wir wissen instinktiv, was wir als Baum ansprechen sollen oder nicht” (8).
Yet this is not to say that there is a single tree form that would be considered ideal. Were 
that the case, a physiognomy of trees would not be possible, since the multitude of answers to the
question of the ideal tree expresses the multitude of human character types corresponding to 
these trees. “Besser wäre freilich auch hier, wie gegenüber jeder physiognomischen 
Entscheidung, von Charakterologie zu sprechen, denn es ist im Grunde die Frage nach seinem 
inneren Wuchs und Wesen, die der nach seinem Baum Gefragt beantwortet. Er wählt sein 
Totembild” (9). In this sense Charakterologie, like physiognomy, indicates an expressive 
connection between inner essence and external form — resemblance indicates affinity. Thus in 
“Steine” the work of the Japanese artist Hokusai represents, according to Jünger, not just a 
stylistic particularity but rather the deep elemental connection between water and rock that both 
transcends and shapes epochs. “Der Künstler sieht es: so Hokusai, denn es ist kein Zufall, daß die
beiden großen Motive dieses Meisters, der heilige Berg seiner Heimat und die Lebenswoge, so 
seltsam sich gleichen, bis in den Schnee des Gipfels und den Schaum der Welle hinein. Das 
heißt, durch die Zeit hindurchblicken” (34). 
Jünger describes a visible order (“Sichtbare Ordnung,” 26) in a superordinate principle of 
growth that unifies organic and inorganic matter.217 Growth is thus a formal principle inherent in 
217 “Daß hier organisches und mechanisches Wachstum sich sehr ähnlich werden, spricht für ein übergeordnetes 
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nature, and it is precisely this move – positing growth as an essential formal principle based on 
the assertion of a visible order in nature, seen in resemblance – that allows him to describe a 
relationship between form and essence that admits of temporal change but not of history as a 
determinate process of change involving social and political actors, let alone any notion of 
progress. In this regard, his conception of form echoes Renger-Patzsch’s practice and 
theorization of visual analogy, yet where Renger-Patzsch placed formal similar in the service of a
perceptual training that would provide kinesthetic access to reality, Jünger in these essays 
describes forms as changeable containers for an unchangeable essence. “Hier stürzt die Mauer, 
und dort wächst sie empor. Beständig im Wesen, wechselt sie die Form. Die Formen sind 
Fassungen. Der Stein in seinem Wesen, der Stein der Weisen, bleibt unberührt” (26). 
Over the course of the essay, Jünger unfolds a logic of dissolution and reconstitution, rise 
and fall, that draws on the competing historical geologies of Plutonism and Neptunism. 
According to Plutonism, stones are forged by fire from smaller particles, while Neptunism holds 
that the erosive influence of the sea is responsible for the creation of small stones from larger 
ones. Jünger plays these two historical theories off of each other poetically to universalize the 
tendencies inherent in the accumulation and breakdown of geological formations. The historical 
theories of Neptunism and Plutonism allow Jünger to access an elemental logic of creation and 
destruction in constant balance. “Die große Flut gehört neben dem großen Feuer zu den 
vollziehenden Mächten der Wenden und Endzeiten. Hier spürten wir ein erstes Anheben. Bald 
sollte sie in ihren weiten, stets wachsenden Zusammenhängen sichtbar werden: als geologische 
Veränderung” (21). Here Jünger explicitly describes the coming catastrophe of the first World 
War as a “geological change.” History in this conception does involve change, but it is a 
catastrophe towards a rebirth, a pendular swing without meaningful difference: “Das Universum 
Prinzip.” (26).
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hält sich im Gleichgewicht” (25). Zooming both down and up from the historical village that 
opens his essay, he introduces a universal process of creation and destruction that elides the 
specificity – not to mention the political dimension – of the soon-to-be-flooded village. “Das 
Universum ist eine große Mühle, die grob und fein mahlt, Sonnen und Sandkörner. Da wird 
immer neuer Vorrat verlangt. Er muß sich bilden, schichten, härten, absetzen, aufstocken, muß 
rastlos ergänzen, was durch den Angriff dahinschwindet, und mit ihm Schritt halten” (25). 
Thus for Jünger the notion of a visible order, according to which visual form is expressive
of an inner essence, by no means preclude the forms themselves from changing over time. The 
visible appearance of things changes according to a logic analogous to geological shifts and the 
slow metamorphosis of stones. Yet, and this point is crucial, the change in forms leaves the inner 
essence untouched. When Jünger writes that “die Formen sind Fassungen,” he is emphasizing 
both the possibility for forms to be reconfigured and the necessity of the connection between 
form and essence. In this way, he moves from a physiognomy to a temporality. It is significant 
that Jünger does not discuss photography at all in these two essays – rather, they both hinge on 
the symbolism and essential recognizability of stones and trees that allow them to stand in as 
figures of time. Indeed, he begins “Steine” by recounting a youthful hike in prewar Italy, a rest in
an inn in a village about to be flooded by the construction of a new dam, and the assorted 
company’s speculations on the nature of stone. Despite the social, punctual nature of a major 
public works project such as a dam, Jünger uses the imminent flood as a paradigm of history with
its cycles of ebb and flow, creation and destruction, rise and Untergang. It reflects his 
idiosyncratic telescoping of individual event and transhistorical patterns that Jünger implicitly 
portrays the impending disappearance of the small village both as a symptom of contemporary 
upheavals and a symbol for his vision of history as such. Likewise, he later assimilates 
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geological catastrophes with historic upheavals, comparing the moods and uprising of different 
peoples to volcanic eruptions (33).
In “Bäume,” the tree becomes a formal pattern for spatial extension and temporal flow as 
such. 
Der Lebensbaum ist, wie die Sanduhr, ein Sinnbild der Zeit, die sich im Zeitlosen 
schneidet — dort ist die Taille, der Wurzelhals. Dort ist der Punkt, den wir Augenblick 
nennen; wir sehen das Vergangene unten, das Zukünftige oben sich ausbreiten.
Im Baum bewundern wir die Macht des Urbildes. Wir ahnen, daß nicht nur das 
Leben, sondern das Weltall nach diesem Schlüssel in zeit und Raum ausgreift. Das muster
wiederholt sich, wohin wir auch die Augen richten, bis in die Zeichnung des kleinsten 
Blattes, bis in die Linien der hand. So verzweigen sich die Flüsse von der Wasserscheide 
auf dem Lauf zum Meere, der Strom des Blutes in den hellen und dunklen Adern, die 
Kristalle in den Klüften, die Korallen im Riff. 
*
Im Urbild wird Unbegreifliches geahnt, das sich in der Erscheinung ausbreitet. 
Der Augenblick birgt und verbirgt das Überzeitliche … (7) 
Crucially, it is the form of the tree that allows for Jünger’s dendrological cosmology. In other 
words, the same visible recognizability that guarantees our knowledge of what counts as a tree 
and what doesn’t is also what lets trees serve as an Ursymbol for the passage of time in a 
transhistorical ahistorical way. In this way, nature becomes a figure for a history marked by 
growth and decline, rise and fall, ebb and flow: “Der Mensch hat immer Werden und Vergehen 
am Gleichnis des Baumes zu begreifen versucht” (15). The same is the case with stones: “Wie an
den Jahresringen eines Baumes lassen sich an manchen Schliffen oder Kernen die großen und die
kleinen Rhythmen ablesen” (26, “Steine”). The physiognomic assertion of a fundamental 
legibility of the visible world, and in particular natural forms, provides the visible spatial, formal 
order that enables all history to be natural history.
Concluding thoughts. Reproduction, realism, and the type
One would be hard pressed to come up with a position more distant from Brecht’s 
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statement quoted at the outset of this chapter – that the photograph of a factory tells us nothing 
about the factory – than Jünger’s attribution of legibility to visual form. In many respects the 
photographic theories delineated in this chapter are at odds and at times simply incompatible. 
Even where the focus seems to be the same – as in the claim that photography is the adequate 
medium to represent technological modernity – a closer look shows the rifts between what the 
various positions assume and entail.
Yet precisely in their differences and incompatibilities, these positions on photography 
nevertheless mark out a shared discursive arena particular to German modernism. When Brecht 
rejects the ability of the photograph to tell us something useful about the factory, he is 
nevertheless working with a common set of assumptions about the relationship between the 
image and reality. What is ultimately at stake in these various photographic positions is the way 
that ideas about visual reproduction and photographic objectivity, when interrogated, necessarily 
involve a particular kind of aesthetic and epistemological realism: the question of adequate 
representation necessarily leads to the question of knowledge and often to the idea of the type. 
From Döblin’s description of photography as a comparative anatomy to Renger-Patzsch’s 
insistence on essential forms and his condemnation of contingency in the image to Jünger’s 
“sichtbare Ordnung” based on underlying visible forms, these discussions of photography 
pivoted around ideas, sometimes explicit and sometimes unspoken, about the relationship 
between the individual and the type. Even Brecht, although he denied the individual image of 
New Objectivity any epistemological potential, relied on the possibility of a typology in his 
suggestions for serial portraiture of hands and faces. Despite (or because of) his emphasis on the 
camera’s disruptive potential, such portraiture is by definition less interested in the accidents of 
individuality than a functionalist, positional realism that locates the visible signature of the 
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individual within a set of social, intersubjective roles.
Döblin’s use of the medieval debate between the realists and the nominalists is therefore 
especially useful in this context, because it problematizes theories of photographic realism that 
rely on the contingent or indexical properties of the photographic image. To push the point 
further, one could easily make the case that all of the figures who appear in this chapter, with the 
possible exception of Kracauer, are realists in Döblin’s definition. They invest superordinate 
ideas with more significance than the accidental particulars of the individual phenomenon or 
scene, and yet this could not begin to account for the range of positions or contentions they 
cover. The point, however, is that looking at these theorists in this way opens up the question of 
what realism actually means in this context, and why discussions of visual representation 
necessarily involved questions of physiognomy and type during this particular historical juncture.
It hardly needs to be emphasized that there are any number of other possible frameworks and 
orientations for thinking about images, but discussions of the photographic image in German 
modernism operated within a space marked out by considerations of realism, the type, history, 
and experience. This is likely at least partly due to the inheritance of scientific strategies of 
depiction and illustration from the 19th century, a tradition that involved images as evidence or 
truth of scientific knowledge practices. Yet as the other aesthetic commitments of key figures 
such as Döblin, Brecht, Benjamin, Kracauer, and Jünger suggest, discussions of photography 
were also entangled in broader aesthetic debates about representation as such; further research in 
this area would need to look more closely at the role played by praises of the type over the 
individual in theories of epic prose and drama. And even more generally, it would be necessary to
adumbrate the influence of broader structures of thought on various paradigms of visual 
representation. The role of a Marxist critique of commodity fetishism in the case of Brecht and 
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Benjamin comes most readily to mind, but features of Lebensphilosophie, particularly the idea of
individual forms as transient expressions of an underlying vital force are certainly also at play.
Despite the differences in these paradigms, frameworks, and discourses, all of the takes 
on photography considered in this chapter have involved the question of how best to represent 
reality, far beyond purely aesthetic or technical considerations of the adequate depiction of a 
visual scene. In this sense, the Weimar discourse of photography served as a kind of crossroads 
where media theory, aesthetics, sociology, philosophy, and science intersected in various ways. 
Realism was at a premium, and yet beyond a shared sense that the stakes of the photographic 
image had been raised, there was little consensus on what realism actually was.218 For Renger-
Patzsch, Benjamin, and Kracauer, each in their own way, the camera’s realism had to do with the 
way it accessed or renewed perception and experience. For Döblin and Jünger photographic 
realism was quite different in that it was tied to an epistemology of the type and the way the 
photographic image allowed for a kind of deep recognition, although the two writers diverged 
widely on what the type entailed for an understanding of historical time. In this sense, the 
perceptual training and truth claims of photography served as an aesthetic, social, and political 
battleground. Learning to see was something contested, and at stake were various understandings
of modernity and history.219
Where Döblin’s type is a historical phenomenon closely related to the mass and at times 
indistinct from it, Jünger’s type is a Denkfigur diametrically and polemically opposed to the 
mass. To be sure, the type can be seen, in the case of both Jünger and Döblin, as a historically 
specific trope that arose as part of a broader dismissal of the classically bourgeois individual in 
the context of the rise of modern mass society. Yet unlike the social history to which Döblin 
218 For a substantive and sophisticated discussion of the resurgence of realism – and concomitant return to a 
prosthetically-inflected anthropocentrism – in the interwar period, see Fore (2012).
219 In a similar way, Richard Gray has characterized Sander’s Antlitz der Zeit as a critical countermodel to 
contemporary racial physiognomic projects (379).
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assigned Sander’s typological portraiture, Jünger will deploy the type in Der Arbeiter much as he
does in his essays on stones and trees: as the herald of a time construed as elemental time, a 
history seen as natural history. Just as dramatically as Berge Meere und Giganten but in a 
radically different way, Der Arbeiter will present the reader with a futuristic body neither totally 
organic nor fully technological, but one that is rather the result of their collusion.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Leben in Ordnung. The organic logic of Jünger’s Der Arbeiter and the end of history
In this chapter, I trace the discursive entwinement of the type – the social and 
epistemological figure deployed in opposition to the individual, as discussed in the previous 
chapter – and the technological body in what must be the Weimar Republic’s most involved 
depiction of their relationship, namely, Ernst Jünger’s 1932 essay Der Arbeiter. No account of 
either the body or the technological imaginary in Weimar Culture can afford to bypass Jünger’s 
text, both because of the suggestive intensity with which it grapples with the embodiment of a 
new type of human and because of the canonical status it has obtained as the embodiment of a 
pervasive discourse of the armored body seen as representative of central strands of Weimar 
thought. Helmut Lethen’s well-known account of the cold persona in the Weimar Republic, 
Verhaltenslehre der Kälte (1994), for example, sees Jünger’s essay as paradigmatic of an anti-
bourgeois, anti-subjective program that armored the body and self against a particularly modern 
vulnerability in the wake of the abandonment of traditional social hierarchies, epistemological 
certainties, and established moral codes.220 Der Arbeiter seems to offer a summation of Weimar 
codes of conduct, presenting the fullest depiction of an outwardly-oriented, electrified, 
hierarchical, highly technological, and anti-individualistic collectivity predicated on production, 
speed, and the metaphysical embrace of danger. Jünger provides Lethen’s account with a rich 
Sinnbild of a mechanized self that abolishes psychological interiority to the same extent that it 
supposedly represses its own organic, creaturely life. Yet Lethen underplays the organic 
220 Jünger plays a privileged role in Lethen’s history, and I suspect this has as much to do with biographical reasons 
as with analytic ones: the fact that Jünger, the Frontkämpfer, Freikorps member, and polemicist of the nationalist
ultra-right made similar arguments about subjectivity and the body as figures on the left of the political spectrum
is invaluable for Lethen’s teleological and etiological reconstruction of Weimar culture.
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dimension that comprises as crucial a component of Jünger’s attack on bourgeois subjectivity as 
it does of Döblin’s. In this chapter I will analyze the implications of this elision, which frames a 
dominant understanding of Weimar culture; Indeed, Der Arbeiter complicates the image of the 
armored body as much as Berge Meere und Giganten but in very different ways. What does it 
mean that Jünger’s essay undermines the very trope for which it has been made paradigmatic? If 
the armored body does not exist here, does it exist anywhere, or is it merely an interpretive 
projection from later decades that has more to do with their imaginaries and politics than with the
way the body and technology were seen to relate in Weimar thought?
As will become clear, these questions bear on our understanding of the dense interweave 
of discourses that comprised the culture of the Weimar Republic. Crucially, Lethen reads this 
culture as a reaction to a crisis in the period’s self-understanding. Once old social and ideological
demarcations had been undermined by the culmination of processes of industrial modernization 
in the First World War, new forms of behavior, or Verhaltenslehren, had to be established in the 
absence of stable, traditional moral codes. The key function of these Verhaltenslehren was to 
differentiate between friend and enemy, inside and outside, self and other.221 Lethen dubs this 
process “Entmischung” to indicate the guiding role played by various polarities in the thought of 
this period across the political spectrum.222 While Entmischung works on various levels – 
epistemologically as a prosthetic aide to perception and and clinical, amoral evaluation,223 
221 “In Augenblicken sozialer Desorganisation, in denen die Gehäuse der Tradition zerfallen und Moral an 
Überzeugungskraft einbüßt, werden Verhaltenslehren gebraucht, die Eigenes und Fremdes, Innen und Außen 
unterscheiden helfen. Sie ermöglichen, Vertrauenszonen von Gebieten des Mißtrauens abzugrenzen und Identität
zu bestimmen” (7).
222 “Der Schmerz der Trennung und die Sehnsucht nach Fusion – zwei Quellen der ästhetischen Faszination – 
werden in der Ära der Ersten Republik in extreme Ferne voneinander gerückt. Die bürgerliche Kultur der 
Schattierungen und gemischten Temperaturen weicht einer Ästhetik der Entmischung, der Polarisierung aller 
Lebenssphären, der Faszination der ‘scharfen’ Grenzziehung und klaren Kontur” (133).
223 “Der Habitus der Wahnehmungsschärfe fordert in diesen Jahren vom Subjekt vor allem die Verletzung der 
Grenzen der Moral. Es ist die Schärfe der Negation einer moralischen Norm, die im neusachlichen Jahrzehnt 
nicht nur einen Habitus zum Ausdruck bringt, sondern auch beansprucht, Exaktheit im Sinne empirisch 
verfahrender Wissenschaft herzustellen. Die Abschirmung der Wahrnehmung gegen Einmischungen des 
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psychologically as the separation between self and other across the clear contours of the armored 
body, as a way of protecting the vulnerable ego,224 as a political heuristic to differentiate between 
friend and enemy225 – its basic logic necessitates the linkage between clear perception and clear 
(corporeal and social) separation. The individual subject, caught up in joint crises of a shaken 
symbolic order, overturned social hierarchies, and unsettled bodies of knowledge, must reinforce 
according to Lethen its perception and its status as subject by recourse to a prosthetic logic of 
armoring, classification, and enhanced vision.226 This logic necessarily foregrounds the 
mechanical and technological at the expense of the organic.
This brief sketch already suggests both the key role that Jünger, and especially Der 
Arbeiter, plays in Lethen’s account, and why this role will necessarily truncate some of the more 
interesting complexities of Jünger’s text. Lethen rightly emphasizes the prominence in Der 
Arbeiter of the armored body and Panzerung, a sharpness of vision, and a clearness of contours. 
Der Arbeiter remains such an interesting document, at least in part, because of the way it blends 
descriptive, prescriptive, and performative analyses in order to account for the contemporary 
moment and invoke a desired future precisely through its classification of the figure of the 
worker as a transhistorical Gestalt. Yet – and this objection is the starting point for my reading of 
Der Arbeiter – by shoehorning Jünger’s worker into the trope of the cold persona, which Lethen 
moralischen Urteils muß mit der Entpsyschologisierung des beobachteten Gegenstands, seiner Reduktion auf 
physiologische oder ökonomische Basisdaten und die Ausrichtung auf naturwissenschaftliche Diskurse 
einhergehen” (187).
224 “Die Umrisse des ‘Typus’ des Arbeiter-Soldaten, den Jünger den Partisanen und Lumpenproleten entgegensetzt, 
verschwimmen nie” (202).
225 “Carl Schmitts Freund-Feind-Theorie ist eine Wahrnehmungsprothese, welche geradlinige Bahnen durch den 
amorphen Körper der liberalen Gesellschaft legt. Halbdunkel wird entfernt, Schwanken und Lavieren werden in 
der Kategorie des Verrats fixiert. Entmischen ist das Metier der kalten persona, ‘Distinguo ergo sum’ ihr 
Wahlspruch” (191).
226 “Wenn stabile Außenhalte der Konvention wegfallen, Diffusion der vertrauten Abgrenzungen, Rollen und 
Fronten gefürchtet wird, antwortet die symbolische Ordnung mit einem klirrenden Schematismus, der allen 
Gestalten auf dem Feld des Sozialen Konturen verleiht. Alle Phänomene – vom Körperbau bis zum Charakter, 
von der Handschrift bis zur Rasse – werden klassifiziert. Merkwürdig genug dienen neue technische Medien wie
die Fotografie hierbei als Definitions-Instrumente.” (11)
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identifies as a key figure of Weimar culture and which is marked by calculating distance, 
affective iciness, and externally-oriented behavior, Lethen’s interpretation is built on unspoken 
normative and analytic assumptions that lead him to repress the organic nature of the armored 
body. In particular, Lethen must ignore two key features of Jünger’s text: the teleological 
movement towards reconciliation based on a biological notion of entelechy, and the heuristic – 
rather than absolute – nature of the contours of the Typus of the Arbeiter. 
In this chapter, then, I will examine key dimensions of Jünger’s text in order to recover 
the inheritance of the organic in what has been read as the kingdom of the mechanical. As I will 
show, the project of Der Arbeiter, far from offering codes of conduct for an estranged and 
dangerous age, is to move towards a reconciliation that would overcome the alienation between 
self and object, mechanical and organic, body and technology. This teleological movement, 
which Jünger describes as Verschmelzung, draws on contemporary biological understandings of 
entelechy – the notion that an organism as a whole is greater than the sum of its parts and strives 
towards an ingrained harmony. The projected endpoint of Der Arbeiter is not a dynamic system 
where technology has eclipsed the organic, but rather a stasis after history where technology has 
become organ. This movement necessitates a dynamic play of contours and boundaries – both 
corporeal and epistemological – more complex than the Entmischung, armoring, and delimiting 
emphasized by Lethen. Metaphors of liquid do not just have a negative valence, but also stand in 
for the flows and merges central to the trajectory of Der Arbeiter. More importantly, the clear 
contours of the Typus that set it off, polemically and epistemologically, from the social mass, are 
not the end of the story for Jünger, but are rather only one necessarily heuristic and historical 
moment in his positioning of what he calls the Typus between the ephemeral individual and his 
conception of a transhistorical, metaphysical Gestalt.
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At issue is ultimately not the limitations of Lethen’s compelling and important analysis, 
but rather the possibility that Lethen’s repression of the organic dimension of Der Arbeiter is 
emblematic of a reading of Weimar culture that occludes its discursive integration of nature and 
technology. Without the organic, one cannot understand how technology functions in Weimar 
thought. Ernst Jünger, often taken to be a champion of the mechanical, armored, inorganic 
subject, shows why.
Der Arbeiter presents the reader with a text that is both a diagnosis of modernity and the 
prognosis or Wunschbild of continued intensification of those features of modernity that depart 
from the ascendancy of the autonomous bourgeois individual. Jünger’s text, somewhere between 
a treatise and an extended essay, heralds the arrival of the figure of the worker as the emblem of a
modern fulfillment still in the process of becoming. Der Arbeiter treats its subject in general 
terms with little recourse to specific historical or social referents, moving from one suggestive 
image to the next in a way that is speculative and associative: the reader often has the sense of 
moving through a panorama.227 The salient historical context is strongly informed by processes of
modernization, industrialization, and urbanization in general, and the experience of the First 
World War in particular. Yet a basic narrative trajectory can be located in a movement away from 
the critiqued moment of bourgeois liberal democracy toward the Arbeiterstaat that will replace it.
The text has often been read as an embrace of a mechanical armoring in the face of a turbulent 
technological modernity to protect the vulnerable, creaturely, organic self; this characterization of
Der Arbeiter is often linked to Jünger’s concept of the “totale Mobilmachung,” to emphasize the 
227 Marcus Paul Bullock makes the case for reading Der Arbeiter as a literary project: “The contradiction for 
[Jünger] here is that even where he goes beyond the role and territory accepted as that of the literary artist, 
where he explores the phenomena of another domain, he has to keep to the literary character of the initial 
project. His method must always be adapted from that of literature, or of art more generally.” (25-6)
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technological dynamism of Jünger’s vision. Helmut Lethen reads the text in this way, and 
Andreas Huyssen (1993) assigns Jünger a similar status by interpreting Jünger’s texts as 
themselves partaking of a logic of armoring in order to shield the wounded male ego. Without 
denying the presence of armor in Jünger’s work from this period, I would like to complicate the 
analytic centrality it is often granted. In this chapter I draw on the work of scholars such as 
Benjamin Bühler, Thomas Pekar, and Thomas Löffler in order to explore the organic dimensions 
of Jünger’s text and the specific relationship between its attack on the bourgeois individual on the
one hand and its vision of a future beyond history, on the other. 
To begin with an image: a description of the face of the worker emphasizes the sharpness 
of the face’s metallic contours and bones, as well as the calm mastery of its gaze.
Verändert hat sich auch das Gesicht, das dem Beobachter under dem Stahlhelm 
oder der Sturzkappe entgegenblickt. Es hat in der Skala seiner Ausführungen, wie sie 
etwa in einer Versammlung oder auf Gruppenbildern zu beobachten ist, an 
Mannigfaltigkeit und damit an Individualität verloren, während es an Schärfe und 
Bestimmtheit der Einzelausprägung gewonnen hat. Es ist metallischer geworden, auf 
seiner Oberfläche gleichsam galvanisiert, der Knochenbau tritt deutlich hervor, die Züge 
sind ausgespart und angespannt. Der Blick ist ruhig und fixiert, geschult an der 
Betrachtung von Gegenständen, die in Zuständen hoher Geschwindigkeit zu erfassen 
sind. Es ist dies das Gesicht einer Rasse, die sich under den eigenartigen Anforderungen 
einer neuen Landschaft zu entwickeln beginnt und die der Einzelne nicht als Person oder 
als Individuum, sondern als Typus repräsentiert. (107-108)
The type of the worker is described with recourse to the physical description of the individual 
body, but in a way that deemphasizes its particularity. The depiction of the worker’s face as 
sharp, defined, metallic, bony, and attentive evokes a sense of seriality, even as the description of 
the fixed gaze suggests the importance of individual experience. If this is a technological body, it 
is not entirely an objectified one. Indeed, the particular shift between subject positions in this 
passage demonstrates the ambivalent nature of the project of the book as a whole. Just as Der 
Arbeiter frequently shifts, often uneasily, between a motivated depiction of its contemporary 
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moment and predictive or exhortatory future prognostications, thereby altering its mode of 
address and the reader’s implied position from actual, contemporary subject to ideal, future 
subject, here too the gaze becomes an intersection in a chiasm of sorts. Where the passage begins
by describing the face of the worker from the outside, drawing its associative force from the 
various connotations of the hardened physiognomy, the portrayal of the gaze puts the reader into 
the position of the worker. If the outward manifestation of the worker’s calm mastery is the 
steady gaze, schooled on the observation of rapid movement, part of the project of Der Arbeiter 
is to school the reader’s gaze on the rapid movements of workers themselves. In other words, the 
line of sight suggested here is a mirrored and autogenerative one, whereby the worker obtains the
characteristics of an armored, technological body by observing armored, technological bodies in 
motion.
While this mirrored relationship already suggests a complex interplay in the production of
the type that goes beyond the protective armoring of the otherwise vulnerable individual, it is 
certainly true that the body of the worker is an armored body, and Lethen is correct to point to the
way that the figure of the Typus links the clear contours of the body to the clear epistemological 
distinctions the figure enables. It is no accident that the above passage pivots from the body to 
the object world through the gaze of the worker, since the type for Jünger is largely a visual 
phenomenon: the clarity of his228 face that allows it to be identified as a new type is 
fundamentally related to the clarity of its gaze that grants it privileged access to a drastically 
altered landscape in radical motion. Yet at stake here is not so much a renewed physiognomic 
logic, but rather the assertion of a sense of corporal solidity and control intended to contrast with 
228 While in many ways the depiction of the Arbeiterstaat seems to undermine older gender distinctions based on 
affect or divisions between productive and reproductive labor, the figure of the Arbeiter still appears 
aggressively male, and indeed, the pronoun is always “er.” This has in part to do with the way Jünger chooses to 
depict a type rather than a class or group: it is never “the workers” or “they,” but always “the worker” and “he.”
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the problematic fluidity both of the bourgeois individual and of the mass. The type of the worker,
for Jünger, is able to instrumentalize its body as a precise machine. 
Es sind hier Bilder einer höchsten Zucht des Herzens und der Nerven Geschichte 
geworden, die den besten Überlieferungen als ebenbürtig zur Seite zu stellen sind, – 
Proben von einer äußersten, nüchternen, gleichsam metallischen Kälte, aus der heraus das
heroische Bewußtsein den Leib als reines Instrument zu behandeln und ihm jenseits der 
Grenzen des Selbsterhaltungstreibes noch eine Reihe von komplizierten Leistungen 
abzuzwingen weiß. (107)
By describing the worker’s subjectivity as a “heroische[s] Bewußtsein” that has the calculated 
distance from its own body needed to use that body as a powerful modern technology, Jünger is 
able to construct the type of the worker in opposition both to a notion of bourgeois subjectivity 
predicated on psychological interiority and to the unstructured human masses of liberal 
democracy. Later, in describing how the Arbeiter differs from the creative individual 
(“Schöpfer”), the text categorizes the features of bourgeois subjectivity that the worker opposes: 
a finely differentiated soul, uniqueness of character, individual achievement, and a less than 
robust physical health.229 “Kultur” is even invoked in opposition to the “Zivilisation” represented 
by the worker to broadly indicate the intellectual and spiritual virtues of the cultivated interiority 
of the individual in a specifically German context.
The Typus thus serves the strategic function in Jünger’s polemic of allowing him to attack
229 “Einem an der individuellen Leistung und ihrem einmaligen Charakter geschulten Empfinden fällt es schwer, 
sich den Typus in einer Zone vorzustellen, in der das Bewußtsein durch die schöpferische Kraft gebändigt wird. 
Sein enges Verhältnis zur Zahl, die strenge Eindeutigkeit seiner Lebenshaltung und Einrichtungen scheinen 
seine Welt weit von jener musischen zu trennen, in welcher der Mensch des ‘höheren Adels der Natur’ teilhaftig 
ist. Die metallische Bildung seiner Physiognomie, seine Vorliebe für mathematische Strukturen, sein Mangel an 
seelischer Differenzierung und endlich seine Gesundheit entsprechen sehr wenig den Vorstellungen, wie man sie
sich von den Trägern der schöpferischen Kraft gebildet hat. Das Typische gilt als die Form des Zivilisatorischen,
die von den natürlichen Formen ebensosehr wie von denen der Kultur unterscheiden, und zwar durch das 
Kennzeichen der Wertlosigkeit unterschieden ist. 
Dies sind gängige Wertungen der Zeitkritik innerhalb eines polaren Verhältnisses zwischen Masse und 
Individualität. Wir sahen jedoch, daß Masse und Individualität die beiden Seiten ein und derselben Medaille 
sind, und keine Kritik wird aus diesem Verhältnis mehr herausrechnen, als in ihm enthalten ist. Insbesondere 
wird der Typus durch diese Wertungen in keiner Weise berührt, denn seine Form ist dort, wo er als Gemeinschaft
erscheint, nicht die der Masse, und dort, wo er als Einzelner auftritt, nicht die des Individuums.” (218-219)
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what he saw as necessarily linked forms of subjectivity and collectivity. Put positively, the Typus 
was a way of advancing an idea of individual control and sovereignty within the framework of a 
particular kind of collective. In this sense, the Typus is a strategy of aestheticization: just as the 
gaze of the worker served as the link between the clear contours of the face and the clear vision 
that allowed for action, the Typus is an aesthetic form capacious enough to accommodate 
sovereign individual action within a reworked vision of of mass society. Benjamin is useful here, 
but not just the Benjamin who wrote about the aestheticization of politics and called for its 
inverse. In a 1930 review of a volume edited by Jünger called Krieg und Krieger, Benjamin 
castigates Jünger for a naïve and anachronistic commitment to chivalry in the face of a 
mechanized warfare that had rendered individual action irrelevant by becoming a matter of 
statistics. In Benjamin’s critique, the authors of the volume are engaging in a repression of 
technology in order to preserve an ahistorical apotheosis of war.230 The type of the worker can 
therefore be seen as a way to circumvent this dilemma – Der Arbeiter is not holding onto an 
antiquated, pre-existing form of subjectivity in the face of processes of modernization that have 
rendered the former obsolete (or even obscene) so much as advancing forms of individual 
subjectivity and collectivity that embody what Jünger sees as the lineaments of the age. The 
individual and the group fit together because they both demonstrate a “crystalline” structure: 
Die Masse ist ihrem Wesen nach gestaltlos, daher genügt die rein theoretische Gleichheit 
der Individuen, die ihre Bausteine sind. Die organische Konstruktion des 20. Jahrhunderts
dagegen ist ein Gebilde kristallischer Art, daher fordert sie vom Typus, der in ihr auftritt, 
in einem ganz anderen Maße Struktur. Dies bringt es mit sich, daß das Leben des 
Einzelnen an Eindeutigkeit, an Mathematik gewinnt. Es ist daher nicht weiter 
230 Walter Benjamin, “Theorien des deutschen Faschismus. Zu der Sammelschrift ‘Krieg und Krieger.’ 
herausgegeben von Ernst Jünger.” Die Gesellschaft 7 vol. 2, (1930), 32-41. Quoted in The Weimar Republic 
Sourcebook. “Instead of using and illuminating the secrets of nature via a technology mediated by the human 
scheme of things, the new nationalists’ metaphysical abstraction of war signifies nothing other than a mystical 
and unmediated application of technology to solve the mystery of an idealistically perceived nature […] Until 
Germany has broken through the entanglement of such Medusalike beliefs that confront it in these essays, it 
cannot hope for a future” (164-165).
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verwunderlich, daß die Zahl, und zwar die präzise Ziffer eine wachsende Rolle im Leben 
zu spielen beginnt; es steht dies zu dem maskenhaften Charakter des Typus in Beziehung,
von dem bereits die Rede war. (137-138)
This passage thematizes concisely the vision of society that Der Arbeiter opposes. The 
purely theoretical equality of liberal democracy, the shades of bourgeois interior life, the 
expressive (rather than “maskenhaft”) character of bourgeois individuality, and the formlessness 
of masses of individuals are connected. Lethen is correct to identify the metaphors of liquidity 
the text deploys to characterize the uncertainty and weakness associated with liberal, bourgeois 
culture.231 Where the worker is hard, the bourgeois individual is soft; where the bourgeois 
individual is expressive and ambiguous, the worker is functional and determined; and where the 
Arbeiterstaat exhibits a determining order from the micro- to the macrocosm on the model of 
crystal formations, the masses of individuals are shapeless and Verschwommen.
At several moments throughout Der Arbeiter, we read that the body of the masses is 
vulnerable or unable to defend itself. “Die Bewegungen der Masse haben überall, wo ihnen eine 
wirklich entschlossene Haltung entgegengesetzt wird, ihren unwiderstehlichen Zauber verloren –
ähnlich wie zwei, drei alte Krieger hinter einem intakten Maschinengewehr auch durch die 
Meldung nicht zu beunruhigen waren, daß ein ganzes Bataillon im Anrücken sei. Die Masse ist 
231 “Das Verschwimmen der Gestalten erfährt die kalte persona als Provokation. Erst recht, wenn sie im Innern des 
Staates aufkreuzen im ‘amorphen Körper der Massen’ – im Gewühl der Sonn- und Feiertage, im Aufruhr oder 
im ‘grauen Heer der Demobilmachung’ – als ‘Ferment der Zersetzung’ wirksam werden.
Die Umrisse des ‘Typus’ des Arbeiter-Soldaten […] verschwimmen nie” (Lethen 201-202). 
Indeed, Jünger describes aspects of the bourgeois world in terms of liquidity: “Den Arbeiter in einer durch 
die Gestalt bestimmten Rangordnung zu sehen, hat das bürgerliche Zeitalter nicht vermocht, weil ihm ein echtes 
Verhältnis zur Welt der Gestalten nicht gegeben war. Hier schmolz alles zu Ideen, Begriffen oder bloßen 
Erscheinungen ein, und die beiden Pole dieses flüssigen Raumes waren die Vernunft und die Empfindsamkeit. In
der letzten Verdünnung ist Europa, ist die Welt noch heute von dieser Flüssigkeit, von dieser blassen Tünche 
eines selbstherrlich gewordenen Geistes überschwemmt” (36). Yet the counterpart to bourgeois society, the mass
or mob, is also described in liquid terms that link it to the same dying world and contrast it to the rigid shape of 
the type: “Ewig würde [der Bürger] sich an seinen schönen Anklagen ergötzen, deren Grundpfeiler Tugend und 
Gerechtigkeit sind, wenn ihm nicht im rechten Augenblicke der Pöbel das unerwartete Geschenk seiner 
mächtigeren, aber gestaltlosen Kraft darbringen würde, die ihre Nahrung aus den Urkräften des Sumpfes zieht” 
(19). On the political use of motifs of floods and swamps, see Theweleit (vol. 1), especially 287-312 and 497-
501.
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heute nicht mehr fähig anzugreifen, ja sie ist nicht einmal mehr fähig, sich zu verteidigen” (110). 
Beyond the fantasies of power and evident misanthropy of such claims, Jünger’s argument is 
working on a formal level that contrasts the tightness of order to the looseness of an amorphous 
mass. This is an underlying pattern that unifies the various areas discussed in the text, from the 
control of individual perception, to the hardness of the body of the worker, to the epistemological
clarity of the Typus, to the crystalline integration of the Arbeiterstaat. It is difficult to say for 
certain whether these linkages among various levels are analogical, homological, 
microcosmic/macrocosmic, or merely rhetorically suggestive. It seems clear at least that 
causality is not a category his analysis favors,232 and at times Jünger’s presentation tosses up 
counterintuitive images. Where one of the strengths of the worker seems to be a total integration 
of organism and machine – an idea that is central to the book, as I’ll discuss below – in the case 
of the body of the masses, integration with technological and social infrastructures represents 
instead a vulnerability: “Das Verkehrswesen, die Versorgung mit den elementarsten 
Bedürfnissen, wie Feuer, Wasser und Licht, ein entwickeltes Kreditsystem und viele andere 
Dinge, von denen noch gesprochen werden wird, gleichen dünnen Strängen, freiligenden Adern, 
mit denen der amorphe Körper der Masse auf Tod und Leben verbunden ist” (111). The 
difference would seem to be topological. Where the positive integration with technology 
represented by the “organic construction” of the worker involves an incorporation of technology 
into the working body, here it seems to be the outed interior, in the form of exposed veins, that 
232 When describing the type of vision needed to perceive the deep contemporary metaphysical impact of the 
Arbeiter, Jünger describes cause and effect as a veil, in effect suggesting that they too are mere epiphenomena 
obscuring the deeper relationship between Gestalt and Typus. “wie könnte sich hier ein Auge, das wirklich zu 
sehen versteht, der Einsicht entziehen, daß hinter dem Schleier von Ursache und Wirkung, der sich unter den 
Kämpfen des Tages bewegt, Schicksal und Verehrung am Werke sind?” (45) For an excellent reading of the way 
Jünger’s text develops an authorial position uniquely able to perceive the relationship between metaphysical 
essence and surface appearance in a way that is both descriptive and performative/propagandistic, see Bühler 
(280-285).
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creates the sense of vulnerability. The extended body-machine integration that inverted the 
individual body in Döblin’s Berge Meere und Giganten, serving there to explode the isolated 
autonomy of the bourgeois individual, is here seen as the characteristic vulnerability of that body.
Concretely, then, one can at first glance make a much stronger case for the presence of the 
armored body in Jünger than in Döblin; the worker is invulnerable precisely because the 
apparatus has been recontained within the closed contours of the typical body. The problem with 
the bourgeois masses is precisely the amorphousness of that body, and as we saw above, the 
performative project of Der Arbeiter is to give shape to the body by presenting it with shaped 
bodies. 
This depiction of the mass also accounts for why Jünger insists that the mass and the 
individual are two sides of the same coin. Where Döblin deploys the type and the mass more or 
less synonymously against the bourgeois individual, Jünger articulates his definition of the type 
in contradistinction to the mass of individuals. The looseness and dissoluteness of the mass – 
Jünger refers to the Pöbel as drawing its strength from a “Sumpf”233 – correspond to the unique, 
ambiguous, sensitive bourgeois individual Jünger identifies with the 19th century.234 The type, by
contrast, appears in social formations that are seen to be much more discrete and more organized,
local expressions of an overriding and teleological Gestalt.
Nicht also innerhalb dieser Masse suchen wir den Einzelnen auf. Hier begegnen wir nur 
dem untergehenden Individuum, dessen Leiden in Zehntausende von Gesichtern 
eingegraben sind und dessen Anblick den Betrachter mit einem Gefühl der Sinnlosigkeit, 
233 (19)
234 “Im engsten Verhältnis zur Gesellschaft steht endlich der Einzelne, jene wunderliche und abstrakte Figur des 
Menschen, die kostbarste Entdeckung der bürgerlichen Empfindsamkeit und zugleich der unerschöpfliche 
Gegenstand ihrer künstlerischen Bildungskraft. Wie die Menschheit der Kosmos dieser Vorstellung, so ist der 
Mensch ihr Atom. Praktisch allerdings sieht der Einzelne sich nicht der Menschheit gegenüber, sondern der 
Masse, seinem genauen Spiegelbilde in dieser höchst sonderbaren, höchst imaginären Welt. Denn die Masse und
der Einzelne sind eins, und aus dieser Einheit ergibt sich das verblüffende Doppelbild von buntester, 
verwirrendster Anarchie und der nüchternen Geschäftsordnung der Demokratie, welches das Schauspiel eines 
Jahrhunderts war”(21).
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der Schwächung erfüllt. […] 
Es sind vielmehr Zusammenhänge anderer Art, innerhalb deren sich der neue 
Typus, der Schlag des 20. Jahrhunderts, anzudeuten beginnt.
Wir sehen ihn auftauchen innerhalb scheinbar sehr verschiedener Bildungen, die 
zunächst ganz allgemein als organische Konstruktionen zu bezeichnen sind. [...]”
Daß die Kräfte, die solche Gruppierungen veranlassen, andersartige geworden 
sind, deutet sich vielfach schon in einer Veränderung der Namen an. Aufmarsch statt 
Versammlung, Gefolgschaft statt Partei, Lager statt Tagung – darin drückt sich aus, daß 
nicht mehr der freiwillige Entschluß einer Reihe von Individuen als die 
unausgesprochene Voraussetzung der Zusammenkunft betrachtet wird. Diese 
Voraussetzung klingt vielmehr, wie es in Worten wie ‘Verein,’ ‘Sitzung’ und anderen 
deutlich wird, bereits das Belanglose oder das Lächerliche an. (113-114)
Given the way that the Typus Arbeiter is characterized against the bourgeois individual by 
foregrounding iterability, repetition, and substitution, it is interesting that the rejection of the 
mass of individuals works at least in part by invoking a sense of anonymity and 
indistinguishability. Descriptions such as, “...dessen Leiden in Zehntausende von Gesichtern 
eingegraben sind und dessen Anblick den Betrachter mit einem Gefühl der Sinnlosigkeit, der 
Schwächung erfüllt,” or “der freiwillige Entschluß einer Reihe von Individuen” work to 
undermine the individual’s claim to individuality. The agency seen to pertain to the individual is 
shifted onto the type by the various depictions of the impotence of massed individuals seen in the
above passages. In a similar vein, a feature of the bourgeois individual comes to be its 
featurelessness – as suggested by the image of “a row of individuals” and the depiction of the 
worker’s face cited above (107), it is now somewhat paradoxically the type that is recognizable 
because of its accentuated, if mask-like characters, while the uniqueness of the individual, 
reproduced in an endless series, merely lends a sense of fatality to its dissolution. Put simply, one
could explain this by extrapolating the idea that industrial modernity (with all that entails) has 
rendered the individual obsolete, and the type regains agency and control by embracing this state 
of affairs. This is implicit in Lethen’s reading of Der Arbeiter as presenting a code of conduct for
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adapting to a radically changed historical and social situation.
And indeed, thus far I have followed the basic contours of Lethen’s reading of Jünger. 
Against the Verschwommenheit and lack of distinction of the 19th century mass of individuals, 
the Typus Arbeiter presents us with multiple distinctions that work in concert on epistemological,
social, psychological, and political levels. The armored body and the clear gaze seem inextricable
in Der Arbeiter, and the repeated insistence on the metallic appearance of this new type suggests 
that we can, with Lethen, extend the analogical pairs of individual/type, mass/Arbeiterstaat, 
expression/mask, and vulnerable/armored to add organic/mechanical. To be sure, such a move is 
crucial to Lethen’s argument, which needs to see the mechanical, cold persona repressing its 
organic, creaturely side in order to be able to identify a code of conduct that would help navigate 
the fraught and uncertain landscape of Weimar culture. And yet, to see in Jünger’s text a strong 
dichotomy between the organic and the mechanical is to fundamentally misread Der Arbeiter by 
ignoring how it was working within existing discourses of the relationship between the body and 
mechanicity; doing so also risks conflating the Gestalt with the Typus and thereby missing the 
epistemological specificity of the former, which was not merely about making distinctions or 
armoring perception. When Lethen writes,
Der Typus, ein moderner Mensch, realisiert den Traum von der Synchronisation des 
Organismus mit der Gerätewelt. Sein Wesen ist technischen Apparaturen integriert. So 
wie er, eingeschlossen in einer ‘gepanzerten Zelle,’ die Intelligenz des Geschosses sein 
kann, so ersetzen elektrische Maschinen die Funktionen seines Zentralnervensystems. 
Jünger führt ihn in ‘kentaurischen’ Bildern vor, in der Verschalung von Maschine und 
Körper, als ‘organische Konstruktion’. […] Durch Funksignale erfahren wir, daß da noch 
ein Organismus in der metallischen Schale hockt – oder täuscht das Funkgerät seine 
Anwesenheit nur vor? (202)
we can agree that he correctly identifies the importance of the integration of organism and 
machine. Yet the provocatively uncertain question with which the passage ends, privileging the 
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mechanical over the organic, has more to do with Lethen’s project than with Jünger’s. For the 
latter, there can be no question about the presence of the organism within the machine, because 
his attack on the autonomous bourgeois individual, like Döblin’s, does not necessitate an 
organic/mechanical dichotomy and in fact explicitly rejects such a dichotomy, drawing its force 
largely from organic and biological registers.
To begin with, the body of the worker, the body in Der Arbeiter, is not the mechanical 
assemblage that we might expect. Jünger draws a distinction between two kinds of bodies, the 
Körper and the Leichnam.
Es ist sehr wichtig, daß wir wieder zu einem vollkommenen Bewußtsein der Tatsache 
vordringen, daß der Leichnam nicht etwa der entseelte Körper ist. Zwischen dem Körper 
in der Sekunde des Todes und dem Leichnam in der darauf folgenden besteht nicht die 
mindeste Beziehung; dies deutet sich darin an, daß der Körper mehr als die Summe seiner
Glieder umfaßt, während der Leichnam gleich der Summe seiner anatomischen Teile ist. 
Es ist ein Irrtum, daß die Seele wie eine Flamme Staub und Asche hinter sich läßt. Von 
höchstem Belange aber ist die Tatsache, daß die Gestalt den Elementen des Feuers und 
der Erde nicht unterworfen ist und daß daher der Mensch als Gestalt der Ewigkeit 
angehört. (34)
Recent scholarship on Der Arbeiter has recovered the influence of contemporary biological 
debates on the text.235 Of particular interest in light of this passage is the question of the 
mechanical nature of the body. Proponents of a mechanistic view such as Wilhelm Roux asserted 
that the workings of the body could be broken down into independent mechanical systems, while 
figures such as Hans Driesch and Felix Krueger drew on a vitalistic notion of entelechy to argue 
that the organic unity of the body is shaped by a teleological development and is thus more than 
the sum of its parts; Wolfgang Köhler, whose name is most closely associated with Gestalt 
theory, also provided a way of thinking about wholes as different from aggregates of parts.236 
235 Especially the essays by Thomas Löffler and Thomas Pekar in the edited volume Titan Technik. The relationship
between Der Arbeiter’s teleology and biological entelechy these two essays recover will be discussed in further 
detail below.
236 For more on the vitalism/mechanism debate within biology, see Bühler (47-74), Löffler (59, 64-65), and Pekar 
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Ernst Haeckel, meanwhile, drew on visual morphologies to encompass both living organs and 
mechanical tools under the umbrella concept of the organ.237 In the above passage, the Körper is 
a living unity while the Leichnam is nothing more than a collection of parts. Some surplus not 
reducible to a soul makes the body a living body and complicates any assumptions that the 
depsychologization central to Jünger’s text must also be a rejection of the organic.
Similar to the living body, the Gestalt – a central and subtitular concept in Der Arbeiter – 
also involves a whole that is more than the sum of its parts in a way explicitly linked to organic 
unity: “In der Gestalt ruht das Ganze, das mehr als die Summe seiner Teile umfaßt, und das 
einem anatomischen Zeitalter unerreichbar war” (31).238 While the visual connotations of Gestalt 
certainly help Jünger frame his argument about the recognizability of the type, it is a mistake to 
conflate the Typus with the Gestalt, and especially to attribute the clear contours of the former to 
the latter, which serves in Der Arbeiter rather as a determinate yet vague force that finds 
expression in the type of the worker. Often the meaning of Gestalt seems closer to something like
Zeitgeist or “guiding category” than to “figure.” As a guiding category, the Gestalt functions 
according to multiple organic logics, as we will see, and Jünger positions it behind history, rather 
than in history: “Ebenso wie die Gestalt des Menschen vor der Geburt war, und nach dem Tode 
sein wird, ist eine historische Gestalt im tiefsten unabhängig von der Zeit und den Umständen, 
(101-102, 112). For a discussion of the differences between Driesch and Köhler in the context of the 
mechanism/vitalism debate, see Plessner’s Stufen, 138-149.
237 Pekar (101).
238 Eric Michaud has described how “Gestalt” frequently occurred in titles and subtitles of texts written by Nazi 
ideologues (xiii). Besides the lexical overlap, a commonality between Jünger and Nazi thought as Michaud 
unfolds it would be the centrality of visible form. This is a connection that remains to be more fully explored. 
Further research on the relationship between Der Arbeiter and German fascism would also have to consider how
Jünger’s text fits the definition of myth developed by Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy in their essay, “The Nazi 
Myth” (1980) Provisionally, it seems there would be meaningful overlap between Jünger’s use, on the one hand,
of analogy and Stempel/Prägung as a kind of relationality instead of conceptuality or logical causality, and their 
characterization of the mythic importance of mimetic identification, on the other; as well as between their 
account of the key aesthetic features of myth and particularly the clarity of the Gestalt, and the connection in 
Jünger between the type and visible recognizability. The difference between Gestalt and Typus in Jünger could 
however complicate the applicability of their theory of German fascism to his work.
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denen sie zu entspringen scheint. Ihre Hilfsmittel sind höher, ihre Fruchtbarkeit ist unmittelbar. 
Die Geschichte bringt keine Gestalten hervor, sondern sie ändert sich mit der Gestalt. Sie ist die 
Tradition, die eine siegreiche Macht sich selbst verleiht” (79). The Gestalt is beyond a historical 
dialectic, “obwohl sie aus ihrer Substanz die Dialektik ernährt und mit Inhalten versieht” (77). 
While Jünger does not articulate the relationship between Typus and Gestalt as clearly in Der 
Arbeiter as he will in the 1963 essay, Typus, Name, Gestalt, one can say that the Typus is a 
subordinate and determinate expression of the Gestalt: the Typus appears, as we read, as the 
bearer (Träger) of Gestaltung (225). Thus the Gestalt is a transhistorical force that is necessarily 
an organic unity, while the Typus is the manifestation of this force within history. While the 
former is connected to indeterminacy and undifferentiation, the latter needs to be visibly 
recognizable and starkly differentiated. To foreground the clear contours and distinctions of the 
Typus alone, as Lethen does, is to lose sight of the role it plays in Jünger’s (admittedly imprecise)
conceptual framework. More generally, such an excision risks eclipsing the fundamentally 
associative, analogic workings of Jünger’s text – for any political postmortem of this 
Gedankengut, Jünger’s rejection of causality in favor of free association and analogy (or 
“Stempel und Prägung,” to use his preferred image239) is arguably more important to an 
understanding of the text’s relationship to fascism than its deployment of technological bodies.
The relationship between Typus and Gestalt implicit in Der Arbeiter is elaborated in the 
later essay.240 A brief sketch of this relationship will help elucidate the organic logics at play in 
239 For example, when describing the vitalistic unity of the Gestalt, Jünger writes, “Über die Rangordnung im 
Reiche der Gestalt entscheidet nicht das Gesetz von Ursache und Wirkung, sondern ein andersartiges Gesetz von
Stempel und Prägung; und wir werden sehen, daß in der Epoche, in die wir eintreten, die Prägung des Raumes, 
der Zeit und des Menschen auf eine einzige Gestalt, nämlich auf die des Arbeiters, zurückzuführen ist.” (31). 
This would also fit with Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s account of the logic of myth being mimetic identification
rather than conceptual rationality.
240 A full accounting of Jünger’s epistemology would be useful, and particularly an analysis of the development of 
the relationship between perception and ontology from the Weimar period to the later work. Much could be 
gained by bringing the categories of Typus and Gestalt from Der Arbeiter into contact with the essays 
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Der Arbeiter. After a discussion of the worker as type, Jünger writes, “Es ist also ein Unterschied,
ob eine Größe als Individuum, Typus oder Gestalt angesprochen wird. Das Wort durchläuft 
Stufen der Verdichtung oder auch der Vergeistigung. Dabei ist der Typus am schärfsten umrissen;
er steht im Brennpunkt zwischen Erscheinung und Gestalt” (144). Here Jünger positions the 
Typus between the individual phenomenon and the Gestalt – more significant is the explanation 
of the type’s sharp contours. In the broader framework of Jünger’s presentation, the type is 
associated with clarity, sharp contours, differentiation, and armoring on primarily 
epistemological grounds. Compared to individuals, the type needs to have a basic recognizability
– the type is to individuals something like a concept is to a set of objects, but the specifically 
visual dimension is central to their relationship for Jünger.241 Compared to the Gestalt, the Typus 
needs to condense characteristics of a broader spirit of an age into an image that seems to 
function symbolically. This is what I take to be the implication of the following passage:
Wir sahen, daß der Typus einerseits vom Gegenstand, andererseits vom Ungesonderten 
her Licht empfängt: Licht und LICHT. Daher ist seine handgreifliche Realität geringer als
jene der Gegenstände und Individuen – er kommt in der Natur nicht vor. Dagegen sind 
seine Konturen schärfer, geistiger und daher gültiger, gesetzmäßiger, dauernder als jene 
der handgreiflichen Erscheinungen. Im Typus wird das Ungesonderte sichtbar, und zwar 
dadurch, daß es im Gegenstand erscheint – oder anders ausgedrückt: im Typus sagt das 
Objekt aus, daß es mehr enthält als seine gesonderte Erscheinung, nämlich Gemeinsames.
Das wird durch Intuition erfaßt und mit dem Wort gesetzt. […] Anders ist es mit der 
Gestalt. Hier kommt das Ungesonderte, das in dieser Hinsicht besser als das Namenlose 
anzusprechen ist, in weit größerem Umfang ins Spiel. […] Die Gestalt kann daher nicht, 
wie der Typus, durch Vergleichung mit dem Objekt gesichert und revidiert werden. (168)
Here again is an explicit reason for the sharpness of the contours of the type. Its position between
accompanying Renger-Patzsch’s photographic collections Bäume (1962) and Gestein (1966), not to mention 
with postwar novels such as Gläserne Bienen (1957).
241 On the centrality of visual perception and ways of seeing to Jünger’s thought, see especially Marcus Bullock 
(1992). For a compelling problematization of the centrality of the visual in Jünger’s work, see Julia 
Kleinheider’s 2010 dissertation, Illusions of Armor: The Haptic Body in Ernst Jünger’s Early Works. 
Kleinheider complicates the preference given to logics of the visual in discussions of modernism by recovering 
the central role of touch in the way that Jünger understood and reworked the figure of the human body, thus 
adding an important, well, perspective to our understanding of Weimar culture’s “visual turn.”
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the undifferentiated nature of the Gestalt and the world of isolated objects – and not merely its 
particular historical manifestation in industrial modernity – is what stamps the Typus with its 
strong delineation. Where the Gestalt is too vague, too timeless, and too diffuse to be identified 
with the clarity of the Typus, the world of phenomena is too ephemeral to generate the more 
stable shape seen in types. In this way, Jünger is able to combine the sharpness and precision 
associated with the Typus (and with its chief exemplar, the worker of modern, industrial society) 
with forms of relationality and knowledge that work through logics of association, analogy, and 
affinity. “Die typischen Züge werden in einer mathematischen Schärfe bewußt, der sich die Natur
selbst in den Kristallen nur annähert. Der Gestalt gegenüber treten nicht nur die Umrisse, sondern
tritt auch das auf sie gerichtete Bewußtsein zurück. Ein tieferes, ahnungsvolleres Wissen wird 
berührt – Verwandschaft, die nicht in der gestalteten, sondern in der gestaltenden Natur ihre 
Heimstatt hat. Hier fehlt es an Vergleichbarem” (169). Contrary to the clear visibility of the 
Typus, the Gestalt necessitates a different, more intuitive kind of perception. While the portrayal 
of the non-quantifiability of the Gestalt found in the later essay contrasts with the often heavy 
emphasis on mathematical precision found in Der Arbeiter, the basic relationship between Typus 
and Gestalt is the same in both texts. A Typus is the relatively local manifestation of a Gestalt 
that is less determinate, transhistorical, and undifferentiated: 
Gestalten aber kommen aus dem Unvermessenen unmittelbar, aus Regionen, denen 
gegenüber das schärfste Fernrohr wie das beste Mikroskop den Dienst versagt. Der 
Übergang zu ihnen führt nicht durch Quantitäten, kann also nicht durch bessere 
Instrumentation erreicht werden. Es sind vielmehr die Qualitäten zu erfassen, die letzthin 
jeder Art von Ausdehnung Sinn geben. Dazu tut keine neue Optik, sondern ein neues 
Augen not. (139)
The need for new eyes to see the Gestalt is significant here, as is the claim that merely a new 
apparatus wouldn’t quite cut it. In the context of the idea of prosthetic vision in Jünger’s early 
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work,242 this claim underscores both Jünger’s call for a radical new vision and the limits of 
readings of Der Arbeiter that tie this vision exclusively to discourses of technology, defined in 
opposition to the organic. It should therefore also be noted that Typus, Name, Gestalt contains 
something like a methodological declaration at the beginning of the text, where Jünger describes 
the difficulty of accounting for Typus and Gestalt in a way that strongly recalls the organicism of 
his depiction in Der Arbeiter of the living body and the Gestalt as unities that are more than the 
sums of their parts: 
Das Thema ist einfach, und darin liegt seine Schwierigkeit. Einfache Dinge sind 
schwieriger zu beschreiben als komplizierte, weil sie dem Namenlosen näher liegen und 
der Beschreibende auf den Grund der Sprache zurückgreifen muß. Eine komplizierte 
Maschine mit ihren Einzelteilen und deren Zusammenwirken läßt sich in einer Vorschrift 
mit absoluter Genauigkeit darstellen. Weit einfachere und überall prägende Formen wie 
Typen und Gestalten sind schwieriger zugänglich. (85)
A mechanistic assemblage, modular and causal, can be broken down into its constituent parts and
exactly (and anatomically243) portrayed without remainder, while the organic unity of the Typus 
and the Gestalt means that there is an excess that cannot be encompassed by language. The 
opposition Jünger is constructing here is between a system composed of autonomous parts and an
organic unity that is more than the sum of its parts. Without this organicist and vitalist excess, I 
do not see how it is possible to make sense either of the logic of Der Arbeiter in general or of the 
figure of the worker in particular.
What I hope to have indicated with this brief excursion to Typus, Name, Gestalt is 
therefore the particular contours of a relationship among epistemology, ontology, and history that
is central to Der Arbeiter, and in so doing to have problematized an understanding of Der 
Arbeiter that privileges only the mechanical, armored, mathematically precise aspects of Jünger’s
242 See especially Kleinheider and Bullock in this context.
243 “In der Gestalt ruht das Ganze, das mehr als die Summe seiner Teile umfaßt, und das einem anatomischen 
Zeitalter unerreichbar war” (Der Arbeiter 31).
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vision. The possibilities Jünger allows for accessing knowledge of the Typus and the Gestalt, and 
in particular the associative, intuitive, analogical understanding he sees as necessary,244 are 
themselves determined by his ontological framework – perhaps this could provisionally be called
a Platonic Lebensphilosophie – that divides being into individual manifestation, type, and 
Gestalt, each with a particular form of perception or knowledge appropriate to it. This in turn 
generates a paradoxical view of history as both cyclical and teleological – cyclical because of the
way that types, themselves the historical concretion of ephemeral individual phenomena, will 
come to manifest an underlying, transhistorical/ahistorical Gestalt, and teleological because the 
logic of Gestalt demands an absolute fulfillment, a demand seen in the scattered avowals that the 
age of the worker is not just representative of one type among others, but is rather the age in 
which the logic of Typus and Gestalt comes into its own. As paradigms, these two possibilities 
for history can be described as an elemental, tidally recurring logic on the one hand, and a logic 
associated with organic growth and metamorphosis, on the other. It is to the latter of these two 
logics that I now turn.
It is no accident that the Typus bears a resemblance to biological schemes of 
classification. In Typus, Name, Gestalt, Jünger draws an analogy to botanical classification to 
provide an example of the relationship between Typus and Gestalt. Just as the the Gattung of the 
lily is located between all individual lilies and species of lilies on the one hand and the larger 
category of plants in general on the other, the type is located between individual phenomena and 
the Gestalt. In the context of the text, this analogy perhaps raises more questions than it answers, 
but it is significant not just because it shows the way that the Typus and the Gestalt are as much 
epistemologies (in the form of schemes of classification) as ontologies (in that the plant’s more 
244 In his study of Jünger, Martin Mayer has written in detail of the surrealistic dream logic privileged in Jünger’s 
writings of the 1920s and 1930s, particularly in the context of Das abenteuerliche Herz. 
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nebulous status seems to stand in for essential characteristics of the category of planthood), but 
also because it suggests that the indeterminacy that links these various categories is a particularly
vitalist one having to do with growth and change. Ernst Jünger’s Nebenberuf as an entomologist 
is well known, and specifically biological classificatory schemes comprise an important 
Leitmotif in his work. Moreover, at a key moment in the presentation of Der Arbeiter, Jünger 
compares the transition from the bourgeois individual to the worker to a biological 
metamorphosis, something that cannot be explained or understood by recourse to 
“Entwicklungsgeschichte”: “Wir deuteten bereits an, daß ein Verarmungsprozeß unbestreitbar ist.
Er beruht auf der Grundtatsache, daß das Leben sich selbst verzehrt, wie es innerhalb der Puppe 
geschieht, in der das Imago die Raupe konsumiert” (116).
In one form or another, organicist modes of change and transition are crucial to the logic 
of history in Der Arbeiter. To put it simply, one of the perhaps surprising things about the text is 
that it is a historical diagnosis of modern industrial society that portrays that society as the result 
of a natural – biological, organic, elemental – fulfillment. Specifically, the teleological drive of 
Der Arbeiter – the immanent movement towards the total Arbeiterstaat – can be seen as an 
extension of the logic of biological entelechy as propagated by Hans Driesch.245 As Thomas 
Löffler and Thomas Pekar have shown, Driesch’s adaptation of the concept of entelechy links an 
attack on a mechanistic, anatomical view of life with the idea that living organisms comprise 
unified wholes that develop according to immanent goals, in a way that resonates strongly with 
Jünger’s idea of the “organische Konstruktion.” Driesch developed the concept of entelechy as a 
245 While for Pekar, Löffler, and the present study, the connection between the teleology of Der Arbeiter and 
biological entelechy is primarily a conceptual and rhetorical one – i.e., understanding the logic, stakes, and 
metaphorical features of the latter can help us make sense of the former – there is also a historical connection to 
be made, as Jünger may well have been exposed to neovitalism through his teachers in Leipzig, Hans Driesch 
and Felix Krueger (Löffler 57-58).
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critique of the mechanical biology of Wilhelm Roux.246 As Löffler shows, both Driesch’s 
entelechy and the teleology of Der Arbeiter involve a necessary connection between the organic 
whole that is more than the sum of its parts and the guiding drive that propels it towards self-
fulfillment: 
Driesch und Jünger fassen das ‘Ganze’ bzw. die ‘Gestalt’ auf als Wahrnehmungsweise 
bzw. als Qualität der Sichtbarkeit einer letztlich metaphysisch begründeten Wirklichkeit: 
beide wollen eine Sehhilfe anbieten, die in der amorphen Zersplitterung der modernen 
Realität auf ‘Ganzheit’ gerichtet ist. […] Driesch und Jünger gehen von einer teleologisch
wirkenden, gestaltenden Kraft aus, die die innere und äußere Wirklichkeit gleichsam 
bestimmt und harmonisch koordiniert. Diese Kraft wirkt die Ganzheit und Einheit alles 
Lebendigen bzw. Wirklichen. Sie ist gleichsam immanent und hat eine metaphysisch 
transzendente Realität. Die ‘Entelechie’ bzw. die ‘Gestalt’ wirken ‘endganzheitsbezogen,’ 
das ‘Ganze’ läßt sich nicht aus der Summe seiner diskreten Einheiten ableiten, sondern 
hat einen teleologischen Überschuß. (64)
Understanding the development of Typus and Gestalt in Der Arbeiter in terms of entelechy can 
help account for the relationship between nature and history in general in that text, and how the 
vision of a particular historical form (the modern, industrial worker) can come to stand in for the 
culmination of human history outside of a class narrative or any sort of causal mechanism. The 
logic of organic growth also provides a way to understand the symbolic function of the type: 
indeed, in Typus, Name, Gestalt Jünger discusses Goethe’s idea of the Urpflanze (and the 
symbol).
Yet the idea that entelechy provides a model for the teleology at play in Der Arbeiter 
raises a number of questions about the historical status of the Typus and the Gestalt. We have 
246 “Hans Driesch widersprach der biologischen Entwicklungsmechanik und ihrem physikalischen Erkenntnisideal 
seines Lehrers Wilhelm Roux. […] Die Entwicklung lebendiger Organismen sei durch eine physikalische 
Maschinentheorie nicht erklärbar. … Daher suchte Driesch nach dem steuernden Lebensfaktor, den er in 
Anlehnung an die aristotelische Tradition als ‘Entelechie’ bezeichnete … : ‘Entelechie ‘ist’ im Sinne 
empirischen Wirklichseins ebenso wirklich wie potentielle Energie, Potential, Affinität usw.; erfahrbar ist aber 
immer nur ihre Wirkung, ihr Gewirkthaben, im Produkt. Nicht ist sie vor ihrem Gewirkthaben erfahrbar.’ 
(Driesch 1917...) Die ‘Enteleichie’ bewirkt – Driesch zufolge – die Gestaltung zur ‘Ganzheit,’ die nicht 
summarisch, d.h. mechanisch erklärt werden könne. Sie stelle das alles durchwaltende Lebensprinzip dar, durch 
welches alles Lebendige verbunden sei.” (Löffler 59)
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seen that these are epistemological forms as well as historical ones: type and Gestalt are 
privileged as a way of understanding the world. Recall for instance the way the defined face of 
the worker is mirrored in his defining gaze, schooled on the observation of rapid motion (107-
108). But Typus and Gestalt are also presented as historical forms – Der Arbeiter heralds the 
arrival of an age determined by Typus and Gestalt. They are described both as objective features 
of modernity and as ways of thinking.247 So are these categories ways for seeing and classifying 
things, are they the things that need to be seen, or are they somehow both?
Der Typus repräsentiert ein andersartiges Menschentum, in dessen Bannkreis sich auch 
die notwendige Spannung verändert, die zu allen Zeiten zwischen dem Einzelnen und der 
Gemeinschaft besteht. Die Veränderung sowohl des Menschen wie seiner 
Gemeinschaften aber ist nur ein Ausdruck der übergeordneten Tatsache, daß eine Welt, in 
der die allgemeinen Begriffe herrschen, abgelöst wird durch eine Welt der Gestalt. Von 
hier aus, und nicht etwa durch die Gemeinschaft, wird die Einheit der Gestaltung 
garantiert, als deren Träger der Typus erscheint. (225)
This passage implies that the Typus is a historical phenomenon rather than simply one category in
an epistemological or ontological framework, as the analogy to the lily in Typus, Name, Gestalt 
would imply. It represents “ein andersartiges Menschentum,” and is described in the process of 
replacing a world ruled by general concepts. This movement fits well with the dissolution of 
liberal bourgeois democracy in favor of the Arbeiterstaat and suggests that Jünger is depicting a 
transition that is both epistemological (since one has to now think in types and Gestalten rather 
than concepts) and historical, since the worker seems not just to be a type, but the type. This 
could perhaps be attributed to a conceptual and methodological imprecision of Der Arbeiter, and 
specifically the way it often works through analogies that are more suggestive than anything else.
But if we take seriously the challenge of accounting for Jünger’s essay as a text that is a 
247 “Es gehört aber zu den Kennzeichen einer neuen Zeit, daß in ihr die bürgerliche Gesellschaft, gleichviel, ob sie 
ihren Freiheitsbegriff in der Masse oder im Individuum zur Darstellung bringen möge, zum Tode verurteilt ist. 
Der erste Schritt besteht darin, daß man in diesen Formen nicht mehr denkt und fühlt, der zweite, daß man in 
ihnen nicht mehr tätig ist” (21).
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Zeitdiagnose, polemic, manifesto, and prognostic vision all in one, we have to find a way of 
understanding why the categories of the Typus and the Gestalt are not just a convenient, 
incidental form of presentation for the figure of the worker, but rather offer Jünger a compelling 
trajectory for the specifically modern – and therefore historical – worker who also announces the 
end of history. To do so, we need to see what this end of history looks like.
That is, if entelechy indeed shapes the particular development of Der Arbeiter, then it is 
worth looking at the characteristic features of the telos of Jünger’s teleology. What we find, 
instead of a set of guidelines for how to behave in a chaotic, uncertain age, is a vision that opens 
into a posthistorical stasis marked by consistency, stability, and the end of alienation. 
Technology, which Jünger increasingly refers to as “die Mitteln,” attains the naturalness and 
instinctual self-evidence of a bodily organ; the distinction between the organic and the 
mechanical collapses; and a new balance where human activity takes on the orderliness of 
metabolic processes is seen as the eventual result of the present, dynamic disorder.
Der Arbeiter uses the figure of “organische Konstruktion” to describe a state where 
technology has been perfected to the point where it is indistinguishable from nature.248
Wir streiften bereits den Begriff der organischen Konstruktion, die sich in Bezug auf den 
Typus äußert als enge und widerspruchslose Verschmelzung des Menschen mit den 
Werkzeugen, die ihm zur Verfügung stehen. In bezug auf diese Werkzeuge selbst ist von 
organischer Konstruktion dann zu sprechen, wenn die Technik jenen höchsten Grad von 
Selbstverständlichkeit erreicht, wie er tierischen oder pflanzlichen Gliedmaßen 
innewohnt. […] Wir machen die Erfahrung, daß der Verlauf dieses Vorganges nicht nur 
eine höhere Befriedigung des Verstandes, sondern auch des Auges bewirkt, – und zwar 
mit jener Absichtslosigkeit bewirkt, die zu den Kennzeichen des organischen Wachstum 
gehört. (178-179, emphasis added)
The telos of technology is the attainment of a state that negates its distinction as technology. The 
importance of this logic for the overall trajectory of Der Arbeiter cannot be overstated, and 
248 For further discussions of the figure of the “organische Konstruktion,” see Bühler (268-270), Löffler, and Pekar.
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indeed, the passage incorporates other key features of the essay as a whole: the linkage between 
teleology and biological entelechy, satisfaction of visual perception as the mark of an innate 
harmony, technology becoming a part of the body rather than something extraneous to it. The 
point of “organische Konstruktion,” beyond merely binding the two apparently contrary spheres 
of nature (“organisch”) and technology (“Konstruktion”) into a unity, is a way of expressing a 
movement towards the end of alienation. 
Organische Konstruktion ist erst dann möglich, wenn der Mensch in hoher Einheit mit 
seinen Mitteln erscheint und wenn der quälende Zwiespalt berichtigt ist, der ihn heute, 
aus Gründen, die wir bereits untersuchten, diese Mittel als revolutionäre empfinden läßt. 
Erst dann löst sich die Spannung zwischen Natur und Zivilisation, zwischen organischer 
und mechanischer Welt, und erst dann kann von endgültiger, sowohl eigenartiger wie 
jedem historischen Maßstab ebenbürtiger Gestaltung die Rede sein. (216-217, emphasis 
added)
A strong nature/technology dichotomy is experienced as a rift and a form of alienation to be 
overcome. Just as the the armored type needs the broader context of the diffuse Gestalt to be 
properly understood, the programmatic thrust of Der Arbeiter only really makes sense in light of 
the trajectory towards a state where technology is not experienced as exogenous to the body but 
rather as a natural part of it. To see either an antinomy or a value distinction between the organic 
and the mechanical is in fact a sign of the “weakened” bourgeois existence, transcending which 
is the project of Der Arbeiter.249 Far from the mechanical repression of organic and creaturely 
dimensions, such a dichotomy is in fact a symptom of the historical condition to be overcome: 
“Technik und Natur sind keine Gegensätze – werden sie so empfunden, so ist dies ein Zeichen 
dafür, daß das Leben nicht in Ordnung ist” (193). Jünger’s phrasing here is worth dwelling on. 
249 “Dasselbe gilt für das Verhältnis, das zwischen dem Menschen und seinen Mitteln besteht, – schon in der 
Tatsache, daß dieses Verhältnis als gegensätzlich, als feindlich begriffen wird, verrät sich der Mangel an 
Totalität. Es ist diese wertmäßige Unterscheidung von mechanischer und organischer Welt eines der 
Kennzeichen der geschwächten Existenz, die den Angriffen eines Lebens unterliegen wird, das sich seinen 
Mitteln mit jener naiven Sicherheit verwachsen fühlt, mit der sich das Tier seiner Organe bedient” (227).
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While the immediate significance of the final clause is that the perceived opposition between 
nature and technology indicates a fundamental discord that needs to be sorted out, the 
connotations go deeper. The conjunction of “Leben” and “Ordnung” in this context affects how 
we must understand the function of both life and order in Der Arbeiter. “Leben” marks the set of 
social arrangements and the particular historical shape of human society more generally, but it 
also needs to be read in the context of a vitalism that sees life not just in social or even biological
terms, but as the fundamental generative force underlying all existence and change. Martin 
Lindner has shown how the conception of Leben that had broad appeal and influence from the 
late 19th through the early 20th century worked through a metaphoric of flows and liquid. The 
unformed, surging potential of a liquid state provides a metaphorical framework for change and 
becoming that casts any manifestation of form as a momentary solidification subject to 
dissolution and reformation. The forms come and go, but the underlying flow remains and drives 
these changes. And as we shall see in a moment, metaphors of fluidity are key to the teleological 
development in Der Arbeiter. “Ordnung,” on the other hand, is not just an indication that things 
are right, “in order,” but rather signifies the posthistorical, teleological stasis that is the goal of 
the development depicted in Der Arbeiter. Ordnung is the resolution of the dynamic chaos of the 
essay’s present in the fixed, reconciled, crystalline structure of its invoked future. 
While chiasms can often be analytically cheap, I think one would be justified in seeing 
and establishing one here, since both Leben and Ordnung are determined by each other. Rather 
than being two terms that merely happen to fall into accord when a nature/technology dichotomy 
has been resolved (as in, now life happens to be in order), each term inflects the other to the 
extent that they become apparently synonymous for Jünger. Leben is an ordering principle, the 
ordering principle in Der Arbeiter, with the forms of development and relationality in the essay 
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determined by logics of growth, entelechy, and elemental forces. On the other hand, the 
conception of life Jünger draws on is one that necessitates certain kinds of order, such that the 
“natural” progress and triumph of the worker can be alternately teleological and cyclical, 
depending on the valences of the moment. 
Life is order in Der Arbeiter, and this foundational copula both shapes the contours of the 
vision for an Arbeiterstaat beyond imbalance and alienation, and allows this vision to be depicted
as a final stasis. The movement towards this stasis is consistently described as a “Verschmelzung 
der organischen und mechanischen Kräfte.”250 The fusion between organic and mechanical is 
meant to be absolute, a symbol of the totally altered world of the worker: “Der berühmte 
Unterschied zwischen Stadt und Land besteht heute nur noch im romantischen Raum; er ist 
ebenso ungültig wie der Unterschied zwischen organischer und mechanischer Welt” (160). And 
while the period of transition to a world where every human (and cosmic251) activity falls under 
the sign of Arbeit is necessarily experienced as one of upheaval and rapid change, one problem 
with reading Der Arbeiter as a text that takes a certain understanding of its chaotic, uncertain 
social present (the Weimar era) and prescribes this understanding to a desired future, as Lethen 
does, is that such a reading does not account for the repeated insistence on the stasis to come. In 
other words, the value of Verhaltenslehren is not clear if the text’s vision is a world where these 
wouldn’t really be necessary.
Es gibt keinen triftigen Grund, der der Annahme entgegensteht, daß sich eines Tages eine 
Konstanz der Mittel ergeben wird. Eine solche Beständigkeit durch lange Zeiträume 
hindurch ist vielmehr die Regel, während das fieberhafte Tempo der Veränderung, in dem
wir uns befinden, ohne geschichtliches Beispiel ist. Die Dauer dieser Art von 
250 “Der Verlauf dieses Vorganges erfordert bei wachsender Perfektion der Mittel eine immer engere Verschmelzung
der organischen und mechanischen Kräfte, – eine Verschmelzung, die wir als organische Konstruktion 
bezeichneten” (209).
251 “Arbeit ist das Tempo der Faust, der Gedanken, des Herzens, das Leben bei Tage und Nacht, die Wissenschaft, 
die Liebe, die Kunst, der Glaube, der Kultus, der Krieg; Arbeit ist die Schwingung des Atoms und die Kraft, die 
Sterne und Sonnensysteme bewegt.” (65)
227
Veränderlichkeit ist begrenzt, sei es, daß der ihr zugrunde liegende Wille zerbricht, sei es, 
daß er seine Ziele erreicht. Da wir solche Ziele zu sehen glauben, ist die Betrachtung der 
ersten Möglichkeit für uns bedeutungslos. […] Wir wollen dies so ausdrücken, daß der 
Abschluß der Mobilisierungen der Welt durch die Gestalt des Arbeiters ein 
gestaltmäßiges Leben ermöglichen wird. (175)
The “totale Mobilmachung” envisioned by Der Arbeiter is supposed to come to an end in a state 
of constancy (“Beständigkeit”).252 In accordance with the biological logic of this entelechical 
unfolding, the economic and social instability of capitalism and a liberal democracy in transition 
will be replaced by an economic, social, and political order that has more in common with 
metabolic movement and ecological processes:
Erst nach Erreichung eines Abschlusses kann, wie von Ordnung überhaupt, so auch von 
einer geordneten Ökonomie, das heißt von einem berechenbaren Verhältnis zwischen 
Ausgaben und Einnahmen, die Rede sein. Erst die unbedingte Konstanz der Mittel, 
gleichviel wie dies Mittel immer geartet seien, ist imstande, die maßlose und 
unberechenbare Konkurrenz zurückzuführen auf eine natürliche Konkurrenz, wie sie 
innerhalb der Naturreiche oder historisch gewordener Gesellschaftszustände zu 
beobachten ist. 
Auch hier wiederum enthüllt sich die Einheit von organischer und mechanischer 
Welt; die Technik wird Organ und tritt als selbständige Macht zurück in demselben Maße,
in dem sie an Perfektion und damit an Selbstverständlichkeit gewinnt.
Erst die Konstanz der Mittel ermöglicht auch die gesetzmäßige Regelung der 
Konkurrenz... (177-178)
Accompanying the attained stasis of a metabolic exchange is a spatialization of historical 
processes or, more precisely, the replacement of dynamic turmoil with an orderly spatial 
distribution: “In [der Perfektion der Technik] deutet sich an die Ablösung eines dynamischen und
revolutionären Raumes durch einen statischen und höchst geordneten Raum. Es vollzieht sich 
also hier ein Übergang von der Veränderung zur Konstanz, – ein Übergang, der freilich sehr 
bedeutende Folgen zeitigen wird” (170-171).
This, then, is the vision of Jünger’s text. The armored contours and precise control of the 
252 “Die Perfektion der Technik ist nichts anderes als eines der Kennzeichen für den Abschluß der Totalen 
Mobilmachung, in der wir begriffen sind. Sie vermag daher wohl das Leben auf eine höhere Stufe der 
Organisation zu erheben, nicht aber, wie der Fortschritt glaubte, auf eine höhere Stufe des Wertes” (170).
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Typus Arbeiter announce the workings of a transhistorical Gestalt, the full realization of which 
will be a teleological fulfillment along the lines of biological entelechy, ending in a state where 
nature and technology, organ and machine, have become one and the turbulent dynamism of 
history is sublated in a rigidly ordered, static space. My reconstruction of Der Arbeiter’s 
trajectory is quite different from Lethen’s, and it is worth considering the implications of this 
discrepancy. In order to marshal the figure of the worker as another example of the cold persona, 
Lethen needs to psychologize (as it were) the depsychologization of Der Arbeiter – the armored 
body of the worker needs to be a defense against the threat of ego dissolution in the face of the 
collapse of bourgeois norms and the technological onslaughts of the modern world. Armoring, 
typological distinctions, and clear perception are seen to work together to preserve a kind of 
solidity. This relationship can certainly be found in Jünger’s text and it is an important 
component of his argument, but it is not the whole story. We have seen how, to stay on the level 
of metaphor and imagery, liquidity has a positive valence as well as a threatening side. While 
Der Arbeiter does describe bourgeois society as a morass,253 the key figure of “organische 
Konstruktion” is depicted as a Verschmelzung. Furthermore the category of danger, consistently 
given a positive valence in Jünger’s work, is described in liquid terms, as a violent element that 
surges up from hidden springs and threatens to sweep away the levies of a repressive bourgeois 
order (48-49). And finally, the key image of electricity also works in a similar way to metaphors 
of liquid. While Lethen does grant the centrality of electricity for Jünger, it is only as a model of 
control between the individual worker and the center of power. In a similar fashion to the way he 
underplays the logic of Verschmelzung, when it comes to electricity Lethen explicitly brackets 
out the components of the metaphoric tied to vitalistic imagery and also elides how electricity 
253 (38)
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functions as a model of collectivity for Jünger.254 Not just an image of the relationship between 
power and workers, the electric metaphor in Der Arbeiter link all workers in a rigid collectivity 
and must be seen as a counterpart to the metabolic regulation of the Arbeiterstaat. Incorporation 
and fusion, not armored divisions, are the endpoint of the text, and this profoundly alters the way 
in which Jünger’s text can be said to engage with the tropes of the cold persona and instrumental 
body in particular, and the relationship between nature and technology more generally.
Shorn of this dimension, Jünger’s text would be a very different one. Precisely those 
aspects of Der Arbeiter Lethen seeks to claim for the cold persona depend on the organic logic 
repressed by the cold persona. In particular, the text’s frontal assault on bourgeois subjectivity 
and interiority work, as we have seen, not through a repression of the organic but by a 
totalization of an organic register. Moreover, the critique of a body/soul dualism, the hallmark of 
many early 20th-century afterlives of vitalism, monism, and Lebensphilosophie, parallels in Der 
Arbeiter the robust rejection of the distinction between the organic and mechanical.
Die Mittel der Zeit [i.e., modern technology] sind nicht Hindernisse, sondern Prüfsteine 
der Kraft, und der Umfang der Herrschaft wird durch das Maß gekennzeichnet, in dem 
der einheitliche Einsatz der Mittel gelingt. Ein solcher Einsatz ist nicht von dort zu 
erwarten, wo noch das Gefühl eines entscheidenden Gegensatzes zwischen mechanischer 
und organischer Welt besteht, in dem eine letzte Verflachung des alten Gegensatzes 
zwischen Körper und Seele zu erblicken ist. (225)
Just as the distinction between body and soul was seen as foundational to a bourgeois subjectivity
that invested the nuanced traits of the individual in the soul, here Jünger ties the preservation of 
254 “Den elektrischen Medien mißt Jünger einen besonderen Rang zu, sie besitzen die Qualität von Maschinen, die 
nicht wie die ältere Generation der technischen Geräte nur die Muskelkraft, sondern die Funktionen des 
Zentralnervensystems ersetzen. Neben diesen Eigenschaften, die Jünger der ‘Elektrizität’ abgewinnt, sieht er 
noch einen weiteren Grund, sie zur Zentralmetapher seines System-Denkens zu erheben: das Elektrizitäts-Netz 
untersteht der Verfügungsgewalt des Staates, der alle Anschlüsse kontrolliert und jeden Empfänger von Strom 
einem ‘Energieverband’ integriert. […] Das Eindringen der Metaphern der Elektrizitätslehre in Philosophie und 
Literatur ist darauf zurückzuführen, daß in ihnen die unfaßbare Qualität des ‘élan vital’ zum Ausdruck gebracht 
werden kann. […] Dieser lebensideologische Gedanke wird in Jüngers Konstruktion durchgestrichen; er setzt 
die Elektrizitätsmetapher nur ein, um den eindimensional-systemischen Charakter der Sozietät des ‘Arbeiters’ zu
charakterisieren” (210-211).
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an organic-mechanical dichotomy to an outmoded value system that pits them against each other 
and is thus unable to adequately grasp their radical integrations. Curiously, Lethen’s [assertion of 
a] repression of the organic in Der Arbeiter reprises this move to suggest that the technological 
selves of workers must quash their creaturely nature in order to reject psychological interiority, 
while the depsychologization in Der Arbeiter does nearly the complete opposite. Jünger’s text 
needs various organic and elemental logics to forward a new vision of subjectivity opposed to the
bourgeois world, to sketch out a model for historical change and becoming, and to propose a 
historical trajectory that ends in the abolition of history in favor of a static natural order.
My use of Lethen in this chapter was not designed to single out a particular reading of 
Ernst Jünger’s text but rather to consider the analytic pitfalls of importing a strong 
nature/technology dichotomy into our textual objects. In the context of Weimar culture, the risk is
not just missing the substantial role of the organic in discourses of technology, and especially the 
important inheritances from Lebensphilosophie, monism, and contemporary biology, although 
this is a significant blind spot. More acute is the way that the repression of the organic can result 
in readings of Weimar culture as constituting a unified trajectory, either in a teleological (i.e., 
towards 1933 and fascism) or etiological way (i.e., against the background of WWI and the 
varied and at times nebulous traumas of industrialization, urbanization, modernization, collapse 
of the monarchy, etc.). The chief problem with reading Der Arbeiter as one behavior manual 
among others is not just that it may level the distinctions between it and very different texts of 
the period, but that it collapses the different features, functions, and modes of address of Jünger’s
essay.255 Lethen’s reading of Der Arbeiter, in order to show that Jünger’s text does in fact offer 
255 Bühler has written compellingly and at length on the way that the authorial function in Der Arbeiter is a dual 
one, taking on the functions both of objective analysis (grounded in a privileged vision of the relationship 
between historical manifestation and deeper, hidden metaphysical truths on the one hand, and of propaganda and
exhortation, on the other (281-285).
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codes of conduct, needs to see it both as a straight depiction (rather than a stylized presentation) 
of its contemporary moment and as a kind of how-to guide (rather than a more mediated 
engagement with a future vision). 
In Walter Serners Handbrevier für Hochstapler, Bert Brechts Lesebuch für 
Städtebewohner und Ernst Jüngers Der Arbeiter werden die extremen Bedingungen, unter
denen sich zivilisationsfreundliche Verhaltenslehren im Kontext der Republik 
“verkörpern” sollten, sinnfällig. Sie demonstrieren, was geschieht, wenn sich 
Anthropologie mit der Logik des Extrems verschwistert. In dieser Literatur treffen wir 
auf eine persona, die in chronischen Alarmzustand versetzt ist. (12)
To view radically different texts, or any individual literary text for that matter, as a 
straightforward depiction of social “conditions” is a methodological leap that seems unwarranted.
Literary texts are asked to be both unwitting reflections of the conditions their times, and 
extremely canny, deliberate sets of recommendations about how to deal with these objective 
conditions. The two demands are difficult to reconcile, since taken together they imply that the 
relationship between literature and history is both mediated and unmediated, savvy and naïve, 
reflective and prescriptive. It is Lethen’s innovative and invaluable contribution to have 
identified and pursued the connections between disparate discourses of the time: by reading 
literature in conjunction with the new anthropological vision of thinkers such as Helmuth 
Plessner, Lethen is able to recover a key constellation in Weimar culture predicated upon, and in 
dialogue with, the natural artifice of the human (Plessner). Yet his readings of individual texts, 
including Der Arbeiter, often fall short of this contribution by implicitly positing a relationship 
between text and historical circumstance – rather than among texts and discourses – that needs 
the literary texts to serve as reflections of a turbulent age.
It seems instead that the only way to proceed is to view the Zeitdiagnose in Der Arbeiter, 
for example, as a mediated and motivated representation of its contemporary moment. We may 
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learn much from Jünger about a dynamic technological imaginary and how it relates to social 
formations such as the distinction between the type and the individual; it makes less sense to 
view Jünger’s text as a window showing what technology, society, and individuals were actually 
like in the period. The problem with extrapolating codes of conduct from Der Arbeiter is one of 
methodological circularity, and Lethen’s text gives the impression at key moments of being 
locked into a closed hermeneutic circuit. The cold persona accounts for textual features of Neue 
Sachlichkeit from Brecht’s party strategy to Jünger’s criticism of the bourgeois novel; these 
textual features, in turn, buttress the suggestive passel of characteristics that add up to the cold 
persona. The tendency towards schematism comes from the experience of “social 
disorganization” (10), yet culture and particularly literature is the space where configurations of 
the individual and social body are worked out, modified, projected, and revised. The exact 
argument is difficult to pin down; at moments there is a methodologically suggestive interplay 
between society and literature, but the prevailing impression is that the two spheres each have an 
exclusive causality over the other.
To open up this interpretive loop would mean rehistoricizing Jünger’s text within its 
constituent discourses, on the one hand, and attending more closely to the interplay of the various
logics, metaphorics, discourses, and registers in Der Arbeiter, on the other. Rather than ask how 
the text generates a prescriptive response to a (curiously abstracted) historical situation, we must 
explore how the text imagines and projects a future from the representation of a present itself 
already coded in terms of a particular relationship between bodies, organs, machines, types, and 
individuals. Doing so will better allow us to parse the commonalities and differences amongst the
ways the different texts of the period challenged, advanced, and complicated tropes of the 
technological body. This in turn will add to our understanding of the specificity of a given text, 
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and lay the groundwork for interrogating its politics.256 
In the case of Der Arbeiter that would mean asking, for one, what type of type the text 
presents us with. While Jünger and Döblin make for an improbable pair, the immediate 
similarities between Der Arbeiter and key aspects of Döblin’s work in the 1920s are instructive. 
Like Der Arbeiter, Döblin’s texts Berge Meere und Giganten, Das Ich über der Natur, “Der Geist
des naturalistischen Zeitalters,” and “Von Gesichtern, Bildern und ihrer Wahrheit” present us 
with bodies that integrate mechanical and organic elements in order to undermine the bodily and 
spiritual autonomy of the 19th century individual bourgeois subject in favor of a logic of 
typification. And while Lethen does not discuss Döblin in much detail, one could certainly draw 
on novels such as Wadzeks Kampf mit der Dampfturbine, Berge Meere und Giganten, and 
especially Berlin Alexanderplatz to add to the list of traits and behavioral codes that make up the 
cold persona – in a sense, this is testimony to the persuasiveness of Lethen’s narrative. 
Yet the differences between Jünger and Döblin are also crucial to an understanding of the 
variety of strategies of typification available to critique the perceived failings of bourgeois 
subjectivity in Weimar culture. While both authors present bodies that integrate organic and 
technological elements in a way that undercuts a simplistic notion of the armored body, their 
topological strategies for doing so diverge in important ways. Berge Meere und Giganten 
presents an ecologically dispersed body that is integrated with its environment. Because the 
bounds of individual bodies are constantly rupturing and being reconstituted, organic growth 
does not seem so much entelechical as blindly productive and recombinatory. The spatial figures 
at play are rupture, combination, and molecular interpenetration. The body of Jünger’s worker, 
on the other hand, incorporates technology as its own body part, and is in turn integrated into the 
256 One curious result of Lethen’s project, itself coming from a strong political impulse, is that the politics of all his 
textual objects become strangely and passively reactive/reactionary.
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larger collective according to a logic of electrical flows, but it does not seem dependent on the 
same logic of intestinal or arterial flows that mark Berge Meere und Giganten and Das Ich über 
der Natur. In a more abstract way, it makes a key difference that the guiding metaphor for the 
relationship between individual and collective is electricity in Jünger, and water in Döblin. 
Compared to electricity’s strong force of integration and orientation, the valence of water for 
Döblin is that it is amorphous and apparently infinitely divisible. This difference in turn results in
(or from?) their contrasting assessments of the mass. Where Döblin uses the type and the mass 
together (and at times interchangeably) to undercut the isolation and sovereignty of the 
individual, Jünger explicitly opposes the type to the mass. The latter is the form of aggregation 
proper to the bourgeois individual, while the former is associated with the rigid collectivity of 
workers that augurs the end of the amorphous liberal era. 
This difference has important implications, not least of which would be a reassessment of 
their physiognomic interventions into photographic theory, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
In the present context it is more useful to consider how Der Arbeiter and Berge Meere und 
Giganten each offer a narrative closure that suggests the end of history, since this question more 
directly bears on the political visions at play in these texts. As we have seen, Der Arbeiter draws 
on a logic of biological entelechy to present a teleological narrative ending in a future vision of a 
static order beyond alienation. Berge Meere und Giganten also ends with a reconciliation of sorts
after the collapse of technocratic city-states and a repressive hierarchical political order. The 
communes that result at the end of the novel evince, as Hannelore Qual has convincingly argued, 
an ecologically and politically utopian vision influenced by the anarchist thought of Pyotr 
Kropotkin and Gustav Landauer.257 Both texts end after exploding the categorical distinction 
257 Qual, Hannelore. Natur und Utopie: Weltanschauung und Gesellschaftsbild in Alfred Döblins Roman “Berge, 
Meere und Giganten.” Munich: Iudicium, 1992.
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between nature and technology in a vision of a future society that has resolved what are seen to 
be the fundamental tensions of the present moment. 
It is safe to say that the similarities end there. The fundamental differences in the ways 
that each text constructs a particular relationship between body and technology, type, mass, and 
individual also guide their visions of the future and, more broadly, their versions of narrative 
closure. The anti-hierarchical, ecological, and plural communes resulting at the end of Döblin’s 
novel contrast sharply to the unified, total, and rigid order that shimmers forth as the fantasy 
projection of Jünger’s essay. But beyond these important differences in the specific contours of 
each text’s political, social vision, the sense of an ending in general differs from text to text. 
Where the strong teleology of Jünger’s text suggests an absolute closure beyond change, 
intention, or intervention, the messier history of Döblin’s epic yields a narrative world that still 
feels open to change and renewal, for better or worse. This is not to say that the final passage of 
Berge Meere und Giganten does not evoke some sense of naturalized stasis, but this stasis draws 
its associative force from a cyclical logic of change and repetition. The end of Der Arbeiter, by 
contrast, signals a final fulfillment precisely because of the importance of a linear entelechical 
development that leaves this future as the only possible future.
A comparison of two exemplary texts such as these can help enhance features that may be
seen as paradigmatic. Given the differences between them, it seems sensible to imagine that the 
fascist dimension of Jünger’s text is not located so much in the psychologically motivated 
armoring of the individual subject as in the absolute and rigid stasis identified as the end of 
historical development.258 This in turn comes about not through an embrace of technology in 
258 In his analysis of “Nazi time,” Eric Michaud has identified in Nazi thought a similar desire for a posthistorical 
stasis in explicit conjunction with Der Arbeiter. For the Nazis as for Jünger, work conceived as a metaphysical 
and aesthetic project was supposed to effect a change from dynamic movement to static order. Yet in addition to 
the fact of different guiding discourses – biological entelechy for Der Arbeiter, Christ-like eschatology for 
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opposition to the perceived features of an outmoded bourgeois world, since such a move formed 
the background to much theoretical and cultural production in the Weimar years. Rather, it is in 
the precise nature of the organic, biological logic that Jünger adapts and constructs that we must 
locate the enabling gestures of his vision of a rigid, fascist stasis. If strong dichotomies between 
nature and technology, organic and mechanical hinder rather than help a nuanced understanding 
of Der Arbeiter, Berge Meere und Giganten, or other texts of the time, this is because the 
relationship between these two realms was more complex – and more interesting – than one of 
simple opposition. What we see in the case of these texts is rather a relationship of co-
construction, whereby technology was not theorized in opposition to nature – either as its 
repression or liberation from it – but was itself imagined as a natural force that took on the 
behaviors, registers, and logics of the organic world. Yet as the comparison between Döblin and 
Jünger makes clear, this is still a large arena: the figure of the organic machine, in itself, does not 
entail a definitive social vision, philosophical stance, or political project. It is perhaps a 
testimony to both the utility and flexibility (or slipperiness) of these metaphors, registers, and 
discourses that Der Arbeiter arrives at such a different ending than Berge Meere und Giganten 
from starting points that were, all things considered, fairly similar. Der Arbeiter’s rejection of the
bourgeois world, with its attendant dichotomies between body and soul, nature and technology, 
interior and exterior, issues in the vision of a fixed, frozen stasis beyond history. Ultimately, the 
unresolved metaphorical tensions in Jünger’s text may also mean that this stasis is beyond nature 
as well.
National Socialism – the temporal aspirations of the Nazis were, in Michaud’s account, continually frustrated by
the tension between the assurance that salvation had arrived with the Machtergreifung on the one hand, and the 
promise that it was still to come, on the other. This dynamic is also inflected by Jünger’s text, in my opinion, in 
the unsettled relationship between the descriptions of the present age as the age of the worker and the text’s 
performative mode that seeks to bring the new man into being. Yet Jünger’s text seems to contain no analogue to
the dynamic of self-surpassing analyzed by Michaud, which continually frustrated the Nazi desire for (or claims 
of) the full realization of a pure present (181-219).
237
CODA
In this dissertation, I have shown how key texts of Weimar culture used the figure of the 
instrumental human body to interrogate the relationship between nature and technology and 
thereby undermine strong conceptual dichotomies between these two spheres, as well as related 
dualisms such as organic and mechanical, mind and matter, and self and world. By attending to 
the particular logics, discursive reconfigurations, representational strategies, and metaphors of 
the works that comprise this study, I have sought to recover the insistent presence of the 
biological, the organic, and the natural in cultural narratives about technology during this period. 
The dense interweave of discourses, disciplines, and registers that characterizes these narratives 
can be understood in the terms Döblin used in Das Ich über der Natur to describe the boundary-
defying relationship among physical bodies and even matter as such: as an “Aneinanderhaften,” a
“Verzahnung” and a “Verhakung.” This applies to the physical, conceptual, and poetological 
delineations of the imagined individual body, to the conceptual spheres of nature and technology,
and to the relationship among disparate discourses. 
In this way, the intense conceptual and figurative cross-pollination of various discourses 
and registers was related to the period’s emphatic interdisciplinarity. Thus Plessner could bring 
the latest findings in experimental biology to bear on the question of human subjectivity in the 
wake of German Idealism and Lebensphilosophie; thus Döblin was able to formulate novel 
narrative approaches to perception, experience, and subjectivity in part by drawing on monism 
and the topological strategies opened by a vitalist notion of unlimited growth; thus Renger-
Patzsch, Brecht, Benjamin, and Kracauer could formulate questions about the relationship among
perceptual habits, mass media, and representation per se, questions posed of photographic praxis 
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in particular and the relationship among art, society, and politics in general; and thus Jünger 
shaped his vision of a historical fulfillment as natural history by way of a neovitalist theory of 
entelechy and a set of metaphors derived from elemental, biological, and geological registers. 
Reading the cultural narratives of technology from the 1920s with an eye for the 
pervasive presence of nature, biology, and the organic is therefore crucial, not simply in order to 
reconstruct Weimar technological imaginaries on their own terms, but also and especially to map 
the ways in which theorizations of a contemporary moment deployed the human body and the 
human being in a variety of ways in dialogue with a wide array of available discourses and 
disciplines. This approach can help interrupt the sense of crisis and teleology that often informs 
accounts of the period, precisely in order to reconsider how the Weimar Republic’s status as 
“laboratory for modernity”259 allowed for foundational questions about the human, subjectivity, 
art, and society to be posed in novel and interdisciplinary ways that drew on and recombined 
cultural, philosophical, and scientific traditions with roots stretching back to the Enlightenment.
The breadth of this vista is warranted by the material, yet it also raises more questions 
than it answers. For one, the vexed status of “modernity” in the works I consider is more 
reflected in this project than it is properly mediated. In part this is due to the limitations and 
scope of this study, yet in part it also attests to the complex relationship of the texts I consider to 
the idea of modernity. Speaking provisionally, modernity seems to play three primary roles for 
these texts and figures. It is, first of all, the general historical context beginning roughly with the 
European Enlightenment and associated with the rise of the bourgeois subject, modern empirical 
science, and the 19th-century experiences of industrialization, urbanization, and colonialism. In 
this broad sense it provided a historical and cultural background for the creative reworkings of 
259 Kaes, Jay, and Dimendberg
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nature and technology analyzed in the chapters above. Secondly, modernity appears as an 
experience of the acceleration of the present, often associated with technology and the city. And 
thirdly, modernity takes place as a self-reflective dialogue about this experience of change and its
cultural, philosophical, social, and political implications: as the modern stories moderns tell 
about the experience of being modern. Within this provisional and admittedly circular 
framework, it is the third aspect that is of interest here. The cultural narratives about technology 
explored above provided a way for intellectuals to formulate the contours and stakes of their 
present moment, yet not, as is often assumed, by playing technology against nature or moving 
from the domain of the organic to an embrace of the mechanical, but in far more nuanced ways 
that involved technology and nature, nature as technology, and technology as nature. Further 
analysis of the interdisciplinary contours of these narratives would help to mediate between the 
various roles played by ideas of modernity as historical context, contemporary experience, and 
self-reflexive dialogue.
Other threads remain to be more fully teased out and followed up in future research.
The insistent presence of biology in these cultural texts was a surprise, for example, and made for
a nice disciplinary correlate to the metaphorical recurrence of the organic. In this vein, it would 
be instructive to further consider how the personal and institutional connections of the period’s 
intellectual history shaped (and were shaped by) disciplinary borrowings between culture and the
natural sciences and metaphorical borrowings between organic and technological registers, for 
example. The figure of the creature could be another potential way into this question, in its 
linkage of biology and theology.
The role of Marx and Marxism also deserves more attention. I have here argued for a 
primarily methodological importance of Marx, as demonstrating the conceptual interdependence 
240
of ideas of nature and technology and the problem with isolating technology as a unit of analysis.
Yet Marx also suggests a historical and a philosophical utility for interpretations of Weimar 
culture. Historically, any reading of cultural narratives of technology in a period that saw the 
origins of Frankfurt School critical theory would do well to consider the contemporary reception 
of Marx; to some degree all the figures in this study were variously influenced by the legacy of 
Marxism, from Brecht and Benjamin’s critique of Renger-Patzsch’s photographic 
commodification of reality to Jünger’s depiction of the Soviet Union in Der Arbeiter. On the 
philosophical level, the sustained grappling with dualities and dichotomies in the texts I examine 
– from Plessner’s meticulously-derived positionality of the human subject to Döblin’s refusal of 
not just subjective individuation but of the individual ontological unit as such – suggests the 
robust persistence of a dialectical mode. The way that Marx’s presentation in Das Kapital 
continuously moves through various manifestations of value and their necessary subversions and 
correctives in the course of the encounter with the object, and the way that this dialectical 
presentation is intricately related to the fundamental relationality of the terms and concepts he 
unfolds, could provide further insight for understanding the relationship between Döblin’s 
contour-disrupting monism and his various challenges to bourgeois interiority, or between 
Plessner’s immanent unfolding of Cartesian dualism and his idea of the “natural artificiality” of 
the human. Speaking generally, it seems that there is a way in which these Weimar texts are 
retheorizing the relationship between nature and technology not just on the metaphorical level, 
but also by exploring deeper structures of relationality between subject and object. Marx, as well 
as Hegel, could provide a theoretical and historical framework for closer consideration of the 
stakes of these cultural narratives.
Finally, in a project on the roles of the human body in cultural narratives of technology, 
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questions of gender deserve more attention than could be given here. The fact that the topic of 
gender appears sidelined to the odd footnote or unpursued tangent in the above chapters has its 
reasons. For one, the interrogations of the relationship between nature and technology I consider 
tend to be situated on a level that frustrates focus on the individual body. From Döblin’s 
molecular exploration of the relationship between particle and mass and his agglomeration of 
human, plant, and animal bodies to Plessner’s positional anthropology that derives its terms from
the perceptible thing to Jünger’s electrified collective, the bodies of this study disallow an 
assessment of the role of gender in places one has traditionally pursued it: feminized nature, the 
armored male ego, the dissolute and feminized masses, the vamp in the machine, the conquest of 
nature by technology. In a sense, the approach I have taken – tracking how key texts undo 
conceptual dichotomies centered on the human body – also forecloses many of the productive 
ways in which critics have accessed the relationship among gender, technology, and the human in
Weimar culture. Which is certainly not to say that gender is absent from the texts that comprise 
this study, just that it seems to function according to more diffuse and less certain codes. The 
potentiality of nature in Döblin, for example, certainly seems feminine at times (the character of 
Venaska would be a crown witness for this idea), yet at other times, for example in his invocation
of “Das Tausendnamige” in the dedication to Berge Meere und Giganten or in the related “Ich” 
that permeates nature in Das Ich über der Natur, it would seem to be a force of generation and 
inchoate potential that is depicted as more neuter than anything else. Be that as it may, questions 
of gender will be necessary to further situate cultural narratives concerning the instrumental body
and the organic machine within dominant readings of Weimar culture.
The instrumental body and the organic machine allowed contemporary figures to probe 
the relationship between nature and technology, literally incorporating the organic and the 
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mechanical in order to advance self-consciously modern challenges to inherited aesthetics, 
theories of perception, and notions of subjectivity predicated on the primacy of the autonomous, 
self-contained bourgeois individual. Exploring these tropes uncovers both tensions and 
confluences in the thought and cultural production of the period, and also indicates the problem 
with reading dichotomies into this culture in order to identify paradoxes that may well not have 
been paradoxes at all, but rather newly available options for theorizing and representing the 
present. The presence of these tropes in various cultural narratives about technology suggests the 
particularly prominent role played by ideas about anthropology, embodiment, behavior, spatiality,
and positionality in the period’s radical reconfigurations of inherited discourses. Bodies in 
complexly positional and dynamic relation to each other served to model alternative ideas of 
subjectivity and collectivity, and the fluid play of their contours was often coterminous with 
conceptualizations of the present moment. What the instrumental body and organic machine 
ultimately show is the inescapably central and formative presence, within a fully technological 
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